JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10284
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-78890-27

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/05/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL LEVI LAUB
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: July 5, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: LEVI LAUB
UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL TO CUBA

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) letter dated April 18, 1963, captioned "U. S. Nationals in Cuba." The Liaison Agent was instructed to obtain more specific information concerning subject's reported travel to Cuba. The following was furnished to the Liaison Agent on July 3, 1963, by A. P. Flynn, CIA: (U) (S)

Information received by CIA indicated that the subject was in Cuba during the period February 22-March 11, 1963. CIA received this information from [the British Intelligence Service (MI-6). The British] (S) obtained the data from [Gavin Young, a British newspaperman] (S) who was in Cuba during the same period described above. [MI-6] has (S) advised CIA that [Young] (S) is currently traveling to San Francisco. [The British MI-6 representative in Washington, D. C.] (S) plans to contact [Young] (S) and work out arrangements whereby [Young] (S) can be made available to the Bureau for interview. (S)

ACTION:

Calif Eng

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Subversive Control Section.

105-78890

1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Haack
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:gp (5)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for the brackets
KP 3-19-98

4/14/98 Classified by 5668 SLD/GAT
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

REC- 69 105-78890- 27

EX-108

JUL 9 1963

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

62 JUL 15 1963

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10355
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA
TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/28/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

Liaison Section
Mr. Donahoe
Mr. Little
1 - Mr. Meier

REC- 9 105-24642-4 (S)

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---------- RE ----------------
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED --------
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)(U)

EX-112

Date: August 28, 1961

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: EDUARDO ESPINOSA Y PRIETO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - MEXICO (S)

5668 SLD/GCL 4/18/95 (JFK)

1-11-94
Classified by 9803RDD/ety
Declassify on: OADR
211326

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Reference is made to your letter dated August 21, 1961, your reference CSCI-3/766,810 (U)

A review of this Bureau's file on subject fails to reveal that he wrote bank drafts to active communist workers with the possible exception of Alicia Merino Fuentes. (S) With regard to her, the only allegation that she was an active communist worker was made in February, 1941, by a person whose reliability was unknown to the United States Embassy in Mexico City, D. F. Our investigation failed to substantiate this allegation and you were so advised by letter under above caption dated September 24, 1959. Furthermore, at the time subject's bank draft to her was written (February 10, 1958), subject and Merino Fuentes were both connected with the Mexican (S) Mission to the United Nations, a fact which tends to reduce the (S) intelligence significance of this payment. (S)

Based on information in the files of this Bureau, it appears inadvisable to include in your summary to the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany, that subject wrote bank (S) drafts to active communist workers or to suggest that he "was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." (S)

ACM:bja
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

BY COURIER SVC.
46 AUG 29
COMM - FBI

Tolson
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IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-18-98

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

11/7/97

5668 SLD/LLSL
7-4-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mde (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

SECRET

Director
Central Intelligence Agency (S)(U)

NOTE: This letter is classified "Secret" because it contains information so classified by CIA. (S)(U)

CIA seeks to pass a summary of information concerning subject to the BfV in Germany and has requested permission to (S) include the following in this summary, stating it comes from our files: (S)

"During his New York City tenure, he was known to write bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." (S)(U)

CIA stated above conclusion "was apparently based on numerous Bureau reports written during 1957 and 1958." CIA refers specifically to only one bank draft, it having been written by subject to Alicia Merino Fuentes and states that our (S) report dated 10/12/56 contained information that she was an active communist. This report was in the case on Merino Fuentes (S) and the only allegation that she was an active communist was the 1941 allegation made to the Embassy in Mexico. Bureau has developed no information indicating payees of other bank drafts written by subject had subversive associations or sympathies. (S)(U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10357

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : DOS

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/16/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
HENRYK IGNACY JANIKOWSKI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for brackets KP 5-18-98

16 AUG 1963

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: JANIKOWSKI, Henryk Ignacy
DOB: 4 Sept. 1921
POB: Wiele, Bydogoszcz, Poland

105-7-250-28626

1. Reference is made to the name check request, dated 18 June 1963, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain the following information concerning Subject.

2. According to a report dated 23 March 1961 [from an official West German service,] the Bremer Bank in Bremen (S) Germany, reported that they had received a check for one thousand dollars from one [Eduardo Espinosa y PRIETO of the Mexican Embassy in Moscow, USSR,] (S) to be deposited to the account of one Erik SCHOTT, an architect residing at Ginsterweg 1, Bremen Munthe, West Germany.

3. On the basis of this information, SCHOTT was interrogated [by the West German service] (S) on 21 November 1961 for possible intelligence involvement. During the interrogation, SCHOTT provided the following information concerning Subject: SCHOTT first became acquainted with Subject in 1940 when he resided in Subject's home in Germany. Subject, who had moved to Poland, wrote to SCHOTT in 1957 and asked him to buy used cars and ship them to him. Subject transmitted to SCHOTT dollars and dollar checks for purchasing the cars via an unknown Polish sailor. Subject told SCHOTT that he had obtained the money on the black market and from exhibitors at the Poznan Fair. SCHOTT believed that Subject obtained the money from Poles who had relatives in the United States. During a visit to Belgium in 1957, Subject purchased several second-hand taxis and cars for shipment to Poland. Subject visited SCHOTT in late 1957 and purchased a Renault to take back with him to Poland. For the purpose of avoiding the customs duty on the car, SCHOTT gave Subject a statement to the effect that he was a relative.

105-24642 (S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-36449-2

FBI INFO 7-4-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR (JFK)

NOT RECORDED
SEP 3 1963
79

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SEP 4 1963

In 1959 SCHOTT visited Subject in Gdansk, Poland. Subject told SCHOTT that he could obtain dollars from "an employee of an embassy" which he would send to SCHOTT for desposit in his account at the Bremer Bank. Subject obtained the dollars for zlotys at the black market exchange rate. SCHOTT's wife, who was also interrogated, stated that checks arrived by mail from an employee of the Mexican Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, which her husband deposited in Subject's account. Among documents obtained [officially] from the Bremer Bank was (S) a letter from [Mexican Ambassador in Warsaw, Eduardo ESPINOSA y PRIETO,] accompanying a check for one thousand dollars for (S) deposit to the account of Erich SCHOTT. Subject told SCHOTT that in 1950 his maid had reported to the Polish authorities that he had dollars in his house. As far as SCHOTT knew, Subject was investigated but was never sentenced. On 24 June 1961, Subject again visited SCHOTT and from Germany went to Zelzate, Belgium, to settle a debt from automobile buying operations in 1957. Subject visited his sister in Paris, France, and returned with her to Bremen in a new Peugot which he had bought in Holland in his sister's name. Subject then shipped the car to Poland.

4. According to [the West German service,] (S) no evidence was uncovered that would indicate SCHOTT was involved in intelligence activities.

CSCI-3/777,473

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10467

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : LALLIER

TITLE :

DATE : 06/26/1961
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
JORGE BELIARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: June 26, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : S. J. Papich

(5668 SLD/GCL 4/18/95 - JFK)

SUBJECT: [JORGE BELIARD] (C)
[PSI] (C)
IS - CUBA

12/10/93 Classified by 9803RAD/BCL
Declassify on: OADR
211,326

Tolson
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Ingram
Gandy

The captioned individual is a [station manager of] the Cubana Airlines, Idlewild International Airport, New York City. Recently Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) submitted a name check request concerning [Beliard.] Liaison was requested to determine the purpose of this request. (C)

On June 23, 1961, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that a Cuban source had suggested to CIA that (C)[Beliard] possibly could be of some use to the Agency in connection with its operations in Cuba. Mrs. Roman stated that essentially CIA's interest would be to obtain assistance from (C)[Beliard] [in arranging courier routes between Cuba and the United States.] (C) CIA is of the opinion that [Beliard] (C) through his contacts in the Cubana Airlines and because of his possible association with individuals who travel regularly between the two countries, could arrange for CIA [to communicate with clandestine sources inside Cuba.] (C) The Liaison Agent requested CIA not to establish any contact with [Beliard] pending further word from the Bureau. (S) (C)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN 1P'S 2 + 3. KP 5-11-98 (JFK) SLD/KSC 6-14-98 [X] (U)

7-20-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section for appropriate review. We can either (1) inform CIA that no contact whatsoever should be made by CIA with [Beliard] in view of current Bureau operational (C) interest, or (2) we can permit CIA to maintain contact with [Beliard] (C) for exploration of its interests as described above, or (3) we can talk to [Beliard] (C) concerning the [potential for establishing courier routes] (C) and serve as the intermediary if [Beliard] is in a position (C) to be of assistance in this regard. Replies to CIA should be handled via Liaison. (S)

CONFIDENTIAL

SJP:ban
(5)

REC-85 [105-89457-9] (X)(U)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SECRET

EX-112

10 JUL 5 1961

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
1e RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28... N.Y.
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

6/30/61 FCJ: ej

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10468
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : NY
TITLE :

DATE : 06/30/1961
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
JORGE BELIARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS : AT

1 [illegible]pich
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6-30-61

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(5668 SLD/GCL 8/26/98 - JFK) 7-20-98
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12/10/93
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Declassify on: OADR 211,326
(5668 SLD/GCL 9/18/95 - JFK)

To: SAC, New York [(134-5609)] (C)

From: Director, FBI [(105-89457)] — 9 (U)

[NY 3186-PSI] (C)

REC- 85

CIA, by liaison, advised Bureau of desire to contact captioned [PSI] in connection with its Cuban operations. (C) CIA of opinion [PSI] is in position [to assist in the (C) establishment of courier routes between U.S. and its contacts in Cuba] (C) Contact of [PSI] by CIA being held in (C) abeyance pending Bureau's approval. (S)

Bureau's position in this matter flexible. We can refuse CIA authority to contact [PSI] or we can let (C) CIA operate [PSI] on its own. We can also serve as inter- (C) mediary between [the PSI] and CIA. (S) (C)

Promptly contact [PSI] and discreetly ascertain if he is in position and willing [to assist in establishing courier routes.] (C) Do not advise [PSI] of CIA's connection at (C) this time. For information, CIA believes [PSI] able to (C) (C) [establish such a system] because of his employment with Cubana Airlines in New York City, and fact he is in contact with persons regularly traveling to Cuba. Furnish Bureau results of your contact with [PSI.] (C) In event [PSI] is in position (C) to [assist in the establishment of a courier system and] (C) willing to do so, you should furnish your observations concerning [PSI's] (C) proposed use in this matter. (S)

KP 5-22-98

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SLD/KSR 6-14-98 (JFK)

MAILED 2
JUN 30 1961
COMM-FBI

FEJ:eg
(5)

NOTE: [PSI] (C) is [Station Manager of] (C) Cubana Airlines at Idlewild Airport in New York City. He has been [under development] by New York Office since November, 1960, (C) and has [furnished data concerning operations] (C) of Cubana Airlines and personnel employed by Cubana. In addition (S)

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE ON PAGE TWO

Tolson
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 11 1961

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

1 To SAC, [illegible]w York
Re: [NY 3186-PSI] (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE:

[he has made available copies of] incoming and outgoing manifests of Cubana flights between New York and Havana. New York has pointed out that [PSI] has not furnished data of unusual value; but because of his position, has a good potential.] [CIA advised Liaison Agent Papich it would not contact [PSI] until it had received authority to do so from Bureau. Before allowing CIA to make contact with [PSI,] it is believed it would be best for our interests to determine if [PSI] can actually assist CIA. If he is in position to assist that Agency, we will then consider what stand to take in this matter.] (C) (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10488
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ
TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 07/27/1961
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS : MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FBI INFO 7-10-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6 (JFK)

27 JUL 1961

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 28 1961
CIA SJP

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: [Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, born 24 January 1909] in Mexico City, Mexico

1. This Agency was queried recently [by the BfV (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) Germany] for information on Subject. A German citizen in Bremen, suspected of Polish Intelligence Service activities, received a $1,000.00 deposit in his account from [Espinosa.] (S)

2. Your permission is requested to pass the following information, some of which was obtained from your files, to [the German authorities:] (S)

[Eduardo Espinosa] (S)
[born 24 January 1909,] Mexico City, Mexico, appointed [Mexican Ambassador to Warsaw] during the summer of 1960. August 1957 to summer 1960 [accredited to the United Nations Headquarters] in New York City with the [rank of Ambassador as an Alternate Permanent Delegate.] [During his New York City tenure, he was known to write bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities] (U) He appears to be a Soviet contact, and that his wife, one

[Tamara Espinosa, nee Pechkurova, native Russian] (S)
was reported to have been an agent of the Soviet security services. She was admitted to Mexico in September 1947. When [Espinosa y Prieto] was in Mexico, he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy and expedited visas for Soviet delegations. The couple were particularly friendly with Soviet Ambassador Kapustin during 1953. [Mrs. Espinosa's] brother died in a Soviet prison in 1953, and her mother still resides in the USSR.

These facts might indicate a Soviet hold over [Espinosa.] Various opinions collected from persons who knew [Espinosa,] when he served in [Shanghai, Bogota, Mexico, Caracas, Togoland, and the U.S.,] vary from "basically friendly to the U.S" to the following: That he had been a penetration agent in the Axis group (in Shanghai) on behalf of the

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KP 5-18-98

REC-52 105-24642-45

EX-129

22 AUG 3 1961

SECRET

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55

USSR, that he was 100% pro-Communist and most dangerous, that he has been an eagerly cooperative contact of the Soviets in Mexico for several years, and so on. The bulk of opinions are derogatory in nature. Petrov identified [Mrs. Espinosa] as an MVD agent.

CSCI-3/766,521

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10004

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-67173-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : BRENNAN

TITLE :

DATE : 10/15/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 10/15/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Wannall

Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that her agency finally has been able [to place a man in Cuba] who might be able to develop information in answer to the Bureau lead transmitted to CIA. She explained that the source's capability to be productive will depend upon his resourcefulness to get into the appropriate areas. (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(5) chs

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KP 3-19-98

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

REC- 20

65-67123-20

OCT 21 1963

4/9/95
Classified by 5668 dld/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

EX-114

SECRET

68 OCT 28 1963

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10007

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-63987-210-370

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 10/02/1963
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency (S) SECRET (U)

12328

He is willing to write a letter to Vergara and instruct him to deliver the papers to a person who would be designated in his letter. He would make such a letter available to the FBI for delivery to Vergara. (S) (U)

Garcia advised that he has had no contact with Vergara since his departure from Cuba.

If feasible, it is requested that your Agency take the necessary steps, possibly through the [Spanish] Government (S) or through the [Swiss] Embassy in Havana, to obtain Garcia's (S) papers since they could conceivably contain intelligence and/or propaganda data of interest to the United States Government. If you desire, we would be glad to have Garcia write a personal letter to Vergara which would be made available to your Agency. If Garcia's papers are obtained, they will be reviewed by our Miami Office and pertinent data contained therein will be made available to interested agencies of the United States Government. (S)

NOTE FOR SAC, MIAMI:

On 9/26/63 State Department advised that it preferred (S) [that we handle this matter through CIA.] Above for your information.

NOTE:

We previously directed a letter to State Department asking that they handle the above matter. Contact with State Department on 9/26/63 was made by SA O. H. Bartlett with Mr. John MacDonald of State.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10066

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 64-200-210-2325

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : FROHBOSE

TITLE :

DATE : 12/02/1959
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
PAUL HICKMAN
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

DATE: 12-2-59

SECRET

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: PAUL HICKMAN
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Communist Party - Cuba

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 1-23-98 (JFK)

Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, McGuire, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, Tamm, Trotter, W.C. Sullivan, Tele. Room, Holloman, Gandy

The following information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on 12-1-59 by Mrs. Jane Roman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (U)

Swiss police recently located Hickman in Zurich, Switzerland. Information was developed by the Swiss indicating that subject allegedly was involved in business dealings relating to the sale of arms to the Castro Government. [With the collaboration of Swiss authorities, a CIA representative] (S) interviewed subject on 11-27 and 28-59. The subject has been characterized as a confidence operator and very unreliable. He claimed that he already had volunteered information concerning his knowledge of activities in Cuba to "friends of Senator Smathers." Hickman claimed that he had been in contact with a Soviet Embassy representative, Bern, Switzerland, in connection with a sale of Cuban sugar to Russia. Hickman claimed that the Soviet had given him considerable encouragement and indicated that the transaction would go through. The Soviet then suddenly told him that the deal was off.

Mrs. Roman stated that CIA does not plan to cover subject's activities in the absence of a specific request from the Bureau. (U)

ACTION:

This information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP/nmn
(5)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. James
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

See serials - 64-211-210-533, 64-211-210-540, 64-211-210-543, 64-211-210-...

Classified by 9803 ... Declassify on: OADR

EX-135

64-200-210-2325

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ...

SECRET

15 DEC 7 1959

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6-6-78 BY
RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

5/15/96 CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mck
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

5668 SLD/ISL 3-13-98 (JFK)

64-200-210

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10073

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 64-211-210-830

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 11/21/1960
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
SOVIET EMBASSY HAVANA, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mullins

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY
SSS RE Soviet-Cuba
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE) BY LIAISON

64-211-210 830

REC- 88

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/rlh
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT PP 1 ON pg. 2
KP 11-19-97
SLD/KSR 12-9-97 (JFK)

Date: November 21, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Mr. S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, Counterintelligence Staff (S) (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SOVIET EMBASSY (S) (U)
HAVANA, CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

8/17/93
Classified by 5668 SLD/GAT
Declassify on: OADR

We have received information that a Soviet official in the United States has ordered ten safes from the (S) Mosler Safe Company for shipment to the Soviet Embassy, (S) Havana, Cuba. They are to be shipped by Export Order (S) Number E 12344, but the exact shipment date is unknown. (S)

The safes are identified as follows: (S)

Model Number (S)	Serial Number (S)	Combination (S)	Dial Key Number (S)
2016CL	14387-11	5-70-40	H-669B
2016CL	14387-81	5-70-40	H-602B
2016CL	14387-55	5-70-40	H-794B
3016CL	14155-54	5-70-40	H-660B
3016CL	14155-19	5-70-40	H-667B
3016CL	14213-13	5-70-40	H-732B
3016CL	14213-60	5-70-40	H-784B
4216CL	13905-39	5-70-40	H-749B
4216CL	13905-29	5-70-40	H-800B
4833CL	14483-21	31-75-26	H-679B

The model numbers designate the inside dimensions (S) of the safes. For example, Model Number 2016CL has inside (S) dimensions of twenty inches by sixteen inches. Each safe is (S)

RAM:jwh
(6)

ENCLOSURE

(SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

57 DEC 1 1960

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

BY COURIER SVC. 5 9 NOV 23 COMM-FBI

NOV 21 3 30 PM '60 READING ROOM

SECRET

-----COPIES MADE, DATE..........BY
---------- RE ----------------------
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ....
(SEE FBIHQ 62-117290)

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

equipped with a key locking dial and each has two inside (S) compartments. (S)

Enclosed for the Central Intelligence Agency are a set of dial keys, appropriately labeled, and a set of (S) keys for the inside compartments of the safes. (S)

Information concerning the existence of this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this Bureau.

Enclosures - 18

1 - Mr. John W. Hanes
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since nature of information requires that handling be limited and since disclosure could seriously jeopardize a most delicate source. Information concerning a purchase of the safes was developed by Washington Field and (S) the keys and combinations were obtained by Cincinnati from an (S) established source at the company's factory. The set of keys (S) for the inside compartments consists of total of 8 keys and (S) they apparently are interchangeable to some extent. (S)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10002
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	10/10/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 10/10/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: [MANUEL PINEIRO] (S)
IS - CUBA

Wannall

We previously have been informed that the subject is a high-ranking official in the [Cuban G-2 organization] in Havana. On (S) 10/8/63, Mrs. Anita Potocki, a CIA analyst who has been working on [intercepted Cuban communications intelligence traffic] (S) advised the Liaison Agent that her Agency has come to the tentative conclusion that [Pineiro] (S) is identical with ["Petronio,"] (S) who has been mentioned in messages made available to the Bureau and CIA. We have noted that messages sent to the unidentified Cuban Agent in Panama referred to as ["Roberto"] (S) have been signed by ["Petronio"] (S)

Mrs. Potocki gave the following explanation which led to CIA's deduction. (U)

Messages emanating from Havana indicated that one of the recipients was probably located in a small town in Colombia near the Venezuelan Border. CIA developed a suspect and instituted coverage. Recently, this individual transmitted a letter to Havana which communication was intercepted by CIA. The person had apparently violated instructions by including some sensitive data in the communication. Havana then [transmitted a radio message] (S) castigating the Cuban Agent in Colombia. An examination of [the radio message and the intercepted communication sent by the Agent has led CIA to believe that "Petronio" (S) is identical with Pineiro.] (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS KP 3-19-98

Bufile [105-78656] (S)

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - [65-67843 ("Roberto")] (S)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(6)

REC 12

[105-78656-10] (S)

Classified by 5668 SLD/SAT
Declassify on: OADR 4/24/95 (JFK)

11 OCT 17 1963

4-1-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/LLS/R
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

EX-114

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-67843 (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10050
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	08/17/1961
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. L'ALLIER

DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : S.J. PAPICH

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 5-11-98

SUBJECT: ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
(134-9775)

Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Callahan, Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Malone, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Ingram, Gandy

The captioned individual is the comptroller of Cubana Airlines, New York City, and has been utilized as a source of information by the Bureau. (S) On 8-16-61, David Hanlon, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that on occasion his Agency has utilized Rodriguez [as a courier for transmitting material between the U.S. and Cuba.] This material has dealt with CIA operations in Cuba. (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP:jad (5)

1-Donahoe
1-Nasca
1-Liaison
1-Papich

8-16-95 Classified by 5668 SLD/mk
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2-14-94 Classified by 9813 RDD/ltj
Declassify on: OADR
2/1326

LET TO NY
VHN:dcr
8-22-61

134-9775-6

REC- 87

6-14-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (JFK)

AUG 25 1961

EX-112

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

... DIA
RECD

AUG 18 10 32 AM '61

COPIES MADE, DATE 6-7-78 BY ... RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10070

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 12/11/1961
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
HERBERT LEVY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

— Liaison
1 - Mr. Mullins

17619

11 - 2 - 10 - 445

Date: December 11, 1961

To: [Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans] (S)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: HERBERT LEVY
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Nationalities Intelligence)

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated November 28, 1961, at Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning Cuban economic matters. Copies of the memorandum have been furnished to the Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce, and to other interested agencies.

The source of the information contained in the memorandum is Mr. Herbert Levy, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. He resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, and his home telephone number is HUnter 4-6424.

According to Mr. Levy, he resided at Houston, Texas, approximately five years ago and was contacted there on several occasions by [a representative of your Agency.] (S) Mr. Levy indicated he was then traveling abroad on occasions and was able to furnish (S)[your representative] information of interest concerning [India.] (S) He indicated he recently telephoned your headquarters in Washington, D. C., but was unable to obtain any information concerning the identity of your representative in his section of the United States. He said he had no objection to his identity being furnished to your Agency but does not desire that his identity be revealed to any other agency. He also requested that no action be taken which would reveal his identity to the business firm mentioned in the memorandum or to any other commercial firm.

We contemplate no further action in this matter.

Enclosure
DEC 15 1961

1 - Salt Lake City

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

SEE NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY
PAGE TWO

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS KP 5-11-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/RSP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 7-2-98 (JFK)

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] (S) (U)

17620

NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY:

Reurlet 11/28/61 captioned "Large Quantities of Jute Bags and Hessian Cloth Sought by Cuban Government by Purchase or Barter Through International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, and Other Unknown Concerns November, 1961."

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Secret" since we refer to [CIA's use of Levy abroad.] (S) He furnished information concerning possible violation of export regulations regarding shipments to Cuba by International Ore and Fertilizer Company, a large and reputable firm. Copies of memo have been furnished separately to Commerce, the military agencies and State Department. Separate letter also sent Salt Lake City concerning proper caption for reporting similar data.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10071

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SU
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 11/28/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
ECONOMIC MATTERS CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI SECRET DATE: 11/28/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (62-0) -C-

Economic Matters
Cuba

SUBJECT: LARGE QUANTITIES OF JUTE BAGS AND HESSIAN CLOTH SOUGHT BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT BY PURCHASE OR BARTER THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORE AND FERTILIZER COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, AND OTHER UNKNOWN CONCERNS NOVEMBER, 1961.
MISCELLANEOUS (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

12/13/93 Classified by 980 SE/SLC
Declassify on: OADR

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 5-11-98
K 8-20-98

Enclosed herewith to the Bureau are the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as above. Also enclosed are photostats of two teletypes (total of four pages) purporting to be copies of teletypes from International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, to St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The photostats and information set forth in the letterhead memorandum were furnished to SA JOHN R. PHILIPS, Jr., by a man identifying himself as HERBERT LEVY, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. Mr. LEVY said he resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, residence telephone HUnter 4-6424. Mr. LEVY stated he resided at Houston, Texas, about five years ago, and at that time, he traveled abroad, mostly in [India] (S) for his company, St. Regis Paper Company. While living in Houston, Texas, [a representative of Central Intelligence Agency,] name and telephone number (S) not now recalled, contacted LEVY on several occasions and requested him to obtain various types of information on his trips to [India.] (S) The type of information requested and obtained by LEVY was mainly of an [economic nature, or with respect to some company or individual in India.] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)
7-2-98

REC-34 110-6210-445

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)
1 - Salt Lake City

JRP:ps
(3)

051-ONI-6-2
12-7-61
15 DEC 1961

Let - Salt Lake City 12-11-61 RAM:bw
Let to [CIA] (encl) 12-11-61 Ram:bw

EX-110 REC-9

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10138

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-210-4315

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/10/1965
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

#4.

1 - Newpher

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6/26/78 BY LJC RE PAPICH FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED (SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

May 10, 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT KP 5-26-98 BRACKETS

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

A highly confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that on about February 20, 1963, (S) Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, commented that the Sino - Indian conflict continually bothers Cuba and this conflict worked in the favor of the United States in the Fall of 1962.

Roa's evaluation of the situation in Cuba was highly pessimistic. Roa stated that the situation has deteriorated; that this was the only thing that could have happened because talks at the United Nations, New York, did not find an answer to the problem. Roa also observed that conditions as of February, 1963, were similar to those just before the crisis in the Fall of 1962, mentioning pirate boat activities, a campaign in the United States and a statement by President Kennedy which Roa described as meaningless.

Roa commented that the United States was the only nation which benefited from the crisis. The informant understood that it was Roa's contention that by excluding the Security Council of the United Nations from considering the Cuban situation and permitting the Organization of American States (OAS) to take up the matter freely, the United States is now enjoying a very favorable position in the OAS, the best it has enjoyed at any time in the Organization. In still referring to what the informant believed was the OAS, Roa said that the report of the Antisubversive Committee, now under study by the OAS, contains some definite proposals, such as a collective breakoff and a breakoff in relations with Cuba including postal contacts. Roa said it is known officially that Mexico will accept such resolutions with reservations; Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay will accept everything; and it is believed that only Brazil will oppose such resolutions. Cuba, according to Roa, believes that talks between President Kennedy and President Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela, will establish the action by the OAS.

Classified by 5665 SLD/gm 4/26/95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

(S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

EX-115

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

JON:rmc
(7)

109-12-210
1 - 101644 (PRIME)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

REC 38

50 MAY 16 1963

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

4315

17 MAY 13 1963

To CIA & State by liaison 5/10/63

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Roa also commented that it would have been much better if the Cuban situation had been handled by the United Nations Security Council. Among other things, this would have limited the ability of the OAS. When it was suggested that time was working in Cuba's favor, Roa agreed, saying it permitted internal consolidation, and economic and organizational endeavors. He also mentioned the differences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the hope for settlement of differences in the Soviet Bloc and prospects for general relaxing of strained relations between all countries.

Although Roa did not mention the Soviet Union at any time, it appeared that he does not now agree with the Soviet Union's placing missiles in Cuba in 1962. Roa's comments during the entire conversation left one with the feeling that he was pessimistic, according to the informant.

NOTE:

Classified "Top Secret" because unauthorized disclosure would reveal a high-level intelligence operation involving [PRIME,] our (S) extremely sensitive source at the [Polish UN Delegation.] (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90140-10004

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 03/13/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY [illegible] RE ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4/28 (SEE BUFILE 62-117290) SECRET

REC-140 (SC) 100-398547 - 60

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Floyd

Date: March 13, 1963

EX-112

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans (S)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
SECURITY MATTER - C

3-4-94 Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR
(5668 SLD/BCL 3/31/95 - JFK)

Reference is made to prior communications concerning the captioned individual.

It would be appreciated if you would advise this Bureau of any information which has come to your attention indicating continued residence by the captioned individual in Cuba. Any additional information which you may have received concerning her activities in that country would also be appreciated. (S)(U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN P 2 KB 10-17-97

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

2 - New York (100-112920)(See note)

ATTENTION SAC, NEW YORK:

12-15-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/BSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

Reurlet 3/1/63.

You will be advised concerning the results of the above inquiry.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Subject is in SI. She traveled to Cuba in December, 1960, to join her husband, Pedros Moutsos, who, in the past, has acted as CIA informant. (S) New York requested contact with CIA for information of subject's current residence in Cuba and her activities. (S)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1963

WHF:cad
(7)

BY COURIER SVC.
28 MAR 14
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90140-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/01/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-398547)   DATE: MAR 1 - 1963

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-112920)(P)

SUBJECT: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS aka
SM - C

(OO: NEW YORK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN P1 KP 10-17-97

Rerep of SA JOHN H. SHEEHAN, dated 6/29/62, at NY.

Subject, who is on the SI of the NYO, departed from NY, 12/31/60, for Havana, Cuba. At that time she indicated she was to join her husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, in Cuba and remain there for two years. It is noted that the subject's husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, (Bufile 105-30972), (S) [was a source utilized by the CIA] as of June, 1960 (S)

The Bureau is requested to [alert CIA sources for any information concerning subject's activities and residence in Cuba] (S)(U)

Classified by 9803RDD/etj 3-4-94
Declassify on: OADR 21324

(5668 SLD/gcl 3/31/98 JFK)

COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

12-15-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

REC- 52

100-398547-60

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5 MAR 4 1963

EX-115

2-Bureau (100-398547)(RM)
1-New York (100-112920)

JJL:rtd
(3)

[2-CIA] (S)(U)
3/13/63
WHF:cal
2-NY

SUB CONTROL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90140-10012

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 100-439769-302

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : BRENNAN

TITLE :

DATE : 09/03/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Casper, Callahan, Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: September 3, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA IS - C

Austin Horn, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent on August 30, 1963, that a reliable CIA source in Madrid, Spain, had been in contact with [Mark Tischman,] (S) one of the American students who accompanied the group which recently visited Cuba. (S) This contact took place on August 27, 1963, at which time [Tischman] volunteered the following information to the CIA source: (S)

[Tischman] (S) identified the following students as "fellow travelers": Joseph Rex, Elena B. Fleming, John Milton, Don Ranmann, and Alberti Maher. (S) (U)

[Tischman] (S) referred to Levi Laub as a "communist in ideology" but not a Party member. He stated that Phillip A. Luce is "a person of Marxist-Leninist tendencies"; that Michael Brown is a Trotskyite; that John W. Thomas is a decided partisan of the policy of Mao Tse Tung; that Eric D. Johnston is "of communist ideology though not a Party member"; that Clinton M. Jenks is "the son of the number three ranking communist in California"; and that the only student in the group who is actually a member of the Party is Allan Sheffield. (S) (U)

ACTION: Possible C.P. Member

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security and Nationalities Intelligence Sections.

4-1-98 CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Simpson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

5/15/95 Classified by [illegible] GAT Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC 46 100-439769-302

SJP:gp (6)

11 SEP 5 1963

SEP 10 1963

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SECRET

JFK Assassination System
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Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90155-10008

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68530-116

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : WMFO
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/07/1964
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
NOSENKO 1964 REPORTINGS
YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : AT

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

FBI

Date: 4/7/64

SECRET

Transmit the following in _______________ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _______________ (Priority)

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CIA ADDRESSED ONLY pgs. 1,2,3 & 6

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

FROM: SAC, [WFO] (134-5437 Sub A) (U)

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
[ESP - R (KGB)] (U)
[(OO:WFO)]

ReWFOairtel 3/6/64. (U)

NOSENKO was interviewed 4/2/64, by SAs DONALD E. WALTER, ALEKSO POPTANICH, and MAURICE A. TAYLOR. A number of cases which originated with source were discussed with him for additional data and photographs of Soviet Nationals were displayed to him. Topics covered included the following: (U)

[VAN KRAKOV YUGOV], POSSIBLY [YUGOV VAN KRAKOV] (S)

[HUGO JOSEPH VON KRAKAU], suspect for the above individual was discussed with source who was unable to furnish additional information or make any conclusion although he observed it was significant that [KRAKAU] is approximately the same age as subject described by him and has part German background. Source advised that the contacts with [LAWRENCE ALOYAN] in Russia were made by Armenian Officers of KGB and none of the officers of the Seventh Department (tourist) were in contact with [ALOYAN]. (S)

[BERNARD FERGUSON MITCHELL
WILLIAM HAMILTON MARTIN] (U)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF _____ DATE _____

3-Bureau
1-New York (RM)
1-WFO

MAT:mal
(5)

C. C. Wick

65-68530-176

16 APR 16 1964

7-11-98 5668 SLD/KSR

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRTEL

Approved: Thomas J. Jenkins Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[WFO 134-5437 Sub A] X (u) SECRET

[UNSUB; AMERICAN TOURIST TO RUSSIA FROM SOUTH OF SAN DIEGO OF INTEREST TO 13TH DEPARTMENT, KGB] X (u)

Source was questioned in this matter in effort to obtain identifying data. He was unable to recall any additional info of value and explained that his recollection was based on brief examination of a paper which came across his desk with many others. Source repeated there is a possibility that captioned case is identical with the case involving an American whose occupation which was repairing pipes, and stated his recollections concerning this was also very vague. Source could not recall the case officer from the Seventh Department who handled captioned case. X (u)

[UNSUB; CODE CLERK ALLEGEDLY RECRUITED BY KGB MOSCOW, SPRING, 1960] X (u)

Photograph of Sergeant [CHARLES BRYANT] (S) was displayed to source who advised the face was familiar especially the characteristics, twisting of the mouth to one side, but advised he could not recall any circumstances which made his recollection of the picture possible. In view of the current status of NOSENKO he was not furnished with the facts in this case at this time. X

[AMERICAN PRIESTS IN MOSCOW - STUDIED BY KGB] X (u)

Source advised that prior his departure from Moscow GENNADIY GRYAZNOV, the KGB official, who was then Chief of Section, had told him that two American priests in Moscow were being studied and that one was under consideration for approach on the basis of blackmail. GRYAZNOV told source that a Russian girl who is employed at American House is on very friendly relations with this priest and KGB has knowledge that he has carressed and fondled her and anticipates they may succeed in catching him having intimate relations with this girl in which case a recruitment approach will be made. X (u)

[UNSUB; KGB AGENT ANDREY] X (u)

SECRET

SECRET

[WFO [134-5437 Sub A] X (u)

Source advised that [REINER] (S) is the Head of [Cosmos Tours,] (S) New York City, and described him as a very shrewd and foxy individual. He said he was known to VLADIMIR D. CHELNOKOV, who was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department (tourist), however, subject was not recruited by the Seventh Department and no effort was made to recruit him. Source described [REINER] (S) as talkative and foxy and said he was suspected of being connected with American intelligence (FBI). Source stated [REINER] (S) knew many important people, but he believed work on him was wasted. He recalled [REINER's] (S) firm was the first to book a tour to Mongolia. He had negotiated with the Mongolian Republic for additional tours, but did not know whether he was successful. X

[SERGEANT JAMES MC MILLAN] X (u)

Source advised he was aware of the MC MILLAN case and stated although he did not know any details he understood MC MILLAN had assisted KGB and furnished everything he knew while at the American Embassy. He advised VADIM V. KOSOLAPOV visits him regularly and gives KGB funds in the sum of 500 rubles for a month. Source advised MC MILLAN is still married to the agent who assisted in his recruitment. Source identified this woman as VERA (LNU) and described her as a shy and decent girl. He said she had one son by MC MILLAN and also a child by a previous marriage. Source mentioned it was the task of the First Section (American Embassy), First Department (American), Second Directorate, to take care of defectors such as MC MILLAN. X (u)

[ANNABELLE BUCAR] X (u)

Source advised he also was somewhat familiar with the case of BUCAR who was recruited on the basis of ideology and a love affair with KONSTANTIN LAPSHEIN, an actor agent of the First Department, whom she subsequently married. Source stated BUCAR has not been happy in her private life since her husband is a heavy drinker and has weakness for girls, but she is satisfied otherwise with her life in Moscow where she works for the Radio Committee as an editor handling foreign broadcasts and also does translations receiving good money. X (u)

Photographs of members of the Bolshoi Ballet which visited the U.S. in 1962 were displayed to NOSENKO who identified three individuals, namely: X (u)

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10056

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO : THE PRESIDENT

TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION

DATE : 06/10/61
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
CIA
COVERT ACTION
PARAMILITARY WARFARE
CUBA
POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 244
Folder 7
Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort [in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).]

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operation Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivab from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. [CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover]

(1)(B)
4 NOV 93

Deleted all of Sec 3

JFK ACT

(1)(B) 4 NOV 93

[The other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover).] Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. [In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS.] On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration [47 percent of the political] officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period [in Laos]) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

(1)(B) (1)(C) 4 NOV 93

In [the Paris] Embassy today, there are [123] CIA people. CIA [in Paris] has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section [by 10-2.] CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain [French] political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of [the Paris] Embassy, a fact well known locally; and in

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ___
☐ With concurrence of ___
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. ___
FPC/HDR by ___ 12-6-93

Delete Sec 3
JFK Act

8e (1)(B)
4 NOV 93

the night of the Generals' revolt [in Algeria] passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador [Gavin] was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10105

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

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ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 62

SUBJECTS :
ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
THE PRESIDENT
QJWIN
MAFIA
SILVER, ARNOLD

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Box 245
Folder 13

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and
2 the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the
3 War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until
4 the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

5 Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as
6 head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

9 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked
11 on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in
12 the Department for Plans, is that right?

13 Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular
14 command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence
15 and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten
16 months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

17 Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as Chief of
18 Station for the CIA?

19 Mr. Harvey. I did.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

21 Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some
23 rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin
24 Tunnel.

25 Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel

operation and then move on?

Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that Frank Rollett and I conceived some time before I went to Berlin.

Senator Tower. You and who?

Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett, who for many years was one of the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the cryptologic group.

And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to mount this operation.

In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground, across the sector boundary, and tapping into three main telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.

I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these, which were, among other things, the main circuit between the command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow.

We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in Unter den Frund and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not really readable.

Senator Tower. Were not what?

Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

1 Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not
2 correct -- that you not only conceived the program but helped
3 to dig the tunnel?
4 Mr. Harvey. I did.
5 Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign
6 Intelligence Staff Division D?
7 Mr. Harvey. That is correct.
8 Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which
9 is responsible for communications intelligence?
10 Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.
11 Mr. Schwarz. But part --
12 Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may,
13 Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services,
14 which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two
15 things: the procurement of communications intelligence through
16 operational and clandestine sources and the control and utiliza-
17 tion of the product of communications intelligence, as it
18 affected the clandestine services.
19 We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of
20 research and analysis use which was handled in a separate
21 COMINT shop in the what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director
22 Intelligence.
23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibili-
24 ties the surreptitious obtaining of code information?
25 Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and

1 coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the
2 security risk, and also in the direct procurement through
3 operational means abroad, but not in this country.
4 Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean entering into
5 buildings?
6 Mr. Harvey. Surreptitious entry, intercepting couriers,
7 monitoring of communications, monitoring of scatterback from
8 microwave, that type of thing. Clandestine monitoring would
9 be covered as well.
10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call Justin O'Donnell work
11 for you in Staff D?
12 Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.
13 Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did Mr. O'Donnell recount to
14 you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?
15 Mr. Harvey. Yes.
16 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?
17 Mr. Harvey. Briefly, Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said
18 that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then
19 Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the
20 Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of
21 Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to
22 undertake this assignment.
23 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversa-
24 tion with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had
25 requested Mr. O'Donnell to undertake such an operation?

He Plans in Fall 1960

1 of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and
2 theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to
3 determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was
4 willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment,
5 this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly,
6 of self-protection.

7 I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions.
8 In the field of political assassination, although I cannot
9 document this by evidence, I have no question but what the
10 Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of
11 assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside
12 of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to
13 make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-
14 simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps
15 three classes.

16 One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous
17 agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official
18 staff officers of other intelligence services.

19 During the seven years that I spent in Berlin, which was
20 the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to
21 Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great
22 many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other
23 nationalities.

24 Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean
25 Russians who were working with the United States?

1 Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

2 Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just

3 these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB

4 to assassinate me in West Berlin than it would have been for

5 me to assassinate my opposite number in East Berlin, in the

6 Soviet Embassy across the border.

7 Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish

8 between political assassination, direct agents of the United

9 States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

10 Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but

11 emigres and Soviet nationals.

12 Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

13 Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are

14 the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States

16 ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

17 Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected

18 or doubled?

19 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

20 Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country

22 enemies of the United States?

23 Mr. Harvey. No.

24 Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United

25 States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

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1 Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary
2 documentation for the authority which was later signed off on
3 by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.
4 Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --
5 Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story,
6 not the real story, the objectives --
7 Mr. Harvey. It is both.
8 Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective,
9 assassination or assassination capability.
10 Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.
11 Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code
12 and cypher materials.
13 Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a
14 perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover
15 story except that if this project had gone so far as to the
16 actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the target-
17 ting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would
18 have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were
19 spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also
20 honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of
21 communications intelligence outside the U.S.
22 So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover
23 in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.
24 Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.
25 Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN an agent
2 who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection
3 with the Executive Action program?
4 Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for
5 possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver
6 for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld
7 connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of
8 whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I
9 personally know, were ever used.
10 Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one
11 purpose the possible use in assassination?
12 Mr. Harvey. Only in the sense that had we ever been saddled
13 with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination.
14 I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibil-
15 ities.
16 But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is
17 approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I
18 don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to --~~ is
19 actually approached, there ~~is a~~ should be long period of assessment,
20 crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting
21 mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.
22 I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated
23 him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was
24 before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an
25 operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation.

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1 and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do
2 with assassination.
3 I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment,
5 pages that were written by Mr. Arnold Silver?
6 Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the
7 same writing as these first three pages.
8 Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by
9 you?
10 Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.
11 I would also like to point out that from page 4 that --
12 that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting
13 was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I
14 would guess were probably Arnold Silver's notes and probably
15 based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me,
16 and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that
17 I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.
18 Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting,
19 is that right?
20 Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.
21 Mr. Schwarz. And at the bottom of page 8, does that
22 indicate that you had a conversation with Mr. Silver on January
23 26th?
24 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.
25 Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

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1 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

2 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr.

4 Bissell that you have recounted?

5 Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when

6 I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to

7 be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this

8 is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with

9 Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint

10 because there were several such discussions in varying degrees

11 of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in

12 '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early

13 on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question

14 of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at

15 the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already

16 had discussed the matter with Silver.

17 Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of

18 paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's

19 from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used

20 to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations

21 that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

22 Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them,

23 classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save

24 them. There is no relationship between the material that

25 appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just

1 before the 26/1 AS, , and the material which appears above
2 it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.
3 Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?
4 Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.
5 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb
6 on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included
7 the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --
8 Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of
9 assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a
10 discussion on a number of other things that were of particular
11 and specific interest to the communications intelligence field
12 and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you
13 will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a
14 sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably
15 held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after
16 he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual
17 Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the
18 clandestine services.
19 Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that
20 conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last
21 resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to
22 assassination?
23 Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination.
24 That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the
25 use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

1 of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that
2 the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases
3 as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really
4 sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions --
5 it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in
6 my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in
7 the words that are here, I just don't know.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that
9 make up the examples of 3?

10 Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume
11 that the logical candidates at that point would have been
12 Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that
13 we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets
14 for assassination, but that these were sort of the three
15 people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this,
16 these are three to be considered.

tape 2b

17 But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of
18 Sid's job. ELINT R&D - Memo." Ludford is the name of ~~the~~ staff
19 officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

20 This "translating machine" was an experimental device,
21 done under -- hoped for development by GE that I was most
22 interested in, because of the serious translation problem that
23 we had and particularly in communications intelligence.

24 So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the
25 framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination

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1 as a general problem.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten

3 page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's

4 notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had

5 with Mr. Silver and it is his notes about that conversation, is

6 that right?

7 Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

8 It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth.

9 I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any

10 specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers,

11 because Arnold Silver was under specific instructions not to

12 discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing

13 it with me first.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about

15 "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth,

16 and that reflects the conversation you had with Mr. Silver?

17 Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has

19 the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page

20 4?

21 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

22 Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows --

23 two sentences, which I should read into the record, three

24 sentences.

25 "Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

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1 crossed in this document.

2 Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

3 Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the

5 January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS.

6 That is Arnold Silver, I take it?

7 Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI

9 matter. What does that mean?

10 Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to

11 that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never

12 even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context.

13 Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to

14 throw up my hands. I just don't know.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI

16 in the notes means?

17 Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr.

18 Schwarz.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

20 Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the

21 portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified

22 at this point?

23 Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are

24 either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the

25 members have questions.

8

Scd G — 25/1 — Expec Actions
— "The Magic Button"
Narcotics Büro
"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover
Caution — Bankruptcy — No Stars
eyes — Jim A.
not a TSD problem
/ Contradistinct from U-2 /

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —
— El Benefactor = assumptions —
Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]
[redacted] Memo.

[redacted] Fear

Anathesia —

26/1 — [redacted] Fanfani-DCI-Matter
No file Review

1. Select proper oper to run —
2. [redacted] Mary of 2
3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-3
4. Guide lines [redacted] - Review.
Last Resort - Brakes — Substitute -

SECRET

2

9

6. No [redacted]

7. No projects or papers except for cover.

8. Principal agent - ? ([redacted]) ? - [redacted] Project Chief LCH - ticket 1500 - from NB - mask spot agm. chief [redacted] project - are Blake

9. Disposal -

10. Targets who & where - Must know before we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

Fd S list - Remember

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

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SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

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Box 245
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

HARVEY EX 1 R371
6/25/75
gkf

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~pur~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~posit~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is [redacted] and information concerning such materials in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, [redacted]. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

~~3. Background:~~

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements [redacted] materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements ~~from NSA~~ became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted], could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ sporadically [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

SECRET

3

QJWIN annual salary:	$7,200
Travel + ops expenses for QJWIN + other agents & agent candidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in ZRRIFLE activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

4

1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience ([Bangkok]) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/KGB ([redacted]) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does [redacted] now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search), or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of ~~any~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., [Mankel]) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

5

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: [redacted] search; this established (e.g. Rome)

j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals [redacted], those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved — selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. [redacted]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. [redacted]

Keeping of files.

SECRET

freedom to travel [6]

Legal, operational + ethical → morale problems. [redacted] case.

1) Maximum security ± within Kubark only (e.g., how much does [redacted] now know?). [redacted] not secure enough. Limitation on number [redacted] [redacted]. Guise of [redacted] objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) [redacted] recommended. [redacted] [redacted]

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) [redacted] + stable in [redacted]

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sel~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Fo~~ Danger of standbys.

8

...ed 1 – 25/1 – Exec Action

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Büro

"for a living" – RIS 201 cover

Caution – Bankruptcy – no Stars

eyes – Jim A. / Contradistinct from U-2 /

not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &

a confession of weakness. –

– El Benefactor – assumptions –

Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]

[redacted] Memo.

[redacted] Fear

Anathesia –

26/1 – [redacted] Forefine DCI – Matter –

No file Review –

1. Select proper person to run –
2. [redacted] Max of 2/3
3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-
4. Minimize levels [redacted] – Reserve.
Last Resort – Brakes – Substitute – ...

SECRET

2

9

6. no [redacted]
7. no projects or papers except for cover.
8. Principal Agent - [redacted] - Project Chief LCH - tickets 1500 - from MB - mark spot rqm. staff at project - see Blake
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who & where - Must know before we can spot -

11. Case officering
12. [redacted]
13. [redacted]

Fd I list - Remember

RECL[...] FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165

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CIA
CUBA
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CHILE
ALLENDE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

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Box 256
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1 Mr. Phillips. I did not.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

3 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Ruben-

5 stein?

6 Mr. Phillips. I did not.

7 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba

8 and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your

9 time on?

10 Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to

11 Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very

12 early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican

13 Republic as Chief of Station.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And then --

15 Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until

16 the summer of 1967.

17 And after that I returned to Washington and became

18 the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

19 In 1970 I went to Rio de Janiero as Station Chief. And

20 in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to

21 Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.

22 In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station.

23 And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of

24 the then Western Hemisphere Division.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until

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1 or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as
2 to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or
3 the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be
4 necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually
5 assassinate some one.

6 Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even
7 get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an
8 option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency
10 talk that way?

11 Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard
12 human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that
13 saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were
14 bumped off or something.

15 But I have never heard two officers sit down and
16 seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever
17 said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line
18 and say almost anything.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with
20 the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifi-
21 cally a Major Marshall, reported to the CIA that they intended
22 to assassinate Allende?

23 Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall,
24 Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think
25 of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

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1 Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert,
2 whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could
3 accomplish it, didn't you?
4 Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.
5 mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt
6 on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to
7 help accomplish the kidnapping?
8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.
9 Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Val-
10 enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?
11 Mr. Phillips. That is ture.
12 Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a
13 kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that,
14 didn't you?
15 Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be
16 used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their
17 plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe-
18 cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was --
19 the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people
20 need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin
21 America.
22 And they said something about, their own arms could be
23 identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified.
24 I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was
25 just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

1 Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we
2 establish what I called a false flag base of people that would
3 go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the
4 chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much
5 less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.
6 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is
7 this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that
8 he asked for it after I came over.
9 Mr. Treverton. It is not.
10 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which
11 unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is
12 relatively simple.
13 This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970,
14 and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to
15 the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the
16 purposes of setting up the false flag office --
17 Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.
18 Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base
19 will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as
20 a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".
21 That is right, isn't it?
22 Mr. Phillips. That is true.
23 Mr. Schwarz. Continue:
24 "Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian
25 would be vital, and we have candidates."

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1 And you did that.

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These
4 officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap
5 potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any
6 Chilean."

7 That is right, isn't it?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

10 Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall,
11 that sort of thing.

12 Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II
13 activities?

14 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can-
16 didates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence
17 officers." You did that, didn't you?

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded
20 and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

22 Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would
23 the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would
24 be blamed if something went wrong.

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me,

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1 because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian
2 foreign service officer. However, that was it. It was a
3 devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that
4 if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone
5 other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is
6 not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying,
7 why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets,
8 is not true.
9 But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents
10 should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that
11 was the idea.
12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were
13 their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go
14 to their death swearing they were Brazilians or whatever?
15 Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic,
16 Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And
17 I briefed them,and I think what I said to them was, this
18 is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have
19 to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.
20 And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help
21 you.
22 So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.
23 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the Brazilians that you were
24 sending someone down to pose as a Brazilian, and his instruc-
25 tions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose

1 as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?

2 Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest

3 dreams to do that.

4 Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between con-

5 tinuing intelligence services were things that were

6 very important to preserve, and that we had very close and

7 delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

8 Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a

9 man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I

10 thought that was better than letting the world know that was

11 a U.S. Citizen down there.

12 Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27

13 to say this:

14 "Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by

15 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate

16 and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi-

17 bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure-

18 ly."

19 So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging

20 from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services --

22 not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living

23 overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you

24 are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana

25 and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence

1 service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the
2 Soviets, from us, or from the Brazilians.
3 So, it is not an unusual practice.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing
5 in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year
6 involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered
7 by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was
8 Chile.
9 And then you said what the other one was. What was that?
10 Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs
11 of Station course, which is a training course for people who
12 are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.
13 When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines
14 to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to
15 protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might
16 have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there
17 as the Chief of Station. And I just wasn't sure that I
18 wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de-
19 cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is
20 doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go
21 along.
22 Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation
23 between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin-
24 ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding
25 it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could under-
2 stand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at
3 Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.
4 Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that
5 he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32
6 years beforehe was elected.
7 Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ar-
8 dent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that
9 we had a visit from a man who had the code name of Ariel; he
10 was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in
11 rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot
12 at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the
13 same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send
14 22,000 rather than 400.
15 So, I can understand why they thought this was going,
16 in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our
17 interests. But that is an assumption.
18 It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear
19 that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The differ-
20 ence was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice
21 and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to
22 Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are
23 going to have to use violence.
24 I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper
25 where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,

1 activities?

2 Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in

3 Rio de Janiero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for

4 six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

5 Senator MOndale. Now, in that position you familiarized

6 yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on,

7 and tried to become as expert as you could in the political

8 forces and so on?

9 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator,

10 one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived

11 for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

12 Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I

13 just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused

14 Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the

15 democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff

16 on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he

17 was pursuing, is that correct?

18 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but

19 he indeed acted that way.

20 Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur-

21 suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with

22 the population support under constitutional system?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

24 Senator Mondale. Thank you.

25 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection

1 assignment by the President and by the White House?

2 Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference

3 today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why

4 should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game.

5 The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the

6 word.

7 And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that

8 we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

9 Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

10 I call your attention in our briefing books to what is

11 Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21

12 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author

13 of that cable?

14 Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating

15 officer, yes.

16 Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

17 Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the

18 right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating

19 officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know

20 the situation.

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess

22 is what I am after.

23 Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably

24 written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was

25 joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by

putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is the one that accepts the responsibility.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the following sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes on the stars.

What does that mean in Agency talk?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye, however.

Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed a joint venture, I can promise that that was Dino Poinzio's contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I am not sure what it means even now.

SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

1 Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the
2 assassination of Schneider was something which presented the
3 opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have
4 done.

5 Do you agree with me?

6 Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am
7 not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will
8 tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when
9 the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finished
10 Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred,
11 Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as
12 Marshall, immediately said,this is it, that is enough. There
13 was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the
14 moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is
15 it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America
16 that would have been the signal for further action, weakness,
17 and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the
18 business.

19 Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi-
20 ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group
21 and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one
22 of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that
25 one of the assignments that Colonel Wimert had?

1 Mr. Phillips. Wimert? Yes, I believe it was Colonel
2 Wimert that was in touch with that group.
3 Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem,
4 didn't they?
5 Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?
6 Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team and Colonel
7 Wimert.
8 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have
9 been some central direction from the office or from headquar-
10 ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had
11 the slightest idea that Colonel Wimert was working with us.
12 And I don't believe that Colonel Wimert -- I don't know that
13 Colonel Wimert knew about them.
14 So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of
15 direction from the Station.
16 Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in
17 Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand
18 the Viaux group?
19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.
20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here,
21 counsel?
22 Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interrup-
23 tible.
24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we
25 chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

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1 Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one
2 of the Valenzuela group's plan?
3 Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically.
4 Obviously when the guns were passed through Colonel Wimert
5 and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we
6 thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we
7 read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-
8 gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could
9 really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly
10 the Valenzuela group using those guns.
11 Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had
12 been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there
13 were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to
14 abduct General Schneider?
15 Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have
16 been, but I am not real sure about that.
17 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which
18 is the relationship with Colonel Wimert. If there are any
19 questions on the relationship between the two groups.
20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19
21 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum
22 by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable
23 A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of
24 these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with
25 U.S. Army attache and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be

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1 carried out on October 19. The Huerth, who was head of the
2 Carabineros, witting of the above plan, has promised to keep
3 the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the
4 abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is
5 knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly
6 involved."

7 What do you think "not directly involved" refers to?
8 Why not just not involved?

9 Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what
10 I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very
11 unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin
12 that works with some group type of thing.

13 And I believe that it must refer to that.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual
15 cable in the Senator's books?

16 Mr. Inderfurther. No.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that para-
18 graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19
19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

20 "General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not
21 directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with
22 prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19
23 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is
24 not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of
25 week."

1 Now, I can't read that language any way other than
2 meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in
3 close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it
4 was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would
5 be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved.
6 And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there
7 was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.
8 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that
9 way.
10 Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more
11 than just the statement?
12 Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.
13 Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --
14 Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was Hecksher.
15 Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.
16 Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an ex-
17 hibit.
18 (The document referred to was
19 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2
20 for identification.)
21
22
23
24
25

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1 As for the narrow part of your question, by all means
2 it is a bad way to do business.
3 Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line
5 of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu-
6 ment Tab A.
7 It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17
8 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep-
9 tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project".
10 Incidentally, what was the code name for this project?
11 Was it FU Belt?
12 Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.
13 Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular?
14 Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two
15 letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would be a
16 lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt
17 means Chile. Belt means nothing.
18 Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of
19 these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these
20 names?
21 Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have
22 a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated.
23 And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes
24 out in those things.
25 Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call

1 it pixie-like.

2 Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonums mean ab-

3 solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

4 Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

5 Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

6 Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good

7 ones.

8 Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that

9 document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2

10 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

11 "The Agency is to carry out this mission without

12 coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

15 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in

17 Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

20 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed

22 to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that

23 right?

24 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell

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1 his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the
2 defense attache system down there?
3 Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army and then
5 there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there
6 was a boss?
7 Mr. Phillips. That is right.
8 Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?
9 Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.
10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert
11 came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?
12 Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was
13 the fact that Colonel Wimert had been around Latin America,
14 spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he
15 developed really marvelous relationships with the military of
16 officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just
17 that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the
18 task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take
19 advantage of the one man in Chile that they liked the most,
20 trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural
21 for him to spend his weekends with these people.
22 Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset.
23 But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and
24 lay that question against the instruction from President
25 Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did

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1 you accomplish it?

2 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory
3 refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know
4 that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book
5 that has been signed by General Philpott which was a message
6 to Wimert saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process
7 was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott ,
8 I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

10 Mr. Phillips. I never did.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

12 Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large
13 meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any
14 meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior
15 to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr.
16 Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been
17 left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

19 Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

20 Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Phil-
21 pott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this
23 entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our build-
24 ing.I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do
25 that sort of thing.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the
2 message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?
3 Mr. Phillips. It is.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you
5 drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and
6 then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.
7 Did you make that change?
8 Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said
9 Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said
10 Bennett. I think the signature on the original document
11 was from Philpott. But that is my change there.
12 Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page --
13 the sentence reads:
14 "Do not allow Colonel Wimert to retain copy of this
15 message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that
16 General Bennett is out of the country".
17 Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.
18 Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what
19 do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make
20 those changes?
21 Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one
22 of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed
23 something that is written out, and there is no secretary,
24 and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that.
25 On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask

1 the communicators to send that, and youwill then later write
2 for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable.
3 I am not sure about that.
4 Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Ben-
5 nett's name and not General Philpott's name?
6 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had
7 been the case that not only would the change have been made,
8 but there would have been some sort of note on the side or
9 something. So, I believe that the original must have said
10 Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.
11 Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the
12 first page used Bennett's name, right?
13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
14 Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had
15 previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the
16 "suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General
17 Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that
18 purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that
19 before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used
20 Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.
21 Mr. PHillips. Yes.
22 Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed
23 message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3
24 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?
25 Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would

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1 wasn't aware of this.

2 Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving

3 the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct Wimert to

4 work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence

5 Agency further brought into the operation which we have been

6 calling Track II?

7 Mr. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes

8 ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document

9 since then that indicates that someone else was talked to

10 later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never

11 knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message.But

12 until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have

13 said, I think that Philpott was the man.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on

15 that one occasion?

16 Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion.

17 But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little

18 room with windows, and so there were other people doing other

19 things.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

21 Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

22 (The document referred to was

23 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5

24 for identification.)

25

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1 Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer Willia
2 Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated Octo-
3 ber 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA.
4 And it says:
5 "Please deliver the following message ('destroy immedi-
6 ately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General
7 Bennett. "
8 Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message
9 which purports to be to Colonel Wimert from Lieutenant General
10 Bennett?
11 Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because
12 I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again
13 there was a document that was handed to me and I was told,
14 send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there,
15 and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I
16 authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on.
17 If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document
18 that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on
19 the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority
20 to authenticate, and I didn't necesarily turn to them and say,
21 hey --
22 Mr Schwarz. Prove that --
23 Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with
24 General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.
25 Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated docu-

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1 ment headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett to Colonel
2 Wimert "Eyes only".
3 (The document referred to was
4 Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6
5 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett
2 to Colonel Wimert, and has the text in it which you sent on
3 to Colonel Wimert.
4 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
5 Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to
6 who handed you that document?
7 Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that.
8 There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the
9 office and say, here is something to send. There were others
10 which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow
11 forwarding slip on it. There are times,I am sure, when I
12 would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the
13 way, send this.
14 I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which some-
15 one handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying
16 less attention to those things, because I was in effect the
17 postman for people doing other things.
18 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all
19 about this document?
20 Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.
21 Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on
22 that document?
23 Mr. PHillips. Well, it certainly looks like the sig-
24 nature which was on the other document which was said to be
25 Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

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1 military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently
2 it would appear that theremight be something here where they
3 are going to bring in more people, as is known to several per-
4 sons, it says down here.

5 And itmay have been because there was an attempt there
6 not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk
7 to you about something we are doing that we have kind of
8 already done. That is theonly thing I can come up with. I
9 can't give you a better explanation than that.

10 Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling
11 and strange document?

12 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be
13 more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things
14 were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings
15 on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't
16 paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

17 Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with
18 some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place
19 you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating
20 officer.

21 And second, this is not simply taking some other message
22 and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive
23 document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station
24 Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

25 Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling,

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1 and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when
2 you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory.
3 I can't remember the rationale for this.
4 Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that
5 are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.
6 Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will
7 confuse Colonel Wimert".
8 It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would
9 have confused him.
10 "Background for his information: both Generals Bennett
11 and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".
12 Who told you that?
13 Mr. PHillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume
14 this must have been Bill Broe.
15 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling
16 you that?
17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I --
18 I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that
19 Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words,
20 that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released
21 just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing.
22 This cable I think must have originated either with a dis-
23 cussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word,
24 write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say,
25 do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it

1 here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone
2 else that was working in my shop, Mr. Pionzio, or someone
3 else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing some-
4 thing else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said,
5 here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things.
6 So I really can't remember.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe
8 spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff
9 spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes
10 out?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

13 Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable
14 went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at
15 night.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

17 Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

18 Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has
19 a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

20 Mr. Phillips. Right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

23 The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were
24 leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and
25 he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well

1 and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use
2 Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and
3 that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed
4 by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the
5 only explanation I can give.

6 Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new
7 interested parties and the several persons referred to in
8 the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority
9 than Bennett and Philpott?

10 Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just --
11 this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem
12 logical to me that they would start going outside and down,
13 I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I
14 only assume that.

15 Mr.Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself
16 being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as
17 you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

18 Mr. Phillips. I understand.

19 Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using Wimert, and knew
20 some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which
21 would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but
24 very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an in-
25 terest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction

of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing the work for the CIA through Colonel Wimert.

Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety daily events, were they?

Mr. Phillips. They were not.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it was necessarily because General Philpott would have been embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

But this rather unusual step was made because of the talents of the military men, to bring him into a program that you weren't even talking with the State Department about. And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things that I obviously had something to do with.

But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job, and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when someone would come in and say, we want something to go down to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott, I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had been one of our operations.

Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2

1 there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse
2 Colonel Wimert. Background for his information".
3 Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his
4 information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine
5 background.
6 The other is that it is a story to be given Wimert for
7 his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way
8 doyou read it if you do not know what the facts are?
9 Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because
10 nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do
11 I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent
12 of falsehood in putting something down like that.
13 So, I assume that it is really for his background of
14 what happened.
15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got
16 the information which you provided in this cable?
17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful
18 after you talk to others. But I simply do not.
19 Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation
20 "that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when Wimert shown"
21 the telegram which is Exhibit 3.
22 Did you advise General Bennett?
23 Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I
24 presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been
25 involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

1 Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't
2 know that it was.
3 Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply
4 from Wimert is located? Is it K?
5 Mr. Treverton. K, yes.
6 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit
7 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant
8 General Bennett from Colonel Wimert".
9 (The document referred to was
10 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8
11 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we
2 correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA
3 station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come
4 from Colonel Wimert and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant
5 General Bennett?

6 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

7 Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would
8 such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the
9 responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

10 Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable
11 would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an
12 info copy and this, that and the other.

13 The action on this cable would have certainly have gone
14 at least to Mr.Broe, and possibly higher, because it says,
15 this is his message to the head of another government
16 service. And so it would have gone to that level.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have
18 come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to
19 either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

20 Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a
21 cable will come in and there will be more than one copy.
22 And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and
23 then you get the information copy, and so forth.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable
25 whether there would have been more than one copy?

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went
2 to.
3 Mr. Schwarz. Does the "eyes only" have any significance
4 to you in the third line?
5 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what Colonel
6 Wimert was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Depart-
7 ment, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else
8 other than General Bennett.
9 Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?
10 Mr. Phillips. I do not know.
11 Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?
12 Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been
13 highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying,
14 give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to
15 be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.
16 Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its
17 delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?
18 Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded
19 into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is
20 really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes
21 through a communications channel, it means that they are going
22 to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If
23 an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive
24 message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying,
25 will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

1 Mr. Schwarz. This message states:

2 "Please deliver the following message, ('destroy imme-

3 diately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General

4 Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspen-

5 sion temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

6 What are MAP and FMS.

7 Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or

8 another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

10 Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

12 Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not,

14 repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the

15 contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which

16 we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and

17 situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date

18 of situation".

19 Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

20 Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency

24 responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

25 Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to
2 do with that, do they?
3 Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that
4 it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett
5 to Wimert, to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the
6 whole business, all of these different options were being
7 looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with
8 military things because it looks like Allende is going to get
9 in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead
10 and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for
11 Colonel Wimert to give him some rationale behind it when he
12 was down there running away trying to foment the coup,
13 saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this govern-
14 ment?
15 I am speculating. But this was another one of those
16 messages quote unquote which went in our channels.
17 Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?
18 Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.
19 Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?
20 Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are
21 a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that
22 I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved,
23 and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me
24 or how it arrived.
25 Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be
another document which contains the purported message from

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1 Mr. Fenn. Yes.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally,
3 was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago
4 which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

5 Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is
6 a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on
7 the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those
8 absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it
9 down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

10 In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I re-
11 alize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is
12 a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General
13 Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of
14 endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that
15 the approach we are making to this?

16 Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach.
17 He has denied any knowledge of this.

18 Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

19 Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

20 Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

21 Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters
22 saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his
23 knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand
24 why. Because the messages went from Philpott to Colonel Wimert.
25 And Colonel Wimert said, I am with you 100 percent, and from

1 that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't
2 recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy
3 on his part about doing what he was doing.
4 And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's
5 side, not having been involved with him.
6 From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that some-
7 one is using that business that I referred to in dispatches,
8 General Bennett says, when they are really talking about
9 what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure
10 he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that
11 is conceivable.
12 But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of
13 little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.
14 Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see
15 a motive?
16 Mr. Phillips. Precisely.
17 I can't see the motive for fooling Colonel Wimert, be-
18 cause Colonel Wimert had already started working when he re-
19 ceived the instructions from the number two man in his Agency,
20 which is indeed pretty high up.
21 So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful
22 is that I, too, am confused.
23 Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that
24 Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October
25 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

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1 Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.

2 Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --

3 Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday.
4 We have talked to him. He accepts at least one message. There
5 are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not
6 sure if he accepted two.

7 Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

8 Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

9 Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

10 Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while,
13 as we said previously, things had fallen into place according
14 to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction
15 that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very,
16 very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being
17 that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the
18 inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

19 And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few
20 of us, probably myself and Mr. Pionzio and Mr. Broe and Mr.
21 Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but
22 I do remember thatmeeting going up there and saying, if there
23 ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to
24 say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that
25 meeting.

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1 what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside
2 of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool,
3 and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies
4 to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in
5 refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days
6 to die.

7 Miss Culbreth. You had served as Chief of Station in
8 the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in
9 this position on the Track II party?

10 Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of
11 Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much
12 aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement.
13 U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our
14 arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while
15 those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly
16 nation", relations were very bad.

17 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General
18 Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by
19 your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

20 Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do
21 that now.

22 Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize
23 his death as having been an assassination?

24 Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that
25 occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that

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1 when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing
2 around his car he drew his gun.
3 Miss Culbreth. Thank you.
4 I would like to direct your attention to this cable
5 that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated
6 September27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in
7 talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A
8 false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by
9 10 October".
10 And you were questioned about this part: "These
11 officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap
12 potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any
13 Chilean. An example: We have a Canadian who can pose as
14 Brazilian intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and
15 ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a Brazilian one".
16 In the second paragraph which was not read earlier,
17 I would like to read this and then put a question to you:
18 "Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by
19 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate
20 and recruit under false colors, will give station great
21 flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations
22 securely".
23 To me this second paragraph indicates that these false
24 flag officers were people that had experience in this very
25 kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

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1 Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me per-
2 sonally and had worked for me.
3 Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity
4 as a false flag officer?
5 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
6 Miss Culbreth. So, this was not some unique and unusual,
7 devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this
8 instance?
9 Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, es-
10 pecially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the imme-
11 diate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first
12 heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on,
13 that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what
14 are you talking about, this, that and the other.
15 As a matter of fact, as I recall, Henry Hecksher, the
16 Chief of Station, was terribly upset, because he is a sort of
17 an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words,
18 to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing
19 came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the
20 station that we had been given this job to do and that we
21 at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to
22 accomplish the job that they had been given with the least
23 possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that
24 sort of thing.
25 Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think

(1)(A) 17 NOV 93

1 in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even
2 though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

3 Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind
4 as principal operating officer here in the states that there
5 was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the
6 Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them
7 as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really
8 regard them as separate groups?

9 Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two
10 separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America
11 some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else.
12 But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups,
13 and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I
14 thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought
15 that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

16 And then we had the other group which seemed to be
17 more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I
18 very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

19 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that
20 might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping opera-
21 tions when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up
22 on these.

23 With regard to the information that was given to you,
24 the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the
25 Chief of Station and were directed to Colonel Wimert, who can

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How large was the room you were operating out of? You described it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there -- no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries, there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing. There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. Poinzio, six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much Mr. Poinzio and myself, as the real action officers. And then there were two junior officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that

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Date:06/08/94
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10095

RECORDS SERIES :
REPORT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

DATE : 03/17/64
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN PLOT TO ASSASSANATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA
PANAMA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/09/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New Orleans, Louisiana
March 17, 1964

DDA 05763

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(1) **ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA**

At 4:55 PM, March 17, 1964, Orlando Piedra, formerly connected with Federal Police in Cuba and presently residing New Orleans, Louisiana, advised that about one week ago he received information from a source in Cuba whom he considers reliable that Castro is not satisfied with the way things are going in Panama and for that reason plans to have the President of Panama assassinated to create additional uprisings in that country. Piedra advised that he furnished the above information by letter to Colonel Bolivar Ballarino, Chief of the National Guard of Panama whom he has known for years. Piedra declines to identify the source and has no additional information to report.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This will confirm information orally furnished Mr. J. J. Kelly, State Department, and Mr. James Murray, Central Intelligence Agency on March 17, 1964, by A. J. Decker of this Bureau. This will also confirm data furnished orally to Colonel Graham E. Schmid, Department of the Army; Major William Boyd, Department of the Air Force; and Mr. Don Gorhan, Department of the Navy, on March 19, 1964, by G. A. Day of this Bureau.

1A per CDA

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Rec'd from L. Sternfield, CIA.
5-28-76. CHM

200-300-5

Date:07/14/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10144

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12 MARCH 1964

DATE : 03/12/64
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CIA MEETING WITH WARREN COMMISSION
HELMS, RICHARD
ROCCA, RAYMOND
WARREN COMMISSION
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/14/94

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COMMENTS :

302-3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investigation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned. Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Commission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle interviews with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station would be under State Department cover and that it would be proper to advise the Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details with the CIA Chief of Station.

8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November 1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the materials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination. Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did not release actual copies of our messages because they contained codewords and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission who might come to visit him at Langley.

9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to

believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements. Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone intercepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any information affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive and that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very carefully protected.

10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assisting, to air manifest checks in Mexico. These would be carried out he said.

11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemination. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affecting internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always understandable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but

Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10270

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU

DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
OFFICE OF SECURITY
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

(C-TO)

SUBJECT: Robert Maheu - Foreign Head of State

1. In connection with the official State visit of a foreign Head of State in 1959, the Office of Security was requested to render special support during the Los Angeles and New York phases of the tour. According to [illegible] personnel, the foreign official was especially desirous of female companionship during his Los Angeles visit and it was requested that appropriate arrangements be made through a controlled source of the Office in order to assure a satisfied visit.

2. On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robert Maheu, a cleared Office of Security contact, was asked to arrange a party for the foreign official at Los Angeles, California. This was done by Mr. Maheu through Mr. Gregson Bautzer. Mr. Bautzer is a prominent Los Angeles attorney and Hollywood figure previously granted a covert security approval for use by FE Division. By pre-arrangement, during the course of this party the foreign official was introduced to a part-time screen and stage actress. For the duration of the foreign official's stay in Los Angeles, 3 through 7 April 1959, he and the actress became intimate friends. It was indicated by a CIA employee who was integrated into the State party, that the foreign official desired to continue his friendship with the actress and that he wished to meet with her during his stay in New York City from 14 through 18 April 1959.

3. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the home of an Office of Security source, at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 through 18 April 1959. The home was to be used as a confidential meeting place for the actress and the foreign official. At the same time the actress was registered at the Hotel Barclay, 111 East 48th Street, New York City, under an assumed name. The publicity touching on the relationship had become more pointed since some publicity mention had been made of the Jewish background of the actress. On 14 April 1959 a CIA employee and the actress were transported to the home on Long Island which was taken over as

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the meeting place for the foreign official and the actress. Later the same day, by pre-arrangement, two Department of State Security Agents, a New York City police lieutenant and a hired chauffeur arrived with the foreign official. The actress remained at the site through 18 April 1959, and the foreign official and his party visited each evening and remained for about four to five hours.

4. During the stay at the Long Beach site, the actress discussed the publicity in the case at some length with the Security representatives. She speculated about the possible sources of certain personal information that she felt had been leaked to the press. Additionally she spoke of her deep feeling for the foreign official & commented on how Gregson Bautzer initially sought her out to serve as a party companion for the foreign official. At the time she said she was unclear as to just what part Mr. Bautzer wanted her to play. "In attempting to clarify his case Mr. Bautzer said, "I am employed by the CIA. We want you to go to bed with him." The actress said she rejected the proposal but finally went to the party. She became quite taken with the foreign official and found him to be most charming.

5. All personal contacts by Security representatives in this case were under alias and implied State Department affiliation. There is no record or indication in any of the files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name or reference. It is believed that Mr. Maheu was never introduced to the actress, and as far as can be determined Bautzer "fronted" for all arrangements. Office of Security investigation conducted variously from 25 May through 17 September 1959 of the actress reflected no substantive derogatory information regarding her.

01470

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10280

RECORDS SERIES :
CABLE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU'S TRANSPORTATION OF PROSTITUTES

DATE : 10/10/57
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROBERT A. MAHEU AND ASSOCIATES (RAMA)
PROSTITUTES
FOREIGN LEADERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

C-IV-4

Clean Copy of IN 20362

10 October 1957

DIRECTOR

IN 20362

CIUDAD TRUJILLO

CITE TRUJ 272

RE: HDCW 119

1. CIA source called COS urgently 9 Oct and turned over two documents charging that Robert M. Maheu violated Mann Act in procuring and transporting prostitutes for a foreign leader during state visit U. S. 1956, that this done with tacit approval State. Also charge Maheu with wire tapping OPS against Onassis Shipping Co in 55, that this done with tacit approval U. S. Government and known to CIA, State and FBI.

2. COS expressed low interest info but agreed pouch to CIA.

3. On 8 Oct EMGREEP gave identical documents to DCM who pouched same 9 Oct to State for action AMB Farland. Told DCM a high foreign official desires wide distribution U. S. Government agencies.

4. CIA source believes only possible source above documents is John Joseph Frank who formerly close to Maheu.

5. FC: DOM objective possibly blackmail U. S. Government, kill Frank Trial.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO KAPOK CABLES.

SECRET

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10141

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.
FROM : BELIN, DAVID W.
TO : HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

TITLE :
LETTER/ENCLOSURES

DATE : 05/01/75
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
INTERVIEW WITH REGARD TO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 435-3

Sent to NSC 11/22/93

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bx 34

H: Would you make that please -- Do you mind my interrupting?

B: Sure - go ahead.

H: Make that Soviet Intelligence Branch.

B: -- and he was in charge of the Soviet Intelligence Branch of the Agency --

H: --which is a lesser position than the other reads like.

B: All right. He went to Berlin in the Fall of 1952 where he was Station Chief until 1959. He came back to Washington in the Fall of 1959 where he stayed until June of 1963, except for possible short periods of temporary duty --

H: -- except for several periods of temporary duty.

B: -- except for several periods of temporary duty abroad. He went to Rome in June 1963 where he was Station Chief until 1966. He came back to the Agency in Washington in 1966 and he retired from the Agency in 1967 on December 31. Now, Mr. Harvey, does that summarize basically part of your background, at least that we discussed?

H: That is correct. I would like to add one thing, if I may. During both the Berlin and Rome periods and for a considerabl period of time in Washington after I returned from Berlin I was on the roles of the Foreign Service of State which raises a ~~little~~ question of propriety. But I want you to know that in the handling of this.

B: All right. I first asked you with regard to any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots within the Agency concerning Patrice Lumumba and you might indicate what your response was to that, Mr. Harvey.

H: I have no personal knowledge of any such plan or operation within or on the part of the Agency.

B: I also asked you apart from the question of Fidel Castro whether or not you had any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots in the Agency that involved any other foreign leader.

01771

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10048

RECORD SERIES : TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MAHEU

DATE : 07/30/1975
PAGES : 95

SUBJECTS :
ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL: GALANE, MORTON R.
GIANCANA, SAM
WIRETAPS
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
MAFIA CONNECTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1A; 1B; 1C; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/19/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : SSCI Box 252, Folder 5

157-10011-

10048

tape 1b

am not too far off in what I am about to tell you. The contract was structured in such a way that as the bottoms of other companies became obsolete, they could only be replaced with Onassis' tankers. Even ARAMCO had to, by attrition, within a period of four-and-a-half to five-and-a-half years, would have, if their tankers became obsolete, they could only be replaced by Onassis tankers.

Our statistics, after having studied the contract and making what we considered to be proper projections, indicated that at the completion of approximately five-and-a-half years, Mr. Onassis would control more dead weight tonnage than the United States controlled in its entirety, that he would control on the high seas annually more oil by tens of thousands of gallons more than were used by all of the Allied nations during the most severe year of the Korean War, that in the first year his profit would be approximately $17 million dollars, that after five-and-a-half years his annual profit would be in the area of $200 million.

While this analysis is going on, we also found that a million dollar pay-off had been made to one of the top ministers in Saudi Arabia and we had the evidence out of the Swiss bank accounts, in other words, contrary to what a lot of people believe that they can't be broken, even in those days, they were broken and we had the evidence with all of the documentation.

We then prepared our inputs and presented them to the

1 National Security Council --

2 Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?

3 Mr. Maheu. -- of the United States, and within a matter,

4 I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department

5 denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone

6 had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an

7 innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would

8 be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and

9 do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the

10 background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make

11 a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we

12 presented to the National Security Council verbally but not

13 in writing.

14 Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?

15 Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with

16 the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?

17 Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement

18 and that same evening we were told that two of the top CIA

19 officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

20 Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of

21 Carl Twitchell by virtue of reading about the country, because

22 I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs

23 and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name

24 of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out

25 to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by

1 National Security Council --

2 Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?

3 Mr. Maheu. -- of the United States, and within a matter,

4 I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department

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13 in writing.

14 Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?

15 Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with

16 the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?

17 Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement

18 and that same evening we were told that two [redacted]

19 officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

20 Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of

21 Carl Twitchell by virtue of reading about the country, because

22 I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs

23 and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name

24 of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out

25 to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by

1 old King Saud. Mr. Twitchell had spent time in the country
2 as a mining engineer to help them in the exploitation of
3 mines. It was in fact to Carl Twitchell that the old king gave
4 the power of attorney to come to the United States government
5 or come back to the United States and try to form a consortium
6 for the exploitation of oil from which emanated ARAMCO.

7 Carl was the type of man who was only reimbursed for his
8 expenses. I think his total expenses were slightly in excess
9 of $8,000. He didn't even keep the banking and percentage
10 for himself, or a piece of the action, so to speak, and he was
11 highly, highly loved by the Saudis and although the old king
12 was then gone and King Saud, the son, was in power, Mr.
13 Twitchell had the same respect and reverence from the present
14 leaders as he did from the father and I convinced Mr. Twitchell
15 that -- he already had a clearance, a satisfactory clearance,
16 and I convinced him to precede me to Saudi Arabia to try to
17 lay the groundwork.

18 Senator Schweiker. What year was this, roughly?

19 Mr. Maheu. This, I believe, was in '54 or '55, yes.

20 Anyway, I finally ended up going to Saudi Arabia, having
21 a meeting with the King's confidential assistant, presenting all
22 of this evidence, frankly at the time not knowing if the King
23 himself had a piece of the action --

24 Senator Huddleston. Had some of this evidence come from
25 the wiretap?

1 Mr. Maheu. That tap was entirely unproductive, entirely
2 unproductive.
3 Senator Schweiker. What happened then at your meeting?
4 Mr. Maheu. Well, it's very interesting, if we could take
5 a little time, I mean, I was scheduled to have the meeting
6 "with the King," but he doesn't show, he stays somewhere else
7 and the confidential assistant shows up and one trusted
8 minister that he had with Carl Twitchell present.
9 And my meeting was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. one night, and
10 this happaned to be the last day that the King was supposed to
11 be in Jidda, he was then leaving for the capital further
12 inland, Jidda being the only major port in Saudi where he
13 spends his summers, and they were having a big parade for him,
14 and from the balcony of the hotel, I'm watching the parade go
15 by, and finally the King's car comes and he is arm and arm with
16 the man on whom I'm going to give the evidence that night, and
17 I frankly was not too comfortable, particularly in view of the
18 fact that in those days -- and I don't know whether it has
19 changed, but in Saudi, the same document did not give you
20 permission to enter and leave; you had to make application for
21 an exit visa after you arrived, and I was in constant contact
22 with the then-United States Ambassador. He made it very clear
23 that the government approved of everything I was doing, but if
24 something went wrong they could not come to my rescue, I would
25 have to be the fall guy, and I was prepared to do it. That was

1 Saudi Arabian government would have its flag flying the high
2 seas, and at the time that all of this is going on they are
3 building what then, upon completion of production, had been
4 the biggest tanker in the world at that time, a ship named
5 after the old King, a tanker which was scheduled to go and take
6 a maiden flight and take off, and it turned out the biggest
7 problem that we had was to find a save-face gimmick. But
8 finally the whole thing was accomplished, and it took two and
9 a half years to do it.
10 Senator Schweiker. I didn't mean to get you off the
11 track.
12 Mr. Maheu. Well, I'm sorry I am so verbose.
13 Senator Huddleston. You said you bought a paper in
14 Athens? You mean by that you actually bought the paper or just
15 paid them to run the story?
16 Mr. Maheu. We bought a newspaper.
17 You'll have to understand, Senator, that in Rome, in those
18 days, there were fifty newspapers. I mean, the big circulation
19 in those days, big circulation in Rome was 20,000. It's hard
20 for us to visualize that.
21 Senator Huddleston. The CIA supplied the money to buy
22 the newspaper?
23 Mr. Maheu. Yes.
24 Can we go off the record?
25 Senator Schweiker. Yes.

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1 Mr. Liebengood. Was this listening post that you referred
2 to, was that a project that was related to work for the Central
3 Intelligence Agency?
4 Mr. Maheu. I don't believe it was.
5 Mr. Madigan. Did you have any New York assignments other
6 than Onassis that you gave to Frank?
7 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember any.
8 Mr. Madigan. How about Thomas Evans? I may have asked
9 you that yesterday. Do you recall whether he had any relation-
10 ship with your company during the 1950's?
11 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember a Thomas Evans. Thomas
12 Evans?
13 Mr. Madigan. A CIA employee.
14 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall his name.
15 Mr. Madigan. I got sidetracked off of my question of
16 whether you recall a prosecution or an investigation of the
17 Onassis wiretap. You may have already have answered that.
18 Mr. Maheu. I think I did, yes.
19 Mr. Madigan. What did you say?
20 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I appeared before a
21 Grand Jury that was investigating Mr. Frank on another
22 matter.
23 Mr. Madigan. On another matter, but you had no recollection
24 of any investigation of that particular tap?
25 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

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1 Mr. Madigan. Either an investigation of you or Frank or
2 Leone or anyone?
3 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.
4 Mr. Madigan. No interviews by the FBI?
5 Mr. Maheu. It's conceivable, but I don't remember it.
6 Mr. Madigan. You don't remember it?
7 Mr. Maheu. No.
8 Mr. Madigan. Let's go off the record.
9 (Discussion off the record.)

tape 2a

10 Mr. Madigan. Did there come a time when you were asked
11 by the Central Intelligence Agency to be involved in a
12 project which would involve sending a woman by the name of
13 Florence Horn over to a foreign country?
14 Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.
15 Mr. Madigan. And what were you asked to do with regard
16 to that?
17 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I was asked to find
18 a woman, preferably from Los Angeles, who would agree to go to
19 a foreign country and under some pretext try to meet the
20 leader of the country and hopefully change his basic philosophies
21 which at the time were thought to be detrimental to the United
22 States, and that they were very, as a result, very seriously
23 jeopardizing the national security of the government of the
24 United States.
25 Mr. Madigan. Did you find such a woman?

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1 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

2 Mr. Madigan. And did the Agency sponsor her trip overseas,

3 that is the CIA?

4 Mr. Maheu. I placed her in touch with a representative

5 of the CIA. He made certain commitments, financial commitments

6 to her. At the completion of the assignment, she claimed that

7 she had additional funds coming to her which I paid out of my

8 own pocket, so that I guess a more accurate way of saying it is

9 that the Agency and I sponsored her trip.

10 Mr. Madigan. Did she ever get to meet the foreign leader,

11 whom we will call A?

12 Mr. Maheu. I do not have any recollection.

13 Mr. Madigan. You don't know whether she did or she

14 didn't?

15 Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection.

16 Mr. Madigan. Do you know how long she was gone?

17 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that she was gone for

18 several months.

19 Mr. Madigan. And this person is the woman I referred to

20 earlier by the name of Florence Horn, is that right?

21 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

22 Mr. Madigan. Now can you date that assignment as sometime

23 in 1956 or '57, does that sound about right, or do you have

24 any recollection of what year it was?

25 Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection. It was before

1 1960.

2 Mr. Madigan. It was sometime after you had begun in '54
3 with your Agency operation?

4 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

5 Mr. Madigan. Or your sponsorship?

6 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

7 Mr. Madigan. Subsequently, did this Leader "A" come to
8 the United States to your knowledge after this?

9 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall whether he came subsequently or
10 prior to.

11 Mr. Madigan. When the same leader did come to the United
12 States, were you involved in any assignment for the CIA with
13 regard to his presence in the country?

14 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I was.

15 Mr. Madigan. And what was that assignment?

16 Mr. Maheu. I was told by the State Department and the
17 CIA that this leader would be in need of female companions and
18 that the government was very much concerned that the type of
19 women that would be secured for him might eventually be very
20 destructive to the national security of the United States
21 government unless said women had been cleared by local police
22 departments in several of the cities in which he was scheduled
23 to travel.

24 Mr. Madigan. Who was the Agency representative that gave
25 you this assignment? Did you go through Mr. O'Connell, or was

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1 it someone different?

2 Mr. Maheu. This request emanated from, directly from the

3 State Department.

4 Mr. Madigan. Who in the State Department?

5 Mr. Maheu. Mr. Scott McCloud, who was then Director of

6 the Office of Security and Consular Affairs.

7 Mr. Madigan. Was it coordinated with the CIA, or was this

8 strictly between yourself and the State Department?

9 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the CIA was kept

10 apprised, however that the coordination was with the State

11 Department, in connection with the security that was being

12 provided for this leader during his visit to the United States.

13 Mr. Madigan. Did you meet with the State Department or

14 CIA people or both in New York City when the leader arrived

15 there?

16 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I met with Security

17 Personnel of the State Department.

18 Mr. Madigan. What did you do in New York for this

19 assignment?

20 (Pause)

21 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

22 Mr. Madigan. And did you meet with the New York police

23 with regard to the assignment?

24 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

25 Mr. Madigan. Did you obtain or send over any females over

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1 to the hotel that person A was staying at?

2 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

3 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you

4 did send girls over there?

5 Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

6 Mr. Madigan. Did you travel from New York to any other

7 city with this leader?

8 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I did.

9 Mr. Madigan. What occurred when you arrived at the other

10 cities?

11 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I contacted the

12 security representatives of the State Department.

13 Mr. Madigan. And after you contacted the security

14 representatives, what were you supposed to do in these other

15 cities?

16 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I, through local

17 Police Department officials or law enforcement officials, made

18 certain that the women who would gain access to the leader's

19 suite were such that they would not be a security risk insofar

20 as the national security of our government was concerned.

21 Mr. Madigan. Were these women that would not be a security

22 risk be women who the Police Department had some relationship

23 with?

24 Mr. Maheu. I don't know what you mean by relationship,

25 Mr. Madigan.

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1 Mr. Madigan. You indicated in our discussion yesterday
2 that the women that were allowed access, as you put it, to this
3 leader "A" were to be women that the police would have some
4 control over so that they would not be a possibility of a later
5 blackmail problem with the United States government, is that
6 not correct?
7 Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection, yes.
8 Mr. Madigan. Did you participate in sending these women
9 or providing these women over to the hotel where the leader
10 was staying?
11 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.
12 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you
13 did?
14 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
15 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday when I
16 asked you whether someone had travelled from city to city, you
17 indicated that you thought maybe one did, but you weren't sure
18 about how many others.
19 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
20 Mr. Madigan. How many cities did you visit during the
21 trip that this Leader "A" made?
22 Mr. Maheu. Several cities.
23 Mr. Madigan. Now were the women that were provided known
24 to you or represented to you as prostitutes in any of these
25 cities?

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1 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

2 Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that they

3 were?

4 Mr. Maheu. Do you recall yesterday identifying the

5 leader?

6 Mr. Madigan. I do.

7 Let's go off the record.

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 Mr. Madigan. According to your understanding, Mr. Maheu,

10 of the project that you were involved in with the State

11 Department in providing the women to this foreign leader in the

12 various cities starting from New York and going through the

13 other cities he stayed at, do you believe the women that were

14 sent over to his hotel were prostitutes?

15 Mr. Maheu. That they may have been, yes.

16 Mr. Madigan. And you did participate under instructions

17 of the government, to send these women over to his hotel or to

18 make them available to him at his hotel, not knowing what

19 happened after they got to the hotel?

20 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

21 Mr. Madigan. And that occurred in New York and the other

22 cities that he stayed at while he was in the United States?

23 Mr.Maheu. That is correct.

24 Mr. Madigan. And as far as these women travelling with

25 you from city to city, your recollection is that one may have --

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1 Mr. Maheu. No.

2 Mr. Madigan. But you did not bring a crowd of six or

3 seven.

4 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that any woman travelled

5 with me, may have travelled independently, but I have no

6 recollection of being on the same plane with any of these

7 people.

8 Mr. Madigan. You think may have traveled from city to

9 city, or four or five?

10 Mr. Maheu. One may have gone to one further city. That

11 is the best of my recollection.

12 Mr. Madigan. And the others that were provided in each

13 city were sort of local, so that they could be controlled,

14 more or less, by the local police?

15 Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

16 Mr. Madigan. Is that the theory of the project?

17 Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

18 Mr. Madigan. Now with regard to this same leader, did

19 you ever receive an assignment from the CIA to produce any

20 film with regard to him?

21 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

22 Mr. Madigan. Do you remember when that assignment was

23 in terms of whether it was before or after this visit to the

24 United States?

25 Mr. Maheu. Subsequent to his visit to the United States

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1 he made a trip to Russia. Our inputs were to the effect that
2 he brought back from Russia with him an attractive, Russian
3 agent, and that his philosophies relative to the United States
4 began to change appreciably and that the security of the United
5 States was in great jeopardy as a result of whatever influence
6 this female agent was able to have upon him.

7 Mr. Madigan. As a result of that, what assignment did you
8 receive, if any, from the CIA?

9 Mr. Maheu. As a result, I was asked if -- well, as a
10 result I was provided with pictures reflecting the quarters,
11 allegedly reflected the quarters to which she was assigned
12 during his trip to Russia, photographs of the female agent,
13 and I was asked if I could find some contacts in Los Angeles
14 who could produce a set resembling the headquarters reflected
15 on the pictures, a woman who looked like the female agent, a
16 male who looked like the leader, and take some pictures
17 subsequently showing them together within the confines of the
18 alleged headquarters.

19 Mr. Madigan. Did you recruit anybody to be in this
20 film?

21 Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

22 Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

23 Mr.Maheu. I recruited a man who was working for me in
24 Tucson, Arizona by the name of Charles Kays, a female agent
25 who was known to -- I mean a female who was known to the law

1 enforcement authorities in Los Angeles, and who resembled the
2 Russian female agent.

3 Mr. Madigan. Did you ever advertise in the newspaper for
4 that film?

5 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection. I can't believe that
6 where you would find the proper subjects, I don't believe so
7 no.

8 Mr. Madigan. Did the CIA provide the set for that, or
9 did you do the backdrop and all that business making it look
10 like it was in Moscow?

11 Mr. Maheu. The CIA provided me with photographs, and I
12 secured the services of a person in Los Angeles who was in the
13 industry on behalf of the CIA.

14 Mr. Madigan. Was that Bautzer?

15 Mr. Maheu. No, sir.

16 Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

17 Mr. Maheu. First I discussed the matter with Howard
18 Hughes and he recommended that I contact Mr. Larry Crosby, which
19 I did.

20 Mr. Madigan. Did Hughes have to approve your being
21 involved in this?

22 Mr. Maheu. I am not sure he had to approve. I was just
23 seeking his advice.

24 Mr. Madigan. You were more or less just telling him about
25 it?

Mr. Maheu. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Madigan. You were just telling him about it?

Mr. Maheu. No, Mr. Hughes had been in the industry, he had been in movie studios, I thought he could be helpful to this contract.

Mr. Madigan. Did you deal with O'Connell with regard to this contract or with somebody else?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I dealt with Mr. O'Connell and Colonel Edwards.

Mr. Madigan. Colonel Edwards?

Who was this person, the female who was known to --

Mr. Maheu. I really don't remember. The one and only time I have seen her in my life.

Mr. Madigan. Could this film have been described as a pornographic film, or was it something less than that?

Mr. Maheu. By today's technology, I would say definitely no.

Mr. Madigan. You say this woman was known to the law enforcement authorities. Was she suspected by yourself to be a prostitute?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. Not at all?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. She was just an actress of some kind?

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1 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall, but my recollection is she
2 was highly respected by the law enforcement authorities.
3 Whether she was an informant for them or what the relationship
4 was, I don't know.
5 Mr. Madigan. So you produced one film? One film
6 cannister as a result of this, movie film?
7 Mr. Maheu. Very short.
8 Mr. Madigan. Did you make any still photographs or
9 anything like that?
10 Mr. Maheu. No, I did not.
11 Mr. Madigan. And then you turned the film over to the
12 CIA?
13 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
14 Mr. Madigan. And thereafter do you know what happened
15 to it?
16 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
17 Mr. Madigan. Were you told what was going to be done
18 with it?
19 Mr. Maheu. I was told that the stills would be distributed
20 in the country of the leader in an attempt to embarrass him
21 and hopefully as a result remove what was considered to be a
22 very serious threat to the national security of our country.
23 Mr. Madigan. Were you ever familiar with the project names
24 that were attached to these assignments by the CIA?
25 Mr. Maheu. Not that I recollect, no.

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1 Mr. Madigan. Did you ever hear of project Happy Days?

2 Mr. Maheu. No.

3 Mr. Madigan. Or Project Harp Star?

4 Mr. Maheu. No.

5 Mr. Madigan. Or Project Norfok?

6 Mr. Maheu. No.

7 Mr. Madigan. Did you have an occasion to receive an

8 assignment from the CIA with regard to the leader of another

9 foreign country, who we will refer to as Leader "B"?

10 Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Madigan. What was your assignment in that regard?

12 Mr. Maheu. I was told that said leader would be visiting

13 Los Angeles, that he was enthralled with Hollywood and asked

14 if I could find someone to have a party, preferably in a

15 private home, with a reasonably large attendance on his behalf

16 during his trip to Los Angeles.

17 Mr. Madigan. And who did you contact with regard to that?

18 Mr. Maheu. I contacted Mr. Gregson Bautzer.

19 Mr. Madigan. Is that B-a-u-t-z-e-r?

20 Mr. Maheu. B-a-u-t-z-e-r, a Hollywood attorney.

21 Mr. Madigan. And did he hold the party that you refer to?

22 Mr. Maheu. Yes, he did.

23 Mr. Madigan. Was part of your assignment to line up a

24 woman who was to try and associate herself with this leader?

25 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the intent was to

1 have young movie starlets present at the party, but I do not
2 have any recollection of receiving any instructions stating
3 that, for instance, one specific person was to be his date, if
4 that's what you're --
5 Mr. Madigan. So your understanding was to have a number
6 available at the party, that's all. Not to have anyone --
7 Mr. Maheu. To have the party, period.
8 Mr. Madigan. Not to introduce one to him?
9 Mr. Maheu. That is correct.
10 I did not go to the party. I do not know who all was
11 there. I do recall that there were quite a few people present
12 and again, my recollection is that since this particular
13 leader was enthralled with Hollywood that the intent was to
14 have present people who -- with whom he would have an opportunity
15 to converse concerning his interests in the movie industry,
16 and the making of movies, and talk to not only starlets, but
17 I believe that some male stars were also invited to the party.
18 Mr. Madigan. As a result of the party, did the leader
19 associate himself with one particular female?
20 Mr. Maheu. I was subsequently told that as a result of
21 the -- having met a young starlet at the party, that he
22 subsequently invited her to spend time with him in his country.
23 Mr. Madigan. Were you ever asked to be involved in
24 providing a house in Long Island for him to stay at with this
25 particular female?

1 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I was asked.

2 Mr. Madigan. Do you know who that person was?

3 Mr. Maheu. I do not recall the name.

4 Mr. Madigan. You indicated that your recollection was

5 that there was some embarrassment later on with regard to this

6 female?

7 Mr. Maheu. I was subsequently told that at a subsequent

8 date after he had taken this person with him to his country

9 there was some embarrassment because it turned out that the

10 leader was from an Arabic country and that the young starlet

11 was of Jewish extraction.

12 Mr. Madigan. Was your assignment in that regard solely

13 to set up the one party, was that the end of it?

14 Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection of it, yes.

15 Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with

16 regard to that Leader "B"?

17 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection.

18 Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with

19 regard to Leader "A"?

20 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

21 Mr. Madigan. Did you undertake any other Agency assignments

22 with regard to any other leader of any other country?

23 Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

24 Mr. Madigan. Does the name Susan Cabot mean anything to

25 you with regard to that assignment in Los Angeles?

Mr. Maheu. That name is familiar, yes, now that you mention it.

Mr. Madigan. Do you think she might have been the person?

Mr. Maheu. I think she might have been, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you contact Howard Hughes with regard to that assignment?

Mr. Maheu. No, I did not. However, Mr. Bautzer was, in those days, Mr. Hughes' personal attorney.

Mr. Madigan. Would you date that party assignment as being around 1959?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. It was before 1960, but that would sound approximately right.

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever have your office in Washington used for cover purposes by the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I have.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know on how many occasions?

Mr. Maheu. On several occasions.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know what the purpose of the agent that would be using it for cover was?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that my role was limited simply to fund their income. In other words, they would be on the payroll of Robert A. Maheu Associates and that I would be reimbursed the exact amount of their payroll.

As to the specific assignments, I have no recollection.

Mr. Madigan. What types of duties would they have for

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1 an employee who was working in Ecuador at some point in their
2 career?
3 Mr. Maheu. Yes, we did.
4 Mr. Madigan. Would you recall that to be around 1968,
5 or do you have a specific recollection?
6 Mr. Maheu. It would be about that time.
7 Mr. Madigan. About that time.
8 Mr. Maheu. Yes.
9 Mr. Madigan. And did you ever hear of the name Peletier
10 with regard to that cover arrangement? P-e-l-e-t-i-e-r?
11 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. My recollection is that the
12 guy's name was Mike Marrage or Milrage, but I don't recall
13 the name Peletier. Perhaps he was placed on the payroll as
14 Peletier, but I don't recall.
15 Mr. Madigan. You did not address him as Peletier?
16 Mr. Maheu. No, not to my recollection.
17 Mr. Madigan. What was he supposed to be doing in Ecuador,
18 do you know?
19 Mr. Maheu. Covertly or overtly?
20 Mr. Madigan. Both.
21 Let's start with covertly.
22 Mr. Maheu. Covertly he was -- he had an assignment from
23 the Agency which I don't know. Overtly he was an employee of
24 Robert A. Maheu Associates trying to exploit the possibility
25 of business ventures in the country of Ecuador.

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1 Mr. Madigan. You have no inclination or no feeling at
2 all for what his assignment was?
3 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
4 Mr. Madigan. In covert terms whether it was an espionage
5 assignment or whether it was a PR kind of assignment? No idea?
6 Mr. Maheu. I don't know.
7 Mr. Madigan. Was there ever an island involved with that
8 assignment to your knowledge?
9 Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge or recollection.
10 Mr. Madigan. You never heard of an island called
11 [Peletier], have you?
12 Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.
13 Mr. Madigan. During the 1960's did you employ a fellow
14 by the name of Jack Buckley? We may have discussed this
15 before.
16 Mr. Maheu. I believe that from time to time a Jack
17 Buckley did work for Robert A. Maheu Associates. I don't
18 believe he was an employee.
19 Mr. Madigan. Would he be on a kind of an intermittent
20 contract basis like Frank was? You would use him every once in
21 awhile?
22 Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that he did some work for
23 Robert A. Maheu Associates and, as I say, not an employee.
24 Mr. Madigan. Do you know what types of assignments he
25 did?

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1 Mr. Liebengood. Mr. Mort Jackson?

2 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember his name.

3 Mr. Madigan. Mort Jackson being an attorney --

4 Mr. Liebengood. -- in Los Angeles.

5 Mr. Al Long of the Secret Service?

6 Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

7 Mr. Liebengood. Mr. Jack Bauman, formerly of the Central

8 Intelligence Agency, a resident of Florida.

9 Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

10 Mr. Liebengood. Mr. Jack Stewart?

11 Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

12 Mr. Liebengood. James McCord?

13 Mr. Maheu. Only what I saw in the newspapers.

14 Mr. Liebengood. But you had no dealings with him while

15 you were in Washington?

16 Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.

17 Mr. Madigan. Just briefly, in that regard, we discussed

18 yesterday whether you had any recollection of Mr. McCord

19 being involved -- or at least I think we discussed it -- in any

20 either sweeping of your office or electronic equipment or

21 using of your office as a listening post or anything like that?

22 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember.

23 Mr. Madigan. And your indication was you didn't have

24 any recollection?

25 Mr. Maheu. No.

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1 payroll, and for the second time I was turned down by Mr.
2 Hughes. I believe it was in September of 1969 that I finally
3 called Mr. Meier in and requested his resignation and then
4 I informed Mr. Hughes that he had resigned.
5 After the departure of Mr. Meier, while going through his
6 files, Mr. Ellson ran into some documents that indicated some
7 very serious double escrows on mining properties and we
8 recommended to Mr. Hughes that all the information be made
9 available to the authorities and let the chips fall where they
10 may.
11 Mr. Liebengood. Do you know why Mr. Hughes was not inclined
12 to follow your recommendations with regards to Meier's termina-
13 tion at earlier dates?
14 Mr. Maheu. He was afraid that Meier would embarrass him.
15 At least, that is what he told me.
16 Mr. Liebengood. You are aware of no CIA interest in
17 Meier?
18 Mr. Maheu. The only thing I know is that Meier was cut
19 in on the cover of Mike Mihrage in Ecuador and was aware of
20 that operation.
21 Mr. Liebengood. How did that come about? How was he
22 cut in on that?
23 Mr. Maheu. Because it was he who initially had worked on
24 a deal for a venture in Mexico on the part of Hughes Aircraft
25 for cable television and subsequent to -- well, when that

1 collapsed, the person who was to be the partner of Hughes
2 Aircraft in that particular venture threatened to sue Howard
3 Hughes and all of the Hughes interest for non-fulfillment of
4 contract, and I made a recommendation to that person whose
5 name slips my mind, but I believe his last name was Jamie,
6 J-a-m-i-e or something like that, I don't recall. But to try
7 to discourage him from filing such a lawsuit I suggested that
8 he and I put up $10,000 in Ecuador and check into the
9 possibility of developing business there.

10 I put up my ten, he never put his up, and Meier was the
11 one who was involved. But when the Agency needed a cover for
12 an assignment in Ecuador, Meier was made privy of this by the
13 Agency.

tape 3b

14 Mr. Liebengood. Just to be certain I understand, this
15 was because of Meier's role in reestablishing the operation
16 in Ecuador? Is that correct?

17 Mr. Maheu. Well, of trying to save the lawsuit, yes.
18 That's right.

19 Mr. Liebengood. And you think the name of this would-be
20 partner was Jamie?

21 Mr. Maheu. I don't remember whether that was the first
22 name or last name.

23 Mr. Liebengood. How did Mihrage, whatever way do you
24 spell his last name, do you recall?

25 Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

1 Mr. Liebengood. Do you know who accompanied Meier and
2 F. Donald Nixon on this trip to the Dominican Republic, the
3 celebrated trip?
4 Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.
5 Mr. Liebengood. As far as you know, they had nothing to
6 do with any Agency interest in that?
7 Mr. Maheu. No, sir, not as far as I know.
8 As a matter of fact, it's my recollection I found out
9 about this afterwards.
10 Mr. Liebengood. Who else was witting of the cover
11 arrangements that you had with the Agency through Robert A.
12 Maheu Associates? You mentioned Meier and this particular
13 one. Did you have other employees who were witting of the
14 cover?
15 Mr. Maheu. I believe Bill Staton was aware of some of
16 it.
17 Mr. Liebengood. And did he keep your books?
18 Mr. Maheu. Yes.
19 Mr. Liebengood. And outside of the Mihrage cover, Meier was
20 not witting of any other cover arrangements, I take it?
21 Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge.
22 Mr. Liebengood. Do you recall who the other personnel were
23 through the years that obtained Robert A. Maheu Associates
24 cover for the Agency?
25 Mr. Maheu. I don't.

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Deposition of

OF

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Langley, Virginia

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Spoken words fly- written words endure

TM

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SECRET

A

C O N T E N T S

SECRET

1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

2 ON CIA ACTIVITIES

3 - - -

4 Langley, Virginia

5 Wednesday, April 16, 1975

6 Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for

7 examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities,

8 the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary

9 Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the

10 Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50

11 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings

12 being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and

13 transcribed under her direction.

14 APPEARANCES:

15 On behalf of the Commission:

16 GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

17 ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Thereupon,

3 WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

4 called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA

5 Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:

7 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the

10 record?

11 A William C. Sturbitts.

12 Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some

13 weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and

14 Waiver"?

15 A Right.

16 Q You understand that document is still in effect?

17 A Sure.

18 Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

19 A You mean the Agency or --

20 Q That is right.

21 A Central Intelligence Agency.

22 Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

23 A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for

24 Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

25 Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

1 your employment with the Agency?

2 A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence

3 Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special

4 detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans,

5 which is now the Directorate of Operations.

6 Q What year were you put on that detail?

7 A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

8 Q And what did that detail involve?

9 A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

10 Q And how long were you on that detail?

11 A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

12 Q Between 1964 and 1973?

13 A (Nods in affirmative.)

14 Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

15 A Yes, January.

16 Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Were you stationed in Washington?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected

23 with the operations of the Miami Station?

24 A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide.

25 I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

1 Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

2 Q Run out of --

3 A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones

4 were run out of Europe.

5 Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect

6 to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the

7 operations of the Miami base?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

10 A Yes, sir.

11 Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban

12 operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami

13 Station?

14 A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he

15 was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know

16 it. Well, I will come back to that.

17 Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

18 Q What years was he Chief?

19 A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He

20 left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's

21 say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline.

22 He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

23 Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which

24 you were assigned for the 9-year period?

25 A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q. All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

1 heard?

2 A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

3 Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

4 A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other

5 people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time,

6 in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace

7 and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations

8 took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of

9 thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody

10 was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

11 Q This was in Paris?

12 A Yes.

13 Q I see.

14 Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

15 A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff.

16 He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with

17 Cuban military-type.

18 Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received

19 instructions with respect to this activity from another

20 component of the Government?

21 A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether

22 they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty

23 positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision.

24 And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was

25 overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

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1 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided,
2 he did a number of things.
3 Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall
4 in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of
5 Fidel Castro was discussed?
6 A No, not really.
7 Q You referred to this as the first occasion.
8 A This is the first --
9 Q Was there a second?
10 A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it
11 discussed.
12 Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently
13 underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation
14 -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came
15 to your attention after this discussion in the garden in
16 Paris?
17 A The only other thing that came to my attention was
18 that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight
19 that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know,
20 but that is what I was told.
21 Q When did you learn that?
22 A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964,
23 around February, something like that.
24 Q Off the record.
25 (Discussion off the record.)

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1 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

2 BY MR. MANFREDI:

3 Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by

4 the name of Frank Sturgis?

5 A Indeed.

6 Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in

7 the press?

8 A No. It is what is contained in the files.

9 Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files,

10 particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division,

11 in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any

12 connection with the Agency?

13 A I have.

14 Q What were the results of that search?

15 A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

16 Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about

17 an employment relationship?

18 A That is what I am speaking of.

19 Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of

20 the Agency?

21 A No.

22 Q Was he ever a contract employee?

23 A No.

24 Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

25 A No.

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

3 BY MR. MANFREDI:

4 Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr.

5 Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

6 A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

7 Q And what is the volume of that material?

8 A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee

9 called for them the other day after the article in the paper,

10 I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and

11 they returned them Monday afternoon.

12 Q Do you know who examined those files?

13 A No, I don't.

14 Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts

15 the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

16 A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits

17 of so-called information.

18 Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged

19 narcotics traffic?

20 A Recently it has been.

21 Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office

22 in Miami?

23 A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami

24 to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the

25 FBI.

1 Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an
2 established contact?
3 A No manner.
4 Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to
5 collect information from Mr. Sturgis?
6 A I can't speak to that but the records that we have
7 don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact
8 somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file
9 on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin
10 American Division before they did anything since we do hold
11 the file.
12 Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?
13 A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any
14 information relating to an individual appearing in the press
15 as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.
16 Q Personnel or personality file?
17 A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.
18 Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection
19 or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?
20 A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know
21 each other. They have to know each other from their days
22 in Cuba.
23 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
24 pated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?
25 A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

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1 activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during
2 your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during
3 your 9-year tenure with those groups.
4 A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board
5 intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign
6 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary
7 activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about
8 the breadth of the thing.
9 Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?
10 A Right.
11 Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary
12 operations. Were these operations run out of southern
13 Florida?
14 A Right.
15 Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of
18 the country that participated in these activities?
19 A Not to my knowledge.
20 Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami
21 that were used in these activities?
22 A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As
23 I said, we did have a Key West base.
24 Q Were there any other bases in that area of the
25 country that were utilized in these operations?

1 A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have

2 training facilities for the UDT teams.

3 Q What is a UDT team?

4 A Underwater demolition.

5 Q Where were those bases located?

6 A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys,

7 along that long peninsula going down there. There were a

8 number of sites. I really can't recall them.

9 Q Were there any other sites within the United States

10 in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people

11 participating in these activities?

12 A Not to my knowledge.

13 Q Where were these people trained?

14 A What do you mean?

15 Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

16 A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys.

17 Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained

18 at the Domestic Training Station.

19 Q Where is that located?

20 A That is down in Virginia.

21 Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these

22 raids?

23 A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to

24 understand at this time that we had a great many contract

25 employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

1 Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community
2 in Miami? Do you have any idea?
3 A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is
4 probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a
5 military people.
6 Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert
7 action. How do you distinguish between those two categories
8 of activities?
9 A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The
10 paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days
11 we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was
12 media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-
13 type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel
14 seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a
15 Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in
16 the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings
17 that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned
18 in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them
19 because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was
20 -- they were stolen, in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was
21 forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.
22 We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them
23 hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.
24 He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them
25 in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

1 type of thing.

2 Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

3 A Yes, covert action.

4 Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-

5 type operations?

6 A Yes.

7 Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

8 A Yes.

9 Q What other types of harassment activities did you

10 run that would fall under this covert action category?

11 A Well --

12 Q Would economic warfare be --

13 A That was sort of something separate unto itself.

14 This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a

15 decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

16 Q What special group is that?

17 A It is now called the Forty Committee.

18 Q Is that 302 Committee?

19 A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all,

20 it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then

21 it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between

22 there and now it is the Forty Committee.

23 Q All right. We will return to that a little bit

24 later, but what other types of harassment were you running

25 against Castro --

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1 A This is what I was trying to think of.

2 Q -- that would be considered covert action?

3 A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement,
4 media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't
5 remember. I know we had a number of things going against him.
6 We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some
7 extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply,
8 particularly when they were countries that we had treaties
9 with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

10 Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said
11 you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you
12 referring to?

13 A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we
14 were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal
15 activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would
16 phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control
17 regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the
18 Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of
19 Commerce, the Export Control people.

20 I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally
21 U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of
22 thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying
23 to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where
24 we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we
25 or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

1 the market.

2 Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

3 A Yes.

4 Q -- domestic market?

5 A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

6 Q In all cases?

7 A The cases that I was associated with, it was all

8 sold abroad.

9 Q What kind of purchases were made?

10 A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased

11 some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

12 Q What?

13 A Bright Stock.

14 Q What is that?

15 A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of

16 her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical

17 commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar,

18 melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this

19 type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So

20 we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for

21 which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually

22 sold in Africa.

23 Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that

24 were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

25 A No.

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dilion?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturer well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

1 our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was
2 on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the
3 extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know
4 it was one of the parts of the program.

5 Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are
6 referring to?

7 A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they
8 weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a
9 gray area some place.

10 Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international
11 law, the laws of the United States?

12 A I would have to go back and review the thing. I
13 really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

14 Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

15 A I would think probably down in the Records Center some
16 place.

17 Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some
18 time during the lunch hour?

19 A No. It is forty miles away.

20 Q Well, is there some place in the building where
21 you could refresh your memory?

22 A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped.
23 This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material
24 has been retired.

25 Q What category of activity would we be talking about

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

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1 Cuban propaganda?

2 A Not to my knowledge.

3 Q And that would include both the publications and the

4 radio?

5 A Right.

6 Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of

7 moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of

8 economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

9 A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the

10 regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We

11 worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in

12 the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I

13 guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from

14 about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like

15 that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept

16 saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and

17 we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because

18 some of our own island assets told us they were out there cuttin

19 this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day,

20 this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was

21 lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any

22 place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he

23 could.

24 So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in

25 New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

1 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

2 Q We have spoken about the investment American business

3 had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American

4 organized crime --

5 A No.

6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in

8 Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

9 Q The casinos were run --

10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force

11 during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this

12 type of thing.

13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

14 A It was a criminal element.

15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

16 A Right.

17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist

18 the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner

19 whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

20 A No.

21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

22 A Oh, yes.

23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either

25 Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

1 A Well, we used all-source information to find out what
2 his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for
3 instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned
4 by the General Services Administration, finally got back into
5 production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short
6 supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was
7 buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this
8 French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to
9 the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control
10 people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these
11 le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked
12 into the thing and indeed they did.
13 Q Who owned the mine?
14 A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it
15 over.
16 Q I see.
17 A General Services Administration. And it was leased
18 out for operation. But the ownership rested with the
19 Government.
20 So the Treasury simply made the French provide a
21 Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they
22 export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives
23 and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless
24 steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply
25 -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

1 they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's
2 representatives around the world if they got any orders from
3 the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

4 We did the same thing with --

5 Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg
6 compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

7 A No.

8 Q Were they compensated for the loss of business
9 involved in that activity?

10 A No. No.

11 Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from
12 other companies.

13 A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

14 Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in
15 that manner?

16 A No. Not a one.

17 Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any
18 companies?

19 A No. No.

20 Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought
21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with
22 Cuba?

23 A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with
24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country
25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q [redacted: The Keys] would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were
2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return
3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.
4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.
5 A Yes.
6 Q What do you mean by that?
7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify
8 him and capture him.
9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that
10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the
11 Forty Committee?
12 A Every operation received a specific approval from
13 the Forty Committee.
14 Q In advance?
15 A In advance.
16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for
17 initiating such an operation?
18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.
19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.
20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.
21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,
22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have
23 one of these operations and the request would go from here
24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty
25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

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1 tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one
2 of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother
3 ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to
4 see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore
5 before you go. So he may have considered that all these train-
6 ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-
7 pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

8 Q Now, from what specific locations were these
9 operations launched?

10 A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

11 Q Any other locations?

12 A Not to my knowledge.

13 Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and
14 run sabotage operations that were conducted?

15 A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against
16 the Texaco refinery.

17 Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

18 A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

19 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

20 (Discussion off the record.)

21 THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning
22 went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.
23 We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this
24 type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It
25 was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

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1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as
2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out
3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type
4 of operation that we did.

5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn
6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we
7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and
8 exfiltrations.

9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

10 A Not to my knowledge.

11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that
13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him
14 back. He wouldn't walk.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out
20 of the Keys other than what you have just described?

21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage
22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained
23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down
24 crank cases. Things of this nature.

25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

1 all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our
2 own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We
3 contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped
4 it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.
5 The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the
6 automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking
7 down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have
8 everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive
9 equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because
10 Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to
11 extend the credit.
12 The railroad system was in total disaster. The
13 Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus
14 the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment
15 because they were used to good American equipment. And these
16 were principal targets that we were trying to get to.
17 Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of
18 any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run
19 from a base in the United States?
20 A No.
21 Q I know there has been some paramilitary training
22 in the United States.
23 A Oh, yes.
24 Q In connection with other operations.
25 A Oh, sure.

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys?

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

1 Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

2 A Yes.

3 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

6 BY MR. MANFREDI:

7 Q Are there any other operations in which crops were

8 -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

9 A No. No.

10 Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

11 A In Cuban products?

12 Q Yes.

13 A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in

14 those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel.

15 The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total

16 chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have

17 anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving.

18 There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around

19 with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of

20 experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there.

21 I forget -- several other European and American companies that

22 had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-

23 ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

24 Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to

25 Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

1 directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of
2 overseas communications.
3 Q Of course, we have [FR] bases and DCD offices and
4 Office of Security officers, and so forth.
5 A Right.
6 Q But I am talking about actual stations.
7 A Operating stations, no.
8 Q This is the only such station in the United States
9 as far as you know, is that correct?
10 A Right.
11 Q And was this station established to deal primarily
12 with Cuban activities?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Cuban-related matters?
15 A With Cuba, period.
16 Q Did it have, when it was established, any other
17 responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?
18 A Not to my knowledge.
19 Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?
20 A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other
21 countries in the Hemisphere.
22 Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban
23 activities, what was the size or the number of personnel
24 attached to that Station?
25 A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a

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1 couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the
2 Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees,
3 independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was
4 obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its
5 height it had over 500 people in it.

6 Q Full-time Agency people?

7 A No, no.

8 Q Combination of contract and --

9 A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a sta[illegible]
10 employee.

11 Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract
12 people?

13 A Yes.

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14 Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

15 A Oh, yes.

16 Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in
17 Miami? Physical facilities.

18 A Well, they were located on the south campus of the
19 University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at
20 the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained
21 unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn
22 well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the
23 Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

24 Q Official cover?

25 A No. Non-official.

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1 Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

2 A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first

3 one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a

4 President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

5 Q Engaging in any business?

6 A No.

7 Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community,

8 how long could a non-official cover last?

9 A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research

10 activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put

11 one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing,

12 for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

13 Q Yes, I understand.

14 A So it was a research activity and the only people that

15 ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You

16 know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept

17 any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this

18 type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of

19 this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumera-

20 ble other covers with different activities. The guard

21 force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar

22 to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think

23 that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the

24 Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other

25 Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

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1 Q And this particular Station, then, was under the
2 supervision of the group we have been discussing?
3 A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.
4 Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume
5 responsibilities for the Miami Station?
6 A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the
7 Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western
8 Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.
9 Q Is there presently a Miami Station?
10 A Oh, yes.
11 Q And how large is it at the present time?
12 A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the
13 Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present
14 time because we are in one of these periods where we are
15 reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year
16 there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.
17 Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions
18 were being performed by the Miami Station?
19 A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I
20 think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of
21 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this
22 type of thing. Covert action.
23 Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in
24 the deposition?
25 A Yes.

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1 Q Which of these activities, if any of them were
2 actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?
3 A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably
4 counterintelligence.
5 Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence
6 activities in the Miami area?
7 A Yes, sir.
8 Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counter-
9 intelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting
10 in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?
11 A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I
12 recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that
13 came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a
14 number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a recep-
15 tion center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation.
16 The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and
17 we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration
18 and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the
19 preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill
20 out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-
21 type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would
22 look at the forms and based on previous experience or what
23 they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they
24 might have some information of intelligence value, they would
25 reinterrogate them.

1 It was in this manner that this gal came to our
2 knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined
3 that obviously she was receiving messages and she was
4 sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance
5 on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and
6 indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock
7 or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found
8 it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that
9 was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved
10 in.

11 Q. Were there many activities of that type?

12 A. Not really. You have got to remember that the
13 Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large
14 squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, some-
15 thing like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of
16 hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty nega-
17 tive. This was one of the reasons that obviously from --
18 in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts
19 which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting
20 to Case Officers and they would report on things in the
21 community, of people they thought were suspect and this type
22 of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau
23 and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved
24 in CI activity.

25 Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world. . .

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

1 Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

2 A. Cuban exiles.

3 Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

4 A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures

5 but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

6 Q. Go ahead.

7 A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

8 Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the

9 three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

10 A. No.

11 Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami

12 Station?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

15 A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were --

16 they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed

17 by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin

18 American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another

19 smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under

20 another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it

21 was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly

22 owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted,

23 incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

24 Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly,

25 were paid by the CIA?

1 A. That is right.

2 Q And was training provided them by the Agency?

3 Q Oh, yes.

4 A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made

5 up the [REDACTED] conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to

8 debriefings?

9 A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles

10 or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their

11 time here had acquired new information.

12 Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings

13 conducted?

14 A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa

15 Loca.

16 Q. That is the Air Base?

17 A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the

18 reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

19

20 Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had

21 a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into

22 small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them

23 down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any

24 interference and this type of thing.

25 Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

1 A. You mean in terms of years?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from

4 about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course --

5 we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out

6 and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off

7 about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

8 Q. I see.

9 A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just

10 terminated that part of the activity.

11 Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came

12 in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other

13 intelligence gathering functions --

14 A. No.

15 Q. In the community?

16 A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I

17 would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could

18 have been used to debrief people within the community, within

19 the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these

20 people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an

21 On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he

22 had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people

23 were directly under his control. Though the organization as it

24 was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing,

25 but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were debriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

1 Q. How large was that particular group?

2 A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside,

3 I think there were about five debriefers with the support people

4 which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative

5 types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15

6 in that group, if there were that many.

7 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

8 (Off the record discussion)

9 BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

10 Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS,

11 could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in

12 resettling Cuban emigres?

13 A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

14 Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

15 A. Health, Education and Welfare.

16 Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

17 A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole

18 airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when

19 you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the

20 Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were

21 processed through the Center and then they had a place down on

22 Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of

23 course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to

24 stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and

25 care for them in Freedom House.

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. [illegible] there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment, we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

1 purposes other than recruitment?

2 A. Well --

3 Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these

4 files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible

5 internal security problem?

6 A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We

7 would simply task them with through your sources what do you

8 have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we

9 wanted the information on anybody.

10 Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several

11 million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to

12 make generalizations about the kind of information that is in

13 those files?

14 A. Well, that is right.

15 Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask

16 you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of

17 these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as deroga-

18 tory information?

19 A. I would assume so.

20 Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects

21 of those files may now be American citizens?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to

24 study that particular situation?

1 You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel,
2 whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their
3 names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these
4 are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards
5 were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them
6 at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with
7 what the machine system had to see if there was updated informa-
8 tion in the machine system that would show that this guy had
9 become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --
10 Q. Excuse me, off the record.
11 (Off the record discussion)
12 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.
13 BY MR. MANFREDI:
14 Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind
15 where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are
16 presently here in Washington?
17 A. The cards and what is left of the files.
18 Q. That is the soft cover files?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And --
21 A. I assume they are either here or down at the
22 Records Center.
23 Q. And where is the computer system?
24 A. You mean our machine system? We have --

1 information on the cards?

2 A. Right down on the third floor.

3 Q. That is not the hydro system?

4 A. Oh, no, no.

5 Q. This is a separate --

6 A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division

7 uses this particular system.

8 Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

9 The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I thought they were going out in June.

12 A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

13 Q. I see.

14 A. But they have all been let go. They were let go --

15 they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to

16 go find a job.

17 Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in

18 Miami at this time?

19 A. no.

20 Q. So there are no records in Miami?

21 A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

22 Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities

23 in the Miami community?

24 A. No. No.

1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that

3 was not doing debriefings?

4 A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would

5 send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere

6 to train some of the local services in those countries. They

7 served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in

8 listening posts where we had audio --

9 Q. Foreign listening posts?

10 A. Oh, yes, foreign.

11 Q. Any domestic listening posts?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

14 A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall

15 don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but

16 to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance

17 conducted by them.

18 Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record,

19 I don't know where it could be.

20 Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they

21 conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

22 A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban

23 community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-

Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

1 agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies
2 up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the
3 Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess
4 about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they
5 started to tighten up.

6 I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing
7 alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when
8 there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these
9 militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked
10 up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau,
11 this type of thing.

12 Q. These people were arrested?

13 A. Oh, yes.

14 Q. Prosecuted?

15 A. Not really.

16 Q. Any of them American citizens?

17 A. Not to my knowledge.

18 Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

19 A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they
20 are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't
21 know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on
22 so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here.
23 He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever
24 served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted

1 I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went
2 to jaul or not.
3 Q Other than identifying operations by militant anti-
4 Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS
5 engage in?
6 A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence --
7 I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest
8 at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.
9 Q Cubans were?
10 A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well
11 on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and
12 young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't
13 -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to
14 identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.
15 Q Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?
16 A. With the Bureau, yes.
17 Q Because of their manpower limitations you folks were
18 in a better position to do it?
19 A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big
20 factor.
21 Q And this was conducted through the AMOTS?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q How substantial was the counterintelligence operation
24 in the community?

1 would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did
2 come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the
3 Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens
4 to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know
5 the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as
6 well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

7 Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities
8 were they engaging in?

9 A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in
10 electronic intercept.

11 Q. Where was that done?

12 A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

13 Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What ere they intercepting?

16 A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the
17 commo. for the infiltration.

18 As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made
19 available to intercept Cuban Communications. NSA tasks them with
20 the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications
21 nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another
22 important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards,
23 sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior
24 network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage

1 Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin require
2 ments on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently
3 because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in
4 what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular
5 operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans
6 were doing, then we would task our people with that.
7 For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into
8 Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then
9 there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was.
10 But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the
11 boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when
12 it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As
13 a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200
14 Cuban troops.
15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
16 (Off the record discussion)
17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.
18 BY MR. MANFREDI:
19 Q. Were the communications they were intercepting
20 exclusively foreign communications?
21 A. Exclusively foreign communications.
22 Q Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus
23 of which was the United States?
24 A. No.

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A. Right.

1 Q. On the Island?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

6 A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

7 (Off the record discussion)

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the

10 intercept of any communications, either that facility or else-

11 where, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Of other communications?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

16 A. (Nods affirmative)

17 Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike

18 that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances,

19 breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have

20 discussed --

21 A. No sir.

22 -- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

23 A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

24 (Off the record discussion)

WARD & PAUL

...rst Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS

3 has been prepared by one of your members.

4 A. That is right.

5 Q. What is his name?

6 A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last

7 name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have

8 to get that for you.

9 Q. What is the title of the study?

10 A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical

11 series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The

12 AMOT Organization."

13 Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

14 A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What

15 we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside

16 what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things

17 the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-

18 wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. At intervening periods of time.

21 Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

22 A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

23 Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

24 A. Yes.

activities of the [AMORS?].

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

1 MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

2 BY MR. OLSEN:

3 Q Can you begin, since I have not been in on the begin-
4 ning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts,
5 by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your
6 contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere
7 withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

8 A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff
9 which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the
10 Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in
11 a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

12 Q Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

13 A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

14 Q And who was his immediate superior?

15 A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was
16 Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

17 Q Deputy Director for Plans?

18 A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

19 Q What period of time are we talking about now?

20 A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

21 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

22 (Off the record discussion)

23 BY MR. OLSEN:

24 Q So you were not involved in this Special Activities
25 during the 1959 to '61 period?

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

1 Q. YOu mean a source of --

2 A. Source of information of another agent. Another

3 agency agent.

4 Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

5 A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but

6 it is entirely possible that that could have happened without

7 being a matter of record.

8 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance what-

9 ever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any

10 kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

11 A. To my knowledge, nothing.

12 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence

13 whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or

14 indirectly by the Agency?

15 A. To my knowledge, no.

16 Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer

17 to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that

18 you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the

19 basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

20 A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

21 Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with

22 the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all,

23 can you tell us when that began in 1963?

24 A. When the Special Activities Group --

1 Group began?

2 A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

3 Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of

4 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been

5 involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United

6 States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being

7 sponsored by the Agency?

8 A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to

11 have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro

12 factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the

13 CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these

14 fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency

15 or the U.S. Government.

16 Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear

17 to be otherwise?

18 A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this

19 type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that

20 it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface

21 itself.

22 Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr.

23 Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be

24 involved in the CIA organizations?

1 Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami
2 area?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere
5 in the United States? I am asking now particularly with
6 reference to New Orleans.
7 A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am
8 really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was
9 sort of a sideshow to Miami.
10 Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the
11 same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded
12 by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?
13 A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had
14 the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for
15 subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through
16 New Orleans.
17 Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean
18 by that?
19 A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we
20 were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of
21 income for them to continue what they were doing. A great
22 number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select
23 people were -- well, they were selected and then they were
24 talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or

whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

1 to get the funding through to the organizations.

2 These people were normally prominent people and --

3 Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through

4 the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

5 A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend

6 of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity

7 and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this

8 type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and

9 the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend

10 you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is

11 the way the funding went into the fronts.

12 Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people

13 in New Orleans?

14 A. I would think so. I believe so.

15 Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom

16 that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be

17 involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

18 A. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with

20 the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance

21 to Cubans or Cuban groups?

22 A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had

23 a great many people that did this.

24 Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

1 A. This I do not know either.

2 Q. Pardon?

3 A. This I don't know.

4 BY MR. MANFREDI:

5 Q. Where would that information be available?

6 A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was

7 down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

8 Q. Is he in the building?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is his name?

11 A. Bill Kent.

12 Q. Bill Kent?

13 A. Yes.

14 BY MR. OLSEN:

15 Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

16 A. He is still with the DDO.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

19 A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I

20 think Career Management Group Staff.

21 Q. Is he officed near you?

22 A. No. He is down in the basement.

23 BY MR. OLSEN:

24 Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you know wheher -- do you know the identity of any

5 of them in New Orleans?

6 A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took

7 place in New Orleans.

8 Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary

9 for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

10 A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

11 Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago

12 but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

13 I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963

14 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern

15 United States, talked about and believed that they were involved

16 in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

17 A. That is right.

18 Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression

19 that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in

20 the southern United States about plans or prospects for the

21 assassination of Fidel Castro?

22 A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have

23 got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost

24 their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

1 Q. That is Fiedl Castro?
2 A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do
3 anything they could to get rid of him.
4 Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among
5 these Cubans?
6 A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was
7 a lot of talk about that.
8 Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of
9 such conversations?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to
12 you?
13 A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the
14 source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the
15 Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing
16 that this subject always came up. What were they going to do
17 with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type
18 of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the
19 Cuban exile community was discussing.
20 Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the
21 Agency in 1963?
22 A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in
23 '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the
24 DDP.
25 Q. This is your best recollection --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with

3 Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries

4 engaged --

5 A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

6 Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Never met him?

9 A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

10 Q. You would not have known anything about his where-

11 abouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

12 A. Can we go off the record?

13 (Off the record discussion.)

14 THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

15 BY MR. OLSEN:

16 Q. I would like to have it on the record.

17 A. Do you have a particular day?

18 Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with

19 Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on

20 any particular day.

21 A. No.

22 Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

23 A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing,

24 but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

25 Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

1 Q. Can you check that for us?

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. And give us the results of that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Because this is much more detailed information than
6 I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the
7 Agency.

8 A. All right. I will do that.

9 BY MR. MANFREDI:

10 Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

11 A. Let me have a piece of paper.

12 Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which
13 is 351-5106.

14 THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

15 BY MR. MANFREDI:

16 Q. That is the day.

17 A. 1963.

18 Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation
19 made?

20 A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I
21 don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether --
22 I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

23 Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the
24 inquiry?

25 A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

1 Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

2 A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt

3 who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of

4 European Division.

5 Q. When was that inquiry received?

6 A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

7 BY MR. OLSEN:

8 Q. About the first time these photographs began to be

9 circulated?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. About the bums in Dallas?

12 A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry

13 came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was

14 Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently

15 made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

16 Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm

17 Magazine?

18 A. That is right.

19 Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with

20 the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that

21 Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

22 A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way

23 I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who

24 have the contact with the Office of Finance.

25 Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

1 A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick
2 leave, and then on duty status the following day.
3 BY MR. MANFREDI:
4 Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's
5 previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?
6 A. (Nods in negative)
7 BY MR. OLSEN:
8 Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that
9 records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --
10 A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.
11 Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday
12 or on the next day, Saturday?
13 A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the
14 22nd was a Friday.
15 Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief
16 memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting
17 documents you can find?
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. As promptly as possible on this question.
20 I think that covers the subject matter.
21 MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want.
22 Can you think of anything else?
23 MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.
24 MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.
25 (Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long haul

3 I think probably I saved you some time.

4 We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inter-

5 rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ought

6 to be fair.

7 Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship with

8 some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

11 A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the

12 relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly the

13 Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff

14 members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for

15 the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

16 Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

17 A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relation-

18 ship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relation-

19 ship with the press in this town. There were certain things that

20 might come to the attention of the press involving true names

21 and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any

22 particular time.

23 Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami

24 for propaganda purposes?

25 A. No. No.

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SECRET

1 Q Would you know if that were the case?

2 A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was

3 a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these

4 people as well as they were assigint us.

5 Q What assistance would you render for members of

6 the press in Miami?

7 A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor

8 we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of

9 areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations

10 would give him background briefings and this type of thing

11 on the developments within a given country.

12 Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

13 A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami

14 Herald received probably a little more attention than the

15 other papers, principally because it was a large paper and

16 their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout

17 the Hemisphere.

18 Q Was he also used as a source?

19 A No.

20 Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive

21 similar briefings?

22 A Yes.

23 Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time

24 about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these

25 organizations?

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SECRET

1 A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were
2 principally interested in the leadership of the organizations.
3 Once the organization was established and the leadership took
4 over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess,
5 getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.
6 Q What were their functions, the fronts?
7 A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic
8 thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a
9 political organization in exile.
10 Q Did they conduct any operations?
11 A No, not that I know of.
12 Q Just like a political party?
13 A Like a political party.
14 Q How many of these fronts were there?
15 A There were several of them. I really don't remember
16 the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary
17 Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one.
18 And there were some others.
19 Q The RDF?
20 A FRD.
21 Q I see.
22 A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the
23 Democratic Revolutionary Front.
24 Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?
25 A I would think not. I really don't know.

mbh 3

1 Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

2 A No. There was but there isn't any more. There

3 hasn't been one there for years.

4 Q When was it disbanded?

5 A I think the station was established around 1958

6 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it

7 went out of existence in 1958.

8 Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

9 A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

10 Q Do you know what function it was performing?

11 A (Nods in negative.)

12 Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked

13 in the Cuban community for the CIA?

14 A He worked with these fronts, too.

15 Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the

16 community?

17 A Intelligence functions. Well --

18 Q Was he collecting information?

19 A Sure. If he got information that he thought was

20 worthwhile he would pass it on.

21 Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three

22 or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

23 A Yes. He was a contract employee.

24 Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such

25 contract employees?

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1 A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard,
2 or they were at that time. But here again, you always have
3 ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to
4 be surfaced.
5 Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in
6 the business of collecting intelligence information in the
7 Cuban communities in Miami.
8 A Right.
9 Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can
10 you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that
11 we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?
12 A No, not really. No.
13 Q I think you previously described them for me as the
14 eyes and ears into the Cuban community.
15 A Right.
16 Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami
17 which was their headquarters, did they not?
18 A Exactly.
19 Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to super-
20 vise that facility.
21 A Yes.
22 Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?
23 A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go
24 out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't
25 they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

abh 5

1 Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

2 A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

3 Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept

4 for NSA?

5 A Yes. The only reason we use two different names

6 is that in each of these things in those days we had to have

7 a project which had to be renewed every year to get the

8 funding.

9 Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

10 A Synonymous.

11 Q -- are cryptonyms?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

14 A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt

15 somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a

16 crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened

17 at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

18 Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for

19 assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the

20 political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly

21 describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by

22 the Agency to the Secret Service?

23 A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted

24 name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted

25 traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

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1 Beach where any convention activities were to take place,
2 employees of catering services, limosine service, employees
3 in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It
4 is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it.
5 Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.
6 Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested.
7 all foreign nationals?
8 A All foreign nationals.
9 Q Was there any check made to determine whether
10 any of them were American citizens?
11 A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement
12 that they have identified these people by nationality before
13 we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time
14 they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens
15 which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could
16 not trace.
17 Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and
18 1972?
19 A That is right.
20 Q And where were these names traced?
21 A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The
22 Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check
23 here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had
24 more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.
25 Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

1 A Through Agency files.

2 Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI

3 on this as well?

4 A Oh, yes.

5 Q And in effect,they were getting an all-Agency name

6 check --

7 A Right.

8 Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

9 A Yes.

10 Q -- to a candidate?

11 A Well, they were just trying to determine who might

12 be a security threat.

13 Q That is right. Potential threat.

14 A Yes.

15 Q For what political parties -- strike that.

16 In 1968 was this service provided for both political

17 conventions?

18 A Both political conventions.

19 Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

20 A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held

21 there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

22 Q These requests did come from the Secret Service

23 rather than --

24 A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director

25 of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

1 support.

2 Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to

3 that tracing activity?

4 A I have all the names that have been traced.

5 Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there

8 any reason those records have been maintained?

9 A Well, because we were told to maintain them when

10 the Watergate thing broke.

11 Q I see.

12 A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

13 Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various

14 places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban

15 groups?

16 A I was not aware of it until I was told of it.

17 I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on

18 the part of these people or whether they were instructed to

19 do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

20 Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets

21 were located?

22 A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another

23 place. I forget where it was.

24 Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these

25 persons were Cubans?

1 A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history
2 that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying
3 to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized
4 this, which I fully doubt.
5 Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?
6 A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony
7 Sforza.
8 Q Is he still alive?
9 A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know
10 whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the
11 AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with
12 Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.
13 Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.
14 What kind of an investigation have you conducted?
15 A I have talked to people, which is really all you
16 can do. There is no other way you can do it.
17 Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone,
18 authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify
19 any of the persons who participated in the picketing?
20 A No.
21 Q With what frequency did this activity occur?
22 A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.
23 Q This was in New York City?
24 A New York City and Miami.
25 Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

mbh 10

1 the AMOTS engaged in?

2 A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

3 Q Any political activity.

4 Do you know of any other activities that they have

5 conducted within this country, they or any of their members

6 have conducted within this country that we have not already

7 discussed this afternoon?

8 A No.

9 Q Any political activities? Any operations?

10 A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain

11 select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban

12 defectors. In other words, live with them until they are

13 resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity

14 they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of any-

15 thing else.

16 Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have

17 been attribited to --

18 A I have heard of some allegations which have never

19 been proven.

20 Q What are the allegations?

21 A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances

22 and this type of thing.

23 Q Have those allegations been made with any fre-

24 quency?

25 A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

1 Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out
2 and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we
3 made file checks and this type of thing. One particular
4 activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller
5 Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of
6 context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise.
7 These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York
8 and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan
9 -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were
10 supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some
11 of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a
12 memory exercise.

13 Q With what frequency were those kinds of training
14 exercises conducted?
15 A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt
16 that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained
17 in trade craft.
18 Q And did their trade craft training include such
19 things as surveillance?
20 A Sure.
21 Q And break-ins?
22 A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I
23 said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinter-
24 preted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they
25 could have walked into your office, your outer office and

1 said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell
2 me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it?
3 This is just for observation.
4 Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have
5 been proven. Have any of them been proved to your
6 satisfaction?
7 A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.
8 Q I take it you do not believe they took place other
9 than the training exercise?
10 A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.
11 Q Do you know of any instances where members of that
12 group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry
13 in this country?
14 A No.
15 Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of
16 the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the
17 Miami Station within this country?
18 A Legality? No.
19 Q How about the propriety?
20 A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up.
21 No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or
22 the propriety of having the Station.
23 Q There have been some allegations in the press and
24 elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of
25 that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

1 A No.

2 Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some

3 articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of

4 a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various

5 operations in this country.

6 A You mean this country?

7 Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some

8 other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge

9 of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type

10 of operation within this country?

11 A No.

12 Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided

13 any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

14 A No. Not to my knowledge.

15 Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

16 A No.

17 Q Establishment of businesses?

18 A No.

19 Q No?

20 A No.

21 Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed

22 the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups,

23 revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre,

24 Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported

25 by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

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1 A Not to my knowledge.

2 Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached

3 to Mr. Colby?s statement?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

6 A You mean the Miami Station thing?

7 Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

8 A Yes.

9 Q You wrote it?

10 A Yes.

11 Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references

12 to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are

13 there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

14 A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you

15 want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize

16 the hell out of Juanita Castro.

17 Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

18 A You are familiar with all that and that is by the

19 board now, too.

20 Q She was doing --

21 A Propaganda.

22 Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

23 A Yes.

24 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of

25 intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

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mbh 15

1 area now by the Miami Station?

2 A There are no domestic activities at all in the

3 Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back

4 here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely

5 and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

6 Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon --

7 does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban

8 situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

9 A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have

10 a career agent who has been with us for a good many years

11 in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans

12 who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S.

13 who have relatives in Cuba.

14 Now, this is done principally with the idea of a

15 recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this

16 type of thing. He does contact these people all over the

17 United States. If we come across an individual that looks like

18 he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him,

19 we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we

20 find out where relatives and these types of people are, we

21 will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact

22 these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or what-

23 ever.

24 Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this

25 country, as access agents.

bh 16

1 A Right.

2 Q Just like foreign associates would do.

3 A Exactly.

4 Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who

5 are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the

6 Miami-Cuban community?

7 A No. None.

8 Q That entire apparatus has been --

9 A Has been dismantled.

10 Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the

11 Miami Station?

12 A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14,

13 as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal

14 year.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out

20 of Miami?

21 A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of

22 Headquarters.

23 Q And even from the Headquarters location there are

24 no paramilitary operations?

25 A No.

ch 17

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

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1 A Sure.

2 Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

3 A That is all right.

4 Q Thank you again.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the

6 deposition was concluded.)

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AGENCY :	SSCIA
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BOX 418

MEETING 25 JUNE 75

TOP SECRET

AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Biographical

1940-47	Counterespionage work as FBI agent
1947	Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
1948	Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP)
1952	Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
1959	Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries)

1960

August 16	DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)

1961

Late January (approx.)	EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24)
February (approx.)	BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)
	HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38)
	Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

1961 (cont'd)

Early Feb.	According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)
Late Feb.	Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)
March-Early April	O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)
Mid-April	Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee.
November 15	Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39)
November 29	MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962

February	EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)
February 7	EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)
February 19	HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)
April 8-9	HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains <u>Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE</u> (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)
April 14	HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)
April 18-19	Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

1962 (cont'd)

April 21	HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)
Late April	HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)
Throughout May	Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50)
May 7	EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*
May 14	Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65) HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)
June 21	ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)
August 10	Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.
August 13	General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders".

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* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

1962 (cont'd)

August 14	HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.
September	Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)
October	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963

February	HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)
June	HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)
August 16	Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Edwards Ex 1
5/30/75
1 pg.

14 May 1962

INVENTORIED:
ON MAR 2 1977
BY [initials]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: John Rosselli

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

not true

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [illegible]), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

HELMS Ex 2
6/13/75

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

SECRET

R371 1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

SECRET

control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960,

QJWIN annual salary:	$ 7,200
Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory.

DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency. Training by opposition would ________.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4) Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers ________-selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should <u>look</u> like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Use ~~Nobody~~ <u>nobody</u> who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

<u>Keeping of files</u>.

Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.

1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.

2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners -- and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.

Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Bureau

"for a living" RIS 201 cover

caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes - Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2
Not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor -- assumptions
Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford
Ehut R&D - memo.

"Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project.
pherious - (V with CB)

comment - Gear

Anathesia --

26/1 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter
No file

Never mentions word assassination.

1. Select proper oern to run --
2. Place a cover
3. Security Rules
4. Guide leves
5. Last Resort - Brakes -
6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers except per cover.
8. Principal agent - (Mankel) ?
   AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.
   Mask spat rqm. stall AF project - cler Dbieke

Max as ~~3~~ 2
B - WKH - AS -
Sid - Reserv.
Substitute - What next

9. Disposal --
10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --
11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create to provide RIS or ~~xxxxx~~ label it. - non Sov
13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed -

    Fd J list - Remember

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10242

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-147

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1975
PAGES : 690

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ORGANIZED CRIME
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

N.Y. Daily [illegible]SUNDAY N[illegible]WS, A[illegible] 1975

SECRETS OF THE CIA

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

Its clandestine operations now undergoing a sometimes painful official scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Agency maintains, as always, a tight lip. But from interviews with the agents who hired out to do the CIA's cloak-and-dagger work, News reporter Paul Meskil tells here for the first time of the intrigue that surfaced in the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that pushed the U.S. to the brink of war with the Soviet Union. First of a series.

By PAUL MESKIL

A BEAUTIFUL German-American girl scored an intelligence coup for the CIA by stealing secret papers from the Havana hotel suite she [illegible] shared with Fidel Castro.

Among the papers, she told The News, were maps showing the sites selected for Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

[illegible], black-haired Marie Lorenz, who lives quietly in New York, was the Mata Hari of the Caribbean cold war. She was one of the most glamorous members of a spy ring recruited for the Central Intelligence Agency by Frank Fiorini, a onetime triple agent who later became known to the American public as Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis.

Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other former espionage agents, Caribbean conspirators, and Cuban freedom fighters were interviewed for this series on CIA operations in the Caribbean and the Americas. Some of their clandestine activities are told here for the first time, and some are being investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Vice President Rockefeller's Commission on CIA Activities.

According to sources, the CIA was, to one degree or another, involved in:


- Plots to assassinate foreign heads of state, including Castro of Cuba, Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.
- Smashing a Castroite attempt to invade Panama and sabotage the Panama Canal.
- The explosion of a munitions ship in Havana harbor.
- A fantastic scheme to seize a Soviet ship and use it to obtain the release of the captured American spy ship Pueblo.
- Secret deals with American mobsters who had lost their multimillion-dollar Cuban gambling casinos.
- Armed raids on Cuba and many shipments of guerrilla fighters, weapons, explosives and other war materials to the island before and after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Marie Lorenz played a small but important role in the labyrinth of Caribbean conspiracies.

Her Cuban adventures began on a balmy evening in February 1959, when a launch flying the Cuban revolutionary flag pulled alongside the gleaming white luxury liner Berlin, anchored in Havana harbor on the next-to-last stop of a Caribbean cruise.

In the launch were 20 or so heavily armed Cubans, all wearing beards and rumpled olive-green fatigues. The liner's accommodation ladder was

(Continued on page [illegible])



Marie Lorenz spied on Fidel.

Box 441

[illegible]merican Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

(Continued from page 2)

lowered and the *barbudos* (bearded ones) swarmed aboard like pirates, grenades dangling from their belts and machine guns swinging from their shoulders.

Women in evening gowns screamed and ran for cover with their dinner-jacketed husbands, believing the ship was being raided by bandits. But other American tourists recognized the leader of the sinister-looking band as Fidel Castro, the new prime minister of Cuba, and they crowded around him for autographs.

"I'm a friend," he shouted, obviously enjoying the commotion he had caused. "I like Americans."

The Berlin's skipper, former German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, invited the *barbudos* to stay for cocktails and dinner, and he introduced Castro to his vivacious 18-year-old daughter, Marie.

"My father spoke Spanish and he got along well with Castro," Marie told this reporter. "He took Castro and his men on a tour of the ship, then asked them to please leave their guns outside the dining room before they sat down for dinner.

"Castro said they didn't feel safe without guns, so my father allowed them to keep their pistols, but he made them leave the machine guns, automatic rifles and grenades in the smoking room."

Castro sat at the captain's table, between Lorenz and Marie. During the meal, he smiled frequently at Marie, and she was as impressed as any normal teenage girl would be by compliments from the flamboyant hero of the Cuban revolution.

She spoke German and English, which she had learned from her American mother. Castro said he needed a secretary who could write letters in these languages. Before the meal was over, he offered the job to Marie.

Took Offer As Joke

"He asked me to stay in Havana and work for him," she said. "My father and I both laughed. My father said I was going back to Germany to finish my education."

Castro promised to write to her, so she gave him two addresses—her parents' home in Bremen, Germany, and her brother's apartment in New York, where she planned to stay when the Caribbean cruise ended. She never expected to see or hear from Fidel again.

About two weeks later, two Cuban officers called on Marie in New York. They carried a message from Castro, saying he was in desperate need of an English-German translator. He had sent a Cubana Airlines plane to bring her back to Havana.

"I made a big mistake," Marie said. "I got on that plane."

During the flight to Havana, she tried to imagine her life in Castroland. She thought she would have a desk in the premier's secretarial pool and a small apartment of her own. She may even have dreamed of a romance with the tall, charismatic dictator. But her airborne illusions were shattered soon after the plane landed.

"I was very idealistic then," she said. "I was going on an adventure and to my first job. I was going to help the new government. Instead, I became Castro's plaything.

"I was driven from the airport to the Havana Hilton, where Fidel had taken over the 24th floor. For the next four months, I hardly ever got out of the Hilton. When I did get out, I was under guard. If I wanted to go down to the pool or coffee shop, two *barbudos* would go with me."

'I Was His Prisoner'

Asked to define her relationship with Castro during this period, Marie said: "I was his prisoner. I was trapped."

"Were you ever in love with Fidel?"

"No, never. How can you be in love when you're afraid, when you're treated like a piece of furniture, when you're sleeping with a live bazooka under the bed, when you're living in a room with guns on every table and cigar butts all over the floor?

"My way of thinking was German," she continued. "Everything in my life had been very orderly, very neat and clean. I never realized anyone, especially a prime minister, could be so disorganized. I thought he would have several offices, with desks, chairs and telephones. All he had, at this point, was a suite of rooms at the Hilton, where he lived and worked. I was kept in one of the rooms. The door to the hall was locked from the outside. *Barbudos* and visitors were in the next room, but the door between the rooms was kept locked.

"All I could do was read books, study Spanish, walk back and forth, listen to the radio or go on the balcony and look out over Havana. I was miserable. My father tried to find out what had happened to me. He contacted the American Embassy in Havana (Marie was born an American citizen) but nothing happened.

"The only clothes I had were what I brought with me from New York. I couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel had me measured for a uniform so I would look like a member of the 26th of July Movement. An olive-green uniform with a lieutenant's star.

"That way, when I was allowed out under guard, he thought people would think I was of his officers. But almost every Havana housewife heard rumors that Castro was keeping a foreigner, an American girl, at the Hilton. I was becoming a problem to him.

"One day two *barbudos* came to the room while Fidel was out. They said they were there to help me. They took me on a 20-minute plane ride to the [illegible] showed me the beautiful black sand beach there and then drove me by jeep to this huge prison complex. They showed me a cell where dictator Fulgencio Batista had imprisoned Fidel and Raul (Fidel's brother) years before. I went into the cell to look at a bronze plaque on the wall. They shut the door and locked me in the cell. Then they went away.

She Wasn't Pampered

"I spent a week there, eating the same food as the other prisoners—blacks beans, rice, stale bread and coffee. As far as I know, I was the only woman there.

"Every morning we would hear the firing squads. As soon as it got light, the birds would start singing. Then the guns would go off. Then marching and quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks. The guards would check to see if you'd hanged yourself during the night or if you'd done something wrong in there where there was hardly room to turn around. It was horrible.

"After seven days, I was taken out and flown back to Havana."

Marie was never told why she was jailed. She now believes Castro had her locked up to make sure she didn't escape while he was out of the country visiting the United States and South America.

One night she was with Castro and his bodyguards in the lobby of the Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wavy-haired man approached her. He wore the olive-green rebel uniform and the insignia of a captain in the Cuban air force.

While Castro was conferring with his aides on the other side of the lobby, the captain mingled with the *barbudos* around Marie and whispered to her in English: "I know about you."

"Can you help me?" she responded. "Can you get me out of here?"

"Yes. I'm with the American Embassy. I'll get you out."

This was her introduction to Comandante Frank Fiorini (later known as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant and hired agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Agrees to Spy on Fidel

For the next few weeks Frank kept in contact with her in person and through Castro officers who were working for him. Marie agreed to spy on Castro. She filched secret documents and reported Castro's conversations with important visitors overheard through the hotel walls. By now, she could read and speak Spanish fairly well.

"The suite was full of guns and papers," she said. "Fidel had papers strewn all over the tables, the floor, the bed, the dresser. He had one filing cabinet that was never locked. It was full of money, papers, documents, maps. I took papers out and slipped them to Frank. Fidel never missed them.


"Frank said, 'Get all the data you can,' and I did. I was a regular Mata Hari."

Then Marie became sick, and Frank arranged her escape. Two Cuban officers took her out of the hotel while Castro was away and put her on a Cubana Airlines flight to New York.


About that time, Frank also set up the escapes of two top Cuban air force officers, a project that forced him to leave Cuba. He moved his base of operations to Miami, but he kept in touch with his agents on the island and his CIA contacts in Havana and Washington.


When she recovered from her illness, Marie joined him in Florida and volunteered for a mission that meant certain death if she were caught.

Early in 1960, Castro went to



A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her father brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro together. It began a liaison destined to have international repercussions.





Discovery of missile sites in Cuba provoked a cold-war showdown between then President John F. Kennedy and then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a confrontation that had the world holding its breath.

CIA Sent Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

By PAUL MESKIL

The Central Intelligence Agency sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in 1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.

Details of this case were uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligence Committee investigator who learned that a mystery woman had been involved in an assassination plot against the Cuban dictator.

It was the first of several CIA-sponsored attempts to execute Castro.

The mystery woman has now been identified by the committee and The News as Marie Lorenz, an attractive German-American brunette who shared Castro's Havana hotel suite for several months in 1959. When a committee investigator confronted her with evidence linking her to the assassination plot, she admitted that she had been recruited for the attempted hit.

Exclusive Account

Then, last week, she gave this reporter an exclusive account of a mission so secret that she never mentioned it to anyone for 16 years.

Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in New York, is the daughter of the late German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz and his American wife. After World War II, Lorenz became skipper of the luxury liner Berlin. He took Marie along on a Caribbean cruise in February 1959, a month after Castro took over the Cuban government.

Castro boarded the Berlin in Havana harbor and dined with the captain and his vivacious teenage daughter. He later persuaded Marie to return to Havana to work as his personal interpreter. When she arrived she was installed in Castro's 24th-floor suite at the Havana Hilton. She soon realized she was a virtual prisoner.

Quizzed by FBI

Frank Fiorini, an American who had become a Cuban Revolutionary Army officer and a CIA agent, contacted her and persuaded her to photograph Castro's secret papers. He later helped her escape.

She left Havana in January

The Memo That Started It

On Dec. 11, 1959, Col. J. C. King, head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to CIA Director Allen Dulles, according to a Senate committee report. Noting that the "far left" regime in Cuba might encourage other Latin American countries to take action against U.S. interests he recommended that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion, Che Guevara, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the present government."

Dulles and Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell approved the recommendation and the CIA launched an assassination campaign against Castro that lasted at least five years. This is the exclusive story of the first try.



CIA Sent a Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

(Continued from page 3)

[illegible] York and [illegible] Hospital for [illegible] serious illness. [illegible] FBI agents questioned her [illegible] in Cuba. She later took part in various [illegible] operations with [illegible] and Alex Rorke, a [illegible] who worked for both the CIA and the FBI.

On one of these missions she [illegible] to Havana and stole secret [illegible] and documents from Castro's suite while he was away. About two months later, [illegible] told her he had an important assignment that would enable her to do a tremendous service for this country."

He took her to the FBI offices at [illegible] E. 69th St. for a conference with the two agents who had questioned her previously, and a CIA official.

"I was asked about my attitude toward Castro," she said, "and whether I was willing to work since I could get in and out [of] Castro's suite. I said, 'What kind of work?'

Thought It Was a Joke

"Alex said, 'You could knock [him] off.' It would save everybody a lot of trouble.' I thought he was [joking], but they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious.

"Alex said, 'Why don't you kill him?' I said, 'I don't know how, with all those men around him, and I don't know if it's in me to kill him.'

"Once, out of jealousy, I pointed a gun at him and Fidel didn't even [illegible]. He said, 'You can't kill me.' I said, 'I'm not planning to. I'm just cleaning the gun.'"

Ms. Lorenz said there were several more meetings at which various ways of killing Castro were discussed.

"Finally they decided on poison. They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink. I said, 'What are you trying to tell me? To go down and kill him?'

"Alex said, 'It would change history.' I said, "Well, I don't want to die."

"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Fiorini. Fiorini gave her two capsules full of poison powder. She was told to sprinkle the powder in Castro's coffee.

"I guess the company (CIA) supplied them. Frank said it was a company operation."

Packing the olive-drab uniform that Castro had given her, designating her a lieutenant in the Revolutionary Army, Ms. Lorenz flew back to Havana on Cubana Airlines. Believing she might be searched at the airport, she hid the capsules in a jar of cold cream in her purse. When she arrived in Havana she checked into a tourist hotel, changed into her Fidelista uniform and went to the Hilton.

Cold-Cream Caper

"The lobby was full of reporters and other people trying to see Castro, but he wasn't there. One of his aides recognized me and took me up to Fidel's suite.

Entering the two-room suite, she saw that nothing had changed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

She waited nervously in Castro's private room until he came in a few hours later. As soon as he smiled and hugged her, she knew he didn't suspect she had visited the suite a few months previously and stolen his secrets. And he certainly didn't suspect she had come back to kill him.

Do Not Disturb

"He asked why I left him and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home. He started talking about Cuba and the problems, the lack of money, the shortages. He talked a long time. He said he was expecting an important phone call, but he took the receiver off the hook and he shouted to the barbudos (bearded ones) in the next room: 'No me moleste' (Don't bother me)'

"Finally he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed, in his fatigues and with a cigar in his mouth. I had no confidence left, but I knew this was the chance to do it.

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

[illegible] I could get in and [illegible] suite). I said, 'What [illegible]?'

Thought It Was a Joke

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A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with [illegible] for a meeting with Fiorini, who "said he had a way to do it."

She said she spent three weeks in a CIA "safe house" in Miami, seeing no one but Fiorini and Rorke. "They kept talking me into it. They said, 'You can do it. You're the only one who can do it.'"

Asked if she now believes she was brainwashed, she replied: "I guess so." She said they appealed to her patriotism and told her she "would get thousands, enough to retire," if she succeeded.

When she finally agreed to accept the assignment, she said, [illegible] in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

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"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

"It was like an omen.

"I couldn't just dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and I watched him sleeping. Finally I lay down on the bed beside him.

"I thought. 'To hell with it. Let history take its course.'

"Stupid, Stupid"

Frank and Alex met me when I flew to Miami next morning. They asked me what happened and I said the capsules melted. Frank was very upset. He said, 'Stupid, stupid, stupid. Why did you put them in the cold cream?' I said, 'Where else? It was the only place to think of where no one would find them.'"

Ms. Lorenz was not asked to try again.

"Would you have killed him if the capsules hadn't melted," the interviewer asked. "No," she replied. "Probably not."

Alex Rorke later disappeared on a mystery flight to Nicaragua. Frank Fiorini, now known as Frank Sturgis, continued to perform odd jobs for the CIA until his arrest in 1972 as one of the Watergate burglars.

Informed of Ms. Lorenz' account of the assassination attempt, he verified her story.

Soon after her murder mission failed, the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters — including John Roselli of Las Vegas, Sam Giancana of Chicago and Santo Trafficante of Tampa, Fla. — to kill Castro. But they were no more successful than the sexy Mata Hari.

Aria Floors Opera Singer

London, June 12 (UPI) — Don Giovanni reached for a high note at the Royal Opera House in London last night and fell through the floor.

He stuck there, in the person of singer Ruggero Raimondi, trapped to his waist and singing for dear life. Sir Geraint Evans and his other co-performers, still singing, tugged and pulled. Eventually Raimondi climbed out, unhurt but shaken with his word bent into a curve.

"They were magnificent," said critic Hilton Tims, who was in the audience. "They carried on without letting the incident upset their vocal equilibrium."

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... WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion began. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

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"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvanian.

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Levien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.


"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.


"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.





Marie Lorenz says she was told that maps she took from Castro's headquarters were factor in locating and photographing missile sites (above). Under pressure from U.S., Khrushchev ordered missiles removed and shipped back to Soviet Union (right).

Cienaga de Zapata, a vast swamp that he intended to convert to rice fields. As soon as he left Havana with his usual entourage, Marie received orders to return to the Cuban capital immediately. She boarded a regular Cubana Airlines flight, posing as an American tourist and carrying her Castro uniform and a loaded revolver in her overnight bag.

She arrived in Havana a few hours after Castro left town. Americans were still welcome there in those days, and Cuban customs officers seldom searched tourists' luggage.

"There was no trouble at the airport," Marie said. "I checked into a sleazy little hotel in downtown Havana, changed into my lieutenant's uniform and went direct to the Havana Hilton. By this time, Castro had a home on the outskirts of Havana, Casa Cojimar, but it was more convenient for him to keep his papers at the Hilton.

"He had Suite 2408 and the adjoining suites. I had the key to 2408. Nobody recognized me when I came into the hotel. I had changed my hair style and made my complexion darker than it is naturally. And I wore dark glasses. They (Castro's people) all wore dark glasses, even at night.

"A lot of people were loitering in the lobby, *barbudos* and everything. I just walked right through. Passing the desk was the main thing that bothered me because the desk clerks knew me. I had a snub-nosed .38 caliber Detective Special clipped to the inside of my waistband. Nobody seemed to notice me. I walked to the elevators and went up to the 24th floor.

Saw Her Opportunity

"Nobody was around. When Fidel left, they all left with him: his bodyguards, his advisers, whatever. When I had lived there, I was either all alone and everything was dead quiet, or else Fidel was there and there was a lot of noise and cigar smoke.

"I unlocked the door to Suite 2408, went inside and double-locked the door behind me. I felt pretty confident because I knew Fidel was at Cienaga de Zapata. When he left the suite, no one was to go in. Those were the orders.

"As usual, the suite was littered with papers and the filing cabinet was open. I couldn't grab everything. I took as much as I could and stuffed papers and maps into my uniform pockets and the [illegible], went back to the other hotel, changed into a dress and caught the next flight to Miami.

"Frank met me at the airport and I gave him all the papers. I never knew exactly what information they contained. I was told the stuff was good, it was fantastic, 'the United States government is very happy.' "

Among the papers were topographical maps of Cuba on which several sections of undeveloped land, miles away from any population center, had been marked with hand-drawn circles. The maps also had handwritten notations that Marie couldn't read because "they were in a foreign language— Czech, I think."

Her Find Was Valuable

Three years later, another intelligence agent told her the maps were "the original groundwork plans" for Soviet missile sites. The circled areas were the spots where Soviet missile bases were built in 1962, setting off the historic showdown between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

From information supplied by agents inside Cuba and Cuban refugees, and from aerial photos snapped from U-2 spy planes, the CIA was able to pinpoint all the missile bases on the island. But Marie believes her solo mission to Castro's lair gave the CIA its first inkling of what the Russians were plotting. She also believes Castro suspected she was the burglar who swiped his secrets. (The CIA has declined to comment on Marie's involvement.)

In March 1960, soon after she had completed this dangerous assignment, Marie received a mysterious telegram from Havana. Delivered to her brother's apartment at 311 W. 80th St., it said, "CALL 28607 (Castro's private number) LATE AT NIGHT. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT."

It was signed "Yanez," meaning Capt. Jesus Yanez Pelletier, one of Castro's closest aides. Marie's first impulse was to ignore the message, but curiosity overcame common sense. Without mentioning the telegram to her brother, she left the apartment around midnight to place a collect call to Havana from a phone booth on the corner.

As she stepped into the small vestibule between the outer and inner front doors to the apartment house, two men grabbed her. One of them was Yanez.

"They had guns," Marie recalled. "They were going to take me back to Cuba. Yanez said a plane was waiting at Idlewild Airport. They hit me in the face and tried to drag me out to a car.

"A person who lived in the building opened the door and saw me screaming and fighting. This person ran down toward Riverside Drive. The interruption distracted the Cubans enough so that I broke loose and ran. I heard one of them yell, 'Shoot! Shoot!' but they didn't. I ran up to Broadway and [illegible] a cop there.

"The Cubans took off. My face was all bloody. Thank God for that cop. He took me to the [illegible] and I told the detectives an [illegible] story of intrigue and fear. I told them who Yanez was and I gave them the name of a West Side hotel where Castro people stayed when they were in New York. The detectives went there and found Yanez, but they couldn't arrest him because he had diplomatic immunity. He had a diplomatic passport saying he was with the prime minister's office. They told him to get on his plane and [illegible] to Cuba."

When Yanez returned to Havana without Marie, Castro did what the New York cops couldn't do. Fidel sent him to prison.

Discussed Killing Castro

Asked if she and other members of Frank's spy ring had ever discussed killing Castro, Marie replied: "Sure. We all did. We were going to bomb him during one of his speeches. We were going to fly over and drop it right on top of him.

"We had the bomb, the plane. I was going to go along. Hit and run. We were all set, but it was called off. Somebody stopped it. That's all I know."

Marie said two American agents went to Cuba to assassinate Castro shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"I met them at a little white house we rented in the Cuban colony in Miami. I think it was on Flagler St. We would never stay in one place too long. We'd rent a house and move on. Anyway, it was at one of our meetings that they talked real heavy about going in and killing him.

"The two Americans went in, but they didn't get out. They grew beards, dressed like Castro soldiers. I heard [illegible]

Marie said she made three boat trips to Cuba, delivering guns and supplies to anti-Castro guerrillas. She worked with Frank and Alex Rorke, both of whom were contract employees of the CIA, meaning they were not listed on any federal payroll.

"There's really no contract," she explained. "Nothing is put down on paper. You just say you're doing this for the good of your country. I didn't handle the money end of it. We were given what we needed."

'Eduardo' Supplied Cash

When cash was needed, it came from a CIA man she knew only as Eduardo. He would meet Frank and Alex from time to time at a "safe house" in Miami.

"Eduardo was financing our thing," Marie said. "When we went to pick up the money, I [illegible] in the car. I saw him when he opened the door of this little white house we used."

Years later, while reading about the Watergate break-in, Marie saw a newspaper photo of former CIA man E. Howard Hunt and immediately recognized him as the elusive "Eduardo." She also recognized a picture of Sturgis, whom she had known as Frank Fiorini.

Sturgis was one of the five burglars caught in Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Four of the five—Sturgis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Rolando Martinez and James W. McCord, then security chief for the Nixon reelection campaign committee—were former CIA employes.

Sturgis, Barker and Martinez had been active in preparations for the Bay of Pigs landing. So was Hunt, the fiction writer, mastermind of the Watergate burglary. And he referred to Sturgis, Barker and Martinez in court testimony as "some of my old CIA contacts."

Sturgis returned to Washington this month, nearly three years after his arrest there, to testify at secret staff sessions of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities. He won't discuss his testimony, but other sources said he was asked about CIA operations ranging from domestic spying to political murders.

(Tomorrow: Frank Fiorini Sturgis.

How an Invasion of the Canal Zone Was Foiled

By PAUL MESKIL

Third of a series

The Central Intelligence Agency once investigated Fidel Castro, ballerina Margot Fonteyn and actors John Wayne and Errol Flynn in connection with a bizarre invasion of Panama.

The colorful cast of this comic-opera conspiracy included three American adventurers, two of whom were working for the CIA. William Morgan and Alex Rorke, both former U.S. Army paratroopers, were on opposite sides of the Panama plot. And Frank Sturgis, a former Marine Raider, was in the middle.

Sturgis, born Frank Fiorini, was a gun runner and troop-trainer for Castro. Then he became security and intelligence chief of the Cuban Air Force, meanwhile serving as a secret agent of the CIA.

Morgan was a freelance conspirator, more interested in money than politics. A native of Toledo, Ohio, he went to Cuba in 1958 and became second in command of an independent rebel army in the Escambray Mountains. This non-Communist force helped Castro's guerrillas overthrow the Batista dictatorship and Castro made Morgan a major, highest rank in the revolutionary army.

The upset victory over Batista, and the spoils that went with it, encouraged Morgan to consider extending the revolution to other Latin lands. A few weeks after the Castro takeover in Havana, Morgan called at Capt. Frank Fiorini's office in Cuban Air Force headquarters.

Refused second spot

"Major Morgan spoke to me confidentially," Sturgis told The News. "He said he was preparing an invasion of Panama and the Canal Zone. He wanted me to be second-in command of the expedition. I told him I was interested, but not in a leadership position.

"I said, 'Bill, you've got to be crazy.' The American government's got a military force there. You're willing to go against your own country?' He said, 'Well, the U.S. never did anything for me.'"

The American military strength in the Canal Zone at that time in 1959 totaled about 1,000 men, compared to 65,000 in World War II. Morgan figured a surprise attack by a few hundred Cubans, assisted by Panamanian leftists staging riots and other disorders, would be sufficient to capture or at least sabotage the vital canal.

"The conspirators planned to overthrow the Panamanian government and grab the Canal for propaganda and extortion reasons," Sturgis said.

"They were going to send a ship, loaded with explosives, through the canal locks. They were going to blow up and sink the ship somewhere near the locks, so that the gates and locks would be damaged and ship traffic would be stopped in both directions.

"Morgan figured it would tie up the canal for at least two months. He was all set to go. He had the men, guns, ships, planes, everything.

Showed planes, named names

"I contacted the American Embassy in Havana and notified the (CIA) agent in charge. I took Col. Nichols (Erickson Nichols, air attache at the embassy) to the air base and showed him the camouflaged planes that were to be used for the invasion, and I named all the people who were involved in the conspiracy."

Those names reportedly included Margot Fonteyn, superstar of London's Royal Ballet and dame commander of the Order of the British Empire (the equivalent of knighthood), and her rich, aristocratic husband, Roberto Arias, former Panamanian ambassador to Britain and son of a former president of Panama.

Dame Margot and her husband were in Cuba at the time. So was Ruben Miro, head of the Panamanian revolutionary movement. They allegedly conferred with Morgan at Cienfuegos, where he was military commander.

According to intelligence reports, the invasion was to take place while Castro was visiting the United States and Canada. A spearhead force of Cubans and Panamanians would land on the Caribbean coast of Panama. A second force of Panamanians would strike inland from the Pacific coast. Then the main invasion army would sail in from Cuba.

Police and National Guard posts were to be attacked. Rebel bands were to come ... march on the Canal Zone and riot in Panama City to keep Panamanian police and U.S. troops occupied.




Photo by Rogelio Caparros

In Panama, part of the invasion team is quickly seized.

But Frank's reports to the CIA provided sufficient advance warning.

Castro left Cuba on April 14. Then Arias and his wife flew to Panama and rented the 42-foot motor launch Nola for $75 a day, saying they were going fishing. Five tough looking men accompanied them.

Cache of arms

They reportedly sailed directly to a spot where a cache of arms — semi-automatic rifles, revolvers, machine guns, grenades and ammunition in waterproof containers — had been dropped in the Pacific Ocean, 15 miles outside the Panama Canal entrance. The shrimp boat Elaine had been standing by for the arms drop. It retrieved the weapons from the water and later transferred them to the Nola.

The "fishermen" aboard the Nola came ashore on the Pacific coast, near Santa Clara, and buried the guns and ammo on the beach. Dame Margot and her husband then resumed their cruise.

On April 18, after receiving a CIA report that an invasion ship had sailed from the Cuban port of Batabano (part of Morgan's military district in Las Villas Province), the Panamanian government ordered Arias' arrest. He heard the news on the Nola's radio, returned to the Santa Clara area and went into hiding on his family's ranch.

Before dawn next day, the Nola slipped into the Panama Canal with only the skipper and Dame Margot aboard. She went to the home of her sister-in-law, Senora Chela Arias. A few hours later, she was arrested. After 24 hours in jail, the prima ballerina was booted back to Britain. Meanwhile, Arias had taken refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Panama City. He was later allowed to leave the country.

National guardsmen found the arms buried in the beach at Santa Clara. A second arms cache was discovered near a cottage owned by an American friend of the Arias family.

Late Friday night, April 24, a Cuban ship landed at Puerto Coronado on the Caribbean coast of Panama, about 60 miles northeast of the capital. In it were 85 armed men, Cubans and Panamanians, and a woman nurse.

Spearhead blunted

Three of the men drowned in the surf as they tried to beach the boat. The rest were quickly captured by Panama's National Guard. Three more Cuban ships had left the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos and Batabano with the main invasion force of about 400 men, mostly Cubans who had fought under Morgan. When Raul Castro learned that the spearhead had failed to penetrate Panama he called off the invasion and ordered the three ... ships back to Cuba.

Meanwhile, Panamanian officers discovered a blue canvas bag left behind by Dame Margot. Among the interesting items in it were a notebook containing a list of arms to be used in the two-pronged invasion, maps of Panama, a tide table and several letters which Panamanian authorities said proved Margot's involvement in the plot.

There was also a letter from film star John Wayne. Signed "Duke," it noted that Arias had received $5?,000 from Wayne's account between Nov. 19, 1957, and April 5, 1959.

Questioned by American agents, Wayne explained that he and Arias were partners in a ... "I don't deal in politics," he said ... he knew nothing about the Panama plot.

Errol Flynn also was asked about his friendship with Arias. They had been seen together in Cuba, where Flynn was making a movie based on the Castro revolution. The screen swashbuckler said Arias wanted to hire Flynn's yacht, the ocean-going Zaca, for a trip to Panama. Suspecting what he had in mind, Flynn refused.

Some CIA agents believe Morgan would not have attempted the Panama invasion without Castro's consent. But Fidel insisted: "I had nothing to do with it."

When the spearhead force splashed ashore on a San Blas Indian reservation, the CIA had a man at the scene. He was Alexander Rorke Jr., a freelance journalist, photographer and intelligence agent.

Double doublecross

Son of a New York judge, Alex served as a paratrooper and intelligence specialist in World War II. In 1952, he married actress Jacqueline Billingsley, daughter of Stork Club owner Sherman Billingsley.

Frank Nelson, an American businessman in Cuba, was involved with Sturgis, Morgan and Rorke in various plots, including a double doublecross. Nelson, who now lives in New York and has just finished writing a book entitled "For a Million Dollars," told The News:

"I started the counter-revolution against Castro in 1959 because he arrested a close friend of mine. I went to see Frank Sturgis in Havana and asked if there was anything he could do to get my friend out of jail. He sent me to Morgan who was very close to Castro, but Morgan wasn't interested in anything but money.

"I found out that Castro was going to invade the Dominican Republic, so I went there and told Trujillo (Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo) about the invasion plans. I said he should beat Castro to the punch and invade Cuba, with Morgan's help.

"I told Trujillo, 'I think you can buy Morgan for a million dollars. Let him take his army back to the mountains and establish a base. Then you come in with your army and in a few days Castro is finished.'"

Trujillo approved the million-dollar deal and put up the cash to get it started. Nelson said he paid Morgan $400,000 down, plus $100,000 "for expenses." The remaining $500,000 was to be paid when the invasion of Cuba began.

Sturgis soon learned the details of this new plot and informed the CIA. When the agency pulled Sturgis out of Cuba in the summer of 1959, it sent Rorke in to find out what was happening.

Decoyed by Raul's wife

Nelson arranged a meeting between Rorke and Morgan. Soon after Rorke arrived in Havana, he phoned Morgan's home. A woman answered, identified herself as "Mrs. Morgan" and told Rorke to come on over. When he got there, he was arrested. The woman who answered the phone was Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife.

By this time, Morgan had told Fidel about the invasion plot. Without mentioning the million dollars, he said he had pretended to go along with Trujillo in order to set a trap.

In mid August, Morgan sent an urgent radio message to the chief of Dominican military intelligence. He said he had seized Trinidad, on the south coast of Cuba, as an invasion beachhead. When a planeload of Dominican soldiers ...

SECRETS OF THE CIA

it was surrounded by 1,000 Cuban troops led by Fidel Castro himself.

The Dominicans were paraded before TV cameras on their way to jail. Castro denounced Trujillo and praised Morgan as a hero. Less than two years later, Morgan was executed by a Castro firing squad for a much less profitable plot.

What became of the $500,000 is not known. Neither Morgan's Cuban wife nor his American family ever saw a cent of it. Nor did Castro.

As soon as the Trujillo invasion collapsed, Alex Rorke was released from jail and deported from Cuba. But he returned many times by air and sea. For these clandestine trips, he used a twin engine Beechcraft plane, a B-25 bomber and a 36-foot speedboat, the Violynn III. Sturgis accompanied him on many mysterious missions.

Assassins failed

On one occasion, Rorke reportedly landed an execution squad that tried but failed to kill Castro. Early in 1963, the Violynn III was detained in the Bahamas when it stopped to refuel on a run between the U.S. and Cuba. British intelligence agents questioned Rorke and the 17 Cuban raiders who were with him. Rorke told them the CIA had financed many trips of the Violynn III and "the United States government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had advance knowledge of these trips."

Former CIA agents told The News this statement was true.

On April 25, 1963, Rorke and three other CIA contract agents flew over Havana in the Beechcraft and tried to bomb two oil refineries. The bombs missed their targets and caused little damage.

Five months later, Rorke went on his last mission. The 36-year-old adventurer and his partner, Geoffrey Sullivan, 28, of Waterbury, Conn., took off from Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., in a rented twin engine Beechcraft on Sept. 24, 1963. Two Cubans accompanied them.

Rorke and Sullivan filed a flight plan indicating they were bound for Nicaragua, where they planned to start an air freight service. They made two fuel stops — at Cozumel Island off Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula and at Belize, British Honduras. When they left Belize, the plane disappeared.

That night, Sturgis received a report that the plane was overdue in Nicaragua. Frank immediately called the commander of naval intelligence in Miami. An air-sea search was launched by the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force. A private search party was organized later by Rorke's Miami lawyer and personal friend, Ellis Rubin. But no trace of the missing Americans or their plane was ever found.

Forced onto boat

Some investigators believe the plane was sabotaged by Castro agents. Frank Nelson has another theory.

"When they stopped to refuel at Stanley Field near Belize, Alex spoke to an American commercial pilot, Floyd Park of ..., Texas. Alex said they were headed for Tegucigalpa (capital of the Republic of Honduras). They took off in the direction of Tegucigalpa, but they never got there.

"Several months later, Park received information from a couple of Hondurans that two Americans answering the description of Rorke and Sullivan were forced to board a Cuban fishing boat that had pulled into shore in Honduras two weeks earlier with engine trouble. The fishing boat left immediately after the two Americans were put on board."

If these men were indeed Rorke and Sullivan, they never reached Cuba, investigators are certain of that. The two Cubans who left Florida with Rorke and Sullivan were still with them when they made the two fuel stops. According to reports received by both Nelson and Sturgis, one of these men was Eusebio Molina, a Cuban officer who supposedly turned against Castro and fled to the United States.

"Molina was seen in Havana a few months after he disappeared with Rorke and Sullivan in Central America," Nelson said. He believes Molina may have forced the Americans to land somewhere in Honduras, where they were delivered to Castro agents who kidnaped and killed them.

N.Y. DAILY NEWS, MONDAY, APRIL 21, 1975

Our Havana Triple Spy Helped & Hurt Castro

By PAUL MESKIL

Second of a series

SECRETS OF THE CIA

"I was a spy," Frank Sturgis admits.

"I was involved in assassination plots and conspiracies to overthrow several foreign governments, including Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

"I smuggled arms and men into Cuba — for Castro and against Castro. I broke into the intelligence files of the Cuban Army and Air Force. I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents.

"That's what spies do.

"I also broke into foreign consulates and business offices in Cuba, for the purpose of obtaining information, and into a import-export office in Caracas, Venezuela, that was a front for the KGB (Soviet Secret Service)."

Sturgis was a hired operative of the Central Intelligence Agency for at least a decade. Maybe he still is, though his cover was blown forever by the notoriety he received as a Watergate burglar. He constructed and controlled an espionage network in Cuba that is still functioning despite frantic efforts by Castro security forces and the KGB to destroy it.

Though he was only a bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis is a real-life James Bond whose exploits rival those of any fictional spy. Interviewed at the office of his Miami lawyer, Ellis Rubin, and at other places in New York and Florida, he candidly revealed many details of his colorful career as a war hero, secrets-stealer, gun-runner, guerrilla fighter and professional plotter.

Changed the subject

Asked if he had also been an assassin, he politely changed the subject. Some things he will not talk about.

A stocky, iron-jawed man who looks much younger than his 50 years, he was born Frank Angelo Fiorini in Norfolk, Va. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at the start of World War II and fought through the Pacific with the famed First Raider Battalion. After the war, he served in the Air Force, Army and Navy Reserve.

He had the perfect training for a secret agent. The Marine Corps taught him judo, knife-fighting and jungle warfare techniques. The Air Force taught him to fly a plane and the Navy Reserve trained him to handle small, fast ships.


The Army completed this education. During a hitch in Germany, he was assigned to a security unit that handled top-secret reports from Allied intelligence agents all over Europe. This was his introduction to the dark world of espionage and intrigue.

In Berlin during the chilliest part of the cold war, he met his first real spy. She was a beautiful actress who also was an agent of Haganah, the secret army formed to defend the new state of Israel.


When he returned to civilian life, Frank became a Haganah courier — perhaps the only Roman Catholic in this group. In the 1950s, he went to Miami to visit an uncle who had married a Cuban exile. Her family was close to Carlos Prio, the Cuban president who was ousted in 1952 by a military coup led by Fulgencio Batista. Frank met Prio and other wealthy Cubans whose Miami mansions were hotbeds of anti-Batista intrigue. Some of them supplied financial support for a fiery young rebel, Fidel Castro, who was then living in Mexico.

In 1957, Prio asked Frank to "go to Cuba, join Castro's army and let me know what he's doing." Frank accepted

(Continued on page 14)



OUR TRIPLE-AGENT IN HAVANA



Frank Sturgis in Cuba: "I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents."

(Continued from page 3)

A bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis was a real-life James Bond when he did his big jobs for the CIA

the assignment. He flew to Havana and with the help of a Cuban priest, he quickly located Castro's camp in the Sierra Maestra Mountains and volunteered his services.

"Fidel remembered me," he said. "We could understand each other. I spoke Italian, which is similar to Spanish, and he spoke some English. I offered to help train his troops, but he said, 'Frank, what I need is guns.'"

So Frank became a gun runner. With money supplied by the Castro underground in Florida, he purchased thousand of rifles and other weapons from International Armament Corp. (Interarmco) of Alexandria, Va., the world's largest dealer in surplus arms. He then set up an elaborate land-sea-air smuggling network to get the guns and ammunition into Cuba.

He Became Triple Agent

After several months as a double agent, working for Prio and Castro, Frank became a triple agent. This time, he was recruited for the game of intelligence by a major league scout, Park F. Woolam, the State Department official then in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Santiago de Cuba.

"We met at the Casa Grande Hotel in Santiago," Frank recalls. "Woolam knew who I was and what I was doing. He approached me or someone introduced us. We had several other meetings and he discussed my patriotism and so forth. I agreed to work with him.

"Later, when the revolution was over, I received orders to go to Havana. Woolam told me who to contact in the American Embassy there." His new contacts, Frank said, were CIA agents, one of whom was the embassy's military attache.

Castro immediately placed his most trusted officers in command of the Cuban military services. Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, a close friend of Frank's, became commander in chief of the Air Force and his brother, Marcos Diaz Lanz, became inspector general of that service.

Frank helped the Diaz Lanz brothers reorganize the Air Force and they made him their security and intelligence chief. He also became the officer in charge of inspecting and supervising all Cuban gambling casinos, which were owned and operated by American mobsters.

Frank said his CIA advisers "asked me to recruit reliable people in the ... the military, in the presidential palace, in with Fidel. I recruited everyone I could, Americans and Cubans, to be undercover agents."

Max Gorman-Gonzales, a Miami businessman who took part in cloak-and-dagger operations against both Batista and Castro, has known and worked with Sturgis for many years. He says Sturgis was a CIA employee from 1959 to 1968. The CIA asked him to participate in assassination plots in Cuba and elsewhere. Sturgis introduced top Cuban military and political leaders to American agents at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. During these visits, a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders developed.

"Two attempts against Castro's life were made in the early part of 1959. Both failed. The assassins then waited for a green light from Frank Fiorini Sturgis. A third attempt was made in 1960."

This reporter asked Sturgis when the agency first began thinking about assassinating Castro.

"The first discussion of assassination with my (CIA) contacts was in February 1960," he replied. "I was making reports on all the communist activity in the military. I suggested that this would be a good time to assassinate Fidel. I said I would organize it and follow it through.

"I would arrange an important conference at Campo Libertad (Camp Liberty, the combined army air force base and headquarters formerly known as Camp Columbia). All the top commanders would come to the base in their jeeps and cars. I was going to station gunners on the roofs, set up a cross-fire. I would have wiped out Fidel, his brother Raul and all the top (pro-communist) military commanders in 30 seconds.

"I asked my contact in the Embassy to get a green light (official approval) on this. Whether this would have to come from the top level in Washington or a lower level, I don't know."

While they waited for th...

Sturgis and his CIA contacts devised two alternate plots. One was to execute Castro in the second floor conference room at Air Force headquarters. As he and the other officers would not arrive at exactly the same time, it might be more practical to wait until they were all assembled around the conference table.

"The whole idea was to kill all of them at once. Unfortunately, if some of the anti-Communist officers were in there at the same time, they would have to go too. The lives of some of the anti-Communist commanders would have to be sacrificed in order to get Castro and his crew."

The third scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. "I had access to the prime minister's office," Sturgis said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy. I planned to go to Fidel's office with a briefcase full of explosives which I would leave there. When Fidel entered the office, a signal would be given and the bomb would be set off by an electronic device across the street."

The plotters waited several months for the green light from Washington, but it never came. "They couldn't make up their minds," Frank said of the unseen, unknown decision makers. "They couldn't decide what to do."

Asked for Green Light

But, according to former intelligence agents, the CIA later approved and bankrolled other plots to wipe out Castro. American adventurers, Cuban exiles, Mafia dons and high ranking Cuban officials played prominent parts in these conspiracies.

In June, 1959, Castro fired 25 top Air Force officers suspected of disloyalty, including the Diaz Lanz brothers. Pedro Diaz Lanz then resigned from the Air Force and denounced Castro as a ...

Almeida, ordered Pedro's arrest and the Diaz Lanz brothers went underground.

At this point, Frank was pulled out of Cuba. "I left Havana on June 30 and came to Miami to arrange the escapes of the Diaz Lanz brothers and their families. Pedro and his wife got out by sailboat; Marcos was picked up by a plane."

The brothers fled to Florida, told all they knew about the Castro regime and went to work for the CIA.

A few weeks after Frank's abrupt departure from Havana, he received word that Castro was sending an assassination team after him. Frank's informant supplied full descriptions of the three assassins, who were Mexican communists. The FBI posted a round-the-clock guard on Frank's Miami home and federal agents followed him wherever he went.

Tailed to Florida

Customs and Immigration officers were alerted. The Mexican gunmen were spotted when they crossed the border and were tailed to Florida, where they were arrested. Their car was confiscated and they were booted back to Mexico.

On Oct. 25, 1959, an American B-25 bomber swooped over Havana and dropped thousands of anti-Castro leaflets. Castro called this "bombing" raid a Cuban Pearl Harbor.

"Pedro Diaz Lanz was the pilot," Sturgis told the News. "I was the co-pilot. Marcos Diaz Lanz and another Cuban were with us. Cuban Air Force fighters came after us but they missed us and almost shot their own planes down. The big guns at the Navy station and the Cabana fortress opened up but the angle of the guns was such that they were firing from the heights into the city. At least 36 people were killed and wounded."

The leaflet bombardment was the first of many CIA-sponsored missions Sturgis made to Cuba by air and sea. "I made at least 125 air operations into Cuba," he said, "with the green light and without the green light (with and without official approval). And I made some 60 boat missions.

"I had four boats. They were financed by the agency. One was a converted Coast Guard cutter, 83 feet long, with twin 600 horsepower engines. It has a maximum speed of 20 knots. Another boat, the Cusa, was about the same size. I also had two 56-foot fiberglass boats with radar and other sophisticated equipment. They could carry 30 people and do 50 miles an hour.

A Mission to Cuba: Tale of the Doomed Raiders

By PAUL MESKIL 4/24/75

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

Fifth of a series

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to form a guerrilla army of Cuban refugees and invade Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the CIA dispatched agent Frank Sturgis to Guatemala to confer with President Miguel Ydigoras about setting up training bases in that country.

This "secret" mission was quickly discovered and reported by the Guatemalan news media.

"I had planned to break into the Cuban Embassy while I was in Guatemala City," Sturgis told this reporter recently, "but the president suggested I leave the country because of all the publicity. The newspapers and TV reported I was a CIA agent and was trying to obtain bases for the Cuban invasion."

Over the next year, the CIA trained Cuban recruits in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and the United States. Sturgis, a marine combat veteran of World War II, trained about 50 Cubans in the Florida Everglades.

Sturgis was part of the agency's super-secret Operation 40, an infiltration and intelligence-gathering group that was to go into Cuba before the Bay of Pigs assault.

Some former CIA agents describe Operation 40 as an "assassination squad." Sturgis won't go that far.

"It was a top CIA project," he says. "Most of the men in it were Cubans who had been trained by the U.S. Army. I am not saying that Operation 40 had an assassination squad. There are reports that there was one, but I'm not saying so.

To Infiltrate

"The prime purpose was infiltration, not assassination. They (group members) were to infiltrate Cuba and contact anti-Castro military leaders, political leaders and underground people. And they could kill—if they had to, if it was really necessary."

Chief of Operation 40 was Jose Joaquin Sanjenis, a former Castro aide who defected and became a CIA agent. Two of his cousins also worked for the agency.


Early in 1961, the CIA learned that a group of Cuban military officers was plotting to overthrow Castro. The leader of this plot was Major Humberto Sori Marin, a former Havana lawyer who drafted the Castro penal code which made firing squad executions legal. Sori Marin had been adjutant general of Castro's army, presiding judge at the 1959 "war crimes" trials that sent hundreds of Batista loyalists to the firing squads, and Castro's first minister of agriculture. But by 1961 he had turned against the Castro regime.

His partners in the anti-Castro conspiracy included other Cuban army, navy and air force commanders, the chief of Castro's secret police, the deputy finance minister and the head of the Cuban Sugar Institute. They planned a military uprising during which Castro and his Communist advisers would be killed.

As soon as the CIA learned what they were up to, Operation 40 went into action. Agents slipped into Cuba, contacted the conspirators and asked them to time the military revolt to coincide with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A month before the coordinated revolt-invasion was to start, a militia patrol was sent to the Miramar section of Havana to arrest a woman who had been overheard complaining about food shortages. As the militia jeep pulled up to her house, she ran out the door and

(Continued on page 64)



Nelson: a veteran conspirator.

TALE OF THE DOOMED RAIDERS



News photo

In one CIA plot to kill Castro, the rifle failed to fire.

Super-secret Operation 40 was stymied so many times by the alert Cubans that it began to sound like Catch 22

(Continued from page 5)

fled to the nearby home of a retired engineer and his wife.

The militiamen charged after her, entered the engineer's house and burst into a room where ten leaders of the military conspiracy were seated around a table littered with Havana street maps pinpointing the locations of key installations that were to be seized.

The militiamen were outranked and outnumbered. They hesitated, not sure what to do. Then informed sources said Sori Marin pulled his pistol. A short burst from a Czech-made submachine gun wounded him in the leg and persuaded him and his co-conspirators to surrender. They were hauled off to La Cabana Fortress for questioning.

Around this time, in March 1961, a noisy party was held in a small white bungalow in Miami's Cuban section. The bungalow was a CIA "safe house" and the party was a sendoff celebration for an Operation 40 squad—five Cubans and an American—that was about to invade Cuba.

Contact underground

The squad's mission was to contact the anti-Castro underground and create a diversion on the north coast, to make Castro think a guerrilla force was landing there. The diversionary action was to begin shortly before the real invasion on the south coast.

Most of the people at the Miami party were Cuban refugees. Among the Americans there were Frank Nelson, a former Havana businessman and a veteran Caribbean conspirator, and CIA contractors Frank Sturgis and Alex Rorke.

Nelson fell into conversation with young Angus McNair, lone American member of the Cuba-bound squad. Asked why he was going on such a dangerous mission, McNair replied: "Because Castro killed an American soldier, Bill Morgan."

(Morgan, a former U.S. Army paratrooper who attained the rank of major in Castro's army, was executed by a Castro firing squad on March 11, 1961.)

"About 20 people were at the party," Nelson recalled recently. "I asked McNair 'Aren't you afraid of a leak, with all these people knowing about your mission?' He said they were all friends and relatives of the Cubans who were going with him. He trusted them all. That was a fatal mistake."

The CIA raiders set off the following night from the Florida Keys in the 42-foot motor launch Mercury, loaded with automatic rifles, tommyguns, pistols, grenades and boxes of ammo. Their destination was an inlet of Cabanas Bay in Pinar del Rio Province, about 30 miles from Havana.

Reputed CIA agent

McNair, 25, of Coral Gables, Fla., was [illegible] Sturgis. His orders were to contact Howard Anderson, 41, a [illegible] CIA agent who owned a [illegible] in Havana and command [illegible] there.

Anderson had been in close touch with [illegible] military officers who were plotting an anti-Castro coup. After they were captured, he was instructed to determine if other Cuban officers were in on the plot and if they would attempt to carry it out. He was also to advise the CIA of the progress of the [illegible] action to be launched by Operation 40 in Pinar del Rio.

Shortly after midnight on March 19, the Mercury scraped the sandy bottom of a small, palm-fringed cove. McNair [illegible] at perfectly still [illegible]

Hearing none, they jumped into the waist-deep water and started to unload the boat.

Searchlights were turned on, blinding the invaders. Armed men spilled onto the beach and surrounded them. More than 100 soldiers and militiamen had been waiting for them to land. Someone, perhaps a Castro agent who was a guest at their going-away party, had talked.

Anderson was arrested the same night on his way to rendezvous with McNair. The two Americans died at dawn before a firing squad on April 19, two days after the Bay of Pigs invasion began.

Seven Cubans were executed with them, including Gilberto [illegible], one of the leaders of a [illegible] from Cuba to invade Panama in [illegible] former Castro aide, he [illegible]

the Panama fiasco and went to work for the CIA.

Twelve more anti-Castro plotters were executed next day, April 20. Seven of them were shot in the bullet-pocked moat of La Cabana Fortress. Among them were Humberto Sori Marin, the man who legalized firing squads, and a mysterious American citizen who called himself Rafael Diaz Hencom and was employed by CIA. He reportedly served as liaison between Sori Marin's group and the agency.

Although the Bay of Pigs adventure was a disaster, the CIA plots continued and many invasion veterans continued to work for the agency. Some of them were assigned to the "spook ship" Rex, a 1[illegible]-foot converted U.S. Navy patrol boat that made hundreds of clandestine voyages to Cuba.

Flying the Nicaraguan flag, the Rex operated out of West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. It carried the latest radar and sonar equipment, five cannons, several .30-caliber machineguns and two 20-foot speedboats.

Its skipper reportedly was Eugenio Rolando Martinez, a Miami real estate salesman and CIA agent who made more than 300 nocturnal runs to Cuba. (He was taken off the official CIA payroll in 1972, the day after he was caught in the Watergate break-in.)

On the night of July 21, 1963, one of the Rex speedboats deposited six men on a small island off Las Villas province. The invaders reportedly had been sent to kill Castro at a July 26 rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, but they never got there. They were picked up by a military patrol soon after they landed.

Men captured

On the night of Oct. 21, 1963, the Rex sent its twin speedboats ashore at the western tip of Cuba. The landing was observed by a militia patrol and the six men in the first boat were captured as soon as they hit the beach. The second launch was sunk by a Cuban gunboat as it raced back to the Rex.

Cannon fire from the Rex drove off the Cuban vessel. The men in the water were hauled aboard the spy ship. Next morning, a U.S. Navy submarine surfaced near the Rex off the Bahamas. Five Cubans—four dead, one wounded—reportedly were transferred to the sub, which then submerged and headed for Florida.

One month after this incident, President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who had visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City shortly before the murder and had joined the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee. President Johnson later told an aide, Leo Janos, that he thought the Kennedy assassination might have been a "retaliation" for the CIA-backed efforts to kill Castro.

These efforts continued after Kennedy's death.

Leader of students

In the fall of 1964, CIA agents in Paris made contact with Cuban Army Major Rolando Cubelas, a hero of the Castro revolution and a leader of the Cuban student organization. Two Cuban-born CIA employees, Luis Enrique Trasano and Carlos Tepedino spoke with Cubelas and put him in touch with CIA agents working out of the American Embassy in Paris. The discussions continued a few days later in Madrid, where Cubelas met four more CIA agents. Cubelas had become disenchanted with the Castro regime and he eventually agreed to kill his former idol. On his return to Havana, he was given a high-powered sight.

Other plotters rented an apartment overlooking the building where the prime minister's office was located. Cubelas reportedly drew a bead on Castro one day in 1965. He lined up the cross hairs and squeezed the trigger, but the rifle failed to fire. Castro's secret police later got wind of the assassination attempt and arrested Cubelas and seven other plotters, all of whom were saved from the firing squad by a clemency appeal from Castro.

This may have been the last CIA-sponsored attempt to eliminate Castro. But other CIA [illegible] kept the Caribbean cauldron boiling.

Next: The plot to free the U.S.S. Pueblo

How U.S. Made Unholy Alliance With the Mafia

By PAUL MESKIL 4/23/75

Fourth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

When Fidel Castro threw the American gangsters out of Cuba, they vowed to return—over his dead body.

Their determination to get rid of Castro was shared by many high-placed American officials and this common cause led eventually to an unholy alliance between the CIA and the mob. The strange story of CIA agents and Mafia mobsters plotting together against Castro was pieced together from interviews with police, federal agents, ex-agents and underworld sources.

Meyer Lansky, the crime syndicate's financial genius, and Santo Trafficante, Mafia boss of West Florida and Havana, got out of Cuba immediately after the hasty exit of their benefactor, dictator Fulgencio Batista. The overseers of their gambling casinos remained on the island, nervously waiting for the axe to fall.

"I was in touch with all the casino owners and operators in Havana," said Frank Sturgis, who was Castro's casino inspector during this period. "Fidel ordered me to close all the casinos for 10 days. The owners got the hint. They knew he was preparing to shut them down permanently, which he did.

"They were very, very mad. Those casinos were worth $100 million a year to the American crime syndicate. Every important mob boss in the United States had points (percentages) in the Cuban casinos. Each point was worth $30,000 to $100,000.

"Lansky and Trafficante were the top men in Cuban gambling. Lansky had direct business dealings with Batista. Trafficante had several casinos, including the Sans Souci."

Sans Souci partners

His Sans Souci partners included Norman Rothman of Miami Beach and the notorious Mannarino brothers, Gabriel and Sam, Mafia chiefs in Pittsburgh. Rothman and the Mannarinos tried to stop the Castro steamroller in 1958 by smuggling a planeload of arms — stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio — to anti-Castro forces in Cuba.

According to police and federal sources, Rothman was high up in the Cuban crime syndicate and shared his rackets profits with Batista's brother-in-law, Gen. Robert Fernandez Miranda.

Rothman returned to Florida soon after the Castro coup and, with his Cuban partners, bought the [illegible] Hotel in Miami Beach, the scene [illegible]

The hotel's most elegant suite, on the top floor overlooking the ocean, was made ready for Batista, but he chose the cooler climes of the Dominican Republic, Portugal and Madeira.


Sturgis was on friendly terms with several gambling racketeers, including Hyman Levine, a Lansky mobster who ran Havana's Comodoro casino. One evening, during a casual conversation, Levine observed that it "would be worth a million" to the syndicate to get rid of Castro. Sturgis didn't rise to this bait and Levine changed the subject.

It popped up again a few weeks later while Castro was in New York during a whirlwind tour of North and South America.


Fidel and his entourage stayed at the Statler-Hilton, where Sturgis registered under his real name and Cuban military rank, Capt. Frank Fiorini.

Frank was in his room one evening when he received a phone call from a detective captain on duty in the lobby as part of a heavy security detail. No

(Continued on page 42)



AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CIA AND THE MOB



Surrounded by his soldiers, Castro enters Havana in triumph after ousting the Batista government.

UPI Photo

Deprived of its Havana casinos, U.S. mob joined CIA in series of plots to kill Castro, using everything from poison to dynamite

(Continued from page 6)

visitors were allowed on the Castro floor without special permission.

"There's a guy here to see you," the cop reported. "He says he's your uncle."

"Send him up," Frank replied.

The short, pot-bellied man who arrived a few minutes later looked more like a godfather than an uncle. Frank recognized him as a member of the Havana gambling mob. Coming straight to the point, the hood offered Frank $100,000 to kill Castro.

"I'm not for hire," Frank said, ending the conversation.

When he returned to Havana a few days later, he reported the offer to his CIA contacts at the American Embassy.

Sturgis had no further contact with the gangster who approached him in New York, but someone in the intelligence hierarchy decided that the CIA and the syndicate should join forces against Castro. The go-between picked for this project reportedly was Norman Rothman.

"Rothman was in touch with several CIA agents," a former agent told The News. "They had many meetings concerning assassination plots aginst Castro."

Rothman, in turn, discussed the matter with his peers. Among those who took part in these secret parleys, reliable sources said, were Santo Trafficante of Tampa; Sam Mannarino of Pittsburgh; Salvatore (Sally Burns) Granello and Charles (Charlie the Blade) Tourine, both of New York, and John (Don Giovanni) Roselli of Las Vegas.

Granello, a member of the Vito Genovese crime family, had run casinos in Cuba and bossed a major bookmaking operation on Manhattan's East Side. Tourine, an associate of New Jersey mob chieftains Ruggerio (Richie the Boot) Boiardo and Gerardo (Jerry) Catena, also had operated Havana casinos.

Several suggestions were made for Castro's demise. One was to send for Gaspare Magaddino, a one-man Murder Inc. who killed more than 50 people in various parts of the world before he was blown away by a shotgun blast in Brooklyn in 1970. A Sicilian Mafioso, Magaddino had lived in South America and Cuba [illegible] ted for Trafficante prior to the Castro coup. He knew Havana well and was a perfect choice for the assassination assignment, but he either declined or wasn't offered the contract.

The mob and the CIA finally gave it to Roselli, reputed Mafia boss of Las Vegas, federal sources said.

A dapper, gray-haired man who calls himself a Hollywood movie producer and is a benevolent patron of Vegas showgirls, Roselli reportedly was introduced to CIA agents in 1960 by a Howard Hughes executive who formerly worked for the FBI. Then, federal sources said, Roselli agreed to recruit a death squad to go to Cuba hunting Castro.

Money from CIA

The CIA was to supply money, weapons, and transportation.

Roselli flew to Miami in March, 1961, and held separate conferences with CIA agents and Trafficante on the Castro project.

Roselli volunteered to accompany CIA financed missions to Cuba, the federal sources said. One of these expeditions reportedly landed an execution squad that attempted but failed to hit Castro. On another occasion, the crew of Roselli's launch fought a running gunfight with a Cuban patrol boat.

Columnist Jack Anderson reported that CIA agents gave Roselli some poison capsules which he passed along to a Cuban who was related to Castro's chef. The chef was to put the poison in Castro's food. The sources interviewed by the News confirmed that at least one attempt was made to poison Castro.

An American who was active in the anti-Castro underground in Cuba at the time said "enough poison to kill 10 people" was dumped in a glass of malted milk sent to Castro's suite in the Havana Hilton in 1961.

"Castro ordered a chocolate [illegible] every afternoon and the same waiter always brought it to his room," he [illegible]. "When the waiter came in with [illegible] poisoned malt, he was shaking so [illegible] he almost dropped the tray.

"Castro [illegible] you?' The waiter said, 'I don't know; maybe I got a fever.' Castro had him arrested and had the drink analyzed. Chemists found the poison right away."

In early 1961, a more elaborate assassination attempt was directed by a well-financed American who arrived in Havana soon after the Castro takeover and lived there until security police accused him of working for the CIA and plotting to murder Castro.

Working with anti-Castro Cuban military officers, the American planted several sticks of dynamite under the garage floor of a 20-story apartment building where a number of Castro aides and Communist-bloc diplomats lived with their families.

"Castro came to the apartment house every two weeks to see one of his adjutants," one of the plotters said. "He always arrived in the afternoon, on the same day of the week.

"He would drive in with his bodyguards and park his car in the space reserved for him. We timed his visits. It always took at least five minutes for him to get into the garage, out of the car and into the freight elevator that took him upstairs where he wanted to go.

"We had a line of four men. One would signal from a nearby roof when Castro's car started into the garage. The signal would be passed on. Then a couple of guys would hit the plunger of an electronic detonating device. The detonator was in a hotel near the apartment house.

"We would have blown him to dust.

"The night before it was to happen, the guys (the Cuban plotters) had a final meeting to go over the details. Nobody outside our group knew about the dynamite, but a friend of theirs in G-2 (Castro's intelligence service) found out about the meeting and reported it. The G-2 came looking for them.

"They were in an apartment miles away from the place where the dynamite was. The G-2 raided the meeting and everybody started [illegible]

One of the plotters, a young military officer named Jesus Casas, shot it out with the raiders and killed two of them before he was slain by a motorcycle cop. Three other conspirators, all rebel officers who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra, were captured and taken to G-2 headquarters. They escaped a few hours later, with the help of friends in the intelligence service, and found refuge in the Uruguayan Embassy.

"Castro never found out about the dynamite," said the source who disclosed the plot to The News. "It's probably still there, under the garage floor."

Intelligence sources told this reporter that the CIA sent an execution squad into Oriente Province in November 1962 to ambush Castro near Santiago de Cuba as he drove to a memorial service for his fallen guerrillas.

Snipers hid along road

Snipers hid among trees and bushes lining the road to the cemetery where the service was to be held. On the morning of the scheduled ceremony, a motorcade of five jeeps approached the graveyard. The first jeep was full of soldiers. In the second jeep, a tall, bearded man sat next to the driver. He was wearing sunglasses and his fatigue cap was pulled down to his eyes.

Machineguns and rifles sprayed the second jeep with bullets, killing the driver and his passenger, who turned out to be Castro's [illegible] bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo Gamonal. The assassins escaped. So did Fidel, who had prudently taken another route to the cemetery.

The CIA plots against Castro began in 1960, during the Eisenhower administration, and continued through the Kennedy and Johnson years, causing President Johnson to [illegible] to an aide that "we're running a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."

In 1967, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [illegible] deportation proceedings against Don Giovanni Roselli, charging he was [illegible] to the country illegally from Italy.

In 1969, soon after President Nixon took office, government lawyers argued in court that Roselli should not be deported because he had performed unspecified "valuable services to the national security." Roselli was not deported.

'Frogmen' Blew Up a French Ship in Havana

By PAUL MESKIL

Last of 6 series

At 3:10 p.m. on March 4, 1960, a French munitions ship blew up in Havana harbor, killing at least 76 people and injuring more than 200.

The vessel, Le Couvre, exploded during the unloading of 76 tons of ammunition and grenades intended for Fidel Castro's military and police forces. Castro suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. The United States denied any involvement in the incident.

A former CIA agent told The News recently that Le Couvre was sabotaged by "CIA frogmen." He said an underwater demolition team slipped into the water at night and attached a bomb to the ship's hull, under the waterline. The bomb, a detonator and a timing device were in a waterproof container, he said.

The ex-agent added that the frogmen were Cubans working for the CIA. "It was definitely a CIA-connected thing," he said.

Another source said the bomb was supposed to go off around 3 a.m., when the waterfront was deserted, but something went wrong with the timer and the blast came 12 hours later, when the area was crowded with dock workers and harbor traffic.

Still another source, formerly connected with the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the Caribbean area, blamed the big blast on Gen. Rafael Trujillo, then dictator of the Dominican Republic.

Trujillo and his sinister intelligence chief, Johnny Abbes, had many conferences with CIA officials and secret agents. On one occasion in 1960, Trujillo offered CIA agents Frank Sturgis and Pedro Diaz Lanz, former chief of Castro's Air Force, $1 million to lead an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. Diaz Lanz declined, telling his CIA bosses that he didn't want to work for another dictator.

Plotting to kill Trujillo

While in the Dominican Republic to confer with Trujillo in 1961, Sturgis also contacted Dominican military officers who were plotting to kill Trujillo. The CIA agreed to give the plotters guns and ammunition.

"The guns arrived in boxes sent to a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo (the Dominican capital, now called Santo Domingo)," said Frank Nelson, an American who worked with Trujillo in a plot to overthrow Castro. "The Dominican officers didn't need the guns. They already had enough stuff for a [illegible]. They needed the moral support of the U.S. government, and this was represented by the arms shipments."

The rebel officers assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. W[illegible]

SECRETS OF THE CIA


used the CIA guns has not been disclosed. But similar weapons figured in subsequent attempts to exterminate Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, the voodoo Hitler of Haiti.

On the night of Aug. 26, 1963, a converted B-25 bomber left Florida with an arms shipment for Gen. Leon Cantava, a former Haitian Army commander who was planning to invade his homeland from the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. The CIA plane swooped over a flare-lit field near the Dominican military airport of Dajabon.

Wooden crates rained down on parachutes. They contained mortars, bazookas, M-1 rifles, .30-caliber machine guns, M-3 Tommy guns, .45-caliber pistols, grenades and ammunition.


The weapons were distributed among 210 Haitian exiles who comprised Cantava's invasion army. They crossed Massacre River, borderline between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, on night of Sept. 22. Late the following day, after a bloody battle with Haitian troops, Cantava led the remnants

(Continued on page 54)



Duvalier [illegible] CIA

PLOT TO RELEASE THE PUEBLO



Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, offered $1 million for a Cuban invasion.

In the Caribbean, the CIA got involved in dozens of schemes, including blowing up a French ship and killing Trujillo

(Continued from page 4)

of [illegible] and back across the river to [illegible] Dominican sanctuary.

A week later, a small group of Haitian refugees entered a U.S. Army Special Forces camp in North Carolina for training in guerrilla warfare. Most of the Haitians were in their early 20s and had attended college in the United States after serving in the U.S. Army or Air Force. All of them lived in New York City.

They had been hand picked by the CIA for what became one of the bravest and most pitiful invasions in the history of Caribbean carnage.

The invasion force consisted of only 13 men, eight of whom had been trained by the Green Berets. They belonged to an anti-Duvalier group called Jeune Haiti (Young Haiti). Nearly all of the [illegible] 13 were the sons of Haitian military officers or officials who had been [illegible] by Duvalier's thugs.

The leader, Gusle Villedrouin, was a former U.S. airman whose father, Haitian Army Col. Roger Villedrouin, was clubbed to death by Papa Doc's Tonton Macoutes.

They chartered a boat in Florida and landed in Haiti on Aug. 5, 1964, carrying a variety of weapons supplied by CIA agents. Although the invasion was doomed to failure before it began, the 13 young New Yorkers managed to hold off hundreds of Duvalier soldiers, militiamen and Tonton Macoutes.

They were killed one by one, and those who were left kept fighting. The last three invaders ran out of ammunition on Oct. 26, then threw stones at the troops who gunned them down. The heads of all 13 were cut off and sent to the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince.

Drops two gasoline drums

On May [illegible] 1968, a B-25 flew over Duvalier's palace and dropped two gasoline drums, one of which blew a hole in the street outside the Haitian White House. The other did not explode. The plane was piloted by an American who reportedly had done contract jobs for the CIA.

A [illegible] more imaginative, though no [illegible] CIA plot was simmering [illegible] at this time. Its aim was the release of the USS Pueblo and her crew, captured by Communist North Korea in January 1968.

CIA [illegible] named the Pueblo project Operation Sword, but those [illegible] refer to it as "the Mexican [illegible]." It went from the planning stage to the recruiting stage in the [illegible] of 1968, when a classified ad appeared in a Fort Lauderdale newspaper [illegible] "adventure" and "high pay" to qualified applicants.

The ad was placed by Ray Sandstrom, a Fort Lauderdale lawyer who allegedly had worked for the CIA as a pilot. About 60 men answered the ad, and [illegible] letters to Sturgis, who was in charge of the operation.

Sturgis [illegible] appointed Max Gorman Gonzales, who had worked with him on previous missions, as security chief [illegible]. From the letters and personal interviews, Frank eventually [illegible] volunteers.

[illegible] had been in military service [illegible] records. "Three had been in World War II, two others served in Korea and Vietnam. Most were young, but one was in his late 40s and had a drinking problem. He said he had never accomplished much in life and had always wanted to go on some kind of an adventure, so Frank said, 'Well, if you stay sober, we'll take you along.'

[illegible] were offered $10,000 for a completed assignment. They were told it was to be a commando raid into Cuba to free political prisoners from Castro's concentration camps."

To lend credence to this story, Sturgis displayed a map showing the locations of Cuban prisons and prison camps. He also had a list of prisoners who supposedly were to be freed.

None of the men, not even Gonzales, w[illegible]

[illegible] operation was planned [illegible] in advance," Sturgis said. "The CIA station in Miami was aware of it. So were several other federal agencies, including the FBI and Customs.

"The objective was not to raid Cuba but to rendezvous with another ship off the coast of Mexico and, with the assistance of this ship, seize a Russian vessel. We were to meet a Cuban vessel. I assume it was a Naval vessel, commanded by Cuban Navy officers who were disenchanted with Castro.

"The orders (for completing the operation) were aboard the Cuban ship. The captain also had a sailing schedule listing arrivals and departures of all Soviet and Communist bloc vessels in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. We hoped to grab a Soviet fishing trawler that was actually a spy ship, stopped by the Cuban vessel. The skipper of the Soviet ship probably would not be suspicious of a boarding party wearing Cuban Navy uniforms.

"We would then capture the ship. We were to take it to a point off the coast of Venezuela. The orders were not to go into any port but to stay off the coast. Certain officials in the Venezuelan government were aware of the plan. They would participate in negotiations for the release of the captive ship and its crew. A statement would be issued to the effect that we wanted to exchange the ship and crew for certain political prisoners in Cuba.

"But this was a ruse. Then we would go into the second phase of the operation, to dicker with the [illegible] U.S.S. Pueblo, its captain and crew, who were still in confinement at this time.

"We were going to threaten to sink the Communist ship and kill all the hostages if any ship of any country came close. It was supposed to look like a pirate operation, organized by American mercenaries and anti-Castro Cubans."

In preparation for the trip to Mexico, guns, camping equipment, medicine, bandages, uniforms and other supplies were hidden in door panels, seats and a false trunk of a 1963 Falcon that was outfitted by the mechanics of a Miami garage owned by two CIA employes.

The volunteers were to provide their own transportation to Mexico and their own weapons and camping gear.

"The men had to get to the meeting place, Guadalajara, at their own expense," Gonzales said. "The contract didn't go into effect until they got there. How they got there was their business."

Running out of money

One of the recruits, Robert Curtis, later testified in a court case resulting from the operation: "When we got to Guadalajara, the hotel we were supposed to go to was torn down. We went across the street to Los Americanos (another hotel). We left the car parked out front where he (Sturgis) could see it. We waited three weeks, and we were running out of money ... so we went to a gun shop and sold my Japanese Nambu (automatic pistol) for about $30."

Frank and the rest of the gang eventually arrived and proceeded to a training camp Gonzales had set up in the mountains near the Guatemala border. It rained much of the time they were there, and they called their base Camp Mud.

After two weeks there, they moved to Camp Sand on the beach near the Yucatan fishing village of Progreso. They chartered the fishing boat Amigo, smuggled guns and ammo aboard, and set off to meet the Cuban vessel. But the charts they had obtained to guide them through the Gulf and Caribbean were 10 years old and, therefore, not completely accurate.

They cruised south along the Yucatan coast for four days, entered Central American waters and then ran aground on a reef two miles off Belize, capital of British Honduras.

"We threw a lot of gear over the side," Gonzales said. "We waited until the tide came in. Then everybody jumped into the water to help get her off the reef although there were sharks around. We didn't intend to go into Belize, but the propeller and shaft were bent, and there was a small leak. We were taking on water and needed repairs."

When the Amigo limped into port, flying no flag, police and customs officers boarded her. British Honduran authorities at first thought it was an invasion from Guatemala. Sturgis and his dirty dozen were questioned by British intelligence agents. Then Sturgis spoke to the American consul, and, after a few phone calls to Mexico City and Washington, the consul told him not to worry. The Americans were released and flown back to Miami.

"We was supposed to get $1,500 a month plus a $10,000 bonus (on completion of the mission)," Curtis said later. "Well, all I seen was 40 or 50 bucks to get back home (from Miami)."

"Whatever it was, it was definitely a CIA operation," said Max Gonzales, a native New Yorker who is now in business in Miami. "Frank Sturgis was a CIA agent at the time and still may be. He was in contact with other CIA agents in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Frank never told me what our real mission [illegible]

CIRCULATION—NOW MORE THAN 2 MILLION


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
Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



HOW NEW TAX LAW HITS BUSINESSMEN

SPECIAL REPORT

Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



Out from Miami spreads a wave of violence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this dream. But the acts of a few zealots create trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.

Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON

Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of American leaders.

The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.

In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama—even across the South Atlantic to Argentina.

They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several killings.

A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activities and their leaders.

Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconciliation with Castro.

Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at assassinating members of the Carter Administration.

"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins in the world today," says one U.S. official.

Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the days when this country was trying to overthrow Castro, or kill him.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimony from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist squad of the Dade County public-safety department in Miami, where Cuban refugees are concentrated:



Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro leader, is accused in plane bombing fatal to 73.

"The overwhelming majority of the Cubans in Miami are strongly anti-Castro. That's why they came to Miami in the first place. They are also law-abiding citizens who, with minor exceptions, manifest their opposition to Castro in legal ways.

"However, there are a small number of individuals whose hatred of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Communism has led them to engage in extralegal actions and to violate the laws of the country which gave them sanctuary. These individuals use Dade County as a base for international terrorism . . . against governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terrorist-type attacks. . . .

"Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terrorist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban population and diverting the collected funding for their own purposes."

Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.

The number of hard-core terrorists is small; officially estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this year alone they have either bragged about or been accused of such acts as:

- Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels from Cuba and other Communist nations.
- Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States, Latin America and Portugal.
- Planting a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of 73 lives.
- Possible involvement in the still-unsolved bomb death of



EXILES vs. CASTRO— *A Relentless Pursuit*

On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the U.S. have become extremists.

Highlights of events in those 18 years, some involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the extremists—

1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nicaragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south shore. The invasion was a failure.

1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ransom in drugs, food, medical equipment and other supplies from "private contributions." President John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a liberated Cuba.

U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"—a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks generally failed.

1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Guevara addressed the General Assembly.

1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.

1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, terrorized other exiles to keep them in line.

1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelligence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later testified that they thought it would help their anti-Castro campaign.

1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships at sea.

1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than 100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting offices of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami police department.

Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consulates of governments that have diplomatic relations with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.

Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches manned by exile extremists.

Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage of a Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers and crew last October 6 near Barbados. Police seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspicion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro canceled U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement.

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on September 21.

- Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
- Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.

Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about what they may do in the future?

To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of the *U.S. News & World Report* staff dug deeply into the records, interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes though not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.

BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM

After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state, 800,000 Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of them live in the Miami area.

The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the virus of violence can grow.

"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions, hatreds—and their hopes of going back to their homeland. And they know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So they dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in other places in the United States seems very possible in the atmosphere in Miami."

In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable. It was U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the CIA. The invaders were not given the air cover necessary for a successful attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only 180 of about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The Cubans felt betrayed.

Then came other American moves against Castro. There was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro from obtaining sorely needed supplies and equipment from abroad. Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret operations not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts of Latin America—and even in Africa.

To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Communism became a *way of life*.

Since then, however, American policy has failed to match in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more militant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the U.S. Senate have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an agreement with the United States to curb the airplane hijackers who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were moves on both sides toward normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.

As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed, some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own. The box on this page gives the chronology of developments.

TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS

Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active terrorists have organized themselves into many groups. Slogans of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana" have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the

slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha 66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible; FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragmatistas, which means what it sounds like—pragmatists.

A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons on the list soon died violent deaths.

Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to terrorists in the last two years:


- Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broadcaster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his car apart.
- On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquarters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again in a State court.
- A number of bombs have been exploded in New York. One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
- On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the *Dzhordano Bruno*, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machine-gun fire. No one was injured.
- On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked and a fisherman was killed.
- On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb exploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially unsolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret police of the present anti-Communist Government in Chile.

NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY

Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one an has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch, pediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish p in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years prison.

r. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he ortedly returned to the movement. He is now under st in Venezuela, charged along with three other men in nection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is ribed as the leader of the group calling itself Accion ana.

June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his activists together in the Dominican Republic. They sharply divided on policy and strategy. e wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the l States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro e this country. Others held out for continuing their ies both here and abroad. a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached



Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.

to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities, a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolutionary Organizations in English.

American law-enforcement officials say that members of CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.

Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama. Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.

On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida, Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.

The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6, when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing 73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing team.

In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the crash of the plane.

Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents apparently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.

The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press International on November 19, said the four men held by the Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, *if they are* convicted, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion flights to Havana.

Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers," Carballo said.

CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS

Since last spring, there has been a sharp reduction in terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agencies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.

Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organized

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

includes representatives from Dade County and Miami police, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force, its agents work closely with it.

With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of suspects. Police also have learned enough about other suspects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to prosecute them.

A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might have some knowledge of terror operations.

Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terrorist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who had never met him before, called him by name and told him what section he worked in and what his duties were."

Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Government. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S. Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."

A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as *agents provocateurs*, instigating terrorist acts designed to discredit the refugees and influence American policy.

The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year, for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was named in Senate committee testimony as having been involved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana. In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had provided him with the explosives.

In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully informed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equipment and instructions he has received."

Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA . . . can carry out these acts?" Castro asked.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S. involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible."

The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism. Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from domestic law-enforcement activities.

Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or to export arms without a license.

Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S. officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for the FBI to enter that case.

With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say they can look forward to only limited success against the terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from within the Cuban refugee community—and investigators state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to cases of violence committed outside the U.S.

WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?

As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign: The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro into renouncing the antihijacking treaty, thus discouraging efforts toward a diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Cuba.

Despite all the terrorist plots and attacks, Castro remains firmly seated as head of a Communist regime in Cuba. And it appears to the refugees almost inevitable that the movement toward some kind of accommodation with Castro will be resumed by American policy makers. Throughout "Little Havana," the fear is widespread that Jimmy Carter, when he becomes President, will give new impetus to this movement, and that their homeland will never be liberated from Communist rule.

To both officials and Cuban refugee leaders, it seems inevitable that the terrorists will continue their attempts to keep the two countries apart by the only method they know—further acts of violence.

TERRORISTS' ARSENAL: PLANES TO CANNONS

One measure of the military equipment that is available to Cuban terrorists is provided by this partial inventory compiled by authorities:

- 10 or more high-speed motor launches about 30 feet long, with special fuel tanks for extra range
- A number of small, spotter aircraft
- Large-caliber recoilless rifles
- Missile-antitank weapons
- Wide assortment of smaller weapons
- Large quantities of C-4 explosives developed by the U.S. Army

A further measure comes from this tally of extremists' weapons confiscated by Miami law-enforcement officers so far in 1975-76:

- 1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of explosive ammunition
- 498 submachine guns, 480 of them with silencers
- 82 explosive devices
- 3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
- 4 boxes of napalm
- 6 rifles
- 20 handguns
- Thousands of rounds of ammunition

MEMORANDUM

TO: RECORD

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION OF JANUARY 19, 1977

I called Larry Callahan at 2:00 p.m. to advise him that the Commiteee desired to interview Mr. Gene A. Boren, of the IRS, at the earliest available opportunity and requested his advice and assistance to accomplish this. Callahan was nervous about the Committee's eagerness to proceed in response to the memorandum for fear that we would be interfering with an on-going criminal investigation. He noted the FBI was looking into this and he would have to check with the Bureau to ascertain the feasibility of proceeding unilaterally. I told Callahan we did not want to interfere with a criminal investigation and that I did not feel that our interview of the IRS employee would fall into that category. Callahan referred to a possible obstruction of justice on the part of that employee in that the information had been withheld for approximately five years.

At 2:30 p.m. I received a telephone call from Paul Daly urging Committee restraint in unilaterally investigating subject matter. Daly noted the Bureau had just received this information and was intending to interview the IRS employee

and other individuals in question today or tomorrow. Daly noted that he was disturbed that Callahan had brought the memo to the Committee's attention so promptly, as the Bureau had intended to brief the Committee at the conclusion of their investigation. Daly seemed most concerned that the IRS delay in bringing the matter to the Bureau's attention and assured us that the Bureau was desirous of cooperating fully. He noted the information had been furnished by Justice absent a specific inquiry from the Committee and that we were being unreasonable if we desired to pursue the matter further at this time. I asked Daly what information was available at the Bureau on Brading and Hunt. He said there was a large quantity of information available on both and that he felt he could pull that material which related to the assassination quickly, but would be reluctant to produce the information in its entirety. I told him to ascertain this afternoon what information could be produced immediately and he said that he would.

At 2:45 p.m. I talked again with Callahan who indicated that Daly would be calling. Callahan said he thought the Bureau was eager to redeem itself in this area and we should give them that opportunity. I told Callahan that I was concerned about the ~~utilization~~ mutilation of ~~leaks~~ leads, a position which Callahan thinks is ridiculous. Callahan, however, did state that this information was not as old as it looks at the Bureau, to-wit: While the Justice received the IRS memo on December 30, 1976,

considerable time went by before Attorney General Levi could address the issue of whether or not to entrust this matter to the Bureau. Approximately one week ago, Justice went to Jim Adams of the FBI with the request to look into the allegation and was surprised to find that Adams was already apprised of the situation and investigating, i.e., general indexes. Apparently, Adams had been in receipt of similar information in recent days.

Yesterday, in response to the Attorney General's request for information, Paul Daly hand carried to Callahan the Bureau's response (which is dated January 14) and today Callahan hand carried the package to us over Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann;s signature. Callahan advised that Daly was upset that the Committee had been so promptly advised for fear that we would interupt the Bureau's inquiry. Callahan apologized for the lack of responsiveness on the part of Justice and the Bureau but things are in disarray with Levi about to depart. I assured Callahan we did not desire to interfere in the investigation but desired to be promptly informed of any developments and that we would stay in touch with Paul Daly in that regard . Callahan promised to expedite any Committee requests as made.

Paul Daly called at 3:10 p.m. to advise that "the powers that be" at the Bureau were upset with the possibility that the Committee was considering going to Dallas and interfering with the investigation. He specifically that the Director be given an opportunity to talk with Inouye prior to any such action. I told Daly that it was merely the Committee's desire to go to Texas; I had heard no discussion of going regardless of the Bureau's position. Daly promised to pull together without the need for a written request, all available information on Brading for Committee review this afternoon, if at all possible.

THE NEW YORK TIMES,

Hunt Sons Charge C.I.A. Used Agents To Embezzle Funds

F CT 100 Hunt

DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)—Two sons of H. L. Hunt, the late billionaire contending they were discriminated against because of their conservative views, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the family oil empire and used secret agents to help embezzle more than $50-million from them.

The brothers, Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, said new Federal charges that they had tried to cover up a family wiretapping scheme were a further result of an attempt by the C.I.A. to discredit the Hunt oil empire. They said they held the C.I.A. responsible for earlier Federal charges that they had spied on aides of their father.

They said their refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use their overseas Hunt Oil Company affiliate for espionge had led to the Federal charges against them.

"After turning down the C.I.A., a massive embezzlement scheme involving loses of over $50-million from the Hunt Oil Company were uncovered," the brothers said in a news release. "An investigation disclosed that some of the Hunt employes involved in the scheme were secret Government agents."

A spokesman at C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington said, "Since it appears such a complicated matter, the agency's legal people would like time to find out what it is all about."

A Federal grand jury yesterday charged the Hunt brothers, Percy Foreman of Houston, a criminal lawyer, three other attorneys and a retired Texas industrialist with obstruction of justice for allegedly trying to thwart the wiretap investigation.

Who? Why?

Does CIA ever deny?

U.S. Accused of Refusing to Investigate $50-Million 'Theft' at H.L. Hunt Concern

Sep. 22 51:1

By MARTIN WALDRON
Special to The New York Times

LUBBOCK, Tex., Sept. 21 — A member of the Hunt oil family says that its widely advertised H. L. H. food company lost $50-million to $60-million between 1960 and 1970 because of "stealing" by key company employes and that the Justice Department has refused for five years to investigate.

Thomas M. Hunt, a nephew of H. L. Hunt, the eccentric late oil billionaire, who used the radio program "Life Line" to advertise his food and drug products, said that the Justice Department was under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency not to investigate the alleged thefts, and to prosecute two members of the Hunt family for wiretapping.

Thomas Hunt is production manager for H.L.H.'s parent company, the Hunt Oil Company, which is family owned. Mr. Hunt is a cousin of Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, who are on trial in Federal District Court here on wiretapping charges. Testimony in the case begins tomorrow.

Bunker Hunt has said his refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use his Middle-Eastern oil operations as a cover is the possible reason behind the Government's insistence on trying him and his brother on six-year-old wiretapping charges.

Refused Request

A C.I.A. memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1965, indicated that Bunker Hunt would be asked to allow the agency to use his company as a cover in the Middle East. The Hunts had an oil concession in Libya. Bunker Hunt said such a request was made to him in 1966 by the C.I.A., but that he refused to allow it because he did not want to alienate the Libyans.

The intelligence agency has declined to allow the Hunts to see nine of 12 items it has in its files on Bunker Hunt, saying in a letter dated April 3, 1975, that to release these items would imperil "intelligence sources and methods."

One of these items if revealed, the C.I.A. said, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the individual volunteering information.

Thomas Hunt said that the family believed that this individual was one of the H.L.H. employes who organized the system under which the food company was stripped of huge sums of money.

The Justice Department refused to comment on the Hunt contentions.

However, department officials have signed affidavits that none of the evidence being presented in the wiretap trial came from the C.I.A.

Checking Losses

The Hunts say that the wiretap charges grew out of efforts by Herbert and Bunker Hunt to find out why H.L.H. was losing so much money. Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. losses in 1968 had reached $8-million a year, when a company projection had shown they should be making a profit.

Thomas Hunt's phone was one of those tapped by three private detectives hired by his cousins in November, 1969. The other phones were those of H. L. Hunt's private secretary, a Hunt oil company vice president and three lesser company officials.

Losses of H.L.H. were getting so massive in 1968 and 1969 that the Hunt Oil Company, which had been absorbing the losses, "was getting into a cash bind," Thomas Hunt said.

The wiretaps were discovered in January, 1970, and three private detectives were later convicted and sent to prison for short terms. The detectives, after being released, told a grand jury, under threats of contempt citations, that the Hunt brothers hired them, and the Hunts were indicted in February, 1973.

Thomas Hunt said that before his cousins resorted to hiring private detectives, they had become convinced that the company officials who ordinarily would have investigated thefts "were the chief thieves." An independent audit later proved this surmise [illegible] correct, he said.

Every Operations

The thefts, he said, stretched from coast to coast and involved almost every operation of H.L.H.—purchases, sales and operations. Company payrolls were loaded with nonexistent employes and company officials got kickbacks on purchases and commissions on sales through dummy food brokerage companies, he said.

Thomas Whitaker, a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who now is chief security officer for the Hunt

Sep. 22 51:2

Oil Company, said that more than $5-million in thefts had been documented and many more were being investigated.

He and Thomas Hunt gave as an example of a typical operation the sale of an H.L.H. pecan crop from company groves near Tyler, Tex., and the subsequent purchase of a pecan processing plant at the same city.

"We had sold a pecan crop to a company in El Paso," Mr. Hunt said. "The we were told by one of the thieves that he had not realized that pecans were selling for so much and had agreed to sell them to somebody else for two cents a pound less."

Reports Commitment

Mr. Whitaker said that the same former employe negotiated the purchase of the pecan processing plant, committing H.L.H. to paying $180,000 for it.

"The plant had been shut down by the Food and Drug Administration, it was all rusty and has not been operated to this day," Mr. Whitaker said.

The previous owner of the pecan plant gave a deposition to Hunt Oil officials saying that he had paid cash kickbacks of more than $80,000 to three H.L.H. employes.

But the biggest source of income at H.L.H. expense, he said, was at least five dummy food brokerage corporations that were set up by H.L.H. employes to receive 3 per cent commissions on all H.L.H. sales.

After auditors had established the duplicity of H.L.H. executives in early 1970, "the whole scheme was laid out" to the F.B.I., Mr. Whitaker said.

In July, 1970, a claim of $442,873.19 was filed with the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York by Hunt Oil, detailing allegations of thefts by employes whose honesty had been insured by Fidelity.

Sought Eastland Aid

After the private detectives were indicted in 1970, the Hunts made efforts to have the prosecution dropped through political connections, asking Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to intercede with the Justice Department.

One Hunt attorney said that the Hunts had been led to believe that if they would drop damage suits against former employes and settle the company's claim against the bonding company for $100,000, the case "would blow over." The suits were dropped and the settlement made with the bonding company.

[illegible] an agreement was reached in Washington, it did not hold.

The three detectives were convicted and sent to prison, and after they testified before a special grand jury in 1973 in Dallas, the Hunts were indicted on the wiretapping charge in February of that year.

After the Hunts were charged, one of their attorneys, Philip Hirschkop of Alexandria, Va., asked the Federal courts to require the Justice Department to investigate the thefts from H.L.H.

Warned of Dismissal

In response to a statement from Federal District Judge H. O. Woodward in 1973 that he would dismiss cases against the Hunts "if some agency does not investigate," Hunt officials "once again laid out the whole situation to the F.B.I." and other Justice Department officials, Mr. Whitaker said.

Two former employes of H.L.H., John Curington and John H. Brown, were later indicted and were convicted last year for using the mails to defraud H.L.H. They were fined and placed on probation. A third former employe, Paul M. Rothermel, who had been chief of security for Hunt Oil Company, was given immunity from prosecution by the Government, but he was never called to testify at any trial.

The three men said that H. L. Hunt had given them permission to act as food brokers to sell H. L. H. products, a statement denied by the late billionaire.

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In an effort to show that the Hunts were being prosecuted because they refused to cooperate with the C.I.A., Mr. Hirschkop asked both the agency and the F.B.I. for any C.I.A. information they had on his clients.

Three Items

The three of 13 items that the C.I.A. would release to Mr. Hirschkop were a biography of Bunker Hunt, a copy of a memorandum that recommended that Bunker Hunt be asked to be "operational" and copies of attacks made on Bunker Hunt by Tripoli Radio.

Bunker Hunt said that in 1966 the C.I.A. asked him to

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allow [illegible] his Libyan oil operations as a cover for C.I.A. agents in the Middle East, but that he refused.

The December, 1966, memorandum on Bunker Hunt said that the C.I.A. had "had good cooperation . . . on our routine requests but have no way of judging possible reaction to operational requests. Our estimate is that we see no reason we should not make a cautious approach."

In pretrial hearings, the Hunts asked Judge Woodward to order the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to furnish information on the Hunts and on Mr. Curington, Mr. Rothermel and Mr. Brown.

Found No Relevance

Judge Woodward examined reports from the C.I.A. on Mr. Rothermel and on all three men from the National Security Council but ruled that they had no relevance to the wiretap case and he would not allow the Hunts to see the documents.

Thomas Hunt said that the State Department also had become involved, urging Bunker Hunt to pay $43-million still owed to the Libyan Government on the 1972 taxes. These taxes were withheld after Libya seized Mr. Hunt's oil interests in that nation in 1973.

Mr. Hunt said that this advice had been rejected.

Tripoli Radio said in June, 1973, that Bunker Hunt's half-share in an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil in a desert field in Libya had been seized because Mr. Hunt was "an adventurer and broker seeking gains and profits without carrying out any activity or bearing any risk."

"He did not even have a positive attitude toward the wishes of the people," the broadcast said.

Thomas Hunt said that the Hunt oil interests had been paying about $180-million in taxes to the Libyan Government before Mr. Hunt was ousted from the country.

Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. Food Products Division of Hunt Oil Company had been reorganized and was now showing a profit.

Sep. 22 24:5

Saigon Students Tested On Ideas From Hanoi

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sept. 21 (Agence France-Presse)—The first group of high school students to take final examinations since the Communists took over here had a choice yesterday of writing papers analyzing the thoughts of either Ho Chi Minh, the late North Vietnamese leader, or the current Premier, Pham Van Dong.

The first choice was an excerpt from Ho Chi Minh's "Call to the Nation" of July 17, 1966, when American bombers started attacking North Vietnam.

The other was a passage from Mr. Dong's speech when he presented his Government to the latest session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly.

osts down, deal with labor problems." Lamar's low-keyed personal style (Steadman says Lamar has never given him a direct order in the 15 years of their association) tends to make some people think of him as a sort of a Mr. Peepers with a yen to be a jock. "Actually," says Maxfield, "he's Clark Kent. He is a mild-mannered, meek, everyday guy. But when money needs to be committed, he goes into that little phone booth and comes out with an 'S' on his shirt."

Lucky 11 trusts

The bedrock of Lamar's personal fortune is the trust that his father set up for him in 1935 as part of a tax strategy planned with the aid of veteran Hunt attorney J. B. McEntire. At that time, a trust was established for each of the Hunt children. In 1958, the pattern was repeated when the elder Hunt established trusts for each of the second Mrs. Hunt's children, calling them Loyal Trusts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except for Hunt Oil Co., which went entirely to Mrs. Hunt, H. L. Hunt left the bulk of his personal holdings to the Loyal Trusts, whose beneficiaries are Ray Hunt, Ruth Jane Hunt, Mrs. Randall L. (Helen LaKelley) Kreiling, and Mrs. Mark A. (Swanee Grace) Meeks.

The size of these trusts is unknown, but one of the problems facing the Hunt family is how to commingle 11 separate fortunes (those of the 10 children plus the Ruth Ray Hunt Trust) to maximum advantage. Dallas friends of son-in-law "Randy" Kreiling say the question is being debated warmly within the family. Although Kreiling's role in the Great Western United takeover was relatively minor, it did demonstrate a willingness between the two sibling groups to cooperate.

Lamar Hunt observes that, since the bulk of H. L. Hunt's estate was left to Mrs. Hunt, "it was a natural thing for Ray to be the person who looks after it." Lamar adds: "It does not mean that Ray will run the business. He will be making an orderly transition, a change to whatever happens. He will have the responsibility of making decisions in relationship to Dad's property, but Dad's operation was much simpler."

There will be no move to take Hunt Oil public, Lamar says. "Our philosophy is not one of promotion of stock and promotion to the public," he says. "Each of us has his own interests. All of us operate in the oil business, sometimes together, sometimes as an independent oil operator. Hunt Oil, which was my Dad's company, will be run basically by employees of the company. We all will continue to operate out of the Hunt Oil office."

Maxfield, who has been observing the Hunts for nine years as Lamar's partner, believes that Hunt Oil and Placid Oil will carry on the monolithic base of the family fortune. "It's like a tree trunk, with each brother having his own branch," he says. "Oil is not an expression of the personality of the sons as it was of the old man. The expression of the brothers will be in the branches—Ray in real estate; Lamar sports; Bunker horses, commodities, and agriculture; Herbert in real estate, residential development, and commodities." And while the brothers are branching out, Maxfield believes, "they will run the oil companies collectively with a professional staff."

Stormy weather closes in

Meanwhile, a threatening cloud looms on the family's horizon. Not only is an oft-delayed trial ahead for Bunker and Herbert Hunt on the wiretapping charges, but there is also the threat of more indictments against them by a federal grand jury that has been sitting in Dallas for more than a year. The Hunts claim their wiretapping activities were aimed at uncovering suspected embezzlements from their father's food concern. In their only statement on the matter, over a year ago, they cited "extensive, unexplained losses" suffered by the company. "We only sought to protect our father and his property, as any others would have done," they said.

But one of the wiretappers, Jon Joseph Kelly, says that the tapping was prompted by Bunker's and Herbert's suspicions that someone was trying to influence H. L. Hunt to leave the bulk of his estate to the second Mrs. Hunt and her children. Three of the wiretap victims back up Kelly's version.

Just two weeks ago, in their syndicated column, Jack Anderson and Les Whitten aired a recurring Dallas rumor that the grand jury is looking into an alleged "$50,000 to $60,000 payoff" from Bunker to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James O. Eastland of Mississippi, in return for Eastland's assistance in getting a parole for the other wiretapper, Houston private eye Patrick W. McCann III. Eastland wrote a letter on McCann's behalf, but Bunker has denied that there was any payoff.

The Dallas grand jury is said to be mulling the Eastland connection, as well as the circumstances surrounding the three-year lapse between the wiretappers' arrest and the indictment of Herbert and Bunker on Feb. 28, 1973. A Hunt family lawyer told *Dallas Morning News* investigative reporter Earl Golz that Bunker managed to strike a bargain with the Justice Dept. in which "there would be no prosecution of the Hunts if they performed certain actions; they performed the actions, but there was an indictment anyway."

The actions, reportedly made after 1972 meetings with former President Richard M. Nixon and former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, included Bunker's providing Justice with a list of Al Fatah agents in the U. S. He had secured the list privately because he feared he was on the Al Fatah death list because of his Libyan holdings.

For the Hunts, the wiretapping episode has proved disastrous. Bunker and Herbert could receive prison sentences. And, more than anything else in the family's history, it has torn the tightly woven curtain of secrecy behind which the family has lived and worked for more than four decades. ■


Shelly Katz

Ray Hunt (right) looks over his Dallas development.

Film: Holmes Nostalgia

Jul 22 6 23:1

'Hound' on Bill With First-Rate Keaton

By RICHARD EDER

The first bit in a program of Sherlock Holmes nostalgia at the D. W. Griffith Theater is an old filmed interview with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Stout, mustached and affable, the 68-year-old author made it clear what some people had always suspected: it was Watson who invented Holmes. In any case, Sir Arthur was mainly interested in talking about psychic research.

People wanted to know what happened to the generation of young Englishmen who died in World War II, he said. "Are they dissipated into nothing," he inquired, patting his dog, "or are they still the grand fellows we used to know?"

It wasn't Sir Arthur's ghosts that made a success of haunting: it was his stories. "Sherlock Holmes" is on Broadway, tourists still go on forlorn searches up Baker Street, Gene Wilder is filming Holmes's younger brother in London and Lord Olivier will tackle Moriarty this fall.

The centerpiece of the Holmes's film program is the 1939 Darryl F. Zanuck production of "The Hound of the Baskervilles." It isn't a great picture. It isn't even a great mediocre picture, but it is a good mediocre picture, and perhaps they made better mediocre pictures in those days than they do now.

Dartmoor, the funereal setting for "The Hound," may be partly painted backdrop but they roll in enough studio fog to do "Wuthering Heights" twice. Basil Rathbone and Nigel Bruce play Holmes and Watson with comic exaggeration. It is a serious kind of comic exaggeration. It lets you watch it. It doesn't spoof itself: it doesn't wink at you and tell you that it's really just as sophisticated as you are and knows it is making a fool of itself down there on the screen.

The hound is just a large ugly dog, but it manages to be quite as frightening as the mechanical floor waxer in a white shark suit that plays the lead in "Jaws," and a lot less gory.

And then there are the phrases. "Mr. Holmes, you're the only man in all England who can help me." "I'm in mortal fear Sir Henry's life will be snuffed out." "They were the footprints of a gigantic Hound." "Watson, keep your eye on that hansom." "That's what I hate about his moor, there's always something strange." And, of course: "Oh Watson, the needle."

It's like the tunes—singable with a life of their own—that pop out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

Some of the audiences leaves after "The Hound," and the usher urges them back to their seats. He's right: the last picture in the program is a 45-minute Buster Keaton classic.

"Sherlock Junior" is not really a Sherlock Holmes picture. It is about a movie projectionist (Keaton) who wants to be a detective, courts a girl, is thrown out after a rival steals her father's watch and lays the blame on him, falls asleep while projecting a picture and dreams himself into the picture. There he becomes Sherlock Holmes, frustrates the scoundrels and wins the girl.

If it's not quite the masterpiece that "The General" or "The Navigator" is, it is still first-rate Keaton. That is, it is both disciplined and wild. The major part of the picture, where in his dream he literally walks down the aisle, climbs into the screen and joins the pirt as Holmes, is full of marvelous chases, escapes and battles with exploding billiard balls.

But the quieter bits are even better. For example, he sweeps out the theater and finds in the debris two or three dollar bills that will allow him to buy candy for his girl. The customers return one by one to claim them. One is an old woman who comes up weeping. With agony he yields up the dollar bill to her. She takes it and yields her handkerchief to him.

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The Casts

THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES, directed by Sidney Lanfield; screenplay by Ernest Pascal, based on the story by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle; a 20th Century-Fox production; distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, 59th Street and Second Avenue. Running time: 80 minutes. [illegible] Richard Greene; Sherlock Holmes, Basil Rathbone; [illegible] Wendy Barrie; Dr. Watson, Nigel Bruce; Dr. James Mortimer, Lionel Atwill; [illegible] John Carradine; John [illegible] Morton Lowry

and

SHERLOCK JR., directed by Buster Keaton; written by Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell and Clyde Bruckman. [illegible] Metro Pictures. Distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, Second Avenue and 59th Street. Running time: 45 minutes. With: Mr. Keaton, Kathryn McGuire, Ward Crane, Joseph Keaton, [illegible] [illegible], Erwin Connelly, Ford West, George Davis, John Patrick and Ruth Holley.

8 HUNTS INDICTED WITH 5 IN DALLAS

Jul 22 W 21:1

Foreman Among 7 Charged in Wiretap Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

DALLAS, July 21—Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, sons of the late oil billionaire H. L. Hunt, the Houston lawyer Percy Foreman and four other men were indicted by a Federal grand jury tonight on charges of obstructing justice and impeding an investigation into a wiretape case involving the Hunts.

An 18-member grand jury handed up the nine-count indictment in the court of Federal District Judge Robert W. Porter, ending an 18-month investigation. No one named in the indictment was present.

Named along with the Hunts and Mr. Foreman were Ralph Shank, the Hunt family's personal attorney; B. H. Timmins Jr., a former assistant United States Attorney here who is now in private practice; Edward J. Hudson, a Houston oilfield machinery company owner and close friend of the Hunts, and Charles Tessmer, a Dallas criminal lawyer.

Obstruction Charged

All seven men were alleged to have conspired to obstruct the investigation of the wiretapping case and the Hunt indictments. The investigation subsequently resulted in the indictment of the Hunt brothers for violations of Federal wiretapping laws. The indictment said the group attempted to influence potential witnesses in the earlier case through bribes and veiled threats of physical harm and death.

The Hunts were named in all but two of the counts, while Mr. Foreman was named in three of the counts.

The wiretapping case stems from the 1970 arrests of two Houston men, Jon Kelly and Patrick McCann, in Richardson, a Dallas suburb, and seizure of wiretapping equipment from their car.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department entered the investigation and Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann, along with a third man, W. J. Everett, were indicted for wiretap violations. Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann were tried and found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison in 1972 for wiretapping the home phones of three Hunt employes. Mr. Everett pleaded nolo contendere and was placed on probation.

Trial in September

The Hunts were indicted last summer for their part in the wiretap case, and their trial is slated for September in Lubbock, Tex., where it was moved on a change of venue.

The indictments handed up today allege that the Hunts promised Mr. Kelly, Mr. McCann and Mr. Everett amounts ranging from $800 to $1,200 per month while in prison if they did not testify before a grand jury concerning the Hunts' involvement in the wiretapping.

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Two of the counts charge that Mr. Foreman accepted $100,000 in two $50,000 payments from Mr. Hudson to represent Mr. Kelly and Mr. Everett and to guarantee that neither man would testify before the Federal grand jury in Dallas in 1972.

Mr. Shank, the Hunt family attorney, was indicted on seven counts concerning the alleged bribes. Mr. Tessmer, a well-known Dallas lawyer, was indicted on four counts, including lying to the grand jury in August, 1974, and October, 1974, concerning the offer of a bribe to Mr. Kelly and whether or not he had ever been employed as a counsel for the Hunts. Mr. Hudson was named in three counts and Mr. Timmins in two counts, all involving transmittal of the bribe offers.

Judge Porter did not set any trial date, nor did he set any bail for any of the defendants.

'Invasion' of Island Is Laid to France; She Denies Charge

Jul 22 O 24

KAMPALA, Uganda, July 21 (AP) — A spokesman for the Organization of African Unity said today that French troops were invading the Indian Ocean island of Mayotte that the 46-nation group recognizes as part of the newly independent Comoro Republic.

[In Paris, an official spokesman issued a denial, saying, according to Reuters, that "there are no French troop movements or naval movements around Mayotte, which in any case is French."]

Peter Onu of Nigeria, who is assistant secretary general of the African Unity group, said at a news conference here that French warships had surrounded the Comoro island of Mayotte, where "troops are landing."

On July 6, the Comoro leadership declared the entire island group including Mayotte independent of France on the basis of a referendum last December in which 95 per cent voted for an end to colonial rule. On Mayotte, however, a two-thirds majority voted to retain a link to France, and residents there appealed to Paris to be allowed to break away from the other islands.

20 Cambodians Gone From U.S. Navy Center

Jul 22 A 13:1

NEWPORT, R.I., July 21 (AP) — Twenty Cambodian naval officers, who received political asylum in the United States when their Government fell this spring, have left the naval training center here to start new lives.

Most have found work in Rhode Island even though the state has a 16 per cent unemployment rate. Others have left the state to stay with relatives or try to return to Cambodia.

The 20 officers graduated in a private ceremony at the naval training center on May 19, several weeks after Khmer Rouge insurgents toppled the regime of President Lon Nol.

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

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have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B"Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given, the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

— Michael Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

30 March 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 NW. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

We have received your request under the Freedom of Information Act for information pertaining to you. This is to advise you that as of 27 September 1975 the Privacy Act of 1974 took effect. This act and pertinent CIA regulations established requirements and procedures for access by individuals to information pertaining to them. CIA Regulations were published in the Federal Register on 28 August 1975 and may be found in Title 32 C.F.R. 1901.

Since the Privacy Act requires federal agencies to ensure that improper disclosure of personally identifiable information will not be made and further provides criminal penalties for improper disclosure, CIA Privacy Regulations, section 1901.13, sets forth the following requirements for identification of individuals making requests.

> An individual seeking access to or notification of the existence of records about himself shall provide in the letter of request his full name, address, date and place of birth together with a notarized statement swearing to or affirming his identity...If such individual is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, his or her alien registration number must be also provided.

Before we may begin processing your request, we must receive from you a notarized statement as explained above. The statement should verify that you are a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence. It is also requested that you provide any additional information concerning yourself which might facilitate our search of records. Unless you identify specific records you may be looking for, we will conduct a search of all Agency records that might contain information that pertains to you.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976

Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies of any and all available (in accordance with the declassification processes stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974) files of records and documents, both computerized and manual apposite of me and my activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.

As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of consideration. The first of them is that, given the proper access codes, the execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision as to the cost of services.

In compliance with your request for identity verification (pursuant to provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d) I hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship. Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Yours truly,
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A.Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell

code names: Federini
Barbarossa
Samson

born 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.

United States of American citizenship

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Uedene Wilks

Notary Public, State of Florida at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUG 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENTS OF: Frank Sturgis
present address:
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

also known as: Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino

1924, Dec. 9......................................born in Norfolk, Va.
1930-1942......................................resided at 510 High Street , Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa.
1942-1945......................................U.S.Marine Corps Reserve (Paris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
1945..honorable discharge -Klamouth Falls, Ore.
1945..Miami, Florida
c.1945-1948.....................................Norfolk, Va. adrs: Bank St., etc.
joined Norfolk Police Dept.
attended William and Mary College
also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute
c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia Tavern on East Main Street
c.1949-employed as owner and manager of The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
c.1948...enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
c.1949...honorable discharge
c.1949-1950.....................................U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and from Europe
c. 1950-1952....................................U.S. Army - stationed in Germany
c. 1952..honorable discharge
c. 1952-1954....................................owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in Virginia Beach, Va.
c. 1956-1961....................................Cuba(Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida; Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is.
1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate- Santiago, Cuba
1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy- Havana,Cuba
1959: contact with FBI HQ - Washington,DC
1961-1970: Bay of Pigs
CIA control officer Sam Jenis

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH - cont'd

1963............................contact with FBI and CIA
1968............................travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and Honduras
1968-1972.......................mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American Aluminum Corp. 185th St., Miami, Florida
June 17, 1972...................adventure: Watergate Office Building
June-July 1972..................moved to Washington, D.C. jail
January 8, 1973.................Watergate trial: U.S. v. G. Gordon Liddy et al.
January 15, 1973................plea of guilty entered
c. May 1973.....................moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn. then moved to Eglin Air Force Base thence moved to Dade County Jail
January 1974....................released on appeal bond
1974............................salesman for Heavy Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
1974-1975.......................salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida
1975............................salesmanager for Continental Egg Corp., Miami, Florida
1974-1975.......................salesmanager for Miami Book Mfg. Company 4460 N.W.37th Avenue Miami, Florida

Thank you,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

[signature]

Notary Public, State of Florida at Large

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

My commission expires

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 6 MAY 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter, dated 7 May, requesting access under the Privacy Act for information pertaining to you. There is no charge for processing Privacy Act requests.

We are therefore processing your request and will provide you with the results under the Privacy Act as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 12, 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 Northwest 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This is to acknowledge receipt by the FBI on March 23, 1976, of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request dated March 13, 1976.

Based on the limited information you provided, it is not possible to make an accurate search of our records. To insure an accurate search of our records, please furnish your complete name, date and place of birth, prior addresses, employments and any specific data that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.

An exceedingly heavy volume of FOIPA requests has been received these past few months. Additionally, court deadlines involving certain historical cases of considerable scope have been imposed upon the FBI. Despite successive expansions of our staff responsible for FOIPA matters, substantial delays in processing requests continue.

Since January 1, 1975, the FBI has received a total of 17,204 FOIPA requests. Of these, our present backlog is 6,782. In an effort to deal fairly with any request requiring the retrieval, processing and duplication of documents, each request is being handled in chronological order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured that your request is being handled as equitably as possible and that all documents which can be released will be made available at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Frank Sturgis

Prior to the processing or release of any documents which may pertain to you, it will be necessary for you to submit your notarized signature. This procedure is designed to insure that information concerning an individual is released only to that person.

Your patience and cooperation will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

C M Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

FRANK STURGIS
2515 N.W. 122 STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33167

May 3, 1976

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Office of the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you requested more specific information to help in the search, collection and duplication of records indicated in my recent freedom of information request. I am sending a chronological sketch of my residences and employments prefaced by a list of names under which I have been known. I hope this profile will aid the Bureau in its search for my records. Notarization of this letter and the sketch will attest to the verification of my identity.

Considering the voluminous quantity of material that may have to be read and screened, I would be pleased in the interest of fairness to afford the Justice Department whatever reasonable extension of time is needed to comply with my freedom of information request.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis
Encl/
FS:s

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared FRANK STURGIS to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day of May, A.D., 1976.

Eldine Wilke

Notary Public
State of Florida at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22, 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

MEMORANDUM

October 29, 1976

TO : Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood, Mike Epstein

FROM : Rick Inderfurth

In case you missed the attached article on Russell Bufalino . . .

Attachment

The Washington Post

October 28, 1976

Reputed Crime Chief Accused of Extortion In Collecting a Debt

Associated Press

Russell Bufalino, a reputed organized crime leader, has been indicted on federal charges of conspiracy and extortion for using threats of violence in trying to collect a debt, the Justice Department announced yesterday.

Bufalino and three other men were named defendants in a sealed indictment returned by a federal grand jury in New York City Tuesday and unsealed yesterday.

Bufalino, 71, of Kingston, Pa., was identified by federal officials in 1973 as the head of one of five Cosa Nostra families operating in Pennsylvania. The Immigration Service has attempted for nearly 20 years to deport Bufalino to Sicily, saying he was born there and brought to the United States as an infant. He says he was born in this country.

Lieberngood

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI
RE: RAPHAEL GENER

October 26, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #R 5080

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Attorney General Levi:

As you know, the Intelligence Committee has taken testimony with regard to John Rosselli and the assassination plots directed against Fidel Castro. As part of the Committee's inquiry in this area, testimony has been received regarding an individual by the name of Raphael Gener. Committee staff have participated in a review of this testimony with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are requesting that, upon the completion of this review of testimony, the Committee be provided access to all FBI materials relating to Mr. Gener.

We are hopeful that Committee staff and your representatives will be able to work out access to the appropriate files and materials in the same manner as we have in the past. We continue to appreciate your assistance in these matters.

Aloha,

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice Chairman

MJM:mlh

Veciana/FBI notes
12/20/76

(1)

Memo SAC San Juan to Director 10/25/73
Informants on 4 occasions betw. Aug and Oct, 73 advise SA Jerry Sellers AV severed Alpha 66 rel. several years earlier + was member of PRP but severed summer 1973 because lacked "revol. zeal."

Memo SAC Miami to Director 9/27/73 reference 3 inform. for LHM of 9/27/73 re the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) from Miami, Fla.

Veciana: DR planning terrorist activities in Paris in name of phony group "Accion Cuba". Jose Antonio Calatayud Rivera is Sec. Gen. - DR.

Aldo Serafin, Cristobal Mayo, Eulalio Armenteros resigned from DR Sept 16, 1973

Primitivo Rodriguez-Rodriguez said attack on Paris Embassy initiated in office of Resnik (Replica) + financed by Bosch + AV.

Alfred Soler Soler moving to Vz to plan kidnapping of Cuban officials for DR in import export business.

LHM Aug 30, 1973 re Barres

Barres advises FBI that AV and Serafin planned + executed Paris bombing that killed Juan Felipe De La Cruz in Aug 2, 1973.

In July, 73, AV advised Barres that he obtained ~~[illegible]~~ 300 lbs of C-1 explosives in Texas (having been unable to obtain C-4) and tested it in the Everglades. AV said he had sent a man to Spain, France, Argentina & Peru to cause explosion at Cuban Embassies & create a "Black Sept." type organization

---

Spanish Trans. sent to Madrid to Miami (Aug 30, 73) "Moralitos"
Ricardo Morales Navarette - Asked by Bureau to Bosch. Accused of death of Cubans in U.S. Participated in terrorist acts. Bosch group has sentenced to death

Miami SAC to Director Memo (8/2/73)
AV possessed 15 Bolivian & Venezuelan passports belonging to numerous individuals of interest to (Third Ag.)

7/16/73 SAC Miami to Director Memo
Acknowledges FBI contact w/ AV in Miami & thru Legat in Caracas & La Paz. FBI in contact because AV in PRP. Rec. an opportunist w/ delusions of grandeur. Wants to be in limelight regardless of cause

Correlation
Veciana Summary - 3/15/73

(3)

Francisco Vincente Gonzalez Tuero says he ~~and AV robbed the~~ robbed the Banco ~~Financiero~~ Financerio in Cuba in March, 61. AV planned the robbery. AV then sent message to Zenaida (LNU) 1174 SW 12th St. Miami requesting rifle grenades.

12/27/61 Conf. source advised FBI that AV planned most recent attempt on Castro's life.

1/7/63 Craig T. Sheldon raising money for AV + Alpha 66.

AV heavily funded by Julio Lobo.

1/30/64 AV advised? he had no personal knowledge of John Robert Klinner, who was investigated re JFK assassination. Klinner is James Edgar Wethington - with long criminal record. Claimed association w/ Cuban Freedom Fighters. (See reports # 62-109060 and # 62-109060-3083, p. G, 655.)

1/30/64 Veciana substantiated report of Eusebio Ojeda, Chief of Personnel SFNE

Veciana in Dallas in May 64 to visit Dallas SFNE Chapter

Vec in contact w/ Somosa who promised him training bases in Nic.

The CIA advised that James G. Cogswell, who reportedly had high level contacts in society and US Navy in April, 1966, intro. AV to CIA reps. AV wanted 50,000 to organize group to assassinate CASTRO - CIA declined -

Veciana treasurer, administrator + Spokesman for the unity group of Alpha 66, SFNE + MRP.

2/24/69 AV signed Doc. presented this date to Nixon to free Orlando Bosch.

Veciana lived at Savoy Hotel in Caracas,

Quitterez Silva was detained questioned and released after trying to enter Soviet Embassy in La Paz. Silva had AV's wife's name + address in his book.

AV established liaison w/ Legat in Bolivia thru the minerals attache at the US Embassy. AV furnished info. from Bolivian National Police files

GRIMALDI

(5)

Apr 30, 68 info from Augusto Pineda Gonzalez - Pineda came over on boat w/ AV. AV visited Pineda in June 68 and asked Pineda to receive 3 57mm recoilless rifles in Flor. somewhere outside Miami + deliver them to unspecified SFNE people in Miami. Would be used to attack Soviet ships. AV disgusted w/ US policy. AV tried Pineda to organize demonstrations and armed attacks to annoy US + create probs. AV convinced US protecting Castro.
AV would fund Pineda @ $3,000 to $5,000 per mo. Pineda to call Sirā when organized. She would provide the $.

Co-Ordinator of Cuban Affairs of the Dept of State - G. Harry ~~Sh~~ Shuma furnished FBI info. on Veciana ~~on 1968~~ based on his "~~personal~~ contacts w/ him" ~~this info was erroneous i.e. that AV no longer involved in anti~~-Castro activity

Fresquet + Ray active in 1967 w/ Veciana

(6)

1974 - Enrique Nunez Alvarez and Elvio Rivera Limonta active in FLNC terrorist activities / Both in P. Rico.

MM 105-22094 at TAB Bufile # 105-261797

NISO Charleston, SC
111th M.I. Group, Miami } receiving info re PPP.

AV on 11/27/72 had reportedly told source that the US Embassy in La Paz helped him organize the Costa R. convention

MRS. Frances Grant ~~Frances~~ - Spec. invitee on C. Rica Convention

Tony Santiago - on initiating Committee for C Rica convention

Felipe Pazos - headed Banco Nacional in Cuba under Prio.

(7)

Israel Romero was Union City, N.J. repr. of MIRR during pd. Bosch involved in bombing activities. Romero once close to Bosch.

Arturo Villar - wealthy, San Juan, active

Ramon Font furnished explosive for French expl. Aug 2, 73 Hotel Oasis Avrainville, Fr.

Lesnick - longstanding Marxist. Attacked Batista in radio broadcasts
Continued Broadcasts after Castro - invented "Cuba-Si-Yanqui No"

For a # ? years in contact w/ hoodlum elements during Batista regime. Took part in various assaults in Havanna during Batista.
Left Havanna year or two after Castro took power. Exile in Miami. Despite fact - close friend of Fidel's in college.
AV funded "Replica".

LIEBENGOOD ROUTH NOTES FROM U. S. V. VECIANA, ET AL

DATE: December 1, 1976

Veciana was represented by Barry L. Garber, 1040 City National Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130 (305-377-4963)

Veciana became implicated as the result of a drug bust of one Augustine Barres, a/k/a/ Emidigio Augustine Barres Fangul ("Gus Barres"). The bust resulted from an search warrant of 23 July 73 for Barres' attache case at the Taft Hotel in New York. The police were acting on an informant tip to an under-cover agent who arranged for a buy from Barres of seven kilograms of Cocaine at the Taft. The police understood that Barres was to be with a "female" courier. Barres advised DEA task force re-presentative, Eugene W. Flynn, a detective sgt. with the NYPD, that he purchased the seven kilos from Antonio Veciana in Miami on July 21, 1973.

Barres owns a home in Puerto Rico and travels to New York every two weeks on business.

A co-defendant of Veciana's in the case was Ariel Pomares who is the President of Occidental Investment, a real estate firm owned by Barres, located at 1186 J. T. Pinero Avenue, Miami. Pomares is also involved with FRECA Imports in Puerto Rico. This is also a Barres enterprise.

The DEA Miami regional office cables that Veciana is the subject of INS File No. A12-490987 and that he claims to be a public accountant.

According to the Miami Herald of July 25, 1973, Barres was Assistant Secretary of Communications under Castro and later the general manager of the Havana Health Department. He fled Cuba in 1961 for asylum in Puerto Rico. He became a United States citizen in 1970.

A cable from Ivan Wurms, the Chief Investigator of the DEA Task Force to Durkin at DEA headquarters, Washington, states that Veciana was arrested without incident on 7/24/73 and signed a "consent to search" form. Miscellaneous papers and numerous

Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al con't.

foreign passports belonging to several subjects were seized. Swiss bank account deposit slips were seized and are to be followed by IRS. Veciana claims to be an anti-Castro fund raiser. FBI confirms this.

A July, 1973 TWIX from DEA in New York to DEA headquarters Washington (attention: Daniel P. Casey, Acting Chief) referenced as subject: G1-73-X093 (presumably Veciana) and states "during debriefing of the defendant in New York on July 25, 1973, it was learned that Antonio Carlos Veciana, 811 North Southwest 30th Court, Miami is a member of an anti-Castro group which he has stated intends to blow up a number of Cuban properties and/or embassies in foreign nations, i.e., Spain, Mexico, Peru and France. Bombings originally scheduled for July now delayed until August."

Subpoena of August 14, 1973 exists for a telegram billed to Veciana at 649-1226 and sent to Barcelona, Spain on 5/26/73.

Barres implicates a Paraguyan diplomat formerly assigned to LaPaz, Bolivia and reassigned to Spain in the drug traffic. DEA is discretely checking his identity. A follow-up cable from DEA indicates that they have failed to identify the Paraguyan diplomat sent to Spain but do indicate that a Pedro P. Medina, a Paraguyan assigned to LaPaz, is believed to be involved in Cocaine smuggling.

Barres admitted that he was responsible for bringing Pomares, an employee of his, into illegal drug activity.

Veciana claimed to be without funds and destitute and was not fined. The U. S. Attorney was concerned that he posted a $100,000 bail immediately. However, after initial concern being shown in the file by the U. S. Attorney, the U. S. Attorney later writes the Judge that $80,000 of the $100,000 bond was furnished by Veciana's cousin, Dr. Pablo Zalduendo, a phycian from Detroit, Michigan. The remainder of the bail money was furnished by Veciana's uncle and other family members and friends who cashed insurance policies, closed children's savings accounts, etc. U. S. Attorney concluded that Veciana was possibly telling the truth when he advised the Court that he was destitute.

One ~~Hosea~~ Jose Lopez is a character reference for Barres on appeal.

Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

Barres says he requested the government to give immunity to Veciana in order to destroy the traffic of Cocaine from Bolivia.

Barres studied at Columbia Military Academy in Columbia, Tennessee in 1951.

A taped transcript of Barres' debriefing by detectives Flynn and Scamardella on July 25, 1973 reveals the following: Barres got involved in drugs through his friend Veciana who was an officer of the International Development Bank in the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. Some people think Veciana is with the CIA but Barres does not know. Barres dealt with Veciana regarding an attempt to kill Castro in Chile. He says Veciana did a good job of transferring everything into Chile (1970-1971). Barres gave Veciana $2,000 in support of this assassination effort. About this time Veciana said that drugs could be smuggled out of Bolivia through diplomatic pouch. Barres thought this was how Veciana had sent weapons into Chile. Barres advised that the head of Interpol in Bolivia gets a cut of drug money for protection on the Bolivian end and that a Secret Service Agent and two Paraguyan diplomats were also involved. They handled the transfer to Veciana in Miami Beach of the drugs from Bolivia.

Barres thought that the individual he was selling the drugs to in New York was a mafia type. It appears this is the individual who informed the police. He is known only as Tony in the transcript. The police were aware of his identity but did not desire Barres to discuss it.

Pomares' counsel, Gustavo Del Toro, urged the DEA in San Juan at the time of the arrest of Pomares to consider immunity for Pomares because Pomares possessed valuable information regarding international narcotic trafficing, including the implication of diplomats in places such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

The file contains cancelled Veciana checks drawn on the account of Antonio Sira Veciana at the Fidelity National Bank, 5880 Byrd Road, Miami, Florida, in May and June, 1972, for $1,000 each, payable to the Swiss Bank Corporation for account EF558230. These checks were obtained through subpoena on Catherine Hune, Vice President and Cashier of the Fidelity National Bank in Miami.

Liebengood Rough Notes on <u>U. S. v. Veciana, et al</u>, con't.

In Veciana's appellate brief he references transfers of drugs through the government's "APO System". He indicates that the first transaction he was involved in took place in April, 1972.

Also involved is someone known as "the midget".

To Veciana file

MEMORANDUM TO: File

RE: Antonio Veciana

FROM: Tom Moore

DATE: Jan. 3, 1977

Telephoned Veciana to ask if he recalled any attempts on his life in late 1962 or 1963. He answered that there were three attempts on his life, but none in 1962 or 1963. The first attempt, he said, occurred in a stadium in Puerto Rico in 1967 when a bomb exploded approximately 20 meters away. He said he believed Puerto Rican communists were responsible for this attempt. The second attempt occurred in Bolivia in approximately 1970 when some men with weapons appeared at a home where he was supposed to be. He said a woman who owned the home called him to warn him. He said he thought this attempt was related to a revolution which was taking place at that time. The third attempt, he said, occurred in Caracas, Venezuela in 1971. He added that he had received information within the past three months that Castro wanted to kidnap him.

The only relevant incident in late 1962 or 1963 was that an Isobel Zarate began making inquiries about him in Miami. He said many people in the Cuban community informed the FBI she was a Castro spy and that she subsequently escaped to Cuba via Mexico.

~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~

Maheu	~~[illegible]~~ CASTRO	KENNEDYS
Rosselli	Karamessines	ROWAN
HARVEY	Helms	HOOVER
O'Connell	Hunt	LBJ

Warren Commission
- Commission had
- [illegible] contacts

Lines of Inquiry
- what Castro doing in retaliatory vein
- what was Castro intelligence capability
- look anti-Castro community
- who replaced CIA in funding & co-ord & why?
- addit Mafia relationships w/ Exiles
- pressure on mafia from Kennedy Justice Department

CI

CIA Evaluation of McGovern Information

Conf. Tom Moore

Ed. Gr. - M.M. - H.K. - R.I. (A.E.)

Need full picture on Hunt

Cuban - Bahamas switch by mob after Castro (TRAFFICANTE)

Miami trip → Varona, Sturgis

December

Get Hunt, Sturgis, Barker, Martinez material

miami police < organized crime section; cuban exile section

Organizing our material → Castro-Kennedy assassination

district: Continue committee related material - New Register + file system / formalize files

Name: Card Index - name + reference →

Omit all but Impt. References

MAHEU
ROSSELLI
HARVEY
O'Connell
CASTRO
KARAMESSINES
HELMS
HUNT
KENNEDY
ROWAN
HOOVER
LBJ
~~Bundy~~
~~[illegible]~~
ALL ADMIN. OFFICIALS
KENNEDYS
HUNT

- Hughes
- Watergate material

[illegible]

Marita

Mark Sandi
431 – Kennedy office
4:00 PM

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

Coleman
Johnson City – Ramsey
February – Justice Dept. Inst. – 10 weeks
E. Tenn. State
~~BS – Cr. Justice~~
Masters – Sociology.

Perez Jiminez – Kill Kennedy.

Allen Altman – Lawyer
$ ‹2,600› wants!
150 BROADWAY

El Gato despises Frank Sturgis

– REPRESENTS HANK Mesick

MARITA GAVE TO Mesick

"The Cat"
"EL GATO" – Code name
– Pretense buying Nazi book.
– Assassinated Castro's double.
– 39-40 years old.
[Tall/Blonde / German Soldier of Fortune]
(Very wealthy collector antiques)
Told Lorenz.

Rolando Masferrer
Orlando Bosch
Rolando Martinez

Last person
Mickey Rosselli – alive.
Shelly ~~[illegible]~~ Abend
in bus. in N.Y. He brought El Gato to Marita
theatrical agency cover

Son - 4 wks ago after Fag. threat
hospitalized

> no longer wants

> Father - double Nazi for US (FBI) (Submarine) — Married Delaware mother

> Derry Davis = State Dept. or Dept. Justice

> Gerstein bugged.

> Sturgis - HK theory

> FBI down on Marita because of publication of citation by Meskill.

Soviets didn't react adversely to

plane tickets to Germany

CIA Superspy — Frank Sturgis
STAR
Sept 7, 1976

2 Israeli's targeted
Uncle Al - 1970

Lists
FBI
Mat.

> Eduardo —

A Situational Report
on Surveillance + Control
in Modern Democratic
Society —
— Robert Yaffee —

Univ. of Waterloo Student Mag
June 16, 1972

— anti-personnel radar. fled to Canada. accused of being agent

(Lynn Kirkpatrick)

Mike Ackerman — CIA / Miami > Lecturing

CRC — Artime

Frank } $ from EHH
Alex R. } White house.

60-61 - Miami
✓
Frank assigned to General.

ph! { Frank O'Brien
Frank Lundquist } with Alex R. and F. St. when proposed Castro kill.

David W. Walters — Miami lawyer for Perez Jiminez - Marita

Hm me H.

$50,800.00 to JFK in cash

Sturgis Call 12/3/76

Hank Mesnik - writer

won't

Marita Lorenz.

Atty: Allan Altman, Esq.

150 Broadway

NYC, NYC.

Has material

Tapes & documents - Louis Somosa.

KGB

Bobby Baker

Hoffa

Sapid

threatens Killing Kennedy

Jiminez

gave him everything

Call Marita

Pepe Alleman

trouble

Trafficante.

I. Carry-over from Church report

A. Relationship between agencies and Warren Commission

1. Warren Comm. staff has never been interviewed in depth. Many have not been interviewed at all. The Commission had particular staff assigned to (a) Cuba and (b) organized crime. They, especially, should be fully debriefed about everything that happened in their contacts with the agencies, their frustrations, unfulfilled leads, inability to get access, questionmarks, and what they knew, heard, or suspected about contacts at high-level between Commission members and top agency officials. This would include leads to additional documents, memoranda and people, and is especially important in the time-frame just before the Commission issued its report, i.e. as final drafts being written, when staff learned for the first time about Castro's threat. (Willens, staff director, said there were staff pushing hard to re-open this subject, but pressure of getting the report out prevailed.)

2. Look for all other memoranda of contacts between McCone and CIA re how to structure questions, etc.

3. We now know that Ruby was contacted svereal times by FBI to inform on ~~xxganixedxcrimexinxDallasxareax~~ "criminal element" in Dallas area. All we've seen is the cummary memo in which Warren Commission was so informed. Get each memorandum of contact between FBI agents and Ruby, i.e. underlying materials which "support" the summary memo.

B. The inter-agency committee which met to develop continegncy plans in the wake of Castro's threat.

1. Numerous documents were sought from FBI, CIA, Defense, State, etc., but never received by Church Committee before our final report was issued. Must follow-through, and then go deeper into it.

2. What else was known besides Castro's retaliation threat? What facts went into the assessment that Castro might retaliate against U.S. leaders in Latin America, but not U.S. leaders in the U.S.? Precisely what accounted for the/ original inclusion of a concern about retaliation in the U.S., but the subsequent deletion of that prospect? Who was responsible for the deletion, and what impact, if any, did that have on the later ~~of~~ withholding of info from the Warren Commission and on the agencies' failure to investigate retaliation?

3. We must find out exactly who was on this Committee at each meeting, get all back-up materials, and interview.

C. FBI involvement in Bay of Pigs, Lansdale planning, etc.

1. As Church report was being completed, we were just beginning to learn about how deeply the FBI was apparently involved in U.S. anti-Castro action. Possibility here that this could provide another clue in re FBI's original reluctance to investigate retaliation more fully. For instance we now know that FBI had learned about CIA's interest in using organized crime to kill Castro long before RFK toldxHooverx Hoover about it (Hoover had professed surprise in 1963, but there's some indication he may have already known). One FBI witness even told us that a high FBI official had even proposed the plot idea "in jest". At a minimum, the paper record shows FBI wasxcontacted toxprovidexCubanxintellxx informed about idea of using org. crime figures to provide Cuban intelligence and that, according to the paper record, FBI recommended against it. Trafficante has now claimed that FBI agents came to him seeking Cuban intelligence. This must be followed up, agents interviewed, and FBI memo's, etc., examined.

D. CIA files

I always had the impression that Jim Johnston felt there were more CIA documents which he hadn't seen. We must go over the itmes, one by one, with Johnston, to find out just where we stand on the question of whether or not weve seen everything. Do any of us really fully understand the entire CIA filing system so as to know whether we've been shown everything, or indeed , whether they have even g-ne looking for everything.? And how about the field office files, i.e. JMWAVE files in Miami, New Orleans and Mexico City files, DC local CIA station files, and FBI field office files?

II. Rosselli-organized crime-Trafficante-Cuba

A. Organized crime files

1. A full assessment of all travel, contacts, relationships, etc. of all major organized crime figures in and around the time of the assassination of JFK. This would include a review (with appropriate pxixaxxxx system for pritecting privacy interests) of all microphone surveillance logs on organized crime figures during key months in 1963, e.g. Fred Black. Trafficante, Rosselli, Giancana, Las Vegas xaxixaxx casinos, etc. (Rosselli was xxxxyx very defensive in his testimony about some comment he says he made on the phone to someone upon first learning that JFK had been killed; he indicated that he had been "coming out of a deep sleep and said someting about communists did it." Of c orse he now knows that that call may have been xx tapped and is trying to explain. No one had ever asked for

that log.

2. A new analysis of all the long distance toll calls of Jack Ruby in the days around Nov. 22. Warren Comm. records show he made calls to Chicago O.C. figure Barney Baker, and Teamster heavy Dusty Miller, plus others. Does the explanation for these calls really wash (i.e. Ruby's union troubles in re his nightclub). Has this whole subject been exhausted by Warren Comm. or not. Is there more (interviews, etc.) that should be done here?

3. Someone should literally live in Miami area for a month, immerse in the community, get to know the whole scorecard, (maybe hire a local Spanish-speaking cop with good local contacts). More fully debrief Trafficante for his version of events and people. Follow up with contacts with all the Cubans involved. Has Miami pulled all the significant toll records for period of time around Rosselli's death (Cubans, O.C. figures, garage owner, etc.) and followed up.

4. A full tracking of what happened when Church reports were released, reactions, contacts, concerns, who were the key figures who actually got the reports and who did they speak to about the contents. Review our own mailing records, if exist, showing who asked for reports. Local news media for leads in re reactions of the community. Travel records of O.C. and Cuban leaders in and around that time, as well as in and around time of Rosselli's death.

5. McWillie. Trafficante associate who invited Ruby to Cuba in 1959. McWillie later manages Las Vegas casino's & his contact with Ruby continues. Warren Comm. investigation inadequate on this subject.

5986

Marita file

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.

H — I think we should set up an interview at a time which won't conflict w/ hearings etc. — may not be until later now. M

HSL/dr

5986

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Howard: I have no objections to her coming down, but would be personally hesitant to invest any more of my own time unless she can provide at least a specific adjenda of new information she will discuss.

One possible tactic is to tell her that we are extremely pressed for time and cannot subpena her until late February unless she give us specific areas that would allow us to show "our superiors" that talking to her should be given a higher priority over other committee business.

HSL/dr

Tom TM

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HSL/dr

MEMORANDUM

To: Mike Madigan

From: Ed Greissing

Date: Sept. 16, 1976

Subject: Review of CIA documents presented the SCI by Jack Anderson

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The documents recently received by this Committee, from Jack Anderson, had previously been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The documents appear to be a few of those requested for FOIA review by David Belin. It is my understanding, after these documents were declassified, David Belin furnished copies to both David Martin(AP) and Jack Anderson.

The Church Committee was permitted to review the entire Oswald 201 file, the AMLASH file, Garrison files and selected Office of Security files. The Committee primarily concerned itself with the early period of the investigation(November 1963 - October 1964), as it believed the information to be received from this time period to be more relevant in evaluating the performance of the intelligence agencies with respect to their investigation.

Dan Niescher, the Church Committee contact at the CIA,was the individual responsible for the declassification of documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. During this declassification process, Dan Niescher consulted the Committee staff to make sure that we were aware of certain documents.In addition, Mr. Kaleras had given the staff unlimited access to all files we believed necessary to conduct our investigation.

Yet, the possibility still remains that the staff was not shown everything. The CIA has maintained throughout that the Oswald 201 file was a complete compilation of the material related to the assassination of President Kennedy. However, information relating to who Lee Harvey Oswald was, and what he was doing are not included.in their files. The Oswald 201 does not attempt to question Oswald's connection with both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups or any of the AMLASH information. The most notable subject missing was information relating to CIA/U.S. Government attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Dot to Rosselli file

H. L. Johnson w/ LaBrecque 12/22/76

. . . .

No, I can't either confirm or deny it. We are prohibited at staff level from discussing any Committee business. I apologize for not being able to help you. You know the ground rules and they haven't changed. Right.

. . . .

I can't say. I don't know. You indicated that you . . .

. . . .

Are you still working Rosselli? You getting anywhere?

. . . .

You got a pretty good source on that? On the fact that they were having dinner together on many occasions before he was murdered?

. . . .

I just can't help you because of the ground rules. I'd like to have a copy of your piece, or two, for me and Inderfurth here. Just drop a copy in the mail and I'll appreciate it.

. . . .

You mean people like . . . Well, I think . . . people like Trafficante?

. . . .

Well, I can't discuss whether or not such a meeting took place. I can't tell you whether you're right or wrong.

. . . .

Now when you talk about Trafficante you don't need to be

cautioned. You know them as well as I do.

. . . .

Well, as far as our rules are concerned, it wouldn't make any difference if Trafficante was here. It wouldn't make any difference in our ability to confirm or deny that.

. . . .

Miami Herald Dec. 24

Trafficante Made Secret Appearance At Senate Investigation, Sources Say

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Florida's reputed organized crime boss, Santos Trafficante of Tampa and Miami, made a secret, four-hour October appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee to answer questions about his role in a CIA assassination plot, investigation sources have disclosed.

Trafficante, 62, had not previously been questioned by the committee or its staff in the two-year-old investigation of CIA activities.

Of the three Mafia figures involved in the early 1960s plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, only Trafficante is still alive. Both Sam Giancana and John Rosselli were murdered within the last 16 months.

The murders are unsolved.



John Rosselli
... dined with Trafficante

INVESTIGATORS ALSO said that Trafficante had dinner with Rosselli at The Landings, a Fort Lauderdale restaurant, in mid-July, less than two weeks before Rosselli disappeared. Rosselli's body, stuffed in an oil drum, floated to the surface of Dumfoundling Bay the first week of August.

Trafficante reportedly has told police that the July dinner with Rosselli — as well as several other meetings previously at the Cordoba Restaurant in Miami, formerly owned by the husband of Rosselli's niece, according to police — were "friendly, social events with no business."

Investigators in recent weeks have centered their efforts on tracing the whereabouts of Trafficante's associates at the time of Rosselli's disappearance, a source said.

Trafficante, who for about four years has maintained a home at 740 NE 155th St. in North Dade, could not be reached for comment.

Trafficante was identified as the head of a South Florida Mafia family in testimony in 1963 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee.

HIS ATTORNEY, Henry Gonzalez of Tampa, who accompanied Trafficante when he went to Washington, according to sources, would not comment on either the Senate appearance or Trafficante's past activities. When first asked about the Senate appearance, he said, "You realize you're treading on dangerous ground."

A committee source said that Trafficante had not been questioned previously by the committee because his role in the plot had been considered "secondary."

Interest was renewed in the plot after Rosselli's death. Investigators sought to determine whether the murders of the two men were connected in any way with their testimony or potential testimony before the committee.

GIANCANA, WHO was a Mafia boss in Chicago for many years, was killed in June 1975, at the same time Senate investigators were preparing to contact him. The gun used to kill Giancana, found discarded on a roadside several miles from Giancana's house a month after the murder, was traced to a Miami gunshop, but the trail stopped there.

Investigators said the gun was part of a shipment purchased in 1965 by the Tamiami Gun Shop, but there are no records to indicate where it went from there, according to investigators and gunshop owners.

Rosselli, whose most powerful Mafia days were reportedly in the 1950s and early 1960s in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, did appear before the committee at least three times in the 12 months before his death.

In Washington, the committee has kept a tight clamp on comment about the investigation, and only one member, Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.), acknowledged the Trafficante session, saying "I was not present when the witness you speak of was in front of the committee."

Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), the committee chairman who, along with Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) pressured for Justice Department and FBI involvement in the Rosselli murder case, said "I have never met Mr. Trafficante. That's as far as I'll go."

A PRIME interest of the committee has been possible links between the CIA Castro plotting and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Revelations of the Senate committee were a key factor in the creation of the new House of Representative investigation, which is taking a new look at the JFK murder.

Trafficante reportedly has told investigators that he first met Rosselli about 1956. It was in the early 1950s that Florida law-enforcement officials estimated that a Bolita opertion run by Trafficante and his brother netted $2 million annually.

Trafficante was a major gambling figure in pre-Castro Havana, where he ran a casino. In 1959, it was estimated that $1 million or $2 million was bet nightly in all the Mafia-run casinos in Havana. The gambling stopped when Castro took over in 1959.

Rosselli was the first of the three Mafia figures to be recruited by the CIA in 1960 in its plot to assassinate Castro.

IN A CIA memo quoted in an interim report of the committee a year ago, it was said that Trafficante's role was to "serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there."

Rosselli told his CIA liaison that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination." An internal CIA investigation in 1967 "suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing 'gambling, prostitution and dope monopolies' in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro."

Roselli's Body Found in Floating Drum

[illegible] The body of [illegible] figure [illegible] Sam [illegible] CIA [illegible] Fidel Castro [illegible] found in [illegible] Biscayne Bay.

[illegible] County officials said [illegible] had been asphyxiated. [illegible] Wright, chief deputy examiner would not say if Roselli died before or after his body was stuffed [illegible] gallon drum.

[illegible] Roselli's body [illegible] found Sunday and identified yesterday had been [illegible]. Wright would only confirm that there was a circular [illegible] on the lower abdomen.

Wright said Roselli, 71, had probably been dead since July [illegible] the day he reportedly left [illegible] home in nearby Broward County to play golf. He said Roselli's killers tried hard to keep the disappearance a mystery.

[illegible] incredible amount of trouble trying to make sure the body was never found," Wright said. "The lengths to which they went to insure that the body would not be found clearly earmarks this as a true gangland-style killing."

Roselli testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and Giancana had been recruited in 1960 by the CIA as part of a plot to [illegible] Castro [illegible]

[illegible] Giancana were [illegible] paid $150,000 [illegible] according to the Senate report on the scheme, Roselli was the contact man between Giancana and Cuban dissidents who [illegible] to carry out the [illegible]

[illegible] Giancana was also [illegible] June 19, 1975, several days before his scheduled appearance [illegible] someone pumped [illegible] bullets into him [illegible]

THE ACTUAL contact man for the Castro operation turned out to be Robert Maheu, onetime top aide to the late industrialist Howard Hughes, who served as a liaison between the CIA and the mobsters. Maheu, who has partially acknowledged his role in the affair, had split with Hughes long before the latter's death earlier this year.

Roselli and Giancana were also reported to have been linked with Judith Campbell Exner, who said last year she had "a relationship" with the late President John F. Kennedy. [illegible] Roselli and Giancana [illegible] FBI reports [illegible] Exner's [illegible]

[illegible] Mrs. [illegible]

IN [illegible], Roselli's Washington attorney, Tom Wadden, became concerned about his client's life and contacted Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. in an effort to secure more investigation of the case.

Baker was a member of the committee before which Roselli testified.

Wadden told Baker he [illegible] Roselli had met with [illegible]

IN TURN, according to what Wadden told reporters, Baker telephoned Committee Chairman Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, and [illegible] Director Clarence Kelley and urged that Roselli's disappearance be investigated.

Baker could not be reached for comment last night on the conversations with the attorney.

Two fishermen found the drum floating in Dumbfounding Bay, an arm of Biscayne Bay between North Miami and Miami Beach. Police said the fishermen, not publicly identified, called them after they spotted human limbs through the holes chopped in the barrel.

Authorities said that because of the currents, it was not known where the drum was thrown in the bay.

[illegible]

In Washington, [illegible] Inouye, chairman of the [illegible] Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that it would be premature to decide on a congressional investigation until more facts of the killing are known.

[illegible] the facts available [illegible]

ROSELLI WAS reported [illegible] by his sister, with whom he had recently been living [illegible] She said she last saw [illegible]

[illegible]

Roselli was sent to Las Vegas, Nev., in the 1950s to operate the mob's interests there but stayed under the control of the Chicago organization.

HE WENT to Los Angeles in the early 1960s and was [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] has told reporters [illegible] Roselli and Giancana at the request of CIA [illegible] James O'Connell. He said the two were chosen because of contacts they had made in Cuba during the pre-Castro years.

MAHEU SAID the plot was timed to coincide with the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and was "always subject to a 'go' signal which, to my knowledge, never came."

Roselli told the Senate committee that he made several trips to Cuba in high-powered boats furnished by the CIA. He said the scheme included various plans to try to kill Castro by sniper fire, explosives and poison capsules.

Washington sources said last year that the CIA offered as much as $150,000 for the job. Roselli told the Senate panel that he turned any payment [illegible]

Sun-News 8/9/76 Page 1

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

1975 Jack Anderson news release

Four and a half years ago, I broke a story that now is belatedly rocking Washington. I reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited two Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

I tracked down Roselli and questioned him about the story. He had nothing to say. He promised me, however, that he would give me his exclusive story if he should ever be free to talk.

Yesterday, John Roselli told his story -- first, to the Senate Intelligence Committee in secret session, then to me as he had promised four and a half years ago.

Roselli is a dapper, hawk-faced man with a thatch of white hair. He has been disciplined all his life to keep his mouth shut. His Mafia partner, Sam Giancana, was slain before Senate investigators could serve him with a subpoena.

So it was obviously painful for Roselli to talk. I promised I would make clear that he revealed no names, except for the CIA contacts whose identities the Senate already knew.

So here is Roselli's own account of a real-life "Mission Impossible" -- the attempt to kill Castro. It is a story of cash payments, poison pellets, high-powered rifles and powerboat dashes to Cuba.

The plot against Castro, Roselli said, began in 1960 -- when Dwight Eisenhower was President, Richard Nixon was Vice President and Allen Dulles was the CIA chief.

Roselli was recruited in Los Angeles, he said, by Robert Maheu, then an aide to billionaire Howard Hughes. Previously, Maheu had operated a CIA front in Washington.

According to Roselli, the murdered mobster, Sam Giancana, never became involved in the assassination plot. He knew about it; he may even have suggested a Cuban contact; nothing more.

Roselli identified the CIA project officer, in charge of the Castro assassination, as "Big Jim" O'Connell. Maheu put Roselli in contact with O'Connell, as Roselli remembers it, in New York City on September 14, 1960.

Thereafter, Roselli flew to Miami and recruited the assassination squads. At first, they plotted to poison Castro. Poison pellets were supplied by the CIA. They were delivered to the plotters in a Miami hotel room, according to Roselli, by Maheu. He dramatically opened his briefcase, revealing $10,000 in cash and the fatal pellets.

The money was distributed tothe Cuban plotters. Roselli swore he never took any money from the CIA, except for some incidental expenses. He paid the big expenses, he said, out of his own pocket.

The poison pills were supposed to take three days to work. Supposedly, this would give the poison time to work its way out of Castro's system before he died, and his death would be attributed to natural causes.

Roselli never found out what happened to the plotters or the pellets. But they tried again later with a stronger dose of poison. Not long afterward, reports reached them that Castro was desperately ill. Roselli doesn't know whether the illness was caused by the poison or a virus. But Castro survived, and the plotters apparently did not.

Toselli said he also picked up intelligence, which he submitted to the CIA both during the Bay of Pigs planning and the later Cuban missile crisis. After the Bay of Pigs, Roselli said, Maheu was cut out of the plot. Thereafter, Roselli reported to a CIA agent named William Harvey.

There were four more assassination attempts, the plotters were smuggled into Cuba with high-powered rifles. The last assassination squad, Roselli heard, made it to a Havana rooftop before they were caught.

This was around March 1, 1963. Then the project was abandoned. Roselli saw Harvey for the last time in June, 1963. Five months later, Lee Harvey Oswa gunned down President Kennedy in Dallas. Oswald had been active in the pro-Castro movement. Shortly before that dreadful day in Dallas, Oswald had made a mysterious trip to Mexico where he visited the Cuban embassy. The Warren Commission found no evidence, however, that Oswald was in the hire of Havana.

Yesterday, Roselli made no apology for his CIA role. U.S. authorities call him a mobster. He regards himself as a patriot.

THE WASHINGTON POST
L1 Sunday, September 12, 1976

Roselli file



The Calculated Rise And Abrupt Descent Of Johnny Roselli

By Rudy Maxa

Until last month, Johnny Roselli lived comfortably with his sister and brother-in-law in a Miami suburb. A friend estimated he earned about $25,000 annually from a gift shop he owned in the lobby of Las Vegas' Frontier Hotel.

He shrugged last year when his attorney suggested he hire a bodyguard, after the murder of Chicago mobster Sam Giancana, his partner in CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro. If anybody wants to kill me at my age, the 71-year-old Roselli said, what difference does it make? So he played golf several times a week, sipped white wine with dinner, and—until somebody decided Johnny Roselli should wind up in an oil barrel in Miami's Dumfoundling Bay—considered employment in the new gambling casinos beginning to open in the oil-rich Middle East.

In the late 1920s Al Capone and his friends chose Miami as the chic spot for organized crime figures to buy a winter home. Just across a strip of ocean was Cuba, a gambling and vice mecca. The mobsters from the north were treated like visiting celebrities by Florida press and society, while some members of the local police force began developing a taste for the finer things in life.

In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000. One of the sheriff's deputies said he collected $50,000 in bribes in nine months spent as a bagman for Miami Beach gambling concessions. In 1948 a bookmaker's operation in Miami grossed $26 million. It was the kind of place that made a racketeer feel at home.

For the last two years, Johnny Roselli felt at home in Plantation, a bedroom suburb north of Miami that Roselli made his retirement haven because he had family there. His brother-in-law, a government missile expert, lives in a sprawling white home that at first glance, resembles every othe[r] house in the neighborhood.

But it is different: the carefully cur[tained] windows, the extra lock on th[e] front door, and spotlights on all side[s] of the house give it the look of a subu[r]ban fortress. Inside, the furniture i[s] pale blue Mediterranean, the carpet i[s] thick white.

Roselli's killers did not ambush th[e] house; Roselli went to them. He lef[t] Plantation at 1 p.m. on July 28 wearin[g] a golf shirt, his golf clubs in his ca[r] trunk. He told his sister he would b[e] home for dinner. That afternoon o[r] evening he was killed, probably by su[f]focation, perhaps after being torture[d] —early reports said his legs were bro[]ken. Heavily chained, Roselli wa[s] stuffed in a 55-gallon oildrum an[d] dumped into the ocean.

His brother-in-law found Roselli's si[l]ver-colored 1975 Chevrolet Impala se[v]eral days later, parked at the Miami I[n]ternational Airport.

Ten days after Roselli's disappea[r]ance something went wrong. The o[il] drum that was meant to keep his deat[h] a secret floated to the surface of Dun[]foundling Bay, buoyed by the gases o[f] Roselli's decaying body.

The holes in the side of the dru[m] and the placing of his Chevrolet at th[e] airport convinced investigators h[is] corpse was meant never to be disco[v]ered; history was supposed to recor[d] that dapper Johnny Roselli, facing d[e]portation proceedings that the gover[n]ment had threatened off and on f[or] years, decided to disappear on an ai[r]plane flight to who-knows-where.

"Cutting up and disposing of bodi[es] is not necessarily new to our depa[rt]ment," says the man who is directi[ng] the search for Roselli's killers. Lt. Ga[] Minnium, head of the Dade Coun[ty] homicide squad, is a well-muscled m[an] with an aquiline nose that separates [a] pair of hard blue eyes. On the pa[le] green wall of his bare office is a sm[all] card that reads "DYNAMITE—DON['T] SHAKE ME UP."

He and another police officer [re]count the solving of some of Da[de] County's more brutal murders wi[]

See ROSELLI, L4, Col. 1

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ROSELLI, From L1

the enthusiasm of two football players recalling their favorite bowl games. The headless, handless body that floated into a Miami canal last month reminded Minnium of that other, similarly mutilated body that turned up last December. And who can forget the man who got angry with his roommate, sliced him up and tossed the parts along a highway?

As it turned out, Roselli's wasn't the first body to float into the annals of Miami crime in a drum, Minnium says. Ten years ago a lovers' quarrel resulted in a man stuffing his girl friend into a drum, filling it with cement and Aqua Velva shave lotion. The drum was found resting against a dike and justice was eventually done.

Minnium is not pleased by such violent antics.

"We don't appreciate people committing murder and dumping a body in our county, regardless of who the people are, but especially if it's organized crime," Minnium says.

His department handled 168 homicides last year and boasted an 85 per cent "clearance record." As of July, 1976, the percentage was even higher, standing at about 92 per cent.

If Charles Zatrepalek and Julio Ojeda have anything to say about it, Roselli's killing is not going to diminish those percentages. Both men are 28-year-old homicide detectives who vow with a schoolboy's sincerity tha they won't rest until Roselli's murdeı is solved. In the last four weeks, with the help of Washington agencies, Zatrepalek and Ojeda have reconstructed Roselli's life in hopes of understanding his death. For the third time in eight years of marriage, Zatrepalek worked out of town on his wedding anniversary; because of the "awesomeness" of this case, Ojeda spent his Labor Day holiday at work.

"Maybe 10 years from now," Ojeda says, "I want someone to look at my file and say, 'Hey, he talked to everybody.' And maybe he'll hear something and BANG! that's the arrest!"

That Johnny Roselli was destined to walk on the dark side of life never seemed in doubt. As a teen-ager in Boston, when his name was Filippo Sacco, Roselli was a runner for the numbers racket. He helped his stepfather burn down his home for the insurance money. He was arrested at age 22 for stealing about $25 from someone. Then he changed his name and left for Chicago.

It would be 40 years until, in the late 1960s, Johnny Roselli would see his mother again, though he sent money to his family through an intermediary in Chicago so his sisters could attend college.

By the late 1920s Al Capone was well established in Chicago. Newspapermen, politicians and cops were on the Capone payroll and a young man with Roselli's street savvy had little trouble finding suitable employment; he hired on as a rumrunner with the Capone gang. At age 26 Roselli was arrested for selling morphine to an undercover agent. He was acquitted because, after Roselli's arrest, no one could seem to find the arresting officer or informant in the case. They still haven't been found.

In the mid-1930s Roselli, by now a mature and charming man, lucky with

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women, friendly with men of money, moved to Los Angeles. He wore hand-tailored suits and, by all accounts, was easygoing, mild-mannered. He was married for a time to an actress, but they had no children. He became a close friend of Harry Cohn, the legendary head of Columbia Pictures. The two men sometimes vacationed together and Roselli always seemed to know how to place a bet should Cohn care to wager on a horse.

According to Bob Thomas' biography of Cohn, "King Cohn," the movie mogul once offered Roselli a job as a producer. (In his book, Thomas disguised Roselli's identity at Roselli's request.)

"What would you pay me?" Roselli asked Cohn.

"Five hundred dollars a week," Cohn said.

"I get that much from waitresses who take bets for me," Roselli is said to have replied.

Besides being a handy man with the placing of bets, Roselli purchased a 26 per cent interest in a Tijuana race-track with $25,000 Cohn loaned him. Roselli paid him back promptly and included a check for 6 per cent interest; Cohn magnanimously tore up the interest check.

Roselli bought twin star rubies, had them set in rings and gave one to Cohn, who considered it a good luck charm until his death. Once, when Chicago mobster Willie Bioff moved to Hollywood and began making life miserable for movie studios by shaking down executives in return for labor peace, Roselli stepped in and saved Cohn from a lengthy strike.

When Cohn refused to pay tribute to Bioff and his union, Bioff tried to halt production at Columbia by calling a sudden strike. Desperate, Cohn called Roselli who marched into Bioff's office and confronted the hoodlum who sat behind his desk wearing a hat and coat, chomping on a cigar, a gun resting on the desk in front of him.

"Listen, Willie, I don't know what you're trying to prove but it isn't going to work," Roselli told him. "This is a spite thing and you're not going to get away with it. You meet with Cohn and get it settled."

Bioff backed down and called off his pickets. After he was sent to jail for extortion, Bioff cut a deal with the government and named Roselli as a Chicago mobster who had helped him shake down movie studios. Cohn testified on Roselli's behalf, but in 1943 Roselli was sentenced to 10 years in prison. When he got out he returned to Hollywood to make pictures of prison and gangster life. But publicity about a secret appearance before the Kefauver crime committee ruined his relationship with most studios. Even Cohn re fused to hire him—"The stockholders would scalp me," Cohn told a bitter Roselli.

It was during his years in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas that Roselli met the man who would make him a household name later in life. Robert Maheu, the ex-FBI agent who parlayed a Washington private eye business into a stormy career as Howard Hughes' man in Las Vegas, approached Roselli on behalf of the CIA in 1960.


(Another person Roselli met in that era who would later surface to talk of Roselli, Giancana and John F. Kennedy was a young party girl named Judith Campbell.)

Maheu and Roselli would later tell Frank Church's Senate Intelligence Committee the details of their plots to kill Castro. Maheu told investigators he had known Roselli since the late 1950s and, while he didn't know of his underworld connections, "it was certainly evident to me that (Roselli) was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention."

Over dinner at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills 16 years ago, Maheu explained to Roselli that his government needed his services. Roselli, who was born on July 4, 1905, was nothing if not patriotic. (Sam Giancana once said, "Just wave a flag and Johnny'll follow you to any canal.") Maheu recalled that

See ROSELLI, L5, Col. 1

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Johnny Roselli 1975, upper ri[ght] and, countercl[ock]wise from upper l[eft] Fidel Castro in Sam Giancana in President John Kennedy in Dade County Po[lice] Lt. Gary Minni and the Flor[ida] home where Ro[selli] lived before death.

Photos by The Washington P[ost] The Chicago Daily News, AP



pealed to Harvey for help and Harvey recommended to the CIA that it try to prevent prosecution, but Roselli was convicted of violating interstate gambling laws. He went to jail, returning in 1974 to Plantation to do battle against government efforts to deport him.

In 1971 the CIA asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with the CIA" that might occur if deportation proceedings were pursued. The INS agreed to keep the CIA informed, but at his death, Roselli and his lawyers were still fighting deportation.

"Bob Maheu must be running scared —I thought about that just the other day: 'Jesus, what's Maheu thinking?' " said another of Roselli's brothers-in-law, Peter Cardillo of New Jersey.

The public doesn't know what Maheu is thinking, whether he worries if pro-Castro Cubans are exacting retribution for sins of 16 years ago. Maheu's secretary in Las Vegas says she doesn't know where her boss is or when he'll be returning to his office. He reportedly has some business interest in Egypt, a part of the world that seems to hold some fascination for the Castro plotters; Giancana kept an apartment in Beirut and, just before his death, told a friend he had some sort of deal brewing there. And Roselli longingly eyed the opening of gambling casinos in the land of the new oil millionaires.

In Tampa, Santos Trafficante, another of the original Maheu group, also refuses to talk with the press. But unlike the others, he did not testify before the Church committee so the public has no inkling of his thoughts on the Castro assassination attempts.

Whether Roselli's killing was one of retribution for a public or a private matter, Johnny Roselli was a testament to an era that has passed. His life, which would have remained largely unnoticed save for the Senate's CIA hearings, seemed straight from the pages of a Mafia novel: allegedly brought into the United States illegally at the turn of the century, Roselli clawed his way from the mean streets of Boston and Chicago to the relative glamor of Hollywood, Las Vegas and, finally, Miami. Along the way, a simple strain of patriotism—which impressed the CIA enough to mention it to the Church committee—put him in a ropedancer's position of sometimes receiving, sometimes taking advantage of his knowledge of the darkest side of government.

While some have speculated that he was killed for talking too much to government investigators, Roselli was hardly a loudmouth in the league of a Joe Valachi, who sang for televised Senate hearings on the Mafia in 1963. Fourteen years ago Roselli confided in his lawyer, Washington attorney Edward Morgan, that he had been told by Cuban sources in Miami that John Kennedy's killing was ordered and arranged by Castro, but he lived with his secret.

The day after Roselli's body was scooped from its crude coffin, his brother-in-law in New Jersey, Peter Cardillo, told me: "Down deep, in a way, I probably hope it was connected with (the Castro affair). At least then Johnny, he would have died for a cause."

Roselli Probe

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Herald Staff Writer

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Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no evidence indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

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"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader Sam (Momo) Giancana. Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

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Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

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HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Michael Madigan

August 13, 1976

I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli's testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity. During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion, stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana's death), refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos Trafficante by name. In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.

It is my recollection that on at least one occasion, in the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rosselli told the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview room or elsewhere.

Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his exact address in Florida for reasons of safety. It is also my recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus on Santos Trafficante.

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It is my recollection that on at least one occasion, in the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rosselli told the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview room or elsewhere.

Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his exact address in Florida for reasons of safety. It is also my recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus on Santos Trafficante.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

To: Rick Inderfurth

From: Mike Madigan

Date: August 13, 1976

Re: Miami Interviews

I spoke with Senator Hart today about setting up interviews in Miami for Friday, August 20, in the Rosselli matter. He will be calling you about these arrangements.

I will try to have a subpoena for Santos Trafficante signed by Senator Baker before he leaves for the convention. We, however must obtain the approval of all or a majority of the members of the Committee (under the Rules) to issue the subpoena. Therefore, I have asked Martha to poll members on two questions:

(1) Authority to issue a subpoena for Trafficante;

(2) Authority for Senator Hart to disclose to the Miami police investigators in the Rosselli case those portions of the classified Rosselli related transcripts which he deems relevant to the murder investigation.

In case we miss connections, the relevant people involved are:

(1) Bill Lynch -- head of the Justice Organized Crime Section, telephone number 739-3516 (he should help us locate Trafficante and perhaps have a

suggestion as to how best to serve him with a subpoena);

(2) Detectives Wolf and Zatrepallek -- Dade County Sheriff's Office, telephone number 305-547-7456 (they are the detectives investigating the Rosselli murder for the locals). (I have been putting them off about whether they can have access to the transcripts -- you need to talk to Bill Miller and Gary about this);

(3) Paul Daly -- you may have to go through him if we need the FBI to locate Trafficante.

By the time you return I will have taken preparatory steps to set up interviews with the Miami police people as well as begun an effort to locate Trafficante. After talking with Gary you will need to follow up and confirm all these next week as I will be in Kansas City from Monday through Thursday. I will be flying from Kansas City to Miami on Thursday night for the interviews on Friday. You can reach me through the numbers that either Bill Miller or Marie has. We need to talk at some point next week to confirm all this.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Who Killed John Roselli?

WE'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now. Once there was a President who was murdered. His brother was murdered too. A long time after they died some very strange facts came to light. It turned out that while they were running the government, the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters to arrange the murder of someone else—the head of a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that one brother—the one who was President—apparently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of criminals the President's brother was trying to put in jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is complicated, and the complications in this case got even more so. For when a committee of the Congress wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them something about all this, only one of them—the one named Johnny— came. The other one, Momo, was murdered in his house a week before they wanted him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one committee in the Congress and then came back—quietly—to tell some more things to another committee which was in fact looking into the murder of the President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one could find him. Then some fishermen found him. Dead. In an oil drum.

But we haven't told you the strangest part of all yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is that when the great national political community of solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther, of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."

Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need to be put forward in stark outline for their magnitude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnections between all these facts and to wonder why they are not the object of intense press and government scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime—i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a gangland slaying." Those are the good old "earmarks" we only hear about when it is next to certain, that we shall hear nothing more.

The supposition of course is that the Gang which runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie outside the proper realm of public concern because they amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first place and 2) tends only to punish those who have committed what the rest of us would regard as heinous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people say—they're things people can be expected to assume. But we think in this case the assumptions have even less validity than they would have on a clear day, which isn't much. And that is because if we know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had become intertwined with the operations of the United States government. Never mind that the decisions of the early 1960s which made this so may rank among the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S. government. The plain fact is that, given the provocative and suggestive history of the two men, it is not possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.

After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Committee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting with him had figured in his murder. The FBI reported that it had no evidence to this effect. The then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the murder—and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to which these were meant to be the answers, had been raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's death. We think the Department should comply and that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the Attorney General's personal attention. Such attention is needed because of the elaborate and not entirely reassuring history of relationships between the FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any agency of government—or even any of those agency's fringe retainers —were the murderers. We are suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially embarrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep an awful lot of people from wanting to have this thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Congress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see how the public in general and the political establishment in particular can turn their attention away until we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has been made by the government—which means both the Executive Branch and the Congress—to discover what elements were at play in this series of appalling crimes and scandals.

The Data From M

DR. HAROLD KLEIN, one of the scientists work- ... and our best theories

ROSSELLI CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1955 Meets Maheu at insurance friend's home.

1960 Late July/early August. Maheu calls. Working for government. Recruit Rosselli only. Meet Brown Derby, L.A., for lunch. Long talk about project in Cuba. Rosselli wants verification.

2nd meeting, L.A., discuss further details, no discussion of specific techniques. Plan to meet in N.Y. for verification.

Sept. 14, 1960. First meeting in N.Y. at old Plaza Hotel. Rosselli introduced by Maheu to O'Connell. Rosselli "knew" O'Connell worked for the CIA. Rosselli agrees to work on Cuban project.

Sept. 25, 1960. Maheu and Rosselli travel to Miami to begin making contact with Cubans to be recruited for mission.

(Between Sept. 25 and the Bay of Pigs, a series of recruitments, meetings, and arrangements were made. The following is an outline of events that is not necessarily in chronological order.)

-- Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Trafficante. Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Giancana. Giancana was, according to Rosselli, to only be a "back up man." Rosselli states Giancana had nothing to do with the actual operation. Trafficante was used, according to Rosselli, as a translator.

-- Meeting with O'Connell, Maheu, Rosselli, ~~and two Admirals to~~ discuss the Cuban project.

-- Rosselli, in his contact with the Cubans, "invents" the cover story that he represents some Wall Street business interests who want to see Castro eliminated. Rosselli trusts Cubans he has recruited because they are part of the Bay of Pigs operation.

-- 1st attempt at assassination involved the use of pills. Maheu and Rosselli met with Cuban #1 and #2 (?). Maheu opened up his briefcase and gave the pills with instructions for their use to Cuban #1. Maheu also had $10,000 he gave the Cubans for doing the project. Rosselli did not know of the money. Rosselli states he received no remuneration for his work on the project, in fact, he paid out $800 for gas for a speed boat to deliver two or three man parties for guerrilla raids into Cuba.

-- Prior to Bay of Pigs there was no discussion of using guns to assassinate Castro.

-- Rosselli's cover name was "John Ralston."

-- At different times, Cuban #1, #2, or #3 would propose different projects. These would range from using plastic explosives to booby trapping Castro's desk. Rosselli would relay these on to Maheu, who, in turn, would contact the CIA. Most projects were vetoed, but the CIA did supply a short wave radio to the Cubans in Florida, to try and make contact with their people in Havana.

-- Eventually, Rosselli felt the project had failed. There was no specific point when it was announced. But, at sometime Rosselli assumed the project, for whatever reason, had not succeeded.

CHRONOLOGY
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have been planned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc, supra
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no".	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1966	CIA poisoning plot agl Haitian Pres. Duvalier; bombing palace in '68	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, supra.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Andersc referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story, supra
1968	CIA bombing Haitian palace	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition, sup
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	Maheu (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone l
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

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1961 After the Bay of Pigs (April 1961)

Rosselli felt "sorry for the poor bastards left on the beach." ~~Rosselli felt indirectly responsible for their deaths since he had encouraged many of them to participate in the invasion.~~ Two or three weeks after the invasion, Rosselli was contacted in Los Angeles by O'Connell, a meeting was arranged for at the airport hotel in Miami. Rosselli went there and was introduced to Harvey. O'Connell said Harvey was now in charge of the Cuban project. Harvey told Rosselli he was to cease all contact with Maheu and Giancana. Further, Harvey stated that the government was still interested in using Rosselli for intelligence-gathering operations. Rosselli would report information from the Cubans to Harvey about personalities and events in Cuba. Rosselli would also relay on to his Cuban contacts requests for specific information from the CIA.

Sometime between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey gave Rosselli six poison capsules. Rosselli, in turn, gave them to his Cuban contacts who were to take them to Cuba, where another Cuban or Cubans would use them to assassinate Castro. Rosselli never learned the details of what happened, but the project obviously failed. At one point, Rosselli remembers hearing over the radio that Castro was very ill. A short time later, he recovered.

Sometime before the missile crisis, Rosselli arranged, pursuant to Cuban #1 request, for a van loaded with rifles and ammunition to be delivered in Florida. O'Connell and Rosselli watched the Cuban contact pick up the van and return it empty. Rosselli assumed that these guns were going to be used by the two or three-man raiding parties in Cuba to assassinate Castro and overthrow the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

Rowan Tap

Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that Maheu was afraid that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were mad that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet and transfer the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers. Rosselli knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

Howard

See Me

MEMORANDUM

To: Gary

From: Rick

Date: August 10, 1976

Subject: Roselli

First, some background information. Yesterday, August 9, Senators Inouye and Baker met with Directors Kelley and Bush to discuss Roselli's death. The FBI doesn't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole. At the meeting, Jim Adams told Inouye and Baker that the FBI had been told by Justice (Richard Thornburg) that it had no jurisdiction in this case. Levi had, apparently, not been consulted. Senators Baker and Inouye (especially Baker) requested Kelley to take this up directly with Levi. Today, a letter was sent to Levi, signed by Baker and Inouye, urging Justice to authorize FBI involvement. A copy of that letter is attached.

One other point about the meeting. George Bush was extremely upset about this case and the allegations that the CIA was involved in Roselli's death. He said that he would personally contact Levi to request that the Department grant jurisdiction to the FBI to investigate.

For your information, Roselli appeared before the Committee on four separate occasions to testify on three

matters. He appeared on June 25 to discuss the plots against Castro; on September 20 and 22 to discuss the Campbell affair; and on April 25 to discuss the retaliation theory.

Now for current events. First, the two detectives in Miami handling the Roselli case are Detectives Zatrefralek and Wolf. They are with Dade County Homicide. Their numbers are 305-547-7456 and 547-7923. Madigan has already talked with Detective Wolf. Second, in light of the Inouye/Baker letter to Levi I did not ask the FBI about the current whereabouts of Santo Trafficante. I did, however, ask CIA. They have no information. Third, Baker and Liebengood are putting together a packet of information on Roselli, which will include CIA and Select Committee information and will get this to you tomorrow.

I think you already know this, but Senator Baker does want to launch an informal investigation into this matter. Roselli told him, when he appeared before the Committee, that he thought his life was in danger for testifying. Baker feels a moral obligation, therefore, to look into this.

I have attached the most recent articles on the Roselli death for you.

P.S. A couple of grizzly facts: Over the past few years there have been quite a few anti-Castro deaths in the Miami area. Car bombs and shootings have been the usual means of death. Second, we received a report today that another body was pulled up in the Hudson River. Another gangland slaying, complete with cement and chains.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: TO THE FILES

FROM: PATRICK SHEA AND MICHAEL MADIGAN

DATE: JUNE 21, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF A MEETING WITH MR. JOHN ROSSELLI BEGAN AT 11:35 a.m., JUNE 21, 1975, IN ROOM 711 of the WATERGATE HOTEL

PRESENT AT THE SESSION: MR. MICHAEL MADIGAN, MR. PATRICK SHEA OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, MR. ROSSELLI, MR. THOMAS WADDEN, MR. JAMES CANTILLON, MR. LESLIE SCHERR.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Madigan asked Mr. Rosselli if he felt a need for any protection. He stated, emphatically, "No," that he was able to take care of himself. Mr. Madigan made it clear that the Senate Select Committee could provide U.S. Marshalls for Mr. Rosselli during his stay in Washington. This offer was rejected.

Mr. Rosselli stated that Giancana had no involvement, to his knowledge, with any of the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro. Maheu did deal with higher authorities in government but stated that Rosselli was only the contact, Giancana has a backup man. Rosselli was very concerned about the adverse publicity in recent times, about the CIA and he thought it was unfortunate from the Agency's point of view that the Giancana name had been linked to the Agency.

Rosselli was upset by the harassment he had been under by the FBI. He pointed to the 1966 Frier Club incident as an example. He said in 1966 he had been approached by the FBI to provide information on inside basis about organized crime and when he had refused 18 months later he was indicted. Again, the first week in June of 1970, the FBI had offered him cooperation but he refused.

Rosselli first met Maheu twenty years ago. He was introduced through a life long friend who is dead now, named Spitzle, who was in the insurance business. This first meeting happened in Los Angeles, in 1955. Maheu, at the time, was running Maheu Associates in Washington, D.C. The meeting was only a social gathering. There was nothing specifically discussed about activities of the CIA.

In July or August (1960), Maheu called Rosselli and stated that he was working for the government and had been specifically asked to recruit Rosselli. Maheu ~~was~~ stressed that it was to be Rosselli and no one else. They agreed to meet for lunch at the Brown Derby in Los Angeles. At the meeting Maheu described the project as an intelligence operation involving Cuba. Maheu mentioned specifically Castro, Che Guevara, and Raoul Castro. It was Rosselli's feeling that Maheu had recruited him because of his known Cuban connections in Florida. These connections were unrelated to gambling. There was no money mentioned by Maheu to Rosselli for payment for services.

The alleged support of Wall Street business men had not been mentioned and was a cover invented by Rosselli later. At the end of their first meeting, they agreed to meet again at which time Maheu would verify to Rosselli that he was working for the government. This verification would be by introducing a government official of ~~higher authority~~ to Rosselli.

The second meeting occurred a week or ten days later. At this point, Rosselli was instructed to proceed to New York for an introduction to the government official. At both the first and second meetings asked for an hour or more about various aspects of the proposed projects, were discussed but nothing was mentioned of specific techniques.

[Khrushchev] Rosselli remembered his arrival in New York: coinciding with a visit by Eisenhower, Castro, Nasser, and perhaps Krushev. He said it was noteworthy because New York was crawling with officials from all over the world. Rosselli paid his own fare from Los Angeles to New York and stayed at the old Plaza Hotel on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. He was given the cover name, John Ralston.

The meeting in New York took place in a hotel room. In attendance were Maheu, Rosselli and "big" Jim O'Connell, and two or three other people who did not explain why they were there. Jim O'Connell was introduced as a CIA official. Rosselli was unclear as to whether this was stated explicitly or whether through the whole context of discussions it became clear that he worked for the CIA. At this point, Rosselli was satisfied that Maheu was working for the government and,therefore, agreed to work on the Cuban mission described at their first meeting. Rosselli was not sure as to the length of his stay in New York at this time. He did remember going to lunch with Maheu a number of times and talking about the particular projects.

After his stay in New York, he traveled to either Washington, D. C. or Florida. He was uncertain as to the exact location but he did remember there were series of meetings between himself and Maheu to discuss further plans about the attempted assassination. There was only one further meeting with O'Connell, involving these preliminary stages. At this point,he only discussed techniques of assassination with Maheu. Rosselli remembered staying in Maheu's Falls Church home(it had a tennis court)during his stays in Washington. There still had been no discussion of the cover story(that Rosselli was a private citizen representing a group of private businessmen from New York.)

When Rosselli reached Florida, he made his contacts with the Cubans and then arranged for the Cubans to meet with Maheu. He trusted the Cubans he came in contact with because they, according to themselves, were working on the Bay of Pigs operation, which had not occurred as of yet. There were times when they would stay at Arthur Godfrey's hotel, the Kenilworth Hotel, in Florida. At times he registered under the name Rollins. This was to allow him to maintain his cover while Maheu, still working for Hughes, was able to register under his own name, so that Hughes believed that he was doing his work. The operation went on in terms of Rosselli arranging meetings with his Cuban contacts and then having further discussions about specifics with Maheu. At times, O'Connell, from the CIA, would visit with Maheu and Rosselli. One time, before the 1960 election, O'Connell brought with him two Admirals, one of whom, Rosselli thinks, was retired.

At this point, Rosselli also was telling his Cuban contacts the cover story, namely that he represented private business interests in New York who were interested in seeing Castro done away with. The Cubans, at this point, had not met withJim O'Connell, but had met with Maheu. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Maheu left and Rosselli only met once more with O'Connell. Then he also left for the West Coast.

The two attempts at assassination, both involved the use of pills. One attempt was before the Bay of Pigs and the other was sometime after. The first means was to use a capsule filled with a special poison that could be spilled into the food of Castro and cause him to die of poisoning that was not traceable and made his death

look like a heart attack or by natural causes. Rosselli contacted a little Cuban whose relative was a chef for Castro. At this time, Cubans could still travel between Florida and Cuba. It was agreed that the CIA would manufacture the poison capsule. It would be turned over to O'Connell, to Maheu, to Rosselli, and ~~from Rosselli~~ to the Cubans. Maheu brought the capsule to Florida to the Fontainebleu Hotel. The Cubans came up to the room, Maheu opened up his brief case, with Rosselli and the Cubans present, and gave them capsule, plus $10,000 dollars. The money had come from the CIA and was considered partial payment for the job of assassinating Castro. At this meeting, Maheu described the method of using these capsules, making sure the Cubans understood ~~the Cubans understood~~ they could not be put in food that was boiled ~~or other aspects of using these pills~~. There was no discussions with the Cubans, at this meeting, about $250,000 dollars. That figure was used by Maheu after his first meeting with the Cubans, ~~described~~ what the ~~x~~ CIA might put up to help the families of men injured or killed in this ~~attempted assassination~~. Rosselli thinks that the meeting with the money and capsules was after the election. The number one Cuban contact that Rosselli had would from time to time, make requests of Rosselli to be relayed on to the CIA for equipment. The CIA did provide, for instance, a short wave radio, which was supposed to be used by the Cubans in Florida to contact Cubans in Cuba about the success or failure of the poison pill mission. Rosselli was sure that the pills were sent to Cuba but he has received no explanation as to what happened.

Another project was for the Cubans to receive plastic explosives from the CIA and give them to frogmen on their side that in turn would place them on ships in Havana harbor and blow them up. The CIA refused to do this because of the ease with which plastic explosives could be traced back to the government agencies such as the CIA. Maheu did ~~dixxxxxx~~ discuss the use of cigars that would make Castro's hair drop off. According to Rosselli, lose his ability to govern the country. Another proposal was that there be a booby trapped desk. Each of these latter two projects were proposed by Cuban refugees who said they had people in positions vis a vis Castro who could achieve the assassination.

Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there was no discussion of guns. Rosselli claimed to have a better idea than Maheu, namely that with far fewer men than were involved in the Bay of Pigs, perhaps a hundred, they could land in Cuba and do the job successfully. Rosselli's Cuban contact at the time was traveling to New York and New Orleans for meetings. Rosselli was not sure about what the meetings were about but said that they were related to the overthrow of Castro. Another proposal put forward was to purchase a speed boat and use some ~~type of exploding seashell to kill Castro~~.

The night before the Bay of Pigs Rosselli went to his number one Cuban's house and spoke with him. The Cuban contact said, "See you in Havana." Rosselli expressed serious reservation about the possibility of success for the operation. Rosselli left Florida right after the Bay of Pigs. His total time on this particular attempt at assassination in Florida was three or four months.

Rosselli felt sorry for "the poor bastards left on the beach." He felt indirectly responsible for having encouraged ~~them~~ many of them to participate in the operation. He went home and stayed in Las Vegas and Los Angeles for awhile. A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Rosselli was contacted by Maheu or O'Connell, he's not sure. He did meet with Jim O'Connell in Florida a few weeks later. They had arranged to have rooms at the Airport Hotel. Rosselli was not sure as to ~~what his name,~~ what name he registered under, but at this meeting in Florida he met a new CIA man, named Harvey. The first time he ~~Harvey~~ met Harvey, Rosselli was told

2d Phase

Harvey wanted to know all that Rosselli knew about Cuba ~~in~~ on an intelligence line. Harvey told him at ~~xxxxxx~~ this meeting to have no further contact with ~~xxx~~ Maheu and that he should not talk further with Giancana. He also said that he, Harvey, was in charge of the operation and ~~that Maheu should take, or~~ that Rosselli should take his orders from Harvey. At this point the original project, using pills, was considered defunct.

After this first meeting with Harvey, Rosselli again contacted his Cuban people. ~~He made several trips, that is,~~ Rosselli made several trips with Harvey in Florida, some down in the Keys to see what type of operations were continuing. One of the projects Harvey had Rosselli doing was verifying CIA reports by using Rosselli's own people who were in frequent contact with Cuba. The intelligence reports dealt both with personalities with in the Cuban hierarchy, as well as differentongoing operations. Rosselli paid his own bills ~~xxx~~ before the Bay of Pigs but after, Harvey would usually pick up the tab.

Harvey approached Rosselli with the proposed mission to try ~~it~~ for a second time to assassinate ~~Cuba[?]~~ Castro. Harvey said that the new ~~x~~pills would really work and were much stronger. Harvey gave Rosselli six pills, then Rosselli gave those six pills to his Cuban contact. There were no special instructions on how to handle the pills and his Cuban contact said that they would be passed into Cuba and used.

re-inforce →

At this time, Rosselli had no ongoing contact with Maheu, but may have run into him in Los Angeles. Maheu knew that Rosselli was still working on the Cuban project and that he, Maheu, was out. Rosselli never got any report back on what happened to the six pills but he assumed that they had been unsuccessful. He did hear a ~~xxxxx~~ report over a radio or TV station, that Fidel Castro was deathly ill, but then, shortly thereafter, he recovered.

but

Rosselli arranged for the CIA to supply a panel truck loaded with carbines for use by his Cuban contacts to make two or three-manned party raids into Cuba, hopefully assassinating Castro and overturning the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

OK w/ '67 Rept

The only money that Rosselli ever put up was $800 to buy gas for the speedboat that would deliver the two or three-man teams to Cuba to do guerrilla operations. He stressed throughout the interview that he had never received any money and that besides this $800 he had never given any money for. His last contact with Harvey was in June of ~~19x~~ 1963 ~~or shortly there before,~~ when Rosselli found out that Harvey was being transfered to Rome and he made a special trip to Washington to say goodby to him.

date of last trip — April? June? } details

The Rowan tap; Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on ~~Rowan~~ Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that ~~he was~~. Maheu was afraid, that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were pissed off ~~xxxxxx~~ that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Mr. Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet with "Mr. Doakes" for a transfer of the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers and he knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

before or after the tap-details?

During his early contacts with Maheu in 1959 and '60, in setting up the Cuban operation, Maheu was setting up a guard system for different Hughes' operations, such as Hughes Aircraft or other corporate interests.

Rosselli can't remember whether he ever introduced Giancana as Mr. Sam Gold. He claims to have no business relationship with Giancana. Rosselli's only business interests was the ice machines in Las Vegas. He ran those by himself and had no contact with Giancana. When asked about Joe Santa ~~Traxxxxxx~~, Trafficanto, Rosselli stated that he used him only as an interpreter but not as a contact for recruiting other Cubans for his mission.

Mr. Thomas Wadden, stated that he was receiving no fees ~~for his counsel,~~ for his representing Rosselli, now. The status of Mr. Cantillon or Mr. Scherr was not ~~xx~~clear. There was discussion as to the Committee paying the expenses of Mr. Rosselli's transportation from Los Angeles and there was discussion as to the limits, if any, to be placed on the Committee's inquiry of Mr. Rosselli's contacts with the Cubans, how they had been developed, and what other operations did go on.

The informant was told that his offer is outside our jurisdiction, which he acknowledged. No commitments were made to him. At this time, we do not plan to further pursue the matter. Our relationship with him has been most carefully guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any recontact of him concerning this matter if such is desired.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Book V, p. 12-13

The cast of characters surrounding the seizure of anti-Castro hardware as outlined on these pages is particularly interesting. The raw material cited in the footnote is attached. Note reference to Briniuer and Oswald. Below that McLaney brothers and Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis. Not attached is a critical New Orleans field office memo to FBI headquarters linking Briniuer to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos, don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the objective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on the tape last night over at the television station too.

Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4——

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.] This is the spy who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy, Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my organization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.

Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which——

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in Spanish.

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIEBELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had infiltrated the training camp in Louisiana?

Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is—what? Pro-Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a commando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader for the Christian Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing, because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-Castro organization. And my feeling—and this is the question that I am asking myself—in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is where the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me is—because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in New Orleans where it is not publicly known tha. here was something going on at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that

there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to Mexico too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernandez letter was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said, "Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H. Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963——

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have initialed it. Would you initial it?

[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter in which Fernandez said that we—meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices on August 5, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training of Cubans?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New Orleans——

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the possibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, because Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New Orleans.

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernan
aware of approximately the time
fore, indicated to Lechuga that
discovered as an attempted infiltr
Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon?
Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand
lates to the fact that Fernandez
will be in danger,"—up until abo
anything to do with Oswald?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I thi
on August 5 Oswald came to me
same period of time. Somethin
Orleans, that there was a secret
of the Fair Play for Cuba Comm
New Orleans. Those are the fact
not sure about. I just want to s
connection.
Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't see
handing out literature in the stre
to infiltrate the anti-Castro moven
Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that
after I told him that I don't hav
that here there is nothing, and th
went openly to do that before
he went openly to do that after he w
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of
in the pro-Castro movement and
information to Oswald—conducted
Mr. BRINGUIER. No.
Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have
as a result of your anti-Castro ac
person as this, do you think you
Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon
Mr. LIEBELER. If there were suc
Castro movement who had been
would have had access to that in
find out about it?
Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is
have a lot of persons. There ar
who are anti-Castro. Even amo
agents here in the city and you
But there is something else: Th
is located in 117 Decatur Street,
the owner of the Havana Bar is
over there, gave the information
before—that Oswald went to the
lemonade. He was with one Mexi
drinking the lemonade, he start to
to be a Cuban capitalistic, and tha
He was telling that that was too n
moment, Oswald feel bad at that
out to the sidewalk to vomit outsid
the Havana Bar told me that the
the same one that one time the FBI
immediately because that was a pr
August 15 and August 30 was th
because I start to find out all thes
before, because before I did not
nothing of this before to me. Be
the owner of the Havana Bar cam
cause he already saw one automob
one of them the one who had be

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, therefore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, relates to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we will be in danger,"—up until about August 8. Now does that statement have anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp; he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of information to Oswald—conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such a person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar—the Havana Bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store—the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban, and he and one of the employees over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination—not before—that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade. He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment—he had some vomits and he went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not before, because before I did not found any connection. They did not told nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, because he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans, one of them the one who had been with Oswald in the bar, and he told me

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful occasion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,[316] Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Orleans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[317] He first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the vicinity of the U.S.S. *Wasp*, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.[318] He distributed literature in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August 16, 1963.[319] Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.[320] On August 17, 1963, he appeared briefly on a radio program [321] and on August 21, 1963, he debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on August 9.[322] Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was associated.[323]

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above, his "organization" was a product of his imagination.[324] The imaginary president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,[325] the name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon.[326] Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel," [327] to her husband's membership card in the New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if she did not do so.[328] The chapter had never been chartered by the national FPCC organization.[329] It appears to have been a solitary operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present at meetings which were held once a month.[330]

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and sometime untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1, 1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to have rented for FPCC activities had been "promply closed 3 days later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they said something about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand." [331] He wrote that "thousands of circulars were distrubed" [332] and that he continued to receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored "to keep ansewering to the best of my ability." [333] In his letter to V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban

exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone."[334]


In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to uncover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident mentioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above letter to V. T. Lee.[335] Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such incident.[336] Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.[337] Furthermore, the general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he supported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges made against him and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, suggests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least greatly exaggerated.[338] While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, although it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962.[339] The Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald had rented an office in New Orleans. In view of the limited amount of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands" of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000 and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence that he received any substantial amount of materials from the national headquarters.[340]

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch."[341] WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin American Focus."[342] Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August 17, 1963.[343] It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn more about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in New Orleans.[344]

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States. The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar-

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A



GARNER DE

TO: NAME

1. Mr. Paul Crane

2.

3.

4.

- [ ] SIGNATURE
- [ ] APPROVAL
- [ ] SEE ME
- [ ] RECOMMENDATION
- [ ] ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE ______
- [ ] PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF ______
- [ ] COMMENT
- [ ] NECESSARY ACTION
- [ ] NOTE AND RETURN
- [ ] CALL ME
- [ ] PER CONVERSATION
- [ ] AS REQUESTED
- [ ] NOTE AND FILE
- [ ] YOUR INFORMATION

REMARKS

Can you help us identify these loose pgs 35-37, pls.

Thank You

FROM: NAME	BUILDING, ROOM, EXT.	DATE
Geo. Raeme for		
B D Bennett	6330 Main Justice	

10/3/63
Robt J. Dwyer
Report

MM 105-1742

information concerning the Comandos Mambises or their spokesman, RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who made a statement in Guatemala claiming credit for the August 17, 1963 attack.

BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other attacks in the future, as opportunities and availability of equipment permit, without compromising the United States.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

On June 14, 1963, information was received that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.

On June 19, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA, VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along with American SAM BENTON, were involved and detained, but not arrested, by United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosives for this operation. MC LANEY is well known as a former gambling concession operator in Havana, Cuba, and presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a

search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY, brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana, Cuba.

Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUCHLI for VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June 14, 1963 seizures at Miami. ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in this bomb plot were CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.

MM T-3, who is personally acquainted with SAM BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAM BENTON has been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM T-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in Miami, Florida in a Ford station wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers and mercenaries, GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, took LAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American mercenary BILL CARMAN, two automatic rifles and two French guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous other equipment to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in Miami in June of 1963, his station wagon contained .50 caliber

MM 105-1742

machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and a number of foreign-made weapons. LAUCHLI sold nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.

MM T-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the present Government in Cuba.

Book V, P. 5

There was no indication that the Castro assassination plots were brought to the Warren Commission's attention in anyway. "The subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaison with the Warren Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts."

Book V, p. 5-6

The CIA investigation of the assassination did not divulge the AMLASH operation although these investigators, in retrospect, think this knowledge vital. "There is also evidence that CIA investigators requested name traces which should have made them aware of the AMLASH operation, but for some reason, they did not learn of that operation."

Book V, p. 10 — FBI informant during missile crisis suggested that Castro could be assassinated through underworld channels inside Cuba and that the informant would fund this if U.S. government would assure such endeavor would not adversely effect the national security. See attached Hoover memo. We need to identify and interview informant.

TO : The Attorney General DATE: October 29, 1962

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

We have an informant who furnishes data concerning criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and gambling elements throughout the United States. He is most concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes known, he will be killed immediately.

On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky, in the past have had close connections in Cuba whereby they were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be successfully arranged.

[redacted] COULD IDENTIFY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE [redacted]

[redacted] He said that, in the event the United States Government is interested in having the attempt made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security. He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without any additional contact with Government representatives and with a minimum of contacts with private individuals.

109-539

Book V, p. 13 Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting series of meetings among major leaders of anti-Castro movement. Such a report is attached. Attention to the cast of characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza, Carlos Prio.

On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS, Intelligence Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTIME, advised that the MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group. BORJAS said that through his contacts in the latter organization, he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's organization landed in Cuba at the time of the June 20, 1963 invasion hoax.

BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO MACEO and CARLOS BANDIN resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both helped to create.

II. THE SOMOZA PLAN

On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL GARCIA, in charge of public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA, former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in Miami, Florida.

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban exile political and action group leaders attended. At these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the Presidents of the Central American Republics, and these Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form of training camps, military equipment, and bases of operation from which to attack the present government of Cuba. SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the

Presidents of the several Central American Republics and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in Miami, New York and Washington, were known to have the sanction of the United States Government. On July 16, 1963, SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained an article stating that there is growing speculation in Miami that Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly backing certain Cuban exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME BUESA and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It is noted that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASTRO organization.

On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the below-listed persons are some of the better-known Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC)

ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRR

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

MM 105-1742

MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle of July, 1963. ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA was acting as an intermediary between the United States Government and the Cuban exiles.

On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now not clear what SOMOZA is offering, or what the United States Government's position or attitude is in this matter. ALVAREZ said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan Government, to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will have to have the backing and support of the United States Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that about a week ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the MDC Headquarters, and in the name of SOMOZA, offered camps, military equipment and bases in Nicaragua. This individual also offered to pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a "wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the United States Government would take concerning this matter.

On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL, Executive Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised that when SOMOZA was in the United States during July of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA, head of the Rescate Democratico Revolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA in Miami and New York. At the invitation of SOMOZA, VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer with SOMOZA, and is expected to return to Miami in about a week.

On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing definite had been established as a result of VARONA's visit to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, military leader of the MDC, advised that he had recently returned from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with SOMOZA, who made no commitments or indicated any definite plan existed. SOMOZA showed great interest in the Cuban problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the way of arms or training camps.

BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same time, conferred with SOMOZA, but did not receive any offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic (DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of the DR, had been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to obtain any military bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-CASTRO

organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations (UN), that he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG) ROBERT KENNEDY.

AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban exiles. SOMOZA recommended that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At this meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of Nicaraguan support for the Cuban exile anti-CASTRO movement, but first the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as their leader. There was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile leaders attending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ, former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba, advised he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training camps in Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the proposed aid and backing has progressed no further than the talking stage. SIERRA said it seems to him that everyone is waiting for the United States Government to give the "green light".

On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly all top political leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA Plan is too big for

SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into effect without United States military and political support.

MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet obtained a positive commitment from the United States Government, because after two and a half months of conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military training camps in Central America, and the SOMOZA Plan has not progressed beyond the talking stage.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups. It is headed by SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT. The organization maintains no office as such, but continues to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida, to collect money donations.

On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised the organization has had no military activity since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the organization to increase membership, establish different sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section, and committees to raise funds. The organization recently put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and purposes of the organization, along with information concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the Miami River, which will be used in the future for military

Book V, p. 25	Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Book V, p. 25 On November 23, 1963, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico Station to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this was because CIA feared Cuba responsible for assassination.

p. 29 Headquarters equally concerned with Duran on November 27 and warned Mexico City station chief that U.S. Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too hard.

Book V, p. 27 AMLASH's case officer omitted reference to the poison pen in his November 25 contact report of his November 22 AMLASH meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

Book V, p. 28 "D" tells his story in Mexico City on November 25. On November 26, Mexico City cables details of "D" interrogation to CIA Headquarters. On December 1, CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that the White House has been told that D's story is a fabrication.

Book V, p. 30

On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a sensitive source ( ) has advised that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana was delayed in Mexico City on November 22 to pick up a passenger who rode in the cockpit without going through customs. This cable was found in Mexico City file with no CIA headquarters record of follow-up being found.

Book V, p. 35 In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the President that stated that no evidence had been developed which would indicate Oswald's assassination was inspired or directed by Pro Castro organizations or by any foreign country.

Book V, p. 40-41	FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled FBI Headquarters on November 24 that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans participated in assassination effort. "Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in US in effort to confirm or refute this theory." FBI Headquarter's supervisor determined this was not desirable and would only promote rumors.

Book V, P. 58 The CIA investigation reflected a Soviet orientation, with exhaustive studies of Oswald's activities in re Soviet Union. There is no corresponding CIA analysis of Oswald's contacts with pro and anti Castro groups in U.S.

Book V, p. 61-63

In December, 1963, the CIA learned that a Cuban American had crossed the border from Texas into Mexico, on November 23 and arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on the flight. In March, 1964 the Agency received a report from a source which alleged that the same Cuban American had received a permit to enter Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source said the Cuban American was somehow involved in the assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this report other than to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban American's activities. The FBI did investigate the reported unusual travel but did not fully report the results of their investigation to their Warren Commission. Their investigation showed that this individual had lived in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro. He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962 and had a brother in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was the same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that Oswald had possibly contacted in May of 1963.

Book V, p. 63-64

In March of 1964, the Warren Commission requested from Director Hoover information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations which were active in the U.S. including the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Alpha 66, among others. The Bureau furnished less than a full and satisfactory response and did not disclose the fact that the CIA had operational interests in certain of the entities inquired about.

Book V, p. 65 The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished the Warren Commission noted the attack on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963 but did not detail that group's continued activity in planning and carrying out their military operations against Cuba. The FBI reports did not show that Alpha 66 had been involved with the New Orleans anti-Castro training camp.

Book V, p. 65	It is known that the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with which Oswald was associated. According to Bureau documents, the Agency advised the Bureau that they were considering the use of disinformation that might embarass the Committee in areas where the Committee had support.

Book V, p. 72 In late July 1964, an FBI informant reported that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating Castro. Informant also reported that AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan but that the plan had not been completely put to rest. This information was not disseminated outside the Bureau at the request of the informant. But the Bureau notations indicate that the Bureau was looking into an underworld plot against Castro that might be coincidental with the AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in October 1963. That information did not indicate assassination involvement.

Book V, p. 74-75	The AMLASH operation was insecure prior to the Fitzgerald meeting with AMLASH, a meeting that Fitzgerald was urged not to undertake by several in the Agency.

AMLASH

Book V, pp. 77-78	Individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation, and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine contact with Cuban intelligence (Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters, 3/18/65).

Book V, p. 78 Victor Espinosa, a Cuban exile, involved in the transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963, contacted INS with information about the AMLASH operation. This information was turned over to the FBI which informed the CIA. Both agencies interrogated Espinosa in June of 1965 and found that he knew that AMLASH and others were planning a coup which involved the assassination of Castro and that the CIA had been involved with AMLASH and others in the planning.

Espinosa and AMLASH were life-long friends but during the interrogation he gave no indication that he was aware of the 1963 AMLASH-CIA meetings. Espinosa's information noted in the 1967 IG Report suggests a link between the AMLASH operation and the CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. Therefore, Espinosa's information raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the Harvey plots may have been aware of the AMLASH operation. CIA reaction to this interrogation was to terminate the operation immediately.

Book V, p. 79 CIA had FBI files on Espinosa detailing his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and underworld figures who were operating the guerrilla training camps in New Orleans in July 1963.

Book V, p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler, who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers; Teledino stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.

Book V, p. 79	The FBI made the connection between Espinosa's 1963 activities and the fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate Castro. However, there is no evidence that either the CIA or FBI investigated this connection until 1967.

Book V, p. 79 Although the CIA had received information that AMLASH was a provocation there is no evidence that the CIA investigated the possibility of a connection between its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy.

Book V, P. 80 A client of Morgan's had informed him that the United States had attempted to assassinate Castro in the early 1960's and that Castro had decided to retaliate. This information was passed to Drew Pearson who in turn attempted to have Chief Justice Warren look into it but he declined.

Book V, P. 81 Supervisory personnel assigned to the assassination investigation have uniformly testified they do not recall ever discussing or reviewing memoranda which touch upon Cuban involvement in the assassination or of Cuban retaliation for the CIA assassination plots.

Book V, p. 81 According to Secretary of State Rusk in his testimony before the Warren Commission, 6/10/64, he stated there was "very considerable concern" in Cuba immediately following the assassination as to whether Cuba would be held responsible for the assassination and what effect the assassination might have on Cuba's position and security.

Book V, p. 84

On March 21, 1967, WFO send Headquarters 10 copies of a blind memorandum which stated Castro employed assassination teams for the purpose of removing President Kennedy. Morgan's clients were also aware of the identity of individuals sent to the United States for that purpose. He understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey. The transmittal slip is attached to this memorandum.

Neither the President nor the Attorney General ordered a follow-up investigation after receiving this memo.

Book V, p. 92 In October, 1963, Soviet experts at FBI Headquarters were informed that Oswald had met with Vice Counsel Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Kostikov was a member of the KGB and believed to be with the KGB department that carried out assassinations and sabotage.

I, Frank Sturgis, have today personally delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the following materials:

1 Envelope - 2 cassettes

1 lg. manila envelope - secret codes

Date: 9-3-76

Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

RECEIVED:

Pamela Crupi
For the Committee

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco
and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No,That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly / towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need

protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with

them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know,"

FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were _______ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics

peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged

medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And

they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,

put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to

their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants

diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington,D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on

a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up,Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

realize what a bomb this is? This top KGB spy wants you?" And I said, "Well", I say "he's not really my type.", I said but again, the best interests of the country, but how far do you want me to go? And he said "all the way". I said what is all the way? He said, "You start with a Christmas card." Well the Christmas card was answered by Oleg going to Louis and saying, "I got Ilonka's Christmas card. Where is she living, Louis?" You know, so John talked me into calling the mission. I call up the mission, across from 19th precinct, and I said, "Oleg, this is Ilonka Marischa. Hello darling", you know, and this, this and this. And I said oh boy everything is wired and everything from the mission anyway. But he's top dog there. He is top dog in the mission. He has the say. He's a very important person in the Soviet mission. Anyway, John okays a telephone coil pickup that I have on my phone to a Soni tape recorder. We make a tape of this because John Kotter is sitting on pins and needles waiting for me to replay that tape on what Oleg tells me, you know? Oleg doubletalks but we get a message that we want to meet, you know? So they had some kind of a security council and we made a date and it was postponed. Oleg called up and apologized which I also have on tape. And each time the Bureau was very happy. We're gonna start a blossoming relationship here, you know, and end up with photographs and better something, which I don't think I would have gone all the way. But that's what their idea was so they can exchange at a later date.

FS: Blackmail?

ML: Well...

FS: Blackmail him / into giving them information (unintelligible).

ML: Say like they get one of our, one of our pilots, right? And if we don't get our pilot back they expose Oleg, right? Or make him...

FS: Be a double agent. Blackmail him...

ML: Be a double...

FS: into being a double agent.

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you,

and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

Transcript of tapes provided the Select Committee on Intelligence by Frank Sturgis on September 3, 1976

Marita Lorenze (ML) -- Interviewed by Frank Sturgis on 9/2/76

Frank Sturgis (FS)

ML: Marita Lorenze

FS: You an American citizen?

ML: Yes.

FS: Were you born here?

ML: Born in Braemen, Germany on August 18, 1939 and my mother registered me at birth with the Consulate because she was stuck in the war over there, but I am an American citizen, not naturalized or anything. I was registered as an American citizen.

FS: How old were you when you came to the United States?

ML: I was about 12, came over on the U.S.S. Henry Gibbons, American troop transport, because my mother worked for the United States Army.

FS: Okay, now we're going to go ahead and jump. You went to Cuba what month and what year and on what ship?

ML: I met, I went, I took several trips with my father who was Commander of the oceanliner Berlin. I met Fidel...

FS: What was your father's full name?

ML: Commander Heinrich Frederick Lorenz.

FS: And how old was he?

ML: Approximately 50-something, 55, when I first, I went on several trips to Cuba before I met Fidel with, but I was a little girl.

FS: When's the first time you went to Cuba after Fidel took over the government on January 1, 1959?

ML: I met Fidel February 28, 1959, on one of my father's cruises where Fidel came aboard with several of his men. He said he saw the oceanliner from the Havana Hilton balcony and he took a launch with his Chief of the Navy, what's his name, I forgot, Castagna...

FS: Forget it, forget about it, we can go ahead. Who else was there besides the chief of the Cuban navy.

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly / towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need

protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with

them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know,"

FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were _______ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just,the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics

peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged

medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And

they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,

put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to

their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants

diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington, D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on

a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up,Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you,

and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
442 Russell Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Inouye:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter from this office to Senator Mansfield expressing our concern over the rush of the Central Intelligence Agency to destroy large quantities of secret government documents. We believe the Select Committee on Intelligence should review with CIA Director Bush what specifically the Agency intends to destroy before doing so. It is likely that there are numerous memoranda and other documents which are of extreme importance to the committee, which are central to the committee's executing the Senate's mandate of comprehensive and complete oversight of executive intelligence agencies.

We urge that the Senators serving on the Intelligence Committee take whatever steps necessary to stop the destruction of materials by the Central Intelligence Agency until such time as the Committee can review the content and importance of that data.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

GC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

22 June 1976

JUN 23 11 26 AM '76

Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending you a copy of my letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott extending the moratorium on the destruction of certain records until 10 December 1976. I do hope that this action and the procedures outlined in my letters are fully responsive to the interests of your Committee.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

orig → WGM for Chair + return to files
cy → MJM + return to Research for files
cy → Blue/index
cy → Chron

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

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It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

June 7, 1976

Honorable Michael J. Mansfield
United States Senate
133 Russell Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

George Bush's letter to Senator Hugh Scott, with a copy to you, of the 2nd of June is disturbingly ambiguous. In stating that the CIA now believes itself relieved of the responsibility of maintaining data "which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee," the Agency failed to make any effort to identify what materials were targeted for destruction and which weren't. Further, the next to last sentence of Mr. Bush's letter, "I trust you (Senator Scott) agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding," has led some observers in the Senate to conclude no destruction will take place until such confirmation has been given. This does not appear to be true. Neither the press office nor the legislative consultant [counsel] would confirm that destruction of data has not already occurred, or would not occur without acquiesence from the Senate leadership. To the contrary, the legislative counsel's office informed this group that the "process" of destruction has already begun.

The action of the Central Intelligence Agency is wrong. The new Select Committee on Intelligence should have been consulted prior to the destruction of any materials which might be vital to the proper functioning of that committee and which in any case are within the legislative and oversight domain of that committee. Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Baker, along with the membership of the Intelligence Committee should have the opportunity to review the data selected for destruction and to determine, in conjunction with the CIA, theppropriety of destroying or maintaining such data.

Hon. Michael Mansfield
Page Two
June 7, 1976

We urge you, Senator Mansfield, to take whatever steps necessary to immediately halt the unilateral act undertaken by the CIA of destroying possibly critical and irreplaceable government documents.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

Copy for Senator Baker ✓

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have received a letter from the Honorable George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relative to the destruction of papers and material which he has held for sometime relative to our request. Our action was taken to facilitate the inquiry being undertaken by your predecessor committee under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church.

In view of the fact, as we assume, that all of Senator Church's committee records have been turned over to your permanent Select Committee, we would appreciate your advising us as to whether or not you want our original letter to stand and the papers and other materials to still be held. Could you give us the judgment of you and your Committee on this matter?

With best wishes, we are

Hugh Scott
HUGH SCOTT
REPUBLICAN LEADER

Mike Mansfield
MIKE MANSFIELD
MAJORITY LEADER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 June 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

On 27 January 1975, following adoption of S. Res. 21 creating the Select Committee on Intelligence, you and Senator Hugh Scott requested that the Central Intelligence Agency "not destroy, remove from [its] possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21."

In response to this request, the Agency placed in effect a complete moratorium on the destruction of records, including normal administrative records scheduled for routine destruction.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that it is our intention to proceed with destruction of records, now that the Select Committee has completed its investigation and issued its final report. We have so advised Senator Church.

Along with the backlog of routine administrative records, the Agency will destroy records which were collected and maintained by the Agency and which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee. The Agency is required to destroy much of this latter material by the Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579) and by Executive Order 11905. Of course, all records destruction will be fully consistent with other applicable laws, Presidential directives, and the requirements of pending litigation and Justice Department investigations.

I trust you agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

I am sending a duplicate of this letter to Senator Hugh Scott.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing a copy for your information.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Pfeiffer

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

Long → Miller
Cys → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

January 8, 1976

Senator Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

Thank you for your letter of December 15th in which you state that you would contact Mr. Miller and ask him to respond to my request. I am sorry to bother you again but I have had no word from Mr. Miller. As you know, I feel that the matter is of sufficient importance that it deserves a reply or at least an acknowledgement of a receipt of my letter from Mr. Miller.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:kcm

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

SEL COMM
File: ____________________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment

SEL COMM
File: ______________

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

bc: Senator Mike Mansfield

check w/ Ted Ralston

WM:mn

4. (- JMM) Met with Senator Frank Church regarding a letter he had written to Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana, stating that Senator Church had reliable information that Air America was responsible for defoliation operations in Cambodia. A copy of Senator Church's letter had been sent to the Director for comment by Professor Arthur H. Westing, Windham College in Vermont. I explained to the Senator we were much concerned over this allegation and the Director authorized me to deny it categorically. I added that while we were not prying into the identity of the Senator's source, we were curious as to whether this source's allegations were based on honest mistake or malice. If the former, I suggested the Senator might wish to straighten him out. Senator Church said he couldn't remember off hand where he learned this information but would check his files. He said he fully accepted our denial.

INTEL

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0229/2
27 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to requests about Agency involvement in Cambodia, the attached statement is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder

Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
Denial of CIA involvement in the resistance and dissident activities which occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to Communists

The Central Intelligence Agency has not been involved in any way in the resistance and dissident activities which have occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to the Communists.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0229/1
23 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510 Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to your recent request about allegations of Agency involvement in Cambodia, please be advised that Mr. Ralston was given a copy of a 1971 letter from Senator Church to Professor Pfeiffer and a copy of a memorandum for the record reflecting a conversation between Senator Church and our Legislative Counsel about the specific allegation concerning the use of herbicides in Cambodia in 1969.

These memoranda were furnished Professor Pfeiffer in response to his FOIA request.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder

Walter Elder
Review Staff

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

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DMc

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:bcm

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

DMC

orig → Miller
copy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

United States Senate

Washington, D. C., December 15, 19 75

Respectfully referred to

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee
  on Intelligence Activities
U. S. Senate

Correspondence from Professor E. W. Pfeiffer

I would appreciate your replying to Professor Pfeiffer directly.

M. M.

Mike Mansfield *U. S. S.*

Form No. 3 16—45102-3 GPO

MISSOULIAN

THE MISSOULIAN P. O. BOX 1535 500 N. HIGGINS AVE. MISSOULA, MONTANA 59801 TEL. (406) 542-0311

Oct. 23, 1975

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 607, Capitol Hill Hotel
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Recently I discussed with Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, University of Montana zoologist, an incident in which he has had an abiding concern: the herbicide attack that occurred in eastern Cambodia in the spring of 1969.

As I understand it, from my talks with Dr. Pfeiffer and from my review of the correspondence he has received from various agencies, there is no doubt that the attack actually occurred, that it was large and significant, and that the nature of the chemicals and aircraft involved indicate that the U.S. had a direct role in carrying it out.

Yet it seems the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the "private" CIA-affiliate Air America have all denied in one way or another that they conducted the attack.

The obvious question is who did make the attack? Who ordered it, why was it ordered and under what authority? Dr. Pfeiffer has indicated your committee is looking into this matter and that the affair may ultimately be discussed in the course of Select Committee hearings at some point.

Is it possible for you to tell me the status of your inquiry? Would it be appropriate at this time for our newspaper to interview Dr. Pfeiffer and write a news story on the documents he has received, or would such a study benefit from new information your committee efforts may resurrect within the near future?

Thanks in advance for your interest. We have followed with great interest the Select Committee efforts to date.

orig → For TF
cy → Blue
cy → Chm

Xref Pfeiffer

Sincerely,

Don Schwennesen

Don Schwennesen
Environmental Writer

E

Western Montana's Leading Newspaper

100% Recycled Paper

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

Oct. 27, 1975

Mr. William Miller
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Rm G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, we met some weeks ago to discuss certain problems related to possible CIA activity in Cambodia. As you know, I am particularly interested in why the CIA cannot or will not find out who carried out the massive herbicide attack against Cambodia in the spring of 1969. The CIA has under the Freedom of Information Act provided me with some documents from my file which bear directly upon this strange episode and Senator Church's efforts to find out information for me. When we met you indicated that CIA activities in Indochina were to be investigated by the Select Committee. I would greatly appreciate knowing about when you think this subject will come up. I would also very much like to submit some of the documents I have received from the CIA and my personal testimony to the Committee. I believe that Professor A. Westing and myself were the last official guests of the Sihanouk regime before it was temporarily deposed.

I look forward to hearing from you on these matters.

Sincerely yours,

E.W. Pfeiffer
Professor

orig -> WGM
cy -> blue
cy -> Cl Chron
cy -> For. T. F. / Cambodia expert

E

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

Aug. 6, 1975

Mr. Paul Wallach
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G 308 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Wallach:

As decided in our phone conversation today, I am writing to you about a conversation I had last week in Paris with an official of the Royal Government of Cambodia. He informed me that CIA-directed activities hostile to his government are presently occurring in his country, and that these activities are being launched from bases in Thailand. I would greatly appreciate your assistance in finding out for me whether any agency of the U.S. Government is presently carrying out activities against the Royal Government of Cambodia.

I greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with you in person recently, and thank you for your interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology

orig → Wallach
cy → Blue Chron

EM

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 26, 1971

E. W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive my delay in replying to your last letter of March 29, 1971. Although the Department of State has offered to make the Seventh Air Force Study available to me at the Department, I frankly have not had the chance to get down and study it.

I have been told, however, that Air America was responsible for the Cambodian defoliation. My source was not the State Department, but rather an individual who is in a position to know the facts in this matter.

It would be most useful to have a full study of the extent and the effects of our defoliation program in Southeast Asia. Perhaps you and Arthur Westing and others could get together to make a proposal for a study of this nature.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Memorandum

MM 2/14/74

To: Terry Lenzner

From : Jim Moore

Subject: Robert Maheu - John Roselli -

Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli-Maheu connection.

Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in 1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden owners in the Friar's Club case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with him. However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source of those stories, saying that his information came from many people, including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P. Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent,. Nissen remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt to assasinate Castro.

Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding Cuba, but he couldn't remember any of the specifics.

When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it two columns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan. The government successfully resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court in Los Angeles, and they have sent the motion for reduction of sentence, and attached papers to us. The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les Whitten vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.

Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.

FRONTIER CASE

Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in lieu of the Grand Jury appearance. Nissen did not try the Frontier case, because he had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised that he had never heard of such a meeting. He gave me the names of three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not yet returned my phone call. The third, Tom Kotoski, actually tried the case. He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me as soon as possible.

One final note - Nissen said that the Roselli file in the Justice Department contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about a file kept on Maheu himself.

Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles, is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about Maheu and Roselli, as well as about Dalitz coming back to the Desert Inn. He should call me this evening or tomorrow morning. Also, Mike DeFeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force, will be in town tomorrow and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes. In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike force man from Kansas City as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department. I spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting time before he leaves town.



NAME : Sam GIANCANA

ALIASES : Sam Mooney, Sam Malone

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-16-08, Chicago, Ill.; 5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes, dark chestnut hair, fair complexion and medium build.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave. Oak Park, Ill. Frequents the Army Lounge, Norwood House, Villa Venice, all of Chicago, Illinois.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine. Mother deceased, father is Tony Giancana, and sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria. Sam's consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #58437, Chicago PD #E-27465. Subject has record of 13 arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such charges as murder, grand larceny, auto theft, burglary and liquor law violations with two felony convictions.

BUSINESS : Owns the Forest Lounge, the R & S Liquor Co., the Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling interests and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of Ill. and a director of the organization's activities in Chicago and vicinity.



NAME	: Giovanni ROSELLI
ALIASES	: John Roselli, John Russelli, John Kasselle, John Passelli
DESCRIPTION	: Born 7-4-04 Chicago, Ill, 5'8", 171 lbs, brown-grey hair, blue eyes.
LOCALITIES FREQUENTED	: Resides 1251 No. Crescent Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Frequents gambling casinos at Las Vegas where he has room at Tropicana Hotel. Travels frequently all parts U.S.
FAMILY BACKGROUND	: Divorced from movie actress June Lang; father: Vincenzo; mother: Maria Russo (both deceased); cousin: Joseph Evangelista.
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES	: Dragna family, Philip Kastel, Harold Meltzer, Francisco Costiglia, Charles Fischetti, Louis Piscopo.
CRIMINAL HISTORY	: FBI #3339986. L.A. Sheriff's Office #51247. Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.
BUSINESS	: Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and varied other interests.
MODUS OPERANDI	: A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Active in labor racketeering and control of gambling.

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 60, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Senator Ervin

From: Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz

Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's testimony about his CIA activities

Summary:

John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a CIA-financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. The objection is based upon national security grounds as well as an assertion by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to our inquiry under S. Res. 60.

Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.

Facts:

During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. Among the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and John Rosselli. Maheu had a public relations business at the time, and Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime figures (e.g. Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot continued into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, but it failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.

Only a few officials in the government knew of the existence of the plot at that time.

Justice Department officials stumbled across this information about the plot as a result of their investigation into an illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.

The sensitive information was brought to the attention of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and either he or then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order not to compromise national security considerations.

The information about the alleged assassination plot then lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early 1969, when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file was returned to Central Files shortly after it was taken out.

Assistant Attorney General Wilson next requested the secret Justice file in early 1971 in connection with his interview of Robert Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19, 1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)

However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18, 1971, was that <u>on the same day</u>, Haldeman requested Dean to find out what he could about the Hughes - Maheu - O'Brien relationship.

In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."

In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971, and discussed with him the political implications of the information. Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971, by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rosselli. Maheu was <u>not</u> forthcoming with information about the plot at that time. Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do so.

<u>Conclusion:</u>

Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot

to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats that O'Brien might possess from Maheu. And these concerns could have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972, especially since their directions were to photograph any documents relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972 Democratic campaign.

It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rosselli about the nature and scope of his activities with Robert Maheu in the early 1960's.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a rug- gedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban un-

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high

—B

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Thanksgiving, 1970	Hughes leaves Las Vegas.
December 4, 1970	Maheu is fired.
January 18, 1971	Jack Anderson column published linking Mal and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.
January 18, 1971	Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting ir mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relationsl
January 19, 1971	Jack Anderson column appears with more det on Maheu's involvement in plot to assassin Castro.
January 19, 1971	Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert Maheu in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked
January 25, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo discussing Danner relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationshi with Maheu, and request for investigation ir CIA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a "counter-scandal."
January 25, 1971	John Rosselli enters prison.
January 26, 1971	Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-Hughes relationship
January 27, 1971	Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice l A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bill Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" ir Las Vegas.
January 27, 1971	A.A.G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahet privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi
February 1, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo noting that Maheu wa involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in early 1960's.
February 12, 1971	Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban un-

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high regard for him.

equality —B of "incr

(VERIFICATION — 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF } ss.

I am the ______

______

in the above entitled action; I have read the foregoing ______

______

and know the contents thereof; and I certify that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true.

______

______

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on ______ (date) *at* ______ (place), *California*

______
Signature

(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -- 1013a, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF Los Angeles } ss.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:

9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210

On June 25, *19*71, *I served the within* Notice of Motion For Reduction of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in Support Thereof

on the Plaintiff
in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Beverly Hills, California
addressed as follows:

DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring St.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on June 25, 1971 (date) *at* Beverly Hills (place), *California*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of June, 1971.

[signature]
Signature
Myrna J. Weinstein

[signature]

OFFICIAL SEAL
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Expires August 29, 1972

KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

*Both the verification and proof of service by mail forms, being signed under penalty of perjury, do not require notarization.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service

To all to [illegible]om these presents shall come, Greeting:

By v[illegible]tu[illegible] of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I certify o[illegible] his behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration, that the [illegible]ach[illegible] reproduction(s) is a true and correct copy of documents in his custody.

GSA [illegible] 68-13478

SIGNATURE	
[signature]	
NAME GILBERT DORAME	DATE FEB 12 1974
TITLE Center Manager	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY General Services Administration (9NC-I) Federal Records Center, NARS 4747 Eastern Avenue Bell, CA 90201	

R9 Overprint 33 (4-72) GSA FORM APR 68 6791E

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U. S. Courthouse Building
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: 688-2406

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

FILED

FEB 17 4 46 PM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI,
Defendant.

No. 1175-PH-CD

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and records in the case and the attached Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney

David R. Nissen

DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

DRN:jt

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3124

MEMORANDUM

John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905, in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.

Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917. By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the five children moved into the residence of Liberato Cianciulli and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Cianciulli were married.

In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the criminal element in East Boston and was engaged in narcotic traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square. On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large sale from his "source" and was present and under agent surveillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29, 1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and two days later he was released on bail. While awaiting trial in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and was released on bail on July 2, 1923.

FPI-LPC-5-67-150M-3124

In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government sources believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from testifying. Because of his fugitive status, both indictments against Sacco were dropped.

After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli." Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking during this period and police records show he was frequently arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons, and suspicion of robbery.

After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In 1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information service used by bookmakers across the country.

After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios. As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna, Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers and a labor union. Also indicted were union officials Browne and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna, Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea, Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"

Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.

In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor. There were indications that their release had been secured by bribery but admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not obtained. In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his continued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned until November 1948, when his parole was reinstated. Shortly after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a key Government witness at the extortion trial was murdered by the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while they were on parole he would hold them responsible.) Two other co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.

Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles and again associated himself with a movie studio. Reliable sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld. Sacco immediately became a powerful figure in Las Vegas. He travels back and forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and associates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.

Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Committee investigating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his association with underworld figures and even his own personal background.

During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel, and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The

Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, whereupon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount paid for the lease.

During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity and he sold his interest. Following his ouster from the Tropicana, Sacco sold ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels at prices far in excess of prices on the open market. Sacco has also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.

In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.

In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that trial, it was shown that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.

Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:

Al Capone - head of the Chicago underworld gang;

Charles F. Fischetti - a Capone lieutenant;

Micky Cohen - gambler and racketeer;

Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles, now deceased;

Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel - member of Murder, Inc., murdered June 20, 1947;

Allen Smiley - gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;
Tony Accardo - ranking Cosa Nostra figure;
Momo Adams - ranking Cosa Nostra figure; and
Frank Costello - ranking Cosa Nostra figure.

Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investigations concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.

In the Friars Club trial, it was apparent that a number of witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate Sacco, including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.

Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities. He was also convicted of making a false statement in his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years in prison.

In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and, in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3124

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, JUNE S. TOKUYAMA, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made; that on February 17, 1971, I deposited in the United States mails in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

addressed to

Adrian Marshall, Esq.
Attorney at Law
9601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

at his last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail.

This Certificate is executed on February 17, 1971, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June S. Tokuyama
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA

USA-12c-240
(Rev. 10/19/67)

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden, 888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any informatio[n] about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to interview Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)

John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't

want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

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The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

This is cover page of a 25 count indictment arising from Δ's use of the FRIAR'S Club in Beverly Hills for illegal gambling activities..

FILED

DEC 21 1967

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY [signature] DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN;
MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS);
VICTOR G. LANDS;
T. WARNER RICHARDSON,
FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI);
BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM,
Defendants.

NO. 1432

INDICTMENT

[18 U.S.C. §371: Conspiracy; 18 U.S.C. §1952: Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314: Interstate Transportation of Funds Obtained by Fraud; 47 U.S.C. §502: Operating Uncertified Communication Device; 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1) Subscribing False Tax Return.]

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 USC §371]

Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN, MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS, T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI), BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S. Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses against the United States as follows:

(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use facilities

DRN:mlm:mt

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3124

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272-9211

Attorneys for Defendant
Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli

FILED

JUN 28 9 31 AM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY [signature]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7-6-71
2PM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, et al, Defendants	NO. 1432 - Criminal (WPG) NOTICE OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE (RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, United States Attorneys Office, Los Angeles, California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacco, also known as John Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this case. Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing, and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.

Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).

Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00 on Count One, two years to run consecutively to Count One and

1 a fine of $10,000.00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run
2 concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10,000.00 for each of Counts
3 Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment
4 to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000.00 for Count
5 Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was
6 $55,000.00.

7 On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers
8 throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist
9 Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence
10 Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles.
11 The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are
12 attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth
13 as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th
14 of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which
15 appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies
16 of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released
17 and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.

18 The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the
19 sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B
20 of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief
21 of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's
22 attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down
23 by the Court in this case.

24 Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in
25 support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one
26 witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or
27 testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability
28 of defendant to pay the fine of $55,000.00 as well as the condition of
29 defendant's health.

30 /// ///
31 /// ///
32 /// ///

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.

DATED: June 25, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall
ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant,
Filippo Sacco, also known
as John Rosselli

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing under my own by-line. For many years prior to the death of Mr. Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf of the United States Government.

3. The information contained in said articles was made available to me by persons employed by the United States Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and truthful information as pertains to other subjects.

4. After receiving said basic information, my staff and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A, which were performed at the behest of Agents of the United States Government.

5. The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr. Rosselli's activities as described therein.

JACK ANDERSON

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I worked on certain articles relating to John Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal Government.

3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William K. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of Indianapolis.

4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a formidable service for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story . . . I don't think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not true that he had a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he earnestly replied.

5. In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been published widely in the United States. He declined to comment. But

he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf and he expressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.

6. Based on my part of the investigation, I am satisfied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affidavit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's activities on behalf of the United States.

Leslie Whitten
LESLIE WHITTEN

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Jane P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says: that he is the

in the above entitled action; that he has ______ read the foregoing

and knows the contents thereof; and that the same is true of ______ own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated upon ______ information or belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______

day of ______, 19____

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

Received copy of the within Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof. 12th day of February 1971

RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT Attorney for Plaintiff

Received copy of the within THIS 12th DAY OF Feb. 1971 day of ______ 19____

U. S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

BY E. Gomez Attorney for ______

(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL — 1013a, C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

______ being first duly sworn says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; that affiant is over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to the within above entitled action; that affiant's business residence address is: ______

that on the ______ day of ______, 19____, affiant served the within ______

on the ______ in said action, by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the attorney____ of record for said ______ at the residence office address of said attorney____, as follows: *

and by then sealing said envelope and depositing the same, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at the city where is located the office of the attorney____ for the person____ by and for whom said service was made.

That there is a delivery service by United States mail at the place so addressed or ** there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______

day of ______, 19____

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

*Here quote from envelope name and address of addressee.
**When the letter is addressed to a post office other than where mailed from, strike out "and", when addressed to the same city where mailed from, strike out "or."

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272 9211

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, Defendant.	NO. 1175- PH MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys, ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:

1. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and 1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts 2 through 6, all to run concurrently.

2. On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971, for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.

3. On January 18 and 19, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an

assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A and B are Xerox copies of said publications.

4. At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.

5. At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.

6. On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.

Dated: February 12, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By [signature: Adrian Marshall]

ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant.

Security Clearance information on Allen Spence

Date of application: 8/24/76

(10 working day delay —)

Date submitted to the Bureau: 9/8/76

5 people — none yet cleared

Expect summary report this week (will be told by Dick Taylor this P.M.)

Tyler Abell has custody of personal records

in alien history
ccty clf entries
use of pills
unknown source — 4 mo. before
New Orleans.
p67

Bob Miller
Physical Measurements
V

R4297

June 24, 1975 Testimony of John Rosselli before Committee
Senator Church presiding

p. 7-8 Los Angeles

Rosselli first met Maheu in approximately July, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from Maheu. At their first meeting, Maheu told Rosselli that a high government official had requested that Maheu recruit Rosselli to "fight Communism 90 miles away from Florida" -- to recruit Cubans to assassinate Castro.

New York

p. 10-11 Rosselli had second meeting with Maheu and went to New York in September under the alias of John Rawlston [Castro was in New York at this time]. Rosselli met Jim O'Connell of CIA, plus "three others."

Florida

p. 12-15 O'Connell, Maheu and Rosselli met in Florida hotel approximately one week after New York. Rosselli introduced Giancana to Maheu. Also introduced X (Trafficante) to Maheu. Obtained permission from Maheu to bring Giancanainto project.

p. 17 Rosselli recruits Cuban #1, Rosselli's cover was as Wall Street businessman. Rosselli and Maheu agree on a $250,000 price tag for the job.

p. 20 O'Connell never met Cubans. Trafficante, Cubans and Maheu met. Maheu brought $10,000 and poison capsules.

p. 26 Rosselli told Giancana about CIA involvement to keep his mouth shut. Rosselli only had one discussion with Giancana.

p. 27 O'Connell called Rosselli after Bay of Pigs. Met in Florida not long after Bay of Pigs with William Harvey, O'Connell and Rosselli. Harvey told Rosselli that he wanted Rosselli to have nothing to do with Maheu and not to use Giancana connections.

p. 35 Rosselli indicates that pro-Castro people in Florida probably had inkling of assassination attempts.

p. 44 During Missle Crisis, Harvey asked Rosselli to see if "they" had any intelligence on us, on the missiles.

p. 68-70 FBI agents Hill and Dodge met with Rosselli and his lawyer, Cantillon. At this time Dodge informed Rosselli that the FBI was aware that he was not a U.S. citizen. Dodge indicated something about Nevada and some other secret organizations.

p. 71-75 Rosselli met with Sheffield Edwards in 1966 for some drinks and discussed his problems with the FBI.

p. 76-78 Rosselli received a telephone call from an FBI agent, Jack Barron in June of 1970. The agent informed Rosselli that his appeals can be reversed. He was told that his lawyers and friends can't do anything for him in Washington.

p. 79-80 Rosselli talked with Bill Harvey prior to his testimony before the Select Committee to see if Harvey had objections and Harvey only suggested that Rosselli protect those people whose lives and whose families might be jeopardized by his testimony.

p. 81 Rosselli stated he did not know the five so-called Watergate burglars -- Hunt, McCord, Barker, Martinez or Sturgis.

p. 82 Roselli had no doubt that the Cuban operation was on behalf of the CIA and not Mr. Hughes.

p. 84 Rosselli stated that his Cuban contacts were never informed that this was a CIA project, but that he represented a Wall Street business.

In the period 1967-1968, Rosselli failed to register as an alien and faced criminal charges.

p. 85-87 Rosselli describes how he is brought into the operation -- Maheu's contact and O'Connell's satisfying him that they were government representatives.

p. 88 Rosselli stated that Sheffield Edwards was not overly concerned with the FBI's contacting Rosselli.

p. 89 Rossell's reason for not informing his sources that it was a CIA operation was because he believed he would be more successful doing what he was doing by representing big business.

p. 90 When the FBI contacted Rosselli in both 1966 and 1970 they hinted that they wanted Rosselli to provide information about United States gambling interests.

p. 44 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the whole operation came to a halt and Rosselli said he was never in contact with the Cubans again.

p. 45-46 Rosselli met Harvey at Dulles Airport in Washington after the Missile Crisis, in June 1963, and had dinner with him in Washington that night.

p. 47 Rosselli mentions FBI had him under surveillance for several years.

p. 47 Roselli has two stories re Rowan wiretap from Maheu. Maheu told him he wanted Rosselli to get some bail money for two guys in Las Vegas who were in trouble and he had placed some taps in Rowan's room because 1) Maheu was doing Giancana a favor, and 2) Maheu had the authority to see if Giancana was leaking to his girlfriend.

p. 52 Rosselli arranged bail money for the two men who were caught tapping Rowan's room.

p. 52 Giancana laughed when Rosselli discussed tapping incident with him, but gave no clues to the reason for the tap.

p. 54-55 Rosselli met in New York with O'Connell and Harvey in April 1962.

p. 58 Rosselli states to the Committee that he felt the CIA came to him because he has contacts in Cuba.

p. 59 Rosselli states he took on "project" because it was the government; he was patriotic.

p. 61 Rosselli knew Trafficante before "operation" started.

p. 62 Rosselli maintained some contact with Maheu after Harvey took over.

p. 64 Rosselli still is social friends with Harvey.

p. 66 In April or May of 1966, Rosselli was stopped in the street by two FBI agents with note saying to meet him later. Rosselli referred them to his attorney, Mr. Cantillon

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Howard--

In re your "battle plan" memo to Hart and Garn, I think you should consider possible wisdom of our Committee making some kind of very low-key anouncement that we're doing something. Purpose would be two-fold--to prevent getting wholly co-opted by new House Committee (and agencies making a claim that since House is doing it, they can ignore us---also to put House on notice there is specific area we have carved and will continue to carve out for ourselves). Most important, we must do something affirmative to insure that the sources out there come to <u>us</u>. If we say nothing, potentials which just go to House under assumption that that's the only thing going on.

Attached is the type of low-key someone could say in response to an inquiry (which I assume Spencer gets lots of).

Mike

JFK assassination study

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is also ~~seeking to determine~~ continuing to explore the question of whether or Mr. Roselli's murder was related in any way to his ~~testimony~~ appearances before the Church Committee.

Items Interest re Review of R 4881 documents (requested by Rick)

> need unsanitized copy 8 May 74 memo re Records Search by Logistics & access to all 24 items furnished to the IG.

> Why did Houston tell Kyle Miller (per Miller's 14 Mar 74 memo) that only himself, Edw, Osb, Angleton & Rocca aware of details of Maheu, Giancana matter.

SECRET (1)

[illegible] - 1 ______ file

SECRET - CABLE 24 July 74

Response to Memo identifying Meheu [illegible] CIA [illegible] w/ Los Vegas [illegible] - July 1974

while not directly involved + admittedly unaware of all facts + ramifications ref a exposure to Atlanta base of opinion / termination at this stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have adverse effect on his loyalty to CIA. He might resent termination by CIA for something he not respons. for.

March '76 OS Memos to IG on Maheu + Hughes

June - 1974
Security Officer Special Staff Projects asked OS to check records on James R. Phelan + Wallace Turner, both of interest in connection w/ a sensitive SPS activity. OS records show Phelan to be a witness in Clay Shaw trial. Phelan wrote several articles re Maheu's defamation suit w/ Hughes. Maheu thought to be source. Duckett recalled

2 receiving call from RAM in Dec. 1970 complaining that CIA embarked on a new Hughes project + had not gone thru him. (Maheu - Hughes fight reason for termin) w/ RAMA

Non OS/Sec. Doc's in Meheu's OS File

1 Feb 71 Memo from Eric I to DDP - discusses efforts to work out a satis. plan to terminate RAM from RAMA cover in a manner that avoids the need for a meeting w/ RAMA officers

X

Non OIS Docs) in RAM's file SECRET (2)

21 June 66 Houston to DDCI re Long Subcommittee and RAM: John Leon testified before Long Subcom. on Onassis case + subcom. staff undoubtedly knew Maheu used audio device.

Lyle Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974
par. 8 Notes contact w/ L. Houston re Maheu/Giancana. Houston said the only Agency officials "aware of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and himself."

Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 73
re meeting w/ Scott Armst. re his interview of 3 10/3/73 + interest in RAM assoc. w/ CIA.
"New Years Eve Party" - Wilkinson report critical of CIA.

8 page PELTIER memo 11/18/68 re "Observations on Cover Company Personnel + Activities" (RAMA).

4 page 2 Apr 71 MFR of O'Connell + ? (CCS/LPGLOBE) meeting w/ Ed Mullen (Intertel) re RAMA/MM/CIA. (Juan Duran) [J. Duran Arias] $10,000 withdrawn

Rodiack cut 7 SECRET (3)
-Maheu/Interlex

14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET Edwards MFR - Re Baltels..
memo prepared for RFK following oral briefing.
"Rosselli and Maheu spent consid.
time in Miami talking with the
Courier. Giancanni also present.
Giancanni put them in touch w/ a
"Courier" who went back + forth to Havana.
Courier said oper. feasible

Edw. put in quotes

Jan 71 — All CIA contact w/ RAM cut off.
because Hughes battle + unfav. publ.
However - Osb. notes that Helms had
directed termin. of Maheu relat. as
early as 1966. "flags" ignored

O'Connell MFR 1/5/71 - re: RAM
On 17 Nov. 70 - Maheu called O'Connell
to say that Rosselli's lawyer advised
that unless someone interceded on his
behalf re deportation - Ros. was going
to make complete expose of his activities
w/ CIA"

4 Jan 71 - Maheu advised O'C - that his
past affilia. w/ CIA had no bearing on
Hughes power struggle situation.

SECRET

(4)

Review Staff File - Ex Property

7/15/72 OS memo to Colby re Rosselli
DCI ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking calcul. risk as to exposure. [Sanitizes CIA officer's name for unknown reason]

5 June 75 — Subm. to Schwartz from Knoche - Elder for

Typewriter - fragmentary resume - Cubela.

Bill Angeloni - used for dirty work - Surveil. by Maheu

Maheu file "Gaps"

Vol. 1 Nov63 - Dec. 73 - CCS 12419

3 June 71

Eric I to Sam Halpern

"The attached 2 memoranda contain the latest development in the Robert A. Maheu Associates (RAMA) "thriller". The second memorandum is self explanatory except you should know that Robert ~~M~~ Mullen Assoc. is a longtime cooperator in the cover field, and Howard Hunt is now one of its Vice-Presidents."

(No Attach.)

13 Apr 71 MFR by 5 (CCS / CPGLOBE)

re / meeting - / wondering how his name came up in Hughes Tool investig. of RAMA. Hennonen meeting w/ Mullen of interest to det. Hunt

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

HON. DAWSON MATHIS

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1976

Mr. MATHIS. Mr. Speaker, I note with great interest the news reports concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination material which my colleague from Virginia, Mr. DOWNING, made public yesterday. I ask unanimous consent that this article from this morning's Washington Post be inserted at this point in the RECORD. I agree fully with my colleague from Virginia that this information should be investigated properly, by a select committee of the House. If certain Cuban elements were in any way responsible for President Kennedy's death, let us determine that. If former President Nixon had been associated with such groups, and if the "White House tapes" do, in fact, refer to such an association, let us determine that. If the material released yesterday is not true, let us determine that.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to settle these and many other disturbing questions about the Kennedy assassination. We have waited long enough. I am confident a majority of my colleagues would support the resolution to establish an investigating committee, if it came to the floor for a vote. I strongly urge the Committee on Rules to allow the House that opportunity.

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

Rep. Thomas Downing (D-Va.) released sworn statements yesterday quoting an anti-Castro Cuban exile leader as claiming he had an agreement with then-Vice President Nixon in 1960 for "elimination" of leftist Cuban exiles after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Downing said he had no way of validating the information and was in no position to vouch for its authenticity.

He said he released the statements only because they are sworn and part of a package of documents raising the possibility that President Kennedy was assassinated by right-wing Cuban exiles who felt betrayed because promises that they thought they had from Nixon had not been kept in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The two sworn statements were made this month by Mario Kohly Jr., son of the late Cuban leader who claimed the agreement with Nixon, and Robert Morrow, an author who says he was a Central Intelligence Agency contract employee.

Morrow's statement says that the elder Kohly said the agreement was made on his pledge to have his 42,000 underground forces inside Cuba, as well as 300 to 400 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains, support an invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles.

Kohly Jr. says in his sworn statement, "I was told that Vice President Nixon had agreed to the elimination of the leftist approved Cuban Revolutionary Front leaders at a time when the island would be invaded by the exile troops trained under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency."

DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

HON. [illegible]

Oct 12 mtg

Cast char.

- MOB
- CIA
- FBI
- Cuban Exiles & Soldiers of Fortune
- Hughes

Castro Plots

#1	#2	AMLASH	mob

Ruby Connection >

Oswald Connection >

Allegations - catalogue

LBJ/JFK Library

1. Inventory - Review = Tom/Ed.
2. Digesting
3. Timing & Nature of Public Statement
4. House areas of interest

Hot leads

instant interviews

- Someone to work
- file system

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to all the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of the President. This shows how garrulous McCone is. H

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a figment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we were still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either insane or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this. When will we know? H *

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

ACTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.

* SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 JCS : HRT.

RL Well handled. FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 12, 1963

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford (R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined with Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that he (Boggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63. In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority of one that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Jones

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CDD:saj

REC 55 62-109090

XEROX DEC 30 1963

DEC 27 1963

JAN 3 1964

DeLoach to Mohr 12-12-63
Re: Assassination of the President

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to all the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

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When will we finish? H

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ACTION:

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
* SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 SCS:HRT.

RL Well handled

FBI

My Turn

Donald E. Schulz



Kennedy and the Cuban Connection

Conspiracy theories are fashionable, sometimes even fruitful, as in the case of Watergate. So it is not surprising that recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee have resurrected an old question: what connection, if any, did the Castro government have with the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban dictator, having learned of CIA plots against his life, decided to strike back, returning violence for violence, with consequences that are now history. Indeed, the recent report of the Schweiker-Hart task force, while finding no hard evidence to support this theory, did uncover some interesting new leads. More than that, it established that a CIA-FBI "cover-up" had deprived the Warren commission of vital information that prevented it from seriously exploring the possibility of Castro's involvement and that consequently "there is no longer any reason to have faith in its picture of the Kennedy assassination."

And so we may well have a reopening of the investigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to examine the record of the period. A small but interesting body of published testimony and reminiscences describes and amply documents a little-known campaign of accommodation launched by Washington and Havana in the weeks preceding that fateful day in November 1963. Actually, the origins of this tentative and ultimately ill-fated rapprochement may be traced to the previous spring, when Castro, increasingly dependent on his Soviet sponsors, found himself obliged to embrace the banner of "peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain economic and military agreements needed to assure the continued development of his revolution. In practical terms, this meant the normalization of relations with the United States.

A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, however, that this campaign began to show results. At that time, William Attwood, an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told his superiors he had word that Castro wanted an accommodation. John Kennedy got the message and approved a "discreet contact" with the Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Lechuga. Subsequently, communications were established and meetings held to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

By early November, Kennedy had decided to push toward an opening with Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the Soviet fold and erasing the memory of the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a meeting to draw up an agenda for later discussions. On Nov. 18, this message was transmitted to Havana. Shortly thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.

Even as these developments were unfolding, a second dialogue was taking place through an unofficial envoy—the French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct. 24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the White House. The President, it seems, had learned of the Frenchman's forthcoming visit to Cuba and had decided to seize the occasion to send Castro a message. The essence of this communication was a strong hint that the United States would be willing to normalize relations *providing* certain conditions were met. What were those conditions? One, clearly, was an end to Castroite subversion. The U.S. had a special responsibility to contain Communist expansionism. As long as Havana continued to export revolution, the economic "blockade" of the island would remain in effect.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Beyond this, not much was definite. The American negotiating position had not yet been worked out. Even so, hints of possible Cuban participation in the Alliance for Progress and of the desire of the United States to see a decline in Soviet influence on the island suggested further avenues for discussion.

Bearing this message and an invitation to revisit the White House upon his return, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he found a remarkably receptive Fidel Castro. Indeed, during the course of a six-hour interview the *líder máximo* found occasion to praise the American President for his sincerity, realism and "good ideas": Kennedy might yet understand that there could be "coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas." Castro was convinced that normal relations could be restored "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty." His country needed peace in order to concentrate on the socio-economic tasks of the revolution. The issue of subversion would not be an obstacle. Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity" with their revolutionary brethren in other lands. But ultimately, each nation would have to determine its own destiny, and "if they choose regimes other than ours, this is not our business."

This was two days prior to President Kennedy's death.

I mention these developments because they provide an important—and perhaps crucial—frame of reference for Congressional investigators and the public alike. They are not, of course, proof of innocence. But they are suggestive: would Castro have been so intent on coming to terms with a man he was conspiring to kill? One may seriously doubt it. In point of fact, the assassination would bring a quick end to Washington's interest in accommodation.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Still, this is not to rule out the possibility of a "Cuban connection." Governments often behave in inconsistent and self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the Kennedy Administration was taking these first covert steps toward rapprochement, the CIA was engaged in an attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack of political control and a prevailing atmosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S agents could be conducting such activities in direct conflict with Presidential policy, it is not difficult to imagine similar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly denounced U.S.-sponsored assassinations and even threatened retaliation. Might not some overzealous security officials have taken this for tacit authority to set up a "program of elimination"?

But all this remains speculation. It is possible to envision any number of scenarios that *might* have led to the fatal events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evidence, however, it seems only fair to give Castro the same benefit of the doubt that Kennedy has been accorded—namely, that he be considered innocent until proved guilty. It is hoped that the investigations to come will proceed on the basis of that assumption.

Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, is writing a book on the Cuban revolution.

Fonzi Mtg. Notes
9/20/76

photos

305-861-7651

Al Tarabochia memo | Ltr. Ruby-Castro
FBI got quest.

Ruby 62/63 in Havana to see antique dealer

Manolo Ray: Cubela — Artime — someone in Artime circle tipped on Cubela

---

Crile — Alleman/Trafficante —

CUSA — Conservatism
Black bordered ads

DEA
Sturgis / Jerry B. involved in case against Bernstein.

Larry Craford — lived Carousel — "How Hollywood makes movies" — Myers lived & 10 — Ruby called Weiner to get people out of movies

Hemming too. (Keyes operation)

Marita Lorenz — puts Hunt w/ Sturgis early. Shortly after she got here. Knew Hunt as Eduardo.

Bernstein
Werbell
(Baird) Flood/Cuba
DEA
Gibson
Traffic

Paul Meskill — NY Daily News — 1975 — Series of pieces
Sturgis Lorenz

Sylvia Odio — sure it was Oswald in Dallas late Sept — when supposed to be in Mex.
Therefore Duran — asset.

imposter

(McQuiley Strawman)

Norman Rothman — Ruby's Rabbi

Oswald
Ferrie — Lawrence Myers — Ruby — Sturgis McLaney Hemming
Shaw

Ruby Mob

Vol 19 p. 477

Lorenz –

Sam Benton – offered arms deal to assassinate Castro at fuming house. Alex Roark / Sturgis /

– mining –

Naval Intell

Shamma –

Artime
Trafficante

Org. C. Source

Norady Quality Foods

Gaillot – Cocaine
mel Kessler – Atty

Gill – [Ross]
Lee Shannon Jewelry

Eduard Batam

TRICE Co. Realtors
[Rebozo]

Eduardo Buttari – Cuban for

Artime:
Carlos Martin –
Dr Modesto Mora → Gerstein politics

McQuilley working for Rothman when Ruby in contact.

Trafficante
Sam Mannarino } Stolen
Norm Rothman } Bonds

Norman Rothman – first approached Fiorini on assass.

mobster

Rolando Martinez – Joe Merola
(gun runner)
pirate boat

1 1965 – Hunt straightening out Cubela compromise in Spain.

~~Jack Whitten~~

– Lonsky –

2. McCaney

3. Fitz alias

4. Nosenko.

> Jack Whitten

Sanchez → transcript.

AMLASH file.

5. – Alvarrado.

→ 6. sensitive/reliable source.

To Assassination file

CONFIDENTIAL

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparently has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

Braden was then commuting between New Orleans and Beverly Hills, with the approval of his Parole Board. Braden was working as a representative of his Mafia friend Roger Bauman, the oil speculator. Braden worked out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate, Victor Main, Jr., an oil geologist. This was just a short way down the hall from David Ferrie in Room 1707.

Interestingly, in one visit to his Parole Office, Braden "mistakenly" told his Parole Officer that he was working out of Room 1706 - which would have been the room next door to Ferrie - instead of Room 1701.

Thus a possible Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks just before the assassination does indeed arise in addition to the possible Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections definitely do seem to fall outside of or beyond the area which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance, or circumstance.

Beyond several sets of information which tend to indicate that David Ferrie had some contact with Lee Oswald at various times, the critics of the Warren Commission have particularly focused on Ferrie's ties to Carlos Marcello and the Marcello Mafia empire.

In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and Secret Service after the assassination, Ferrie claimed that he was with Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie stated that he was in court with Marcello on the afternoon of November 22, which does appear to be true.

Carlos Marcello, along with Meyer Lansky, had become the central targets of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Division in the early 1960's, under the vigorous direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Marcello, known as "The Little Man," became one of Attorney General Kennedy's most fierce enemies during that period. Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders of Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department.

Ed Reid, author of The Greenfelt Jungle and widely recognized as one of the most respected experts on the Mafia in the nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B" Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

(Braden is now living in Atlanta)

— Mike Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
RE: JKF ASSASSINATION

January 21, 1977

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R ~~6250~~

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Thornburgh:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of Investigation material relating to Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jim Braden.

Your assistance and cooperation with the Select Committee is most appreciated.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman

HSL/dr

cc: 1 - author file
1 - subject matter file
1 - William G. Miller
1 - Michael J. Madigan

DONALD F. MASSEY
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

December 8, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#5785

Mr. Donald F. Massey
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select Committee has expressed an interest in recent press accounts suggesting the existence of transcripts of Lee Harvey Oswald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts and their availability for review by the Senate Select Committee.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
Minority Staff Director

HSL:dr

cc: 1 - Author File
1 - Subject File
1 - Minority Counsel
1 - Staff Director

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.


We got Morgan's permission to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post



GASOLINE ALLEY

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence

agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

Howard Washington

THE WASHINGTON POST

September 12, 1976

Alton Frye

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be reopened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban factor in the murder.

Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commission investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for supporting the work of the Warren Commission. As a result, there was no special effort to explore the possible involvement of either the Cuban government or Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plausible—and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared—even eager —to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an adequate prop for their predilections. The commission did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a ranking Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and recently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the murder of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French reporter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Castro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the White House on Oct. 24, persuading Castro that Kennedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and movement on either track could have provoked violent response by one or another Cuban faction.

The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Perceptions inside the Cuban government responded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA eventually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "insecure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these facts are significant or merely coincidental, one cannot tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AMLASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cuban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an unexpected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban policy as it was then evolving.

For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he was interested in an opening to Washington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Kennedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early September the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and comments as hinting of American interest in a possible accommodation, much as they were later to interpret the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Kennedy has been a compound of political antipathy and personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate regard for the President's courage and realism. They

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profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials speculate that the real origin of the assassination lies in anti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the previous Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "counter-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American relations, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representatives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee, all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting

some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power; according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

Oswald 201 - 57 file folders - chron arranged.
Ballen for access.
→ Ck. CIA files on John Wilson - Hudson.

CIA's first case officer allegedly compromised
by "the Cuban girl" - Williamson (in 1967 IG report on assass.)

Steve Hunt - not in Security report which Rocca
requested in 1967 when Rocca requested the
Espinosa file, as result of Garrison investig.

June 65 - Swenson to Spain.

1961 - Jack Stewart - (1967 IG Report) first recruited
AMLASH in Mexico City.

FBI, Paul Daly, says the FBI informant who
told them of AMLASH plot was not
Tepedino. Bureau refuses to say who
their source was. CIA says the
informant was Tepedino.

Espinosa tied into dynamite via Sturgis
New Orleans / Miami.

Jan 6, 1965
→ first date
AMLASH compromised
to knowl. of CIA.

Questions to be answered + notes of future from reading 1967 IG Report —

1) Who is QJWIN? What does he do? What are names of other principal agents and sub-agents required for ZRRifle activities?

— Dr. Edward "Manny Gunn" involved in Technical aspects of Operational planning. (Asked to treat cigars w/ lethal material).

— Jake Esterline was head of Cuba task force in pre Bay of Pigs days.

Cornelius Roosevelt - Chief, TSD, during early plots.

Giancana nixed gangland slaying because use of weapons rendered escape and survival negligible.

The disaffected Cuban official Trafficante in touch w/ was Juan Orta, who had access to Castro.

Sid Gottlieb involved as Special Asst. to DDP ~~w/ TSD~~ during relevant time frame.

Orta lost position in Cuban govt. on 26 Jan. 1961 + took refuge in Venezuelan embassy on April 11, 1961 and became the responsibility of the Mexican Embassy when Venz. broke relations w/ Cuba in Nov. 1961. Castro refused a safe conduct pass until Oct. 1964 when allowed him to go to Mexico City. Orta arrived in Miami in Feb, 1965 (Covil. fall from favor r/t cold feet killed first gangster attempt)

Orta suggested a successor — who made several unsuccessful attempts.

2) Who was successor?

Trafficante – suggested Tony Varona (high in exile movement) – head of Democratic Revolutionary Front group, supported by CIA as part of larger Cuban opn.

Varona not satisfied w/ degree of CIA assistance.

2) Dec 60 – FBI gave CIA a memo on racketeers efforts to finance anti-Castro activities.

18 Jan 61 – Varona associated w/ above scheme. Hired Edw. Moss, D.C. public relations man as fund raiser and public relations advisor. Moss's mistress Julia Cellini, whose brothers owned 2 large Havana gambling casinos. Moss had been given Covert Security Clearance by CIA.

3.) Where are the orig. FBI report?

4.) Edward K. Moss file

Esterline supposedly took "ineffective steps" to thwart Varona's involv. in mobster plan as he was one of five key figures in the Revolutionary Front & heavily involved in the approaching BofP plan.

5.) Who were other 4 leaders? What steps take take? Why ineffective?

Pill delivery: Roselli → O'Connell → Varona → ?

6). Who is Varona's son-in-law – closely involved w/ him during relevant time frame?

p.35

ZR Rifle was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).

7) Names of those in FI/D involved w/ ZRRifle.

QJWIN terminated by Luxembourg station – Apr. 1964

46 Gunn delivered poison pills to Harvey

47 Harvey says Rosselli in touch w/ Varona when Harvey arrived in Fla. O'Connell does not remember when Varona was re-activated for phase 2 efforts.

48 Giancana and Trafficante apparently not involved in phase 2. Rosselli dealing w/ a Cuban who spoke Italian named MACEO who went by the names Garcia-Gomez + Godoy / Varona + Varona's son-in-law.

50 - Shackley was never told who pills deliv. to or why. Only told surveillance in support of a HQ opn.

49 Harvey and Shackley deliv. arms + equip. to Rosselli for Varona.

52 Jan 63 - Rosselli agreed w/ Harvey that not much ~~[illegible]~~ was going to happen

52. Feb 63. Harvey left word for MACEO that it looked like the effort was over. Rosselli met w/ Harvey in LA and agreed to close opn off "but that it would be unwise to attempt to precipitate a break between Rosselli + Varona" with Rosselli agreeing to reduce frequency of contact until there was none.

53 June 63 - Roselli visited Harvey in DC + went out to dinner — While dining Papich called Harvey + asked if he knew who his dinner guest was. Roselli under intensive surveillance. Papich said have to tell Hoover

Edwds.
plus Why did Agency tell RFK that opns ceased w/ mob when in fact they still underway w/ mob at that moment

70 FBI interviewed Ed Morgan

72 Maheu met at least once w/ Vice Pres. Nixon in effort to aid Niarchos vis-a-vis Onassis.

73 Maheu hired someone to do tech. surveil. on Onassis

73 Gen. Case w/ Maheu's counsel, Ed Morgan, persuaded Sen. Long not to call him.

73 Sam Halpern was in on the contaminated diving suit scheme after Des Fitzgerald took over Cuban Task Force from Harvey in Jan. 63. Gottlieb of course also involved.

TMB A no CI files reviewed by IG in preparing report

78 March 61 - Jack Stewart met w/ Cubela in Mexico City. Stew. assigned to Mex. City knew Cubela casually from Havana days. Tepedino (AMWHIP-1) long time friend Cubela, arranged meeting to sound Cubela out on his views on Cuban situation. This meeting though inconclusive led to AMLASH.

80 March 61 - Miami assn reported that Cubela and Juan Orta (gangsters man in Cuba) wanted to defect.
CIA found 3 name links betw. Cubela and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodes — All nebulous

81 Aug. 61 Cubela sent message to Tepedino that Cubela wanted to talk with friend of Stewart's in Paris if possible. Sent thru Cubela's girl friend - airline hostess. Paris given OK to approach — no indic. he was ever contacted.

82 June 62 - Tepedino told FBI of Cubela's desire to defect. Bureau said would refer Cubela to CIA in Paris if he contacted Bureau's legal attache.

Tepedino contacted FBI because he upset w/ way CIA handled Cubela "defection" attempt in Paris in 1961.

p 83 Aug '62 Wainwright from HQ met w/ Tep. + went to Helsinki for series of meetings w/ Cubela where defection plan turned to recruiting Cubela in place.

84 Aug 62 – Cubela met w/ Spanish speaking case officer in Paris later in Aug. after meeting in Stockholm on Aug 7-9. In Paris it was learned that Cubela told 4 Cuban ~~assoc~~ of his meeting in Helsinki.

85 14-23 Aug 62 – Earle Williamson, Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid, met in Paris w/ Cubela, Tep., + Wainwright. On 18 Aug. HQ. strongly agreed Cubela not to be given physical elimination mission.

Sept 63 Sanchez from HQ joins Wainwright, Tep. + Cubela in Brazil + becomes Cubela's case officer

16 Sept 63 Cubela (Paris) writes Tep. (NY) don't intend to see ~~Sanchez~~ your friend again
3 Oct 63 Sanchez arrives in Paris ANYWAY. Learned that French keeping Cubela under surveillance.

11 Oct 63 – Sanchez cables Cubela insistent on meeting senior US official, pref. RFK, for assurances.

29 Oct 63 Des using James Clark alias meets Cubela in Paris at home of Red. Stent. Sanchez interp. F.Z. said U.S. wanted no part in attempt on Castro's life.

14 Nov 63 Wainwright meets Tepedino in NY – Says Cubela pleased w/ Des meeting from policy standpoint but very unhappy at not being given tech. assistance.

19 Nov 63 Des approved telling Cubela he would be furnished cache inside Cuba.

p 91-92 Docs of record in AMLASH file ~~and ...~~ has gap here

Sam Halpern + ~~Gunn~~ Sanchez asked Gunn for assist. ~~re~~ ~~high~~ means of assassination that would allow Cubela escape ~~powered rifle~~

20 Nov. Halp + Sanchez asked [Gunn] to rig poison pen for Sanchez next day. Done

22 Nov Sanchez arrives Paris + meets Cubela late AM. Cubela accepts pen but doesn't think much of device.

Fitz called Sanchez after JFK ass. saying everything off. The cable not in file.

30 Aug 64 — Artime rec. info thru Madrid that dissidents in Castro regime wanted direct Artime contact

Why ✗ On 7 Oct 64 an Artime assoc. went to France to serve as intermediary w/ diss[ident] group.

1964 — Agency conspiring to put Cubela + Artime together w/o each other knowing it.

Cubela ↓ wants weapon

Artime ↓ wants man inside Cuba

~~27~~ Dec 64 — Artime meets Cubela in Madrid

Feb 65 — Cubela gets silenced weapon from Artime's Secty in Madrid

March 65 — Madrid cable that lawyer Garcia-Bango arrived in Madrid w/ news that he was in contact w/ Cubela, long a close friend. G-B was jailed in 1962 for defending Santos Trafficante.

~~May~~ June/65 Espinosa reported, told knowledge of Cubela plans and of CIA complicity.

106 June 23 65 HQ sent cable to all stations directing termin. of contact w/ Cubela group.

p108 — March 66. Cubela arrested for counterrevol. activ. involving CIA. Cubela Trial brought out contact w/ James Noel in Madrid.

p115 - July/Aug 1964 - CIA memos refer to a gangland effort to pay 150,000 to kill Castro & refer to FBI interv. of partic.

p120 — O'Connell met w/ Maheu post Drew P. article. He reported:

Rosselli steered to Morgan (separately from Maheu) by Greenspun.

Jim Garrison, Morgan & Roselli & perhaps Greenspun in touch w/ each other in Las Veg. in March.

p127 Ref to a Puerto Rican in Phillipine custody who says he participated in Castro inspired assas. plot in Dallas. Bureau expected to wring him dry.

128 Varona became very embittered by B of P failure. Among most critical. Agency failure to support his exile group led to loss of income

Last known to be living hand to mouth as part time auto salesman.

130 "Maheu has good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative clt., Howd. Hughes."

7 Mar 66 – Cable to Rusk – Lies about ass. involv

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: 12-10-64

1-Mr. Sullivan
(O.H. Bartlett)
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Malley
1-Mr. Shroder
1-Mr. Rogge

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

PURPOSE:

To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when testifying before the President's Commission, denied making certain statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the Commission.

DETAILS:

In Volume II of the hearings before the President's Commission commencing on page 61 there appears the testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Assistant Special Agent*, White House Detail, U. S. Secret Service on 3-9-64. *In Charge

Under questioning by a Commission member, Kellerman was asked about certain statements reportedly made by him on 11-22-63, to SA's Francis X. O Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert, of our Baltimore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph 4). SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observers during the autopsy of President Kennedy at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, which commenced on the evening of 11-22-63, to be of assistance to the Secret Service, and to look after the Bureau's interests.

Our Agents, in conversation with Kellerman, sometime during the evening of 11-22-63, learned of certain information, portions of which were reported as follows:

"He advised he heard a shot and immediately turned around, looking past Governor Connally, who was seated directly in back of him, to the President. He observed the President slumped forward and heard him say, 'Get me to a hospital.' Mr. Kellerman then heard Mrs. Kennedy say, 'Oh, no!', as the President leaned towards her. He immediately advised the driver to take the President to the nearest hospital."

FEB 10 1976
FBI

RDR:tmt
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say these things and had never told our Agents that he had. In part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they got those quotes."

OBSERVATIONS:

Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate accounts of a conversation with him. It is to be remembered that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in the President's car and more than likely was upset and feeling remorse over the days episode. In his testimony before the Commission he endeavored to give the impression that he acted calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions after the President was hit. The conversation reported by our Agents made it appear Kellerman reacted normally to the tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony, as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the President had so directed.

It is felt our Agents reported accurately what Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that Kellerman's testimony 3½ months later is the result of considered deliberation, on his part, to paint the most favorable picture possible, under the circumstances, for the Secret Service.

Consideration has been given to discussing this matter with Chief Rowley of Secret Service, however, since it is the word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good purpose would be served by this course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert and O'Neill attesting to the accuracy of their report and refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and did something about it.

OK

FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Research

Review Staff: 76-0298/1
11 March 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Johnston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request dated 9 March 1976 about the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
As stated

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

Attachment to:
Review Staff: 76-0070/1

1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom are now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR 86054 on 30 November 1963:

Originator: Mr. Louis Armstrong

Coordinators: Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling

Authenticator: Mr. William B. Tyng ("for" Desmond FitzGerald)

Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("for" J. C. King)

2. We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria Antonieta MAURI. We have been unable to determine who transmitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we have not been able to locate any documents relating to this matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.

3. We have been unable to locate any documents which would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from Mexico City.

4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the originating Headquarters component should have initiated follow-up action if a response was not received.

5. We have been unable to find any further information relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.

6. We do not have a copy of the Cubana manifest for the 22 November 1963 flight from Mexico City to Havana, but we have determined that the following persons were on that flight:

NAME	NATIONALITY	OCCUPATION
Jakob ETT	Swiss	Diplomat
Hector LEMIEUX	Canadian	Unknown
Joseph POULIOT	Canadian	Unknown
Donald George CAMERON	Canadian	Unknown
William POULIS	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas Clark OSULD	Canadian	Unknown
Dungan MCPHERSON	Canadian	Unknown
Leo John DEST	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas MURPHY	Canadian	Unknown
Arthur EDMONDS	British	Unknown
James DISINOP	British	Unknown
Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde	Spanish	Unknown
Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha	Spanish	Unknown
David FLOR Lechago	Spanish	Unknown
Maria Antonieta MAURI	Italian	Unknown
Mario MAURI	Italian	Diplomat
Maarten Van DERPLAAT	Dutch	Diplomat

Attachment F

[illegible]
. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
[illegible]

27 Nov 63
85471

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: REARREST OF SILVIA DURAN

THIS AGENCY'S STATION IN MEXICO WAS ADVISED ON 27 NOVEMBER THAT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES HAD REARRESTED SILVIA DURAN, MEXICAN NATIONAL EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO, WHO HAD TALKED TO LEE OSWALD AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1963. THE REASON FOR THE REARREST WAS THAT SILVIA DURAN WAS TRYING TO LEAVE MEXICO FOR CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

See follow documents

in [redacted] on this

subject.

I don't know what

FBI did in Nov 63, but

the [redacted] have been

talking about this for

a long time & she is

said to be extremely bright.

~~Legal Attache~~

1. LA Memo said they checked info [redacted] and found it unsubstantiated.

2. [redacted] asked me to send this cable.

3. We will try to confirm or refute [redacted] info and follow up.

She is also ... [illegible]

Document Number 12-528

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

opposing Communists not mentioned in press reports of Warren Commission investigation

RECORD COPY

October 5, 1964

Mexican Communists who had contact with Oswald, as has not appeared in Warren Commission write-ups in press

sat around recalling details of their having been in a group with Oswald here last fall during the daysthat he was in Mexico. The write-ups of the Warren Commission report in the newspapers sparked this discussion, and they apparently had never really sat around determind to piece it all together, although all three were deeply affected by Kennedy's assassination, seemed literally to adore the Kennedy family image, still follow Robert Kennedy career with great interest and admiration.

The main points:

Horacio is the husband of SYLVIA DURAN, the Mexican girl who was arrested for questioning about Oswald because she had been in touch with him at the Cu embassy when he went there looking for a visa. (She is or w also a ringleader at the Cuban-Mexican Institute on Tokio, I remember).

While Oswald was here last fall the Duran cousins invited the to a "twist party" at the

SOURCE

home of Ruben Duran mid-week. A few Communists they knew

and a number of people who struck th as very peculiar at the time, were there. AND OSWALD WASTHERE WITH TWO OTHER BEATNIK LOOKING BOYS, ONE OF WHOM WAS VERY TALL AND ALL THREE OF WHOM THEY REMEMBER QUITE WELL. When they began asking questions about the Americans, who were standing together all evening and didn't dance at all, were shifted to another room. However they were intrigued because said he didn't know who they were, except that Sylvia Duran had brought them, and none of the other guests made any attempt to approach them. Also, when the SOURCE WAS so insistent about meeting them, the Durans replied that the boys were leaving town early the next morning. The next day, well along in the day, saw all thre

SOURCE

boys together on Insurgentes. In other words, they had not le town. At the time, they remarked about it.

As soon as Oswald's picture was printed in the newspapers

SOURCE

clearly rememb red him. And of course the arrest of Sylvia Duran almost immediately afterward, underlined their certainty.

They were so sickened [redacted] that they broke off their relations with theDurans. |

Source [redacted] says that Lynn Duran and one of the Duran boys have made trips to Texas. And that most conspicuously they have all prospered this last year. Always poor before, they now have an expansive car each.

~~Horacio~~ Horacio Duran works at El Dia newspaper.

His employment, finally

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

XXX

CS COPY

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO FLASH INFO CITE DIR 84916

1. ARREST OF SILIVA DURAN IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD PREJUDICE U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION ON ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN RESPONSIBILITY. WITH FULL REGARD FOR MEXICAN INTERESTS, REQUEST YOU ENSURE THAT HER ARREST IS KEPT ABSOLUTELY SECRET, THAT NO INFORMATION FROM HER IS PUBLISHED OR LEAKED, THAT ALL SUCH INFO IS CABLED TO US, AND THAT FACT OF HER ARREST AND HER STATEMENTS ARE NOT SPREAD TO LEFTIST OR DISLOYAL CIRCLES IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WE ARE TRYING TO GET MORE INFO ON OSWALD FROM FBI AND WILL ADVISE DIRECT OR THROUGH FBI MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Document Number 37-529

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

23 Nov 63

CS COPY

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

DATE: 27 NOV. 1963 ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

27 Nov 63 20 12z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
FLASH

TO FLASH

CITE DIR 85318

RE: (IN-69048)

1. THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH AND

2. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT NECESSARY CLARIFY OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED YOUR CABLES LAST 48 HOURS. YOU MAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERROGATORS BUT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH HER.

Document Number 158-610
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

3. ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting to leave Mexico for Cuba.

CS COPY

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 OCT 1963

2		5	
3		6	

27 Nov 63 21 59z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 85371

FURTHER TO DIR 85318.* TO BE CERTAIN THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT NEITHER SILVIA DURAN NOR CUBANS GET IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised. MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hqs. does not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her

Document Number 177-618

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

7 - APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT : Actions of Silvia DURAN after her First Interrogation passed to the Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the attachments to my memoranda dated 31 January 1964 and 21 February 1964, both of which report information on Silvia DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Information on the actions of Silvia DURAN on her return to work at the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, following her first interrogation by the Mexican authorities, is attached to this memorandum. This item may be useful to the Commission in the evaluation of Mrs. DURAN's story.

2. The information contained in this attachment was obtained from sensitive sources. It therefore bears an appropriate sensitivity indicator.

(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Document Number 643-273

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 64

Attachment

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN, Mexican Citizen Employed by the Cuban Consulate, Following Her First Interrogation by the Mexican Authorities

1. A reliable and sensitive source, well informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, had stated that on her return to the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, Silvia DURAN told her colleagues essentially the same story about her official acquaintance with Lee Harvey OSWALD that was published in the Mexico City press. This information, which seems to have been surreptitiously given to the press by certain Mexican authorities, indicated that according to DURAN, OSWALD had visited the Cuban and Soviet Consulates to obtain visas in order to visit these countries, and she had handled his case at the Cuban Consulate.

2. The only new item in the account that Silvia DURAN gave her colleagues was her claim that the Mexican police had threatened to extradite her to the United States for a confrontation with OSWALD. According to the source, Silvia DURAN, an intelligent and quick-witted woman, did not fear such a confrontation.

3. It should be noted that CIA does not know the precise origin of the suggested confrontation. The idea originated, in all probability, with the Mexican authorities involved in the interrogation of DURAN.

4. According to the same source, immediately after and since the assassination the personnel of the Cuban Embassy was shocked and puzzled - no expressions of pleasure at the assassination were heard, and there was little discussion of it. The gossip and official conversations in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate tend to confirm the impression that OSWALD visited the Embassy only to get a visa to visit or to transit the country.

Original & -3 - Addressee
2 - DDP
1
1
1
1

7 April 1964

Based on DIR 85670 dated 29 November 1963

Attachment D

ACTION

AMEND | CLOSE

block letters.

...luding maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the iden-
...tate ... must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable

SECTION III

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE	201 NO.	1. SOURCE DOCUMENT
NON-SENSITIVE		

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title) SEX

OSWALD, LEE HENRY — M

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

N/B: HARVEY!

3/11/75

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION
YES ✓ NO	D 18 M 10 Y 39	USA	New Orleans, La.	1. AGE 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

Radar operator, U.S. Marine Corps, exp 1960 — OCC/POS. CODE NAVY

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
USSR			

Document Number 1-15

for FOIA Review on APR ...

COMMENTS: cit; ?

Defected to the USSR in October 1959

CS Copy

201

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES ✓ NO	✓ YES	

FORM 831a
C-57

RECORD COPY

(38)

OSWALD, LEE HENRY

201

SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39
NEW ORLEANS, LA., USA
CIT ?
REF:
Δ USSR
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS OF 60.
DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 59.

Document Number 2-524
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

10 Oct 1963 ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CS COPY

10 OCT 63 2

CONF:

INFO :

XX

ROUTINE

TO INFO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
~~[illegible]~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CITE DIR 7487[illegible]

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR

recall this description of [illegible] in HSCA affidavit [illegible] Aug [illegible] not Oswald

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

(CONTINUED)

10 Oct 63

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CON

INFO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR

CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE[D] TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATIO[N] RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATIO[N] IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON [ ] (IN 36017) [ ]

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

10 Oct 1963 [ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CS COPY

10 Oct 63 22

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

XX

ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 74830

REF: (IN 36017)*

1. LEE OSWALD WHO CONTACTED SOVIET EMBASSY 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL LEE HENRY OSWALD BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR, BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW, INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT

(CONTINUED)

10 Oct

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO: INFO CITE DIR 7483

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS [ ] REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING [STATE] HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED/
ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO

CITE DIR 748

4. SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE LOCALLY. INFO PARAS TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED. PLS KEEP HDQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

CMT: According to REF ON 1 Oct, an American male stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. name Lee Oswald He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

16 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Ambassador

FROM :

SUBJECT : Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy

°Ambassador notified

1. The following information was received

On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received.

Orig - The Ambassador
The Minister
Counselor for Political Affairs
Regional Security Officer
cc - Legal Attache
cc - Naval Attache
cc - I & N S

NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DATE: [illegible] OCT 1963

TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

FROM: [illegible] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CS COPY

24 Oct 63 19 10z

24 Oct 63

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

CONF:

INFO:

XX

date change - 23 Oct on run should be 24 Oct

TO: INFO CITE DIR 77973

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

REFERENCE IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELETYPE NO. 74673, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1963, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SUBJECT IN MEXICO CITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJECT. WE WILL FORWARD THEM TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: (IN 40357)

24 Oct 63

Document Number 10-6

for FOIA Review on APR 1976


CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

6 Copies of photo of Oswald
Reproduced for use of Legal
Attache with Mexican police

Document Number 11-64

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

We made fifty (50)
copies of each of these
(which we got from
Legal Attache) for Leg.
Attache to use with
Mexican Police —



Lee Harvey Oswald

Race White
Sex Male
DOB 18 October 1939
POB New Orleans, Louisiana
Height 5'.9"
Weight 140 Pounds
Hair Medium Brown
Eyes Blue Gray

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 9, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Your letter of June 1, 1964, requesting summaries of FBI reports with regard to ten named persons and certain information regarding the contact by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn with Jack L. Ruby on March 11, 1959, is herewith acknowledged.

As you were advised by my letter of February 27, 1964, Jack Ruby was contacted by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn of the Dallas Office on March 11, 1959, in view of his position as a night club operator who might have knowledge of the criminal element in Dallas. The purpose of this contact was to determine whether or not Ruby did have such knowledge, and if so, if he would be willing to furnish information to this Bureau. Ruby was advised of the FBI's jurisdiction in criminal matters, and he expressed a willingness to furnish information. A personal description of Ruby was obtained by Special Agent Flynn on the occasion of this contact on March 11, 1959, but no information or other results were obtained. Between March 11, 1959, and October 2, 1959, Ruby was contacted on eight other occasions, but he furnished no information whatever and further contacts with him were discontinued.

The personal description of Ruby as obtained by Special Agent Flynn on March 11, 1959, did not in itself contain the remark "known Dallas criminal." This remark was added to the description by Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at the time when he was assisting in the preparation of the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963. Enclosed herewith is the affidavit of Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at Little Rock, Arkansas, dated June 4, 1964, setting forth his basis for adding the remark "known Dallas area criminal" to the description of Ruby as it appears in the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963, and in the enclosure to my letter to you of April 7, 1964.

The summaries concerning the ten named individuals in your letter of June 1, 1964, are currently being prepared and will be forwarded to you promptly upon completion.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

Little Rock, Arkansas
June 4, 1964

I, Louis M. Kelley, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, after being duly sworn, depose as follows:

I arrived at Dallas, Texas, November 23, 1963, to assist in the investigation of the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and related matters. On or about November 24, 1963, I was assigned to review all previously existing files and current information as to Jack L. Ruby and to prepare an insert based on such file review for inclusion in an investigative report. This insert was to include such physical description and biographical data as were available from the file review and from information developed on November 24, 1963. I had before me at the time I dictated the insert information which had been obtained on November 24, 1963, by other Special Agents of the FBI and from the Identification Division files of the Dallas Police Department. The Dallas Police Department records, under Dallas Police Department No. 22255, included information concerning arrests of Ruby dating from February 4, 1949, to March 14, 1963.

In dictating the physical description and biographical data concerning Ruby, I possibly included under the heading "Remarks," "Known Dallas area criminal," based on the fact I had before me Ruby's identification record from the Dallas Police Department, which listed several arrests in the Dallas area. This would have been the only thing on which such an observation could have been based.

[signature]
LOUIS M. KELLEY

Sworn and subscribed to before me this ___ day of June 1964.

[signature]
Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 22, 1965

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

FBI Withheld Data on JFK Slaying

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Post 10/27/75

The FBI withheld from the Warren Commission hundreds of documents about the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are raw FBI files, which the commission requested but never received. They contain no startling information that will overturn the commission's verdict, but they reveal intimately how the FBI handled its most important case.

In the margins of some suppressed memos, the late FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover, scribbled caustic comments in blue ink. He was critical of almost everyone involved in the investigation, from Dallas police chief Jesse Curry to President Lyndon Johnson.

Confidential notes kept by one top FBI official, for example, quote Hoover as warning: "Johnson may become very dictatorial. We must keep our guard up."

Sources familiar with the suppressed documents say the contents were summarized and submitted to the Warren Commission. But there were some subtle, perhaps deliberate, omissions.

The documents show that Hoover brought pressure on his subordinates to rush out a preliminary report on the FBI investigation before the murdered President's brother, Robert F. Kennedy, returned to his desk as Attorney General.

The confidential notes quote Hoover as instructing his subordinates to get the report out of the Justice Department "before Bobby gets back."

Apparently, the FBI chief also feared Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach might tamper with the report before forwarding it to the Warren Commission. Hoover told his aides to alert President Johnson's majordomo, Walter Jenkins.

"Let Jenkins know after report is out of our hands," Hoover directed. "Let Jenkins know what Katzenbach is doing. Might cause long delay. Must not consider any alteration."

Thirteen days after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Hoover delivered a detailed report to Katzenbach naming Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin. Katzenbach kept it four days before submitting it to the commission.

The crusty old G-man was furious at the Dallas police chief, meanwhile, for leaking the story that the FBI had investigated Oswald but had failed to alert the Secret Service.

"This is the lowest level in history of Bureau since I have been director," Hoover lamented, according to the confidential notes.

He contended that Oswald had never been seen with firearms, had written no hate letters against U.S. leaders. As a former defector, he also knew he was a marked man whom the FBI was watching.

"With that background," grumbled Hoover, "how could he be security risk? No indication of violence so far as our records show . . . Oswald could have hollered false arrest if we had arrested him."

The FBI chief commented that Chief Justice Earl Warren, who headed the commission, "would have been first one to holler" about Oswald's rights. Citing the criticism of the FBI, Hoover commented: "This is one of the rough ones."

He felt, therefore, that President Johnson should have endorsed the FBI report. "President should have backed up report," complained Hoover, "based on evidence gathered by the FBI."

In private remarks that were never intended to be repeated outside his inner circle, he made deprecating remarks not only about President Johnson but about Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was then preparing to run against LBJ for the presidency.

"Goldwater has no sound advisers around him," Hoover noted. But his comment on Johnson was more deadly: "LBJ's speeches are dull."

The Warren Commission adopted a resolution, meanwhile, calling for "the raw materials upon which any reports given to the commission are based, together with all raw materials and reports relating to the work of the commission since the date of any and all earlier reports."

J. Lee Rankin, the general counsel, followed up with a "Dear Edgar" letter to the FBI chief requesting the full files "as promptly as possible." But they were never delivered.

A commission lawyer, remembering those days more than a decade ago, told us: "Nobody ever got the FBI's own files." In 1963-64, another staff member pointed out, the FBI "could do no wrong," so no one pressed too hard for their internal records.

Now 12 years after the Kennedy assassination, a fascinating story is still locked in FBI files awaiting a public reopening. We will tell part of the story in future columns. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), chairman of the Senate intelligence subcommittee investigating the assassination, is seeking the full story from the FBI.

Footnote: FBI spokesmen stoutly defended the FBI's findings and the thoroughness of the investigation. They conceded that "informative" and "deliberative" memos were not given to the commission. But "everything they needed was given them. They had all they wanted to make their findings."

Oswald-Agent Contact Covered Up

W Post 10/2/88

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The late J. Edgar Hoover, in his zeal to protect his beloved FBI, engineered a cover-up 12 years ago to keep the Warren Commission from learning about the ties between FBI agent James Hosty and assassin Lee Harvey Oswald.

The formidable Hoover, whose bulldog visage had become a national symbol of law and order, intervened personally when the Warren Commission began to zero in on Hosty.

Now, 12 years later, Hosty has admitted destroying a threatening note, which Oswald delivered to the FBI office in Dallas a few days before shooting President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963. The note threatened to blow up the FBI office and Dallas police headquarters if Hosty didn't stop bothering his wife.

The FBI should have notified the Secret Service that Oswald, a misfit who had threatened violence, was in the Dallas area. The Secret Service routinely would have checked his whereabouts during the presidential visit. This might have saved President Kennedy's life.

When the FBI learned that a suspect named Lee Harvey Oswald had been picked up, Hosty reminded his boss, Gordon Shanklin, that he had been handling the Oswald case. Shanklin telephoned the Dallas police and asked whether Hosty could participate in the interrogation.

Hosty later questioned Oswald at police headquarters. Oswald, who had been outwardly calm, suddenly became agitated. "I know you!" he shouted. "I know you! You're the one who accosted my wife twice!"

The incident passed, however, without any mention of the threatening letter. Hosty also confided to a friend on the Dallas police force, Lt. Jack Revill, that the FBI had a file on Oswald. Revill repeated the conversation to a superior who ordered him to put it in writing.

"Special Agent Hosty related to this officer..." Revill wrote, "that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was aware of the subject (Oswald) and that they had information that this subject was capable of committing the assassination of President Kennedy."

Hoover was furious when he learned of Hosty's loose talk. According to confidential notes taken at the time, the grizzled FBI chief complained that Hosty had "diarrhea of words." But the old man, nevertheless, sought to cover up the FBI's embarrassment.

On Dec. 23, 1963, the FBI gave the Warren Commission a summary of Oswald's notebook. The summary conveniently omitted the fact that Hosty's name, telephone and license tag had been in the notebook.

The commission found out about the omission and demanded an explanation. On Jan. 27, 1964, Hoover acknowledged that Hosty's name had been in the notebook.

The G-man also gave what purported to be a full account of the FBI's contacts with Oswald. The last contact, he reported, had been on Aug. 10, 1963. "We did not interview Oswald in Dallas, Texas, or in Irving, Texas, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy," Hoover added.

Interestingly, he used the word "our" to describe the last contact with the FBI. But on Feb. 6, in a sworn affidavit, Hoover changed the wording in a curious way. He swore that Oswald had no contact with FBI "agents" after Aug. 10, 1963.

It is now known, of course, that Oswald appeared at the FBI office in Dallas a few days before the assassination. At that time, just as Hoover said, he did not speak with any FBI "agents." But he spoke with an FBI receptionist, who passed on his threatening note to the agents.

It is imposisible to know whether the late FBI chief subtly switched the word "our" to "agents" in order to hide his knowledge of Oswald's violent threat.

But in a later letter to the Warren Commission, dated April 6, 1964, Hoover stated categorically: "I wish to emphasize that the facts available to the FBI concerning Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination did not indicate in any way that he was or would be a threat to President Kennedy."

The truth is, of course, that the FBI had received dramatic evidence less than a week before the assassination that Oswald was violence-prone.

On April 24, the Dallas Morning News reported Hosty had told the Dallas police lieutenant, Jack Revill, that the FBI knew Oswald was "capable" of assassinating the President.

Hoover immediately sent word to the Warren Commission that the story was "false" and followed up three days later with a personal letter delivered by courier.

"Special Agent Hosty unequivocally denies ever having made the statement as quoted in this article..." declared the FBI director.

"Special Agent Hosty points out that prior to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he never had any information indicating potential violence on the part of Lee Harvey Oswald."

There's more to Hoover's great cover-up, which we'll report in a future column.

...erry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON — President Johnson is sitting on a political H-bomb — an unconfirmed report that Sen. Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., may have approved an assassination plot which then possibly backfired against his late brother.

Top officials, queried by this column, agreed that a plot to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro was considered at the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency at a time Bobby was riding herd on the agency. The officials disagreed, however, over whether the plan was approved and implemented.

One version claims that underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the plot. Another rumor has it that three hired assassins were caught in Havana where one survivor is still supposed to be languishing in prison. These stories have been investigated and discounted by the FBI.

Yet the rumor persists, supported by people in a position to know, that Castro became aware of an American plot upon his life and decided to retaliate against President Kennedy.

This report may have started New Orleans's flamboyant District Attorney Jim Garrison on his investigation of the Kennedy assassination, but insiders believe he is following the wrong trails.

For weeks after the tragedy, this column was told, Bobby was morose and refused to see people. Could he have been plagued by the terrible thought that he had helped put into motion forces that indirectly may have brought about his brother's martyrdom? Some insiders think so.

Blow for Blow

Note: Those who may be shocked that the CIA would consider stooping to a political assassination should be reminded of the ugly nature of what Secretary of State Dean Rusk has called "the backalley struggle."

He has described it as "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world . . . a never ending war . . . no quarter asked and none given . . . It's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side."

The blunt truth is that the subterranean world of espionage is harsh almost beyond belief. There have been times that the CIA has been forced to resort to the most extreme measures to protect the national security.

Some of the CIA's best operatives also have suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. No word will be heard of them for months, then a few grim details will leak out.

"We will learn that these people have been subjected to the most skillful, most fiendish tortures that man can possibly devise and that they have been reduced to animals or vegetables," Clark Clifford, head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Committee, told this column. "When they no longer can really be called ... information has ... ed from them, th... disposed of. It is ... picture, but that ... the game is played ..."

We also play rough. The New York Times, in an exhaustive report on the CIA, quoted "one of the best-informed men in Washington on this subject" as saying: "When we catch one of them (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes ... everything out ... we do it wi... barred."

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This much can be verified:

1. President Kennedy was [illegible] disillusioned with the [illegible] after the Bay of Pigs [illegible] that he swore to [illegible] would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the [illegible]" He ordered a [illegible] tion by a [illegible] Gen. Maxwell [illegible] President's [illegible] his brother [illegible] up calling the [illegible] CIA.

2. During [illegible] period, the CIA [illegible] Castro [illegible] the high levels [illegible] insiders, [illegible] Bobby, eager to avenge the Bay of Pigs fiasco, played a key role in the [illegible]. Whether the assassination plot was ever actually put into effect is disputed.

Castro Reacts

3. Some insiders are convinced Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. With characteristic fury, he is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

4. Shortly after Kennedy was gunned down, the FBI handed President Johnson a memo reporting that Cuban leaders had hoped for Kennedy's death. The President showed it to Kennedy's top aide, Ted Sorensen, who thought the details were so ambiguous that he called the memo "meaningless."

5. It is also known, of course, that Lee Oswald, the assassin, was active in the pro-Castro movement and traveled to Mexico seeking a Cuban visa a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Some sources consider Robert Kennedy's behavior after the assassination to be significant. He seemed to be tormented, they say, by more than the natural grief over the murder of his brother.

Author William Manchester, who got his information chiefly from Kennedy-controlled sources, portrays Bobby as a character of granite during those tragic days. But others had a different impression.

McGeorge Bundy, then a top White House [illegible]

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Jack Anderson

WPost 7/27

Did the Castro Plot Backfire?

The late Robert Kennedy was tormented by the terrible thought, according to intimates, that he may have helped trigger the assassination of his brother.

We raised this possibility in January 1971, when we first revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us 4½ years to get the rest of the story.

Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, rushing to defend his memory, have sworn that he knew nothing about the assassination attempts and, contradictorily, that he put a stop to them. Both accounts are incorrect, according to sources with an intimate knowledge of the events.

"Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert Kennedy was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother."

Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother.

The preparations to knock off Castro began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs planning. President Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco, swore to friends afterward that he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Instead, he appointed his brother, Robert, to oversee the CIA, with instructions to shake it up. Characteristically, Robert began investigating the undercover operations from top to bottom. His purpose was to prevent another Bay of Pigs.

He became fascinated, say our sources, with the CIA's covert activities. Eagerly, he pursued the details down through the lower-levels. As one source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed schoolboy."

In the process, he learned about the continuing effort to eliminate Castro, an operation known inside the CIA as the "executive action plan." In fact, Robert took a special interest in the activities against Castro. One insider, former Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, told us the focus "on the Cuban situation" was intensified in 1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence."

The President eventually put Robert in charge of a counter-insurgency committee, called the Special Group, which concentrated upon harassing Castro. One member, former CIA chief John McCone, acknowledged that the group had "directed mischievous things against Castro like infiltrating saboteurs, blowing up bridges and carrying on general confusion."

McCone insisted, however, that "the group at no time gave any consideration to any assassination plot." We have established that the "executive action plan" was directed by William Harvey, the CIA operative whom we linked to the assassination plot in our original 1971 story. We have also learned that he reported to the late Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquarters. We have been unable, however, to identify the next link in the chain of command.

Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources insist that Robert Kennedy knew about the plot against Castro and did nothing to stop it. The intended target, Fidel Castro, also knew about it. One assassination squad reportedly was apprehended on a Havana roof top within range of Castro's movements, about March 1, 1963.

The Cuban premier, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker the following September, warned that U.S. leaders would find themselves in danger if they attempted to do away with Cuban leaders.

"United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe," Castro told Harker.

Two months later, President Kennedy was shot down in the streets of Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy a few weeks earlier.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA director John McCone, who remained alone with Robert at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours. All others, including Robert's priest, were turned away. But McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the agonizing three hours.

Other sources say that Robert, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion for the next few days. Although he bottled up his feelings, they knew him and understood the circumstances well enough to realize he blamed himself for his brother's death. There was little doubt, they say, that he believed the CIA's attempts against Castro put into motion the forces that brought about his brother's martyrdom.

On January 18, 1971, we reported: "Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy."

It has now been disclosed that the Warren Commission was told nothing about the CIA's plot to kill Castro even though the late Allen Dulles, the CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on the commission.

According to the final report, the commission investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and the Cuban government" but found no substance to any of them.

The Cuban premier himself, in an interview with Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, emphatically denied having anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

"It is . . . very interesting that this man Oswald, who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit," said Castro.

"But I ask myself why would a man who commits such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I am under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States and that it was all a result of a conspiracy . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries."

The Washington Post, 9/9/76

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot. ??

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS By Howard Post

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his backed-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.


So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.


DROPOUTS

By Howard Post



GASOLINE ALLEY

By Moores



THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, August 27, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case

It was a grisly end for John Rosselli, the dapper, debonair mobster about town, who had been a familiar figure in the glittering night spots of Hollywood, Las Vegas and Havana.

His killers shot or stabbed him in the stomach. The autopsy indicates they may have shot him and then dug out the bullet with a knife. Then they brutally hacked off his legs. It is possible that he was still alive when they stuffed his body into a 55-gallon drum.

They wrapped chains around the drum to weight it down and tossed it into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy suggests he may have died of asphyxiation inside the drum before it hit the water. The gases from the decomposing body floated the heavy container to the surface. It was discovered, with its nightmarish contents, 10 days after Rosselli had disappeared from his sister's home in Plantation, Fla.

The police withheld the gruesome details of his death while they searched for his killers. We began our own investigation, meanwhile, after an appeal from his associates.

We first encountered Johnny Rosselli more than five years ago. We were investigating his role in the Central Intelligence Agency's plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

The CIA case officer, William Harvey, told us that Rosselli had been the hero of the abortive adventure. Harvey broke his oath of secrecy because he thought it might help Rosselli, who was in trouble with the law. The CIA agent had nothing but praise for Rosselli's daring.

In the strictest of confidence, Rosselli himself confirmed that he had directed six assassination attempts against Castro. We protected his confidence, so he came to trust us. We were the only reporters he would talk to.

So when he vanished last month his associates came to us for help. We were suspicious, of course, that his disappearance was linked to the Castro caper. But our investigation has now produced evidence to the contrary.

We have learned, for example, that Rosselli was not the amiable, retired old duffer he pretended to be. He began in the big time as a bookkeeper for Chicago's notorious Al Capone and became a specialist in white-collar crimes. It's a profession, apparently, that he never gave up.

Competent sources say that, between rounds on the Florida golf courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen securities and financial swindles. His operations reportedly were resented by Santo Trafficante, who has been identified in Senate testimony as the Mafia chief in Florida.

Rosselli came to Florida from Las Vegas, where he allegedly represented the Chicago mob. Our sources say that he handled millions in illegal gambling money, which he forwarded to the Chicago underworld. There are reports that Chicago crime lord Tony Accardo felt he had been short-changed by Rosselli.

Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in the slammer, first, for extortion and, later, for a card swindle. Those who know him say he had developed a taste for the good life. He dressed in the latest styles, dined at the best restaurants and dated beautiful women. The thought of going back to prison, friends say, horrified him.

To avoid prison, he began to talk to the government as early as 1970. He gave information, according to our sources, which resulted in a grand jury confrontation for Tony Accardo. The surly mobster took the fifth. But Accardo grumbled to associates that he would pay back Rosselli some day.

Rosselli was also blamed for passing information to the government, which led to the conviction of Detroit mobster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving a four-year sentence at Sandstone federal penitentiary for racketeering.

Perhaps the last straw was Rosselli's testimony in the Castro case. He identified two mobsters, the late Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, as being involved in the assassination attempts. It's no secret in the underworld that Trafficante detests publicity.

Our sources believe that the Mafia bosses finally became fed up with Rosselli. His execution would have required the approval of the top leaders, our sources say, because it was almost certain to bring the federal government into the case.

Who were the vicious killers? The only clue is a smudge spot on the window of Rosselli's car. One of his assailants probably had used a greasy hair pomade.

Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. As part of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chef to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crackdown on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell is still on the CIA payroll. Both admitted to us a friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities. Harvey said he had a "high regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "bum rap." Said Harvey: "The Friar's Club indictment is phony. Roselli had no more to do with that than I had."

Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get clemency for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

Firearms Fiasco

Under pressure from the firearms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce a vital section of the 1968 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

For the two years that the law has been in force, the Treasury Department has ignored this key provision. The gun industry has complained it would be a bookkeeping nightmare.

The federal government, which would have to compile all the sales data, has also been reluctant to spend the $100 million it would cost for computers and staff to maintain the firearms files.

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Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was—it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

PN 4 S.B

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

BY JACK ANDERSON
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON—Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.



Anderson

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli represented himself as an oil man seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life thereafter, using assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. Roselli personally made midnight powerboat dashes to deliver the teams at secret landing spots on the Cuban coast.

The assassination teams never got a shot at Castro, although the CIA learned that the last group reached a rooftop within range. This occurred around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had paid a mysterious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mexico City a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy can't shake a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro may have become aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore, may have recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, March 10, 1975

CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island. Without the charismatic Castro, it was thought, the defenders would become demoralized and disorganized.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli's CIA contacts were William Harvey and James O'Connell, who accompanied him on hush-hush trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams. No one else was told, however, of the CIA's role in the murder mission.

Roselli represented himself as an oilman seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings. The assassination weapons were also carefully selected from foreign makes, mostly Belgian, to prevent any link to the United States.

Each attempt to kill Castro was meticulously planned, like an episode from the TV drama "Mission Impossible." For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food.

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again. Therefore, the CIA, unsure whether the plotters had failed or the poison hadn't been strong enough, decided to try again with a more powerful dose.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

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Footnote: Sources fami[illegible] with the secret review of [illegible] CIA's activities have now [illegible]knowledged that Castro, as [illegible] reported four years ago, [illegible] marked for assassination by [illegible] CIA. A CIA spokesman refu[illegible] to comment.

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

OBSERVER

By Russell Baker

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

This raises the question whether "gangland-style" murders might possibly be catching among people who don't come from gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found in the customary barrel, with the customary weights, in the customary water. It bears the customary bullet holes. Roselli's publicized standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and-shut case, which the police will quietly shut as soon as possible.

If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been consistently undertipping for years?

If that waiter wanted to take his revenge and get away with it, is it not logical that he would do it "gangland-style," so the police could forget it, rather than by scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen of lobster bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving Roselli's waiters the third degree, but merely to point out that gangland can have no monopoly on "gangland-style killing." Anybody with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse of water can engage in it, just as readily as your corner greasy spoon can engage in "home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a victim who is a bona fide citizen of gangland. Obviously, a philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of 40 years "gangland-style" and expect the police not to lift an eyebrow. Unless the subject is the real gangland thing, it won't work.

The corollary of this fact is that gangland people are peculiarly vulnerable to "gangland-style" murder by devious non-ganglanders, who have no right to get away with it.

This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that you are an eminent statesman of gangland, and the vexation becomes manifest. You are entirely prepared to be sent off "gangland-style" by your colleagues. Those are the rules of the land.

Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the police who did it, even if you could. That would violate the rules of the sportsmanship governing gangland. In gangland, good sports don't tell.

But to have some alien from the outer world—some straight-Jake cousin who wants his share of your will prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns—to have somebody like this do the job on you and get away with it because it's done "gangland-style"—Ah, my friend, that must seem a cruel injustice.

Such a bad egg as that you would surely betray to the cops. How infuriating it would be if they looked at the barrel, the concrete, the water, the bullet holes and closed the case with a quietly murmured, "Just another gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not only of murder, but also of discrimination, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents the police from extending themselves to bring your persecutor to justice.

I do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing gangland members "gangland-style," but my hunch is that they take a sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks it is not the kind of thing decent people ought to be doing.

I know very well that gangland folks don't approve of it, and to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, what's more, I've never been any good with concrete.

8/24/76 N. York Times

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8/24/76 N.York Times

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New York Times
8/23/76

Terrorist Activities Charged to Cubans By Police in Miami

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI) —Militant pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to testimony given before a Senate subcommittee and released today.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security headed by Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi. It said that as many as 50 Cuban groups of various shadings had been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County Public. Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz, of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

Lieutenant Lyons said most Cubans in the area were hard-working and industrious; but some individuals "use Dade County as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lieutenant Lyons said, there have been four homicides "with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Mr. Diaz said that some Castro groups had infiltrated exile organizations and that there were plans to assassinate Latin-American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lieutenant Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service were notified, he said. A well-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and American gangsters to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of an underworld figure, John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Mr. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Select Committee on Intellegence Activities that he and a Chicago gangster, Sam Giancana, were hired by the C.I.A. to recruit Cubans to kill Mr. Castro. Mr. Giancana was shot and killed by unknown persons last year just before he was testify before the Washington panel.

JACK ANDERSON

Plot to kill Kissinger blocked

WASHINGTON — A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was supposed to be carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the Secretary's life was expected, according to underground reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assassin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days before Kissinger got to town.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story two years later after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 12, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination ... against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a ... thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about) the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro le[illegible] ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders prom[illegible] ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch already had b[illegible] convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a [illegible] zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Fede[illegible] parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, pr[illegible] tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to t[illegible] reports, of his "money, friends and protection."

Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be[illegible] cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellen[illegible] ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ... We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

8/23/76 Washington 1 of 3

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappear-

See ROSSELLI, A8, Col. 1

ROSSELLI, From A1

ance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

8/27/76 Washington Post

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principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsiility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

[...] FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

8/22/76
Washington Post
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... a pure invention, a serious risk ... established Washington lawyer.

... ommittee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 24, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to certain material and delivery of other material maintained by the FBI.

Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we currently have one abstract covering the areas of inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by approved personnel of the Committee.

Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City. We are, however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype dated November 27, 1963, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments. The teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which were obtained from a highly sensitive source.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in response to the latter part of request item 18 asking for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963, and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 26 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓orig + attes ⇒ Admin
cy → Wallach
cy → [illegible]
Tissue ⇒ Chron

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — SECRET

ROUTING		
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8 . (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1535 25 NOV CJ)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

MICROFILMED FEB 3 1964 DOC. MICRO. SER.

25 NOV 63 IN 67682

S E C R E T 251954Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7060

REDCAP

REF MEXI 6868 (IN 60046)*

ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOV VIA CUBANA 465, RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY, THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. ANANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED SOVEMB 23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. COMMENT: THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE CALL FROM NEW YORK.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONOMAREV, SOV DIP COURIERS ARRIVED MEXI 10 NOV.

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DATE: 26 Nov 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-8-5

ROUTING

12-62

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

29 Nov 63 19 23z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR 85676

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE OF 8 NOVEMBER 1963 CONCERNING THE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS VALENTI GERMANOVICH PONOMAREV AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOV.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, PONOMAREV AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465 AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA.

3. A USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE COURIERS WERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

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DATE :

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SECRET

ROUTING

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

See Sanitized File Number 14 / 97
For sterile copy of this document.

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85076

4. "ANANYEV" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH ANANYEV OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: MEXI 7060 (IN 67682)

SR/CI/K IDEN 58

C/WH/3 IDEN 4

REC'D IDEN 13 ROM

JAN 23 1976

CI/LIA

RELEASING OFFICER CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IDEN 14

C/WH/R

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

SECRET - EYES ONLY

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

Tab 4

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker

FROM: Jim Johnston
Dan Dwyer
Ed Greissing

DATE: January 27, 1976

SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation of JFK Assassination

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26.

Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruction in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Amlash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198* to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was "reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR of 7 September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

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* DIRs are messages sent from Langley.

At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intelligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

"Mary: I don't want to imagine things but this thing of Amlash.

Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter (unreadable) then the word "treason" or "reason").

Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsibility for Amlash at this time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris 0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)"" "With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con-

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* The files do not accurately identify these case officers. [redacted] and [redacted], however, were the principal case officers.

siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.'"

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 November. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastinate. Amlash talked about going to the French terrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken . . . or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which could be true rallying point."

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morning of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.**

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a typewriter with an old ribbon. It made no mention of the passing of a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source complained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a concealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as one of these visitors.

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* Desmond Fitzgerald

** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found.

On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision."

JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher authority but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be delayed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirmation needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Headquarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets."

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's (Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM."

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report information received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intelligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important operations. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one report rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash, and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA files to determine what other operations Castro might have been referring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

Scenario for B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the <u>nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan</u>

arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Probably feasible within OAS.	a. Does not attack principal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America.
b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level.	b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.
	c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers.
	d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment.	a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups.
b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used.	b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway.
	c. Some noise level.

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled.	a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement.

Advantages	Disadvantages
b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.	b. Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.	a. General ineffectiveness against targets.
	b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil.
	c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery, Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel only.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.	a. High risk of capture and exposure.
b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.	b. High noise level.
	c. Possibility of some Soviet response.

2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

Advantages

a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.

b. U.S. obviously "doing something about Castro."

Disadvantages

a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.

b. Loss of trade.

c. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teams.

Advantages

Improved operations and greater economic damage.

Disadvantages

a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.

b. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.

Advantages

Much more effective operations and real economic damage.

Disadvantages

a. No deniability.

b. Very high noise level.

c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.

5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.	a. Will probably not catch contraband. b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response. c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.	a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America. b. Not fatal to Fidel.

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.	Must be followed by some form of effective action.

8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages

a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.

b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.

Disadvantages

a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.

b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.

c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subversion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

Advantages

a. Proper basis for future actions.

b. Possible deterrence of Castro.

c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.

Disadvantages

a. Difficulty of clear proof.

b. Possible Soviet reactions.

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

Advantages

The most effective method of bringing down Castro.

Disadvantages

Possible Soviet reactions.

11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will bring down Castro.	a. Possible Soviet reaction.
	b. Probable heavy casualties on both sides.
	c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A good typewriter is essential and above all people that will carry out the million and one mechanical functions necessary to make it a going operation.

Note: when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope. You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people will respond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curious postment. These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that we have gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country and have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience.

Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to you as we get more information.

We hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and are looking forward to a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this matter quite thoroughly with me.

Fraternally,

V. T. Lee

V. T. Lee,
National Director.

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.

Advantages

If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.

Disadvantages

a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.

b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages

As in 1. above.

Disadvantages

a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.

b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.

Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

Advantages

We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.

Disadvantages

a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community.

b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives).

Advantages

A carefully targetted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.

Disadvantages

We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.

Exhibit No. 3 to deposition of V.T. Lee 4/17/64 at New York, N.Y. (Substituted for copy on 5/14/64) WJC.

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

May 29, 1963

Lee H. Oswald
4907 L/C Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along with our thanks and welcome.

Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratefully received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have a better picture of what this entails.

For one thing, I am enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for all Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy for an organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate according to the local requirements. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be met.

(All Chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at the retail price and use the proceeds for further Chapter activities.) Credit is extended and payment is not required with the order. We do expect payment within a reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.

It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana seems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined responsibility of concrete organizational work.

We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable we could readily issue a charter for

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3

Exhibit No. 3 to deposition of V.T. Lee at New York (Substituted copy on 5/14/64) W.L. [illegible]

[...]y 29, 1963

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[...] r No. 3

a New Orleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about. We feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which I originally organized before coming up to work in the National Office.

I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from experience that it is quite a problem and requires some sacrifice on the part of those involved.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office here in New York is the only one in the country today and the New York City Chapter uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have discovered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O. Box for all mailings and public notices. ((A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individual should move or drop out.)) We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.

We will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up to the local Chapters to handle their own affairs. You shaould have at least access

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Fiscal Year	Support a/	Covert b/ Collection	Covert Action c/			Total
			PA/Prop d/	Paramilitary e/	Post-Invasion f/ Brigade Support	
1960	$319,534	$131,063	$1,677,161	$318,409	-	$2,446,167
1961	6,293,580	457,633	5,168,584	30,164,698	$1,627,824	43,712,319
1962	3,599,274	793,824 g/	6,444,098	2,975,635	4,176,000	17,988,831
1963	5,343,973	1,738,977 g/	5,786,797	5,038,880	3,899,830	21,808,457
1964 (est.)	5,030,000	1,767,500	3,520,000	9,317,500 h/	565,000	20,200,000
Total	20,586,361	4,888,997	22,596,640	47,815,122	10,268,654	106,155,774

a/ Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of administrative equipment and supplies, rental of administrative properties and facilities, etc.

b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

c/ Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.

d/ PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

e/ Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

f/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.

g/ Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

h/ Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

15 December 1963

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological

lift

lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchev assurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

These

These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to

its

economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Outside Cuba:

a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

C.

C. <u>The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba</u>

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

D. <u>The collection of intelligence</u>

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. <u>Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime</u>

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

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As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

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By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measureable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

CIA's

CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.

3. Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.

4. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe that the

that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

   They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

   Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

   Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

   Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

   Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

   The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

   The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

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Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.[1] All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

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1. Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.

The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months

ago,

ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarra had indicated concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announcement of the raids, the average man on the street seemed apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 1964 that the 23 December Siguanea raid which destroyed a P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Havana has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight continues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very successful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanea had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered which depress the people, they are anxious for something to happen."

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The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 36 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Piratas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate

Cuba's

Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S/Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

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As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

VI

VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

B. OAS ACTION

B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

4.

4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such one was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a pro forma action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

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In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be guaranteed

guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

Annex I

The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.

2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.

3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maravi, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.

4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabela, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.

5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 18 others injured in the explosion.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

tive." Second question: What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague – an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview – and to the editor of *The New Republic*. Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

TAB M

Night Session

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farmers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors – but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my interview with the President. We went up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at

invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government *had decided it would not tolerate it any longer;* he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] *Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary,* which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous information, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the *definite conviction* that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: *do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union.* And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discussions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolution (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me – and I believe him – that Stalin would never have emplaced missiles in Cuba.

"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers' standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn't really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were not gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning – did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there . . . well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it's not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy – not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon – has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going on in their country? Do you think we don't have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to

educate our young *compañeros*. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, *it still remains true that you have chosen Communism,* that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the *fifth anniversary* of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men -- nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to coexistence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

January 19, 1964

MEMO to Boonstra, cc to COS from LEGAT; Subject: OSWALD - It is to be noted that the White House was in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassination of Pres. Kennedy" written by Jose I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla. This speculative paper attempted to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of Pres K was Fidel CASTRO or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Mexi between 27 Sept and 2 Oct 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview with the Cuban Amb in Mexi whom he met in a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurant they both later left in the Amb's car for a talk without being overheard./ Source of this latter info was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. This individual was interviewed at Miami. He stated that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the International Federation of Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the newspaper Excelsior on the night of 25 Nov 63. There he learned through the Mexi press that the Mexi gov had arrested one Silvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSWALD as a guest in her house during his visit to Mexi; and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of the Cub Emb in Mexi. / DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he was d told by Dr. BORRELL Navarros, an exiled Cuban newspaperman employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the day following OSWALD's arrival in Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Caballo Bayo where they met an official of the Cub Emb. DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows nothing about OSWALD and the Cub official leaving the restaurant together in a car. / It was ascertained that Dr. Eduardo BORRELL Navarro, a former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occasion writes feature articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently resides at 1303 Homero St., Apart 301, Mexi. BORRELL Navarro was interviewed on 11 Jan at which time he furnished the following info: Salvador DIAZ Verson was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD with BORRELL and other Cuban exiles. DIAZ Verson also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home. / BORRELL did not tell the story credited to him by DIAZ Verson concerning the visit to a Mexi City restaurant by OSWALD and Silvia DURAN. BORRELL had never heard this story or any similar story before. / BORRELL knew of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other than the meetings which occurred at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mexi. / BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It is to be noted that DURAN was questioned by Mexi authorities

on 23 Nov 63. At that time she confirmed that OSWALD visited the Cub Emb in Mexi during the time he was in Mexi from 27 Sept to 2 Oct. She alleged that the purpose of his visits to the Cuban Emb was to obtain a Cuban visa. She stated she had given him a telephone number to use in calling her concerning the visa, but denied that he had ever visited in her home. / On 17 Jan 64 a source... advised that he had been unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant in Mexi, but stated there is a Caballo Bayo restaurant located on outskirts of Mexi. Source went to restaurant, showed photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, who was in charge of Cub Con at the time of OSWALD's visit there, of Cub Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive interviews of these employees. He was unable to find anyone among the employees who could recall any of the persons as having been at restaurant.

CIA

From CIA prepared chronology

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS, WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project - General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba:

> "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans <u>and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime.</u>"
> (emphasis added)

File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED] [According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

"I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

<u>File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963</u>

Nothing Relevant

<u>File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963</u>

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of <u>Chicago Sun Times</u> [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

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*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

When Castro Heard the News

TAB H

Havana

It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: *"Como? Un atentado?"* ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice *"Herido? Muy gravemente"* ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: *"Es una mala noticia."* ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 19.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a rebroadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,

otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a *granja de pueblo* (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the *granja de pueblo,* where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President Dorticós. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. . . ." I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me

once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL

ROMANS

"Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, 'nothing is true except as a man or men adhere to it – to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it.' We need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements."

– JOHN F. KENNEDY, November 18, 1963

By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and gave over to a succession of photographs of the columns and the windows and the corners of the White House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head in Springfield and to a voice reciting "Oh, Captain, My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the ship has not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is not Abraham Lincoln; not because he is more or less, but because he is a remembered physical presence and Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic arts. One's own time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be before many of us will want to read a book about the day Mr. Kennedy was shot?

The news of the President's assassination was given by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel on Arlington Street in Boston. They turned right around and hurried back inside to attend to their investments. Packed with students and businessmen a shuttle plane from Boston to Washington waited for permission to take off when the captain came on the intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been listening to the news and the President is dead." There was only time to hear one woman say, "How dreadful" before three men went back to discussing plan specifications. A college student reading *Agamemnon* p[illegible] no visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-in-[illegible]e." The plane took off, the stewardess collected the money and started to serve drinks. Then the captain was back again. They had been listening to more news, that is trying to listen to news because their real job was to hear flight control. There had been a gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police had taken a man in [illegible]ie theater. Vice President Johnson was now the President. The talk of business went on through this, and stopped only when the captain again interrupted to say that the new President had been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.

They ask too much of us when they ask us to act up to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent people. And yet some of us always complained that Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally committed enough. But now someone remembered with special affection a moment late in the 1960 campaign. Mr. Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic governor who was with him said how wonderful it was to feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr. Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace in him that he used only the real in emotion and abstained from fabricating the expected. He had too much respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much truer to him might we have been if we had come down in scale and if the many of us who must have remembered the lines from *Cymbeline* had thought them proper to speak

"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious winter's rages,
Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home art thou

½

Flash from Dallas

Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news—sketchy as it was at first—to the world. United Press International's Merriman Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32–33 his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result of Smith's first efforts—the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world.

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DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY "ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIFF-
CASE) FOR SOMETHING."
   THE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100
BILLS, THE WITNESS SAID.  THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD PRODUCE THAT
PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD  NOT  LISTED IT AS ONE "OF THE SEVEN
LINKS."  THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S
DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE BLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE
RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED          MOREDA1234PCS
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At 12:34 the Teletype was supplying copy on a Minneapolis murder trial.

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UPI A7N DA
          PRECEDE KENNEDY
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
                                        JT1234PCS..
```

The Dallas bureau, alerted by Smith over radiotelephone from the press car as it careered toward the hospital, sends out the first sparse news.

```
UPI A8N HX
2ND ADD 2ND LEAD  THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST
BUOS HO
UPHOLD
DA IT YRS  NX
```

Minneapolis starts to add more details on the murder trial. The New York bureau, knowing that ace reporter Smith is covering the President's trip, tells all bureaus to "uphold"—get off the wire. "Dallas, it's yours."

```
UPI A8N AJ
DAY
   CORRECTE
BUOS UPHOLD--NX
```

Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is quickly squelched by the New York bureau.

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UPI A8N DA
          URGENT
   1ST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS (A7N) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
   NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.
   THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN
STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE
THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MA

                        FLASH

FLASH

     KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
                                  PERHAPS SERIOUSLY
   PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET
                                        JT1239PCS
```

The Dallas operator begins sending the rest of Smith's account from the press car.

At the hospital, Smith sees the President's limp body in the car and races to a telephone. At 12:39, nine minutes after the shooting, the grave news flashes over the wire.

UPI 9N
BULLETIN
1ST LEAD SHOOTING
DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY OF TEXAS WERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.
MOREJT1241PCS

Now reporter Smith is dictating a story ready for printing.

UPI A10N DA
1ST ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (9N DALLAS XX TODAY.
THE PRESIDENT, HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL. THE GOVERNOR ALSO WAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND.
CLINT HILL, A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID "HE'S DEAD," AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE TOURING CAR, THE FAMOUS "BUBBLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS RUSHED TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.
OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.
THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEAR
MORE 144PES

Smith rolls on, swiftly and fluently, adding fresh details as "pandemonium" breaks out in the corridor outside his telephone niche.

UPI A11N DA
2ND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9N DALLAS) XXX DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF GUNFIRE.
SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY UNLIMBERED THEIR AUTOMATIC RIFLES.
THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.
THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.
THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE DOWN. CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT
MORE 145PES

Searching his mind for impressions of the shooting, Smith adds all he can remember to the story. The shaken wire operator stumbles in the second line.

UPI A12N DA

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT, BUT BULLET WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.
THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS.
DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.

MORE 146PES

As yet nothing is known of the sniper, what kind of weapon he used, or where the shots came from.

UPIA13N DA

Ambassador Hernandez Armas apologizes with President Dorticos for having been late in calling him, but because of an interruption on the line, he has not done so until now. He adds that "I spoke with this ... and did not add anything important to what I have already informed and which I ... formally. And with respect to the concrete point which you asked me about, ... that there was no offer of any kind". Dorticos: "no...I wasn't asking about an offer". Hernandez Armas: "ah, I had understood that with the confusion of the..." Dorticos: "no, I was refeering as to whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the man...that American...understand?" Hernandez Armas: "ah, no, no, no, not at any moment". Dorticos: "nothing of that?" Hernandez Armas: "No, no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...rather they (enderezar - straightened out?) the interrogation...." Dorticos: "then we can go along with the version of your information?" Hernandez Armas: "yes, Sr. Presidente, of course". Dorticos: "then nothing more of importance?" Hernandez Armas: "No, nothing important...anyway, I am going to submit soon a draft of all the details, because there are other details of minor importance, and others of none at all, but contained in the statement.... and I have asked her to make me a draft as prolific as possible and to submit it at the first opportunity".

COPIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE TRANSCRIPTS AND SOME ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES

11/26/63 1839

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 27, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a.m. He said he had just completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not be running the investigation.

As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investigative duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were any pertinent developments he be orally briefed.

I have done so & will continue. Ev. K

With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson, Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswald and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that this question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most important.

In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place any reliance on anything the Soviets said.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

REC-78 62-109060-1493

After conferring with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:vap (8)

following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points raised by Mr. Katzenbach:

1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government, we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable to them. The United States will have to accept this, since it is in response to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The State Department has responsibility here and we should not dictate the position they are to take, but our views should be stated.

2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is recommended Katzenbach be informed that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign governments and in getting investigative results and intelligence coverage abroad; that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico, the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised. — Done 2:25 pm S. 11/27/63

E

V

O.K. The Ambassador in Mexico is acting like a Sherlock Holmes as indicated in the wires received this morning.

K

HARVEY EX 1 R371
6/25/75
9KJ

SECRET

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~[illegible]~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~of~~ code and cipher materials and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as ~~3. Background:~~ needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: ~~#~~ QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ ~~#~~ sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

3

QJWIN annual salary : $7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
QJWIN + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in ZRRIFLE activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

SECRET

4

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experiences w/KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Sirague now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. - DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search), or intermediaries; rigid case-officering from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Markel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

SECRET

5

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person, singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians), those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged + backdated. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

SECRET

freed. n to travel [6]

Legal; operational + ethical → moral problems. [Khokhlov case]

1) Maximum security + within Kubark only (e.g., how much [single not secure enough] does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Guise of Sovile objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of

5) case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Ofuin) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

SECRET

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne + stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sele~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Too~~ Danger of standbys.

Sid A — 25/1 — Exec Cautions 8
(— "The Magic button"
Narcotics Biiro
"for a living" — RIS 201 cover.
Caution - Bankruptcy - no Stars
eyes - Jim A. / Contradistinct
not a TSD problem / from U-2 /

) Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
a confession of weakness. —
- El Benefactor → assumptions —
(Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Helpful
Elint R&D - Memo.

Translating machines" - FLE
basic sounds project. -
phenoms - (v numbs CB)

Commit - Fear

Anesthesia —

26/1 — AS — Fanfani - DCI - Matter -
no file Review -
~~Press~~ Never mention
word assassination

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. Place & cover — Marks 2
3. Security Rules — B-WKH-AS-3
4. Humble levels — Sid - Reserve.
5 Last Resort - Brakes — [illegible] - [illegible]

6. no other agencies (
7. no projects or papers except for covers.
8. Principal agent - ? (Mankel)? -
   AF - Project chief LCH -
   [illegible] 1500 - from [illegible] -
   mask spot [illegible] [illegible] AF project - [illegible] [illegible]
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who & where - Must know before we can spot -
    —
11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create to prove RIS or old-it. - nonsov
13. had dangers of RIS counter action & monitor if they are blamed -
    Fd J [illegible] - Remember

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman
House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Pike:

Congratulations on your Committee's great service to the American electorate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic covert operations and funding of the CIA. Secrecy protected counterproductive and indefensible covert operations for twenty-seven years. The light of exposure and cleansing is now enhancing our country's security. The publishing of your excellent report over CIA and White House objections is an act of courage the electorate will soon appreciate.

Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on handouts from the CIA itself, is like an investigative reporter compiling his story from government press releases. Neither is doing the job its employer paid it to do.

Finding the hidden CIA budgets for three or four times the billions of dollars admitted to the electorate is a commendable achievement. But what would your investigators have achieved if a law was already in force imposing criminal penalties upon CIA employees who leaked information to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blackmail weapon.

Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. It enjoys no effective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non-CIA departments and agencies. If it surrenders to the doctrine of secrecy it is powerless indeed. To strengthen Congress' power I offer you my own counterintelligence service in place. The sources have been carefully tested and accumulated since 1949.

The problem is not leaking intelligence out of Committee; it is leaking independent intelligence into it. Starting exactly one year ago today I launched penetration efforts with a 19 page report addressed to "Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligence Operations. I hand delivered this report to every committee member's office. My wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person delivered to.

On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receipted for 103 pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This represented a distillation of a quarter century of intelligence gathering. CIA control of the Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation of my penetration of their secrets is covered. The application to the U.S. Attorney and three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigation and prosecution of murder of American citizens within the U.S.A. is in your files. Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recognition or investigation within the executive departments or your Committee.

On July 30, 1975 Emily Sheketoff of your staff receipted for a one page notification distributed to chairman and members that Anne P. Commanduras, an employee of CIA's domestic assassination office, had been murdered in her apartment house swimming pool by CIA assassin Eugene Hale Brading.

I now enjoy the additional intelligence that Commanduras was executed with a CIA dart gun such as that displayed to news cameras by a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The intelligence weapon fires a sliver coated with shellfish toxin that kills within seconds, dissolves and leaves no mark. The CIA preserved their shellfish toxin supply in direct contravention of an order of the President. Your Committee filed this report without action along with over 200 additional counterintelligence. Is this secrecy that protects national security?

Congressman Pike, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly hidden in another budget. Will you go for more? Then examine the State Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, White House and Congress appropriations. All of these support personnel accepting orders for covert domestic operations from CIA.

You have uncovered CIA operations in the media. Investigate police departments throughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to CIA orders. In the Fairfax County, Virginia, police department alone a CIA assassin has twice employed the badge of the department as cover to gain entrance to domiciles to perform executions.

I again commend your Committee for resisting the pressure for secrecy in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking of intelligence into your Committee. The latter confines your Committee's intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of the CIA. Please concede that there are other citizens as concerned for the security of America as you are.

I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike, or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Searle Field. I want to assist your Committee in recommending remedial legislation based upon 27 years of defining the problem.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to Senator
Abraham Ribicoff and to
Senator Frank Church.

REQUEST TO TESTIFY ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CIA — PENETRATION OF NON-INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF GOV'T AND COUNTER-PENETRATION BY SOVIET KGB. — Ref

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 8, 1976

Mr. Amos E. Heacock
~~4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708~~ 2334 Hill Rd.
~~Hyattsville, Maryland 20781~~ Falls Church, Va. 22043
TEL. (703) 534-3975

Dear Mr. Heacock:

Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you have discussed these questions at length with members of the Committee staff.

On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The legislation which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA itself. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Furthermore, we were under instructions from the Senate to report out a formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.

I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the new committee created by the legislation we are considering, once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the resources to explore the kind of issues which you raise.

I assure you that the entirety of the information you have submitted to my committee will be made available to the new Congressional oversight committee.

I am sure you understand the constraints on the Government Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res. 400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.

Sincerely,

Abe Ribicoff

Abe Ribicoff

Enclosures (2)

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Ribicoff:

Destiny has chosen you the second time in seven years to chair a committee with capability of establishing legislative remedies to prevent domestic and foreign assassinations, huge corruption within military supply streams, multi billion dollar currency manipulation and massive intervention of the CIA in domestic covert operations.

On or about March 6, 1969 you were the acting chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee that heard Cornelius Hawkridge, my witness, describe a multi billion dollar currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam. Carmine Bellino, staff investigator, prevented Hawkridge from also testifying about truck convoys of stolen military arms and supplies that he observed heading toward the Cambodia border. The "fence" for these stolen arms was the fabulous Soviet KGB agent Jacques Yang, described by staff in your hearings to be a mere Vietnamese commissary clerk. The organized crime vendors of the stolen goods reached into your Committee in Carmine Bellino to protect their lucrative racket. Hawkridge later wrote you a letter covering this deficiency in testimony. He pointed out the sale of arms generated funds used in currency manipulation.

I aided the crippled Hawkridge aboard his flight at Seattle. Your Committee provided an ambulance to meet him for it was less than two months since he survived an assassination attempt that killed his wife. The Soviet KGB let a contract with organized crime's CIA assassination facilities to kill them. The KGB considered Hawkridge a defector. William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, CIA alias William Harvey and double agent for KGB fingered Hawkridge and his wife Angela, a "baby sitter" agent for West German and CIA intelligence. In the contrived truck-car "accident" Hawkridge was crippled for life.

I met with CIA's Harvey as Boxley in November, 1968, in New Orleans pursuant to my counterintelligence investigations. Harvey, witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee, has admitted his role as organizer of the ZR/RIFLE Executive Action assassination capability and his contacts with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana of organized crime to implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclusion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative source of much of my accurate counterintelligence on KGB.

Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury official. The official prevailed upon Senator John McClellan, then

Chairman of your Committee, to conduct it. He first exposed the famous "Prysumeen" account in a New York bank. It was used to convert South Vietnamese piasters to dollars, most of which ended up in three banks in the shiekdom of Dubai on the Persian Gulf.

My further investigation beyond the Committee probe, sabotaged by Bellino, established the dollars were used to requisition gold ingots from the U. S. Treasury at $35 per ounce. These were remelted to convenient "taels" or wafers of gold for black market trading for Indochina currencies again at huge discounts. The conspirators enjoyed government facilities for converting piasters to dollars at fantastically unrealistic official exchange rates. The exchange provided huge profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Treasury.

This inflation machine is still at work, though at a reduced rate since the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The entrepreneurs seek greener pastures where new wars destabilize currencies. Perhaps Angola? Hawkridge's real name is Cornel Solyom. His intelligence activities for a decade were traced in a 64 page report in the possession of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and your Committee.

Senator Ribicoff, had the activities of CIA-Crime double agent Carmine Bellino and Hawkridge's testimony been exposed in the public record in 1969, the trauma for you, for your Committee, for the Congress and for the American electorate would have been mercifully softened. Bellino went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee. He covered up the sources of $1,050,000 of so-called political donor funds I have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Alexander Butterfield in the White House to reveal the existence of the President's tapes, thereby insuring his downfall.

A file of my letters to Senator Henry Jackson in 1969 were sent by him to your Committee. The intelligence was suppressed by Bellino. Although your Committee published eight volumes of hearings in this investigation, Hawkridge's vital testimony was deleted. My intelligence was disregarded.

The legislative remedies now being proposed to counter corruption of our intelligence services can only be made adequate by exposing to public view the depth of the problem of secrecy. I am alarmed at demands for secrecy to support CIA covert operations such as those that led our country into the most counterproductive covert operation in our nation's history -- the war in Vietnam. Did the secrecy imposed by Bellino within your Committee advance the security of the United States? Or did it insure the greatest humiliation of our foreign policy and our armed forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?

I am alarmed that criminal penalties are being proposed for public servants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of irresponsible actions of men infected with the arrogance of power. I

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate,
Russell Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20510

Ref: My letter 11/20/74 & encl. to Sen. Weiker forwarded & acknowledged your letter 4/7/75; your acknowledgement data 5/5/75; my letter 7/11/75.

Dear Senator Church:

I commend the diligent efforts of you, the members and the staff in producing and especially in publishing the Committee's report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."

Nevertheless, I must advise you that over 200 pages of counterintelligence on domestic and foreign assassinations of the CIA I have provided or made available to staff and members has been disregarded or deliberately withheld from members.

Consequently, as members are preparing to sign a final report, it is timely to list some of the disastrous errors of the interim report. The errors are the result of intentional misrepresentation and deceit of the Congress and the American electorate by the CIA, its directors and employees.

(1) The ZR/RIFLE Executive Action program begun in 1960, headed by William Harvey, was designed as a domestic assassination capability.

(2) Under the direct planning and implementation of Harvey, a number of domestic and foreign assassinations were executed.

(3) Harvey's real name is William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, alias W. J. Wood. His assassinations in USA I have already reported.

(4) Among foreign assassinations with participation by Wood's domestic team members on foreign duty are those of Lumumba and Trujillo.

(5) Orders passed by CIA for execution, rather than exiling or kidnapping, caused the deaths of Ngo Diem, Ngo Nhu and Rene Schneider.

(6) CIA gave the code name WJ/WIN to the organized crime assassination consultant employed to insure the killing of Patrice Lumumba. His real name is Michael Genovese, alias Victor Resignio, son of Vito Genovese, boss of bosses of the Mafia in Atlanta federal prison until he died. Genovese enjoyed assassination authority independent of CIA directors delegated by Meyer Lansky, boss of the American international crime syndicate then. Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy conferred assassination authority upon CIA.

(7) Genovese, as Victor Resignio, directed an arms and supplies diversion and currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam in 1966-67 that cost the Treasury $51.8 billion, Executive Departments' total, not mine.

(8) Wood's crime team member that aided Genovese to assure Lumumba's death was code named WI/ROGUE. He is Frank Sturgis, Watergate burglar.

(9) Sheffield Edwards, witness produced by CIA as its Director of Security, was a spurious substitution to deceive the Committee and the American electorate. Recruited from organized crime, CIA coached him to appear as the Edwards or Colonel Edwards who directed the early alleged attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

The real Edwards who collaborated with organized crime's hit man John Rosselli, his boss Sam Giancana and Robert Maheu, agent of Howard Hughes, oil tool billionaire, was E. Howard Hunt, Watergate burglar. Edwards was Hunt's CIA name. The CIA poisoned Sheffield Edwards after his appearance to prevent his recall and possible exposure as a fraud.

(10) John Rosselli accepted assassination orders from mob leader Giancana who accepted orders in turn from Meyer Lansky.

(11) Committee witness Rosselli was the hit man who shot Giancana with a special assassination weapon developed by CIA. He led the kidnapping and execution of James Hoffa, one time Teamsters' president -- even as your hearings progressed.

(12) Witness Robert Mahue executed the orders of Howard Hughes in contacting Rosselli to implement a domestic assassination capability through organized crime. Hughes issued orders to assassinate Premier Ngo Diem through Richard G. Danner, alias Gil Danner.

Danner precipitated the Hughes order to bug Laurence O'Brien's telephone in the Watergate complex by being caught fowarding a $100,000 payment on President Nixon's San Clemente and Key Biscayne homes for Hughes to the President's friend, Bebe Rebozo. Hughes suspected a plot by defector Maheu and O'Brien to blow the election for Nixon. "Gil" Danner was manager of the International Club in Saigon, owned by the U. S. Embassy. He represented Hughes' interest in the $51.8 billion racket managed by Michael Genovese.

(13) CIA in 1949 established a Domestic Intelligence Division for covert action within the White House, the Executive Departments, Congress, political parties and the media.

(14) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was used as authorization for CIA to implement domestic covert actions through funding and personnel of domestic agencies of government. The Intelligence Directorate of CIA is cover for domestic covert actions in the agency itself.

I am sure you will agree that had your staff investigated and confirmed my counterintelligence during the year it has been available to you, the legislative remedies recommended by your preliminary report wold have been found unacceptably weak by Committee, Congress and the American electorate. Please permit me to meet and serve you with counterintelligence input.

Respectfully submitted, Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock, 4410 Oglethorpe, Hyattsville, 20781, telephone 864-5353.

Encl: Letters to Sen. Ribicoff & Rep. Pike

am alarmed that no witness had pointed a finger of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA's Domestic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA's restriction to foreign operations intended by Congress to prevent a police state.

The 1949 act authorized CIA to conceal huge portions of its budget and personnel within the budgets and personnel roster of domestic agencies of government. These especially include employees on Capitol Hill, in the White House, in the Department of Justice, in the Federal Aviation Administration and in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Until the act is repealed Congress will remain part of the problem, not part of the solution.

When Cornelius and Angela Hawkridge were hit by the CIA's domestic assassins on January 10, 1969 my anger overrode my caution. I wrote all fifteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 23, 1969. I demanded that Hawkridge be heard by the Senate. Although I received no replies, this forced Carmine Bellino's hand and Hawkridge was subpoenaed. The recipients referred some letters to your Committee.

Six months earlier my letter of August 14, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the Industrial State." It concluded with the startling premise I am now prepared to prove to the Senate:

> "It is my firm prediction that when the Foreign Relations Committees get to the bottom of the CIA's conspiracy to usurp Congress' foreign policy authority they will also have solved the conspiracies behind the continuing assassinations of the industrial state."

I rely upon your fairness for opportunity to refute the claims of William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify and to aid your Committee to draft legislation that will effectively prevent abuses of power by the government's intelligence agencies.

As an Air Force officer before, during and after World War II, I am concerned, as I know you are, that our country's security will be protected. I will testify for more effective legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence services. Perhaps the most effective testimony I can give is that which will establish that the CIA has been thoroughly infiltrated and corrupted by double agents who owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet KGB.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Encl: Letters to
Senator Frank Church
and Congressman
Otis Pike.

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

2/4/64 Memo King to Sanchez: Requirements for amlash

1. Latin Americans in guerilla training in Cuba?
2. Number of training schools in Cuba?
3. Are they training Africans, and if so, where?
4. Training for officers in charge?
5. Direction ~~for~~ of the training session
6. Do they instruct foreigners and are the foreigners doing the training?
7. Under whose auspices do they operate? how are they selected? What funds are used for this operations and how are they developed?

Staff Notes

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FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HKH-1385

SUBJECT: Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico Solved

DATE OF INFO: 28-29 November 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 29 November 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (B)
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Montmartre nightclub. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS Aranguren,[1] instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Servia and Rolando CUBELAS Secades[2] had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-machine gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.

2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,[3] mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's participation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but succeeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irenaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TABERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.

3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable, dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARBO and CUBELAS fled to the United States by ship, since both possessed visas to the United States which were still valid.[4] CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami at the present time.

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REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 2

DATE 30 November 1956

4. SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new developments is not known. Further action by the Cuban authorities is complicated by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious reliability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.

Field Comments:

1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hoy (defunct newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans, scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.

2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA, chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1956 and 1 April 1956. CARBO was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.

3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES. Habana newspapers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by SIM.

4. Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS received a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.

5. Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins, naming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and reportedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM and the police have been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing. It is

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~~S E C R E T~~

REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 3

DATE 30 November 1956

possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.

6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were suspected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a student at the University of Habana, was accused of having participated in an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, according to office files.

7. Avance, Habana afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subsequently. It contained substantially the same information as reported above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.

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24

18 March 1965

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Exploit L-1 and Jose Rebellon in AN Operation

1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with U-25 we pass a message as follows:

> "A big comandante or capitan who used to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) account in Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my successor). He was traveling in Europe at that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965. The deposit was in the amount of $10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both L-1 and Jose Rebellon. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

Whose?

L-1:

a. ~~The record:~~ The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then L-1 has threatened to eliminate CASTRO, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person ~~with such~~ traits could resonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

rec'd 28 Aug 65 Smc

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b. · Favorable factors (from OPS standpoint): In the summer of 1962 L-1 gave WJ-1 $500 in Helsinki to be deposited for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961 L-1 showed great sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: ~~While it cannot be discounted that L-1 may be a Castro agent, it may be that~~ he has been sincere in his dealings with CIA Resolution of doubts through an POLYGRAPH interview has been impossible since L-1 hit the ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA'S interest in L-1 is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CASTRO The above proposal may actually stimulate the desired action. If L-1 is questioned by the regime in connection with this charge, and should the investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantness, he might well reach the conclusion that the time to take matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years) has at last arrived.

and how is he going to get out of jail to do so?

If L-1 is a Castro agent and Castro should be aware of L-1 's relationship with CIA Castro might conclude that L-1 received the money from CIA banked it without reporting it, and was in fact working with CIA against Castro. (At the recent meetings in Paris L-1 asked us for $10,000. We did not give him this sum, though WJ-1 gave him $7,000.)

which we had once told him he could have

If for any reason the regime should do away with L-1 , his alleged sympathizers in the Armed Forces might feel they must react at once to save their own skins. Given the tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly this proposal could split the regime more.

L-1 himself told B-1 that the last thing any of his friends would do would be to tell him on this

Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1 , and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the $80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1 , any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

S E C R E T

10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Elder

VIA: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: SSC Request

REFERENCE: RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)

1. Re question number 1 of reference: Attachment "A" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.

2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. The parent organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolutionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla movement which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime. The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.

3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.

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S E C R E T

These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have been worded, "according AMSPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53, a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI Staff.

4. Re question number 3(b) of reference: We have been unable to determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments:
A & B as stated

26/11/63 05:24

Hernandez Armas: "Listen, I have your confidential (report) 125, about the Sra. Duran case; and I want to ask you for some declarations on this; you can tell me in detail". He adds "listen...that's true...of blackmail, what you say here in the confidential (report), the Federals of that country wanted Sra. Silvia Duran to say something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the American? (Oswald). Hernandez Armas replied that "no, no, nothing about money, no". Dorticos continued speaking, "and they tried to detain her, to oblige her to make a statement". Hernandez says that "she was detained, and was questioned with respect to this visit and the request for a visa, and then she said that she had requested the visa, had filled out the documents and the reply of our government had been negative, not granting the visa". Dorticos asked if "you spoke with her". Hernandez said that yes, "I could talk to her yesterday and I immediately sent the report". Dorticos: "understand? if all this is true, better that it be known; if she is being DETAINED by those people, better too." Hernandez: I was saying that she was detained Saturday afternoon, and freed in the early morning, and yesterday was when I found her and could talk with her, she referred me (? me refirió) and I took advantage of the fact that a plane was about to leave with our mail. Dorticos: yes, yes, you sent that, I already know what you sent...do you know what happened? that the paper that I have here, and don't tell me that ~~this~~ that is what happened? Hernandez: What I have just told you besides the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it that they asked you? Hernandez: They asked her concretely about whether she knew

this individual; if she had gone to the Consulate; if she had personal relations, and even if she had intimate relations with him...she denied all that, only....Dorticos: intimate relations with ~~h~~ him? Hernandez: Yes; she denied all that and said that it was a case like any other, of the many of the hundreds of cases that come to request visas at the Consulate, and if she remembered in detail of this case it was because this man had an incident with our Consul...he had an incident ~~withourconsul~~ in which our Consul AZCUE, rebuked him and practially threw him out of the Consulate. Dorticos: and why does she have BRUISES (hematomas), ~~(Spanish word used for bruises)~~, did they treat her badly? Hernandez: well, yes, yes. Dorticos: what did they do to her? Hernandez: She has a few BRUISES ~~[illegible]~~ on the arms, because she says they squeezed her arms during the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it...as she told you about what was done. Hernandez: In this way, (Presidente): they went to her house and took her to the station, to the office of Federal Police and interrogated her to the extreme

2.

I was telling you about. Dorticos: and the maltreatment, how was it? Hernandez: At the time of interrogation, trying to impress her so that she would tell all she had to say, that she knew, and then was when they took her by the arms and shook her. Dorticos: listen, Joaquin and did they aske her some other question about money? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely, it seems....Dorticos: did they try to get a statement from her? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely from what she told me, they limited themselves principally to try to find out what relations she had had and her husband with this individual. Dorticos: and they spoke of money? Hernandez: no, no, she has not told me anything about money, they did not talk to her about that, that is, she has not told me that they spoke to her about that. Dorticos: Mirabal ~~passed~~ SAID to a friend something about that. Hernandez: eeh? well, I asked her if there had been some interest, if they had questioned her on other points, if there had been something else, and she did not speak about that. Dorticos: At any rate, question her some more, investigate more and call me here. Hernandez: Good, Presidente, I will call you immediately.

FIDEL CASTRO SAYS HE KNEW OF OSWALD THREAT TO KILL JFK

By COMER CLARK

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to — but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time — I was told — he wanted to work for us.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someo[ne] [o]ught to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said — and this was exactly how it was reported to me — 'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated.

"The two visits occurred close together," Prime Minister Castro told me. "I didn't take them seriously."

My hard-won interview took place in the middle of a cheering, jostling mob on the sidewalk of La Rampa, the main "show street" of Cuba's capital, Havana.

Castro had arrived unexpectedly to inspect progress on the building of a Cuban pavilion, erected with those of other Communist countries to mark the July 26 celebration of Castro's rebellion against the Batista regime.

And also to mark the meeting in Havana of Castro's rebel Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) conference, due to open on July 31.

Although millions of words have been written claiming that Fidel Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination, no newsman has been able to secure a personal interview with the Cuban prime minister for his views on the slaying of the U.S. President.


To shed more light on the most dramatic event of the 20th Century, The ENQUIRER sent Comer Clark to Havana for a face-to-face meeting with Castro.

And here, for readers of The ENQUIRER, is the exclusive story of the dramatic interview with Castro.

I had applied to the Cuban embassy in London during April-May for permission to go to Cuba to interview the island's prime minister.

Although a British subject does not need a visa to enter Cuba, approval by the Cubans for the entr[y is] necessary.

Oth[er]wise, the incoming visitor risks being turned away at Havana airport. The approval came at the end of June and was telephoned to me by Santiago Diaz, of the Cuban consulate in London, who deals with entry inquiries. Diaz told me that permission to visit Cuba had been "cleared" (though I was unable to learn what specific checks on my eligibility had been made).



REPORTER: Comer Clark's questions netted new facts.

There are only three legal ways to enter Cuba by air. From Mexico City, from Prague, Czechoslovakia, or from Madrid, Spain. So I flew to Madrid and entered Cuba by airliner on July 9.

In Havana, I immediately applied to the Ministry of External Relations for an appointment to see Prime Minister Castro.

In London, I'd been assured an interview would not be too difficult to obtain. But Senor Laurencio Cordoso, who dealt with foreign press queries was not quite as optimistic as that.

"You know, there are the annual celebrations of the rising against Batista," he said. "And then the meeting of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity.



PRIME MINISTER of Cuba, Fidel Castro, was addressing admiring crowd when ENQUIRER reporter drew surprising statements from him in unexpected rapid-fire interview.

"The Prime Minister is bound to be very busy. You will have to be patient."

While waiting for permission to interview the prime minister, I was taken on official visits to Cienfuegos Bay to watch the construction of a massive sugar processing and storage plant. And then I went to Trinidad, one of the oldest towns in Cuba.

I noticed that the windows of many Trinidad shops were barren of goods.

For example, in the former Woolworth store on the main street, the entire window facing the street was empty.

The only things that filled many otherwise empty windows were pictures and photographs of Fidel Castro and propaganda posters. Many shops are simply shut, because of a shortage of consumer goods.

Soviet help in construction schemes was obvious — particularly at Cienfuegos Bay. Some old American machines were still in use, but much of the new construction equipment was either Russian or Japanese.

Inspection tours, however, weren't what I had come for. I kept asking about the Castro interview — and kept being told I'd have to be patient.

Many early-bird delegates to the OLAS conference started to arrive now. Waiters, public servants and others began pinning on OLAS buttons. With all this activity, I began to feel my waiting and hoping

(Continued on next page)

Oct. 15, 1967

I ... restaurant on La Rampa, and was there ... on the evening of July 15 when there ... sudden sound of cheers in the street.

Many people hurried from the restaurant, and I ... in the general direction of the crowd. There were shouts of "Fidel! Fidel!"

Castro had, indeed, arrived.

Many of Castro's public appearances are made with... warning. Partly, this seems to be for security ... But, also, because it is regarded as "in accord... with the spirit of the rebellion." Sudden, dramatic ... — spurning protocol.

I pushed into the cheering crowd as Castro in his familiar "fatigue" uniform of ... green and a sweat-cap, acknowledged ... cheers and looked admiringly at the ... pavilion.

He spoke several times rapidly in Spanish. ... pushed through the mob toward him, ... gripped me.

I had my Press card in my hand and ... it, saying (in English) that I'd like to ... the prime minister when he could spare ... to see me. I hoped some nearby offi... would be able to translate my request ... Castro.

But apparently Castro himself heard my ... voice above the background of the mob noise.

The bearded prime minister — who ... and understands English well — turn... around flamboyantly and, raising his ... called to me in a friendly way: "Where do you come from, senor? Don't you think we're having a great celebration?"

I called out that I was a British news... man and had been trying to get an ap...pointment to see him. Again, I waved my Press card.

"What's wrong with right now?" he asked ... good humor and plainly happy to ... putting on a show for the crowd.

"Prime Minister," I said, "it's been sug...gested several times that there was some ... involvement or link with the assas...sination of American President Kennedy.

"Could you tell me if there is any truth at all ... that?"

Castro looked straight at me, thought for a few ... and then made the dramatic statement, ... at the start of ... article, that he'd ... reports of Lee Os...wald's visits to Cuba's Mexico City embassy ... hadn't believed the ... serious.

"How did you form ... view?" I asked.

Castro replied: "Well, there were two calls in ... weeks. I later learn... he stayed at the em...bassy about 15 minutes ... time. He gave the name Lee Oswald each ...

"The calls were re...ferred to Havana, as a matter of course, un...der the authority of our ambassador in Mexico, Senor Joaquim Hernandez."

I asked: "Did the ambassador himself see Os...wald?"

Castro replied: "No, he was seen by an aide. ... an aide."

He went on: "Let me be clear. I just didn't be...lieve that he (Oswald) meant this. I thought that he ... have been some sort of wild man. Or maybe ... after money.

"It seemed that to kill the head of a state ... stupid. Just pointless. As far as Cuba was con...cerned, the policy of the American government ... go on, anyway."

I asked Castro, frankly: "Did you have any ... of warning the American government ... Oswald?"

Castro replied, spreading his hands: "We don't — ... didn't — have any relations with the American government, anyway.

"If I'd taken it seriously, I might have informed ... United Nations or some other official agency ... But who would have believed me? People ... have said Oswald was just mad. Or that I'd ... mad."


He suddenly asked: "What is your name, any...way?" I told him.

"Well, Mr. Clark," said the Prime Minister,



LEE OSWALD
NOW LINKED TO CUBA

...It's Possible That I Could Have Saved Him, Says Fidel



HIT CUBA HARD: President John F. Kennedy is shown in November 1962 as he told newsmen that Russia had agreed to remove weapons from Cuba.

"I thought the visits might be something to do with the American CIA — whether anything eventually happened or not."

Cries from the crowd began to divert Castro's attention from me. I desperately asked if by "anything happened" he meant an assassination of President Kennedy.

"Well, it crossed my mind. But I didn't give much thought to it," he said.

"Then, too, after such a plot had been found out, we would be blamed — for something we had nothing to do with.

"It could have been used as an excuse for another invasion try. In any case, people would have tried to put it at my door."

Castro started to make his way to the edge of the sidewalk.

As he did so, he added: "I was not responsible for Kennedy's death. I will tell you that.

"I think he was killed by U.S. Fascists — right wing elements who disagreed with him."

Then he started speaking again in Spanish with those immediately around him, turned and said goodbye to the crowd, climbed into his car and was driven away.

It had been an unexpected and shocking interview under odd and difficult circumstances. If he could be taken at his word, Castro had shed new light on the Kennedy assassination mystery. I hoped to learn even more at the formal interview, which was still pending.



DIDN'T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard of the assassination threat but gave vague reasons for not reporting it to the United Nations.

On July 17 I was telephoned at my hotel by Senor Cordoso, who had tried to arrange the formal interview.

Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance of meeting the Prime Minister. You were very fortunate."

I agreed and asked when my longer interview would be granted.

But Cordoso explained he'd been told by the Prime Minister's office that Castro would be heavily engaged with the anniversary celebrations and meetings with OLAS visitors.

"He has a lot of pressing engagements — those and other things," Cordoso said. "I can't see any chance of another personal interview at all in the near future."


This was the final decision, and I decided to make arrangements to leave Cuba. I flew to Mexico City, where I called at the high-walled Cuban embassy to see if I could learn more about Oswald's two visits there.

The grilled double gates were opened by a gatekeeper to allow in some official-looking diplomatic car.

I quickly showed him my Press credentials, and asked if I could see anyone of authority inside the embassy.

But the gatekeeper replied in halting English: "No, no Press. It is impossible."

The wall of silence had been lowered on the Oswald situation, except for that one revealing moment with Castro himself on the sidewalk in Havana.



INTRIGUE: Cuban Embassy in Mexico City was visited twice by Oswald before assassination.

RUSSIAN

mbassy of the USSR
S. A., Washington
Section
Reznichenko

wald, M. N.

nce and, therefore, by this
f replies (sic) to my appeals
the USSR and residence in
the expediting of this matter

fully,

O d

—Continued

FROM: LEE H. OSWALD, P.O. BOX 6225, DALLAS, TEXAS
MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, SOVIET CITIZEN

TO: CONSULAR DIVISION
EMBASSY U.S.S.R.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOV. 9, 1963

Dear sirs;

This is to inform you of recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy Of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.

I was unable to remain in Mexico inderfinily because of my mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.

I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.

Of corse the Soviet embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced.

The Federal Bureu of Investigation is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organization "Fair Play For Cuba Committee", of which I was secretary in New Orleans (state Louisiana) since I no longer reside in that state. However, the F.B.I. has visted us here in Dallas, Texas, on November 1st. Agent James P. Hasty warned me that if I engaged in F.P.C.C. activities in Texas the F.B.I. will again take an "interrest" in me.

This agent also "suggested" to Marina Nichilayeva that she could remain in the United States under F.B.I. "protection", that is, she could defect from the Soviet Union, of couse, I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious F.B.I..

Please inform us of the arrival of our Soviet entrance visa's as soon as they come.

Also, this is to inform you of the birth on October 20, 1963 of a DAUGHTER, AUDREY MARINA OSWALD in DALLAS, TEXAS, to my wife.

Respectfully,
L H Oswald

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 15

R2125 R

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Johnston, Paul Wallach

FROM: Dan Dwyer

DATE: January 21, 1976

SUBJ: CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald

Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case, Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and 13, 1975. Some of Rocco's comments merit consideration in light of our present knowledge of the case.

1. Opening of 201

Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.

2. Status of 201, 11/22/63

Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated via the 201.

3. Oswald's Defection to USSR

With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the case. Rocca could not cite any example of a U.S. citizen defecting on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.

With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certificate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it. Rocca suggested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique of using birth certificates for illegals -- Larry McWilliams, Brannigan or Cregar -- would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI, should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.

In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments by the KGB.

Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and conducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S. defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treatment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relationship with the KGB should be clarified.

Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that the CIA developed this information after the assassination.

Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white Russian area.

Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Embassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing in Russia."

Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca admitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality of Oswald's written material, Oswalds' mentality seemed conducive to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.

4. Alleged Debriefing of Oswald

Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing report existed, it would have been distributed in OO series (overt operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no ties with the CIA.

5. Oswald and Mexico City

Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David Phillips organized the technical surveillance.

Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September 28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.

Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were the responsibility of the FBI.

6. Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections

Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels. He described these areas as "open and relevant."

Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in 1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.

Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's"impromptu "comments to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963. Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders and said it was a "very important signpost," Rocca added that the Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's attention on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?)

In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from "Des to Paris." He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and said "man never heard from again." Rocca should be asked to clarify these references.

Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s. he described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "preliminary relationship." Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports, vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning" of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.

Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee, national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that (fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two DGI agents. Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate DGI-FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who was handled by WH Division.

7. Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case

Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an interview that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965. Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for thePresident's assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)

Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute fabrication." Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a contact of the DCD until 1956.

Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962 or 1963 about a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes that the CIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evidence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a drop in Mexico City.

8. GPFLOOR Period

GPFLOOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation conducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.) The Mexico City aspect of GPFLOOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King, Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who would then inform McCone.

9. End of GPFLOOR: Warren Commission

With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOOR period ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of interest to the WC -- mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman. Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for exploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman researched DeMohrenschildt's relationship to the Oswalds.

Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.

Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in Soviet R&A.

10. Rockefeller Commission Inquiry

Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not clued in on Cuban emigreeissues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca developed the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but only at the conclusion of the WC.)

Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald and the President's assassination.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 24 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓ orig + att → admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue → Chron

VI-C-5-D31

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

62-116395

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI files.

Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975. Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.

1 I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said
2 that -- Chase, I think his name was Peter Chase, one of his
3 assistants -- is the person to be in touch with, and to keep
4 him apprised of all developments.
5 I later again got a word from Jean Daniel, the French
6 correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed
7 ripe for a conversation. So this also came from another source,
8 a Greek town planner named Doxiati, who said that Castro was
9 very much interested in some kind of normalization relation,
10 but that Che Guevera and Raul were opposed.
11 October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking
12 me what was new. I said, well the ball is now in the Cuban's
13 court.
14 On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that
15 Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but
16 he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.
17 The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these develop-
18 ments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with
19 Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who
20 was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who
21 suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.
22 I then briefed Bundy on this on the 5th of November
23 Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing
24 towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department,
25 the idea being -- well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and

1 perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into
2 normal.
3 Chase then said Bundy wanted a chronological memo about
4 the entire thing. I might say I have forgotten one point. When
5 I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach
6 by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said
7 the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he
8 said -- he still offered to take it up with the White House.
9 Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss
10 Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to
11 Havanna with Valao. We never could get through the bad
12 connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and
13 he had suggested that I come to Marianao from Key West and
14 talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid
15 going through Havanna.
16 Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House
17 favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in
18 Cuba and told me to tell Valao this. I finally reached Valao
19 on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message
20 about his coming here. He said -- and that we wanted to discuss
21 agenda.
22 He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he
23 would -- or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they
24 should discuss an agenda with me. He was very cordial on the
25 telephone.

1 we referred to our talk in '59 and he said another talk might
2 be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real
3 indication. At this point, I said I'm no longer a private
4 citizen but a government official and we agreed that the
5 current situation was different, at the same time, things were
6 a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at
7 the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing
8 of their assets.
9 The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th
10 when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney
11 General. His position was -- I showed him the memoranda, which
12 I had prepared on what had happened up to that point. He said
13 that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would
14 be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might
15 result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something.
16 Anyway, it might be a problem. But he did think the matter was
17 worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to
18 Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.
19 At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very
20 violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry
21 too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech
22 in reply. On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him
23 I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would
24 be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with
25 anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.

1 I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November -- by the
2 way, my call to Valao was the 18th -- he said that after their
3 agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the
4 White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what
5 we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days
6 before the assassination.

7 On the 29th of November, LaChuga had seen Miss Howard
8 and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to
9 him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently
10 that we would continue our conversation.

11 On the 2nd of December he confirmed getting a letter from
12 Valao and he wanted to know if things had changed again. He
13 said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.

14 I called the White House, Chase in this case, to say that
15 the ball was now in our court.

16 On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN,
17 said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the
18 detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.

19 He said the decision would take some time now because all
20 our policies were under review.

21 This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say
22 he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door
23 isn't closed, I just don't know.

24 On the 17th of December the President, this time President
25 Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at

1 Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban
2 memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall
3 with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington.
4 Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I
5 didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the
6 White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the
7 holidays.

8 Well, that ended my diary in '63. I then went to Kenya
9 as Ambassador in February of '64. However I do recall that
10 some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well, if
11 this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either
12 John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't
13 look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an
14 election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep
15 it in mind but that it was a dead issue.

16 The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investiga-
17 tion is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination
18 plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems
19 hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this
20 type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening,
21 although it could conceivably have happened.

22 The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of
23 is an explanation.

24 I think your testimony is helpful. Certain inferences
25 can at least be drawn. But it is very helpful.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Research

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attachment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Steven Blackhurst

STEVEN BLACKHURST
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

ICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12, 1976, which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in the "Official and Confidential Files" (O & C) and which was made available for access on February 12, 1976, to an SSC Staff Member.

A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, is attached in compliance with the above request. One excision has been made by reason of privacy.

Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel, and Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr. Blackhurst to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported that during the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances that should the SSC decide to use the attached memorandum or any portions thereof, the material used will not be identified as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.

In addition to the above, referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in the O & C files pertaining to a number of specifically identified items relating to the Warren Commission and to this Bureau's investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination of President Kennedy. A thorough review of the special indices relating to material contained in the O & C files failed to indicate that any documents contained in these O & C files, other than the attached memorandum, would be responsive to the items listed in referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976.

Enclosure

Original

Page one

Document Routing Sheet

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confidential	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr. to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/attach. 1 pg re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to:	Date	Filed:
Research	3/2	VI-C

Research Document Routing Sheet

Page three

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confid	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/ pg attach. re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to:	Date	Filed:
Research	3/12	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 25, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: JACK RUBY;
LEE HARVEY OSWALD - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual identifying himself only as Mr. Miller, 1125 14th Street, Northwest, contacted the Bureau and advised that he was a close friend of Ruby. In addition he identified Clint Murchison and Tommy Webb as being friends of Ruby. Miller declined to furnish additional information but agreed to interview. Washington Field Office was immediately advised and an Agent dispatched in order to get full details concerning the above.

Press vigorously. I would surmise it is Clint Murchison, Jr. not Sr.

1 - Mr. DeLoach

HAS:cfs
(7)

REC-25 44-24016-117

EX-114

22 NOV 29 1963

FEB 6 1978

DEC 4 - 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-23

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked "#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated the following items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to March 1, 1963.

2. IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified information she had obtained from Giancana.

3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S. Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.

4. Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962. (We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC:clb

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap Case - Sam Giancana - This memo recommends prosecution in this case would be against national interest. It contains no mention of assassination.

6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.

7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961, relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically outlined facts of the Balletti matter.

8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12, 1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.

9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961 of participants in the Las Vegas incident.

10. Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22, 1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an interview with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject: "Arthur James Balletti, et al."]

11. FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu. It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.

12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.

13. Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI, Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This report contains the details of the arrest. (This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investigative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information. (Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he undertook for CIA.)

... to eliminate a break for big investors.

... pected to improve the measure's image in the eyes of House liberals, who have been fearful that the committee might report out a "rich man's bill."

The crucial vote in the hair-breadth decision was understood to have been cast by Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.), who was absent when the committee deadlocked 12 to 12.

Youngsters stand in front of the newly completed James W. Johnson School at 1420 S. Albany and watch as the last of ... mobile classrooms is moved away. Portable schoolrooms were moved to Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Supt. Benjamin C. Willis defended the flexibility of the mobile units, saying they are being requested in some areas in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and Lowe. Stories and other pictures on Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)

Chicago Sun-Times 16 August 1963 Helms #1

CIA Sought Giancana Help For Cuba Spying

By Sandy Smith
Sun-Times Correspondent

WASHINGTON—A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times.

EXCLUSIVE

It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government officials said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959.

What the CIA accomplished—if anything—by negotiating with the 53-year-old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter.

One thing, however, is certain:

F[illegible] several months in late 1959 and early 1960, Giancana, a big shot on gangland's "Commission" and in its La Cosa Nostra murder-and-terror society, became what his fellow gangsters abhor and would act swiftly to exterminate—an agent for the U.S. government.

The CIA wasn't talking about the case here on Thursday.

But Justice Department sources expressed belief that Giancana never did any spying at all for the CIA.

Giancana, according to these sources, merely pretended to go along with the CIA in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed—or at least affected—by his ruse of co-operation with another government agency.

If this was Giancana's motive, his scheme was a failure. For a probe by the Justice Department and [illegible] Federal Bureau of Investigation of Giancana's crime syndicate in Chicago led directly to the exposure of the La Cosa Nostra ("our cause") brotherhood and the Commission.

With his connections in Cuba, Giancana declared he would be able to sneak intelligence out of the island for the CIA.

A high government source gave The Sun-Times this account of how Giancana stepped into the role of a government agent:

The CIA made its first contact with Giancana in 1959.

The Chicago gang boss then was embittered because the Commission, in traditional gang bipartisanship, had dollars backing both sides in the Cuban revolt.

The Commission was said to have given financial backing to Castro—only to have him shut down the gambling casinos.

And the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, reportedly fled Cuba with millions he received from Commission hoodlums.

In his dickering with the CIA, Giancana reputedly boasted that he had contac[illegible] with

Turn to Page 2

Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Bahamas while U.S. fliers watch helplessly, Page 2.

that could not intervene under plan.

Reveal CIA Sought Giancana's Aid

Continued from Page 1

anti-Castro factions and was ready to use his contacts for the CIA.

Justice Department officials say now that Giancana was just talking. He might have had some "contacts," but he never produced anything of value for the CIA, the officials said.

The CIA was said to have dumped Giancana as a possible source of Cuban intelligence some time in 1960, long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

An equally bizarre episode months later gave the Justice Department its first clue to Giancana's negotiations with the CIA.

The figures in this incident were a male night-club entertainer and Giancana's girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters.

At the time, in Giancana's opinion, the entertainer was overly attentive to Miss McGuire.

At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertainer's hotel suite. For hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms.

Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, according to federal authorities, led to an admission by the prowler that he was on the payroll of a private detective agency in Florida.

Florida authorities sought an explanation of the incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operator refused to discuss the matter. Finally, however, he told investigators to get in touch with the CIA.

The inquiry then shifted from Florida to Washington and revealed Giancana's negotiations with CIA, it was disclosed.

Government sources reported Thursday that the private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas suite of the entertainer was another riddle of Giancana's caper with the CIA. Neither the CIA nor the Florida detective agency ever has offered an explanation of what the investigator was doing in the hotel suite, the sources said.

Sign First Trade Pact

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanganyika (AP) — Tanganyika and the Soviet Union have signed their first trade agreement. The African nation will exchange sisal, cotton, hides, skins, tobacco and coffee for Soviet metal, tools, vehicles, road equipment, cameras, fishing boats, planes and other things.

Fifth Buddhist Burns Self

HUE, South Viet Nam (AP) —A 71-year-old Buddhist monk burned himself to death in his ceremonial robes inside Hue's biggest pagoda early Friday.

He was the fifth to burn to death in the mounting Buddhist campaign against the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic.

His self-immolation in the courtyard of the Tu Dam pagoda brought immediate martial law to Hue, which lies 40 miles north of Saigon and is the ancient capital of Viet Nam.

He was the third to burn this week. A 17-year-old novice monk committed suicide Tuesday and a middle-age nun took her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday.

Reliable informants said the nun, Dieu Hien, set fire to herself in the market place of Ninh Hoa, a coastal village 200 miles northeast of Saigon. She was the first woman fire-suicide.


Informants at Ninh Hoa said government authorities had taken the nun's body in a move aimed at preventing a mass demonstration at her funeral.

They followed the same tactic with the body of a novice monk who immolated himself early Tuesday near the central Vietnamese religious center of Hue.

It had an opposite effect,

Tar-Feathers 'Torture' Bared As Hoax

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A woman tarred and feathered and apparently left to die in a flaming house told a bizarre story Thursday that her "torture" actually was part of a hoax to stir up a racial incident.



owner of the house which was set afire, Henry Lewis, attempted to inspire a racial incident that would pressure his neighbors in a right-of-way dispute.

Offic[illegible] said Mrs. Harwell and the Lewises were arrested

Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, admitted setting fire to the house, authorities said. She and the Lewis couple faced charges of arson and conspiracy, detectives said.

According to Mrs. Harwell,

INDEX TO

JOB #____

Selected

See

C-XI-1

ox # 6 of 10

iscellaneous John McCone Papers

hai Pilots

ateral used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63

rge envelop of miscellaneous papers

riefing Memoranda-1962

esident Briefing 22 Dec 1964

"I" File 1962

"J" File 1962

"K" ile 1962

ar East Trip 2-14 June 1962

urcell Panel 1963 & 64

02293

JOB #

see No

No ✓

x 4 of 10

Notes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-Dec 1963

Briefing Memoranda 1962

State Cables for DCI Raborn 1966

Task Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65

Vol. I, II, III & IV of Annexes to Report to the PFIAB on Intelligence Community Activities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.

02239

ok

ER 72-B-431
Copies #9+10

2-8-72

Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.

›py #1	retained in Executive Registry.
›py #2	Retained in O/IG. - Ritter 11-15-72
›py #3 thru #7	Records Center
›py #8	DDP retained.
›py #9	PPB Retained.
›py #10	D/DCI/NIPE retained.
›py #11	Records Center
›py #12	DDS&T retained.
›py #13 thru #16	Records Center
›p: 17	PPB retained.
›py #18 thru#26	Records Center.

all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.
so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee
eeting minutes.
r. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.

David L. Bye
David L. Bye
Chief, Executive Registry

02300

Job #___

OK

Box # 8 of 10

8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62	#1
8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62	#2
Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63	#1
Memoranda on Meetings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63	#2
Meetings with the President 1 July 63 - 12 Nov 63	#3
Meetings with President Johnson 23 Nov 63 - 31 Dec 63	
Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964	#1
Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May	#2
Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64	#3
Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64	#4
Meetings with the President Jan-28 April 65	#1

All

02301

JOB # 72-B-431

OK

c # 1 of 10

All

3 Committee January-December 1963 ✓

3 Committee January-December 1964 ✓

unter-Insurgency July-December 1962

unter-Insurgency January-June 1962

ecial Group CI-1965

ecial Group CI - 1964

rono 1962

Checked generally - nothing relating to Cuba

Spot checked.

02302

Job #___

OK

#2 of 10

complete

Memoranda for Record:

1 March-28 April 65

January-28 Feb 1965

November-31 Dec 64

1 Sept-31 Oct 64

6 April 64-8 July 64

9 July-11 Aug 64

12 Aug - 10 Sept 64

1 Jan-11 Feb 64

27 Nov-31 Dec 63

23 July 63-26 Nov 63

5 June 63-20 July 63

15 April - 4 June 63

1 Jan 63-9 Feb 63

9 Sept - 31 Dec 62

7 April 62-21 Aug 62

29 Nov 61-5 April 62

JOB #____

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ox # 3 of 10

Vietnam	August 1963
Vietnam	September 1963
Vietnam	October 1963
Vietnam	November 1963
Vietnam	December 1963
January	January 1964
Vietnam	February 1964
Vietnam	March 1964
Vietnam	April 1964
Vietnam	May 1964
Vietnam	June 1964
Vietnam	July 1964
Vietnam	August 1964
Vietnam	September 1964
Vietnam	November 1964
Vietnam	January 1965
Vietnam	February 1965
Vietnam	March 1965

LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June

DE_TA Trip

NODIS---LOR----McCone Eyes Only

DEFOLIATION

02304

JOB #____

Box # 7 of 10

Selected see OK

NRO 1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 ltr to DCI frmDefense re Management of NRO)

CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964

Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization of USIB; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of CIA.

Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference- Panama(29 Jan-1 Feb 1962)

White House-1962 & 1963(containes correspondence to, from and of interest to the White House.)Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo Bundy.

Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)

Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17 thru 29 Sept 1964

Memoranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964

Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.

Memos for the Reocrd EA/DCI for 1964 & 65

DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip

Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)

DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Trip-1962

DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964 also containes some background papers on trip.

Envelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963

DCI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964

CUBA-Background Material-1962

02305

[illegible] to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation

Job #____

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ɔx #_5_ of _10

:c ican Republic-1965

uba Package

xecutive Registry File "John McCone 1962

ommittee of Principals

aos 1962

uba 1964

ook-Bay of Pigs

uclear Papers

IcCone Speeches 7 June 63 - 25 May 64.

IcCone Speeches 8 June 64 - 11 March 65

uba 1962

ub Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62

ate Eyes only Cables

xecutive Registry DCI File 1963

epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964

02306

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-22

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassination, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971. According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several entries in these files respecting allegations by people who claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination. One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2, 1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance magazine writer.

MC:clb

DeLoach to Mohr 12-6-63
Re: Assassination of the President

that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks," he should carefully examine his own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.

Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.

He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief Counsel of the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.

Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate to the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington inasmuch as Carr was running for office next year. I told Katzenbach I knew this, however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter. Katzenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however, Carr was quite persistent.

ACTION:

In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down and discussing facts concerning our report.

If he calls I will see him. D.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

SECRET

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/650,097

SUBJECT 1. ATTEMPTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT COMMUNIST PLANS TO CONTROL CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW CASTRO.

DATE DISTR. 2 MAY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. MARCH 1962

REFERENCES IN 28109

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (20 APRIL 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ARMY COMMANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE OUSTER OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE ON 26 MARCH 1962 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED BY CASTRO WERE ROLANDO CUBELA, JOSE MARIA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA MATOS, JUAN ALMEIDA, JORGE SERGUERA RIVERI, PEDRO MIRET PRIETO. CASTRO ASKED THEM TO BACK HIM UP, AS HE INTENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREED.

2. AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALSO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF A COMMUNIST LEADER IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE IN ORIENTE PROVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).

3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX TORRES, COMMUNIST LEADER IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. CASTRO TOLD THE ARMY COMMANDERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	CIA	FBI

INS ... CINCLANT ...

INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET

201-252234

"IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TORRES SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA".

4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT DEVIATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS ROCA, AND OTHER COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT BE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP.

5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO BACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL, RAUL CASTRO, AND CHE GUEVARA AT SOME PROPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. THESE MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARMY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: *SOURCE* SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP OF ARMY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA [illegible] ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rose
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Rogge
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines
1 - Mohr
1 - De Loach

Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 26, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

While at the offices of the President's Commission on other matters, J. Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office. Mr. Rankin advised that he desired to make it known that the Bureau had been of tremendous help to the President's Commission, that an extremely large volume of work had been produced by the Bureau and that the Bureau had been most cooperative in handling all requests which had been made by the President's Commission.

He commented that recently there had been quite an increase in the number of requests and there was a possibility that there would be many more additional requests. Mr. Rankin stated this was not intended as a criticism of the Bureau's work but instead was the following through of the Commission's desire to complete the Commission's record and leave no unanswered questions.

In this regard, Mr. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in conducting its investigation, had an extremely difficult and enormous task to perform and that he as well as other members of the Commission staff had been amazed at the amount of detailed information which had been developed by the Bureau in its investigation. He commented that the Commission in performing its tasks was of necessity making a most minute study of the Bureau's work as well as that of other Government agencies with the idea of picking the investigation to pieces to the extreme degree so that wherever it was possible to clarify any item, this could be handled while the Commission was in existence.

Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an explanation concerning information relative to Special Agent James P. Hosty's name being omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas Office (report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), he wanted the Bureau to know the following:

Enclosure

REC- 53

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Lenihan

1 - 62-109060
1 - 105-82555
1 - 44-24016

XEROX

1964

JRM:RUL:msd
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum A. Rosen to A. H. Belmont
Re: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The Commission had noted in reviewing the notebook in question that Agent Hosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone number and a license number. It had been noted that this information did not appear in the Dallas investigative report and members of the Commission wondered why this item did not appear. Mr. Rankin stated that prior to any question being raised concerning this item, the Bureau in one of its letters to the Commission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name in the Oswald notebook. As a result of this information being furnished by the Bureau, the members of the Commission were fully aware that there had been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to make this information available. Mr. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Commission would show the exact circumstances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons why Agent Hosty's name was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63. We are enclosing for the Commission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling and John T. Kesler wherein they set forth their explanations in handling the Hosty entry in Oswald's address book. Both affidavits are excellent and should satisfy the Commission that our handling of the Hosty entry was sound.

If there had been proper supervision here much of the correspondence from Commission requesting clarification & additional investigation would have been avoided. Notwithstanding Rankin's statements the original report is not one reflecting any credit to the Bureau but rather embarrassment. H

REC
FEB 1
FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0412
13 May 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. E. Greissing

Dear Mr. Miller:

As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith is a copy of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Case Figures". This document was recently released by the Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sincerely,

Seymour R. Bolten
Chief, Review Staff

Attachment:
As Stated

TO: COS

EXT.:

DEST: COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-8593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

NUMBER

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.
ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

TO: COS

EXT.:

DEST: COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

TO: COS
EXT.:
DEST: COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that suddenly he had realized that the United States had taken [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs) HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

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3-

HF: Okay; he asks where she is going to stay now, and LUISA comments that now she plans to move tonight to the house of the doctor (female). HF asks if they know everything now, and LUISA says yes, but doesn't know how the thing is, or if they will have to stay in the embassy, however believes that today it will not be possible, because everyone has gone to the airport and the embassy has no car, however, possibly tomorrow morning instead of going to the study circle, she will move. HF: Then he will call her tomorrow. LUISA: To try the embassy or at the house, since if they will not stay at the embassy, she will go home where she will be at about 10. HF accepts.

Soviet Embassy.- 15-60-55.-
27 Sept 63.-

L34-M8.-T128-
0900-2114 hrs.

395- (1605) IN.- OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an American here who has requested a transit visa for Cuba because he is going to the USSR. OV. - Wants to know with whom he (American) spoke at the Soviet Embassy becuase she (OV) had sent him over to them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans would give him one without anymore processing - only advising the Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (American) spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there were no problems. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. 404— 410 OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so ~~as~~ he can call her. SILVIA gives it to him along with the tel, num. 11-28-47.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and that she has not advised about her change of address and will not receive the Bulletin and she can advise them now. IV. asks that she call KOUKHARENKO in order to change the address, and then asks for the name of the Cultural Attache. SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--

EMBAJADA RUSA.- [illegible]-0-55.-
27 septiembre 63.-

16 5 4 A

395- Entrada.- M del Cons[illegible] de Cuba, dice que esta allí

.. un ciudadado Americano [illegible] a solicitar una visa para C
on Tránsito porque va para la URSS y entonces quiere saber co
quien habia hablado porque ella lo mandó con ellos de la Emba
da rusa diciendole que si ellos lo hacian o aceptaban la visa
que entonces ellos los cubanos tambien se la daban sin mas -
tramitos nadamas avisando a Emigración en Cuba, y quiere sabe
con quien habló porque el dice que no sabe tampoco con que -
persona y que le dijeron que si que no tenia problema. HD le
pide espere un momento. 40[illegible]-- 410-- MF es SILVIA DURAN del
Consulado de Cuba y explica lo mismo a otro HD. Este le dice
que le deje su telefono y su nombre para que despues le llame
SILVIA se lo proporciona asi como el telefono 11-28-47.- Y que
aprovecha como cosa personal de que ella se cambio de domicili
y no ha podido avisar para que le envien el boletin y que aho
se la puede dar. HD le pide que llame a KOUKHARENKO para que
de su cambio, y pide le de el nombre de la Consejero o Agregac
Cultual. SILVIA dice que se llama TERESA PROENZA y le llaman
al 14-13-26. HD que gracias.-- 435--

Attachment b:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1605 hours on 27 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy saying there was an America citizen at the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban visa in transit to the USSR. She was asked to leave her telephone number (11-28-47).

..3.-L35-M22.-

27 Sept

IV - inside voice.

OV - outside voice.

288- Out to 14-13-26.- (1625 hrs.)- (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the number of the Cuban Consul. OV. - It's --11-28-47.-- 294--

295- Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs)- IV asks SILVIA if the American has been there. SILIVA: says yes, he is here now. IV.- According to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in Washington he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have not received the answer from Washington concerning his problem and considering the processing it will take 4 to 5 months. Without that permission of the USSR they have to request. and better still the visa can't be given here without asking Washington But according to this man, he belongs to an organization in favor of Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa without the Russian visa and I don't know what to do with him. I have to wait for the answer from Washington. SILVIA - We have to wait also because his problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a visa in these conditions. He expected to process the visa. He knew it would take long to process the Russian visa and would wait for it in Cuba and leave from there for the USSR. IV. - The thing is that if his wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for returing to Russia. She will receive the visa in Washington and having the visa she can sent it to any place for example here or any other place but right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give him a letter of recommendation because we don't know if his visa will be approved. IV. - We will only give the visa according to indications (intructions) SILVIA. - Then that is what I will put in my plans. IV.- We can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuase we don't know him. Please pardon the bother. SILVIA .- No bother and thank you very much.--
--331--

EMBAJADA ...
27 septiem...

Sali... ... ID pregunta a SILVIA que si ha ido allí ese americano ... que sí, que allí está.

295-

ID que según las cartas que ... del consulado en Washington el quiere ir a la URSS para estar allá mucho tiempo con su esposa que es rusa, pero todavía no se ha recibido la contestación de Washington ... a su problema, pero eso según los trámites ocupan ... cuatro o cinco meses pero sin tener eso permiso de la URSS deben de preguntar y mas bien no se lo puede despachar aquí el visado sin preguntarle a Washington pero según este señor le mostró una carta en que es un miembro de una organización en favor de Cuba y ha dicho que ellos los Cubanos no pueden darle el visado sin el visado ruso y ahora ID no sabe que hacer con el, porque deben de esperar la contestación de Washington. SILVIA que ellos tambien, porque el problema de el, es que el no conoce a nadie en Cuba y entonces si es asi es muy dificil que le den la visa, porque el pensaba tramitar su visa, porque como el ya sabia que se iba a tardar mucho en esperar el visado ruso en Cuba y ya de allá irse a la URSS. ID que la cosa es que si su esposa está ahorita en Washington va a recibir ahorita el visado o el permiso de la URSS para regresar a la patria, ella va a recibir su visado en Washington pero teniendo ese visado ella podrian comunicarle a cualquier lugar ese permiso por ejemplo aqui o en cualquier otra parte lo puede recibir, pero ahorita no las tienen. SILVIA que claro y que tampoco se le puede dar una carta porque no saben si su visa será aprovada. ID que ellos solo daran el visado según las indicaciones. SILVIA que entonces eso pondrá en su planilla. ID que tampoco se le puede dar ninguna carta de recomendación porque no se lo conoce y que perdone por la ... molestia. SILVIA que no hay cuidado y que muchas gracias.---

--331--

27 Sept 1963
1626 hrs

Attachment c:

A telephone call to the Cuban Embassy made at 1626 hours on 27 September 1963 by an unidentified

28 Sept 1963

208- IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate - says that there is an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Soviet Embassy. IV. Wait a minute. 213-- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and takes down the number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (them) of the American and says she will call.-- 232--235-- OV.- speaks in Russian. IV.- speaks in English.-- BOTH CONTINUE IN ENGLISH.--244 --1151 hrs.-

208- X Entrada.- HF del consulado de Cuba, quien dice que alli en su consulado esta un [illegible] norteamericano que estuvo alli en la Embajada Rusa. HM que espere un momento. 223-- HF es -- SILVIA DURAN y habla INGLES con alguna persona [illegible]--- y come en español que le pusieron telefono a APARICIO y lo apunta qu es el 14-12-99--- 23[illegible]-- SILVIA le dice sobre el ciudadadano norteamericano y que les va a hablar.--- 232--- 235--- HF habla RUSO. HD le habla en INGLES.--- SIGUEN LOS DOS EN INGLES.---244 --- 1151 hrs.-

Lizuvey

26 SET. 1963

15 60 55

208. /Please see the Spanish transcription/. MO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak Russian? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russia I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Lib: [illegible]
50-5-10-

dice que alli

que entro alli

23-- 07 64 -

persona fuera-- y coment

y lo apunta que

sobre el ciudadaiana

232-- 235-- MF habla

LOS DOS EN INGLES.--244--

-- 1151 hrs.-

8 OCT 1963

5 6 0 5 5

208.

/Please see the Spanish transcription/. MO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak English? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russian/ I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want?

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Attachment d:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1151 hours on 28 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy who puts on an unidentified norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he was just at their Embassy and wants to give them his address. The Soviet tells him to return to the embassy with the address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57

1 October 63

L26-M26-T129

1031 - 2002

hours → man outside
man outside

45.

In at 1031, MO talks to MI, in broken Russian.

MO: Hellow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-[illegible] 7

1 October 63

45. In at 1031. MO talks to MI. in broken Russian.

MO: Hollow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

Attachment a:

A telephone call to the Soviet Military Attache at 1031 hours on 1 October 1963 by an unidentified man speaking broken Russian who asked about a telegram which they were to send to Washington. Unidentified man said he was at the Soviet Embassy "last Saturday". Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.

128. Out to 15-12-64 at 0955? OBYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.

OBY: VOLODYA, come here as fast as you can.

OBR: Alright.

135. (previously transcribed)

140. (previously transcribed)

man outside

151. In at ~~148~~ (?) MO / the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your plac last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the nam of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they havenàt received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothir has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

249. (previously transcribed)

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, 15-65-55

1 October 63

In at 1035 hours MO/the same person who [illegible] day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speak[illegible]. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and [illegible] that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted [illegible] find out if you have anthing new? But I don't remember the name [illegible] that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

Attachment f:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy at 1035 hours on 1 October 1963 by the same man who called previously (28 September 63) and spoke broken Russian. He said his name was Lee OSWALD and wanted to know if they had heard anything. Soviet said no.

TAB J

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *

TAB L

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House. The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, ~~and~~ make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khrushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had *made up his mind* not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public

knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidely the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of *Newsweek*] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this 'will to independence' around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

"I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufactured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is one of the most, if not *the most*, important problems in American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, and has become international – that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not a sociologist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his fault – either his 'will to independence', his madness or Communism – the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it." A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Communist subversion. They won't get there by going from economic oppression to a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced a few years ago. The United States now has the possibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we alone have this power – on the essential condition that Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two quick questions. The first: Could the United States tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: "What about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito three days ago, and our discussions were most posi-

Mike Madigan
Chron File

January 29, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may recall, in June of last year alleged organized crime leader Sam Giancana was killed. At that time, this Committee had taken steps to contact Mr. Giancana for the purpose of obtaining his testimony on our assassinations inquiry then under way. However, we had not yet succeeded in contacting Mr. Giancana or anyone on his behalf.

Shortly after Mr. Giancana's death, Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff met with Mr. William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, and members of Mr. Lynch's staff to inform them of the Committee's actions taken to contact Mr. Giancana, and its interest with respect to determining whether there was any relationship between the Committee's desire to examine Mr. Giancana and his murder. Mr. Lynch informed Mr. Epstein at that time that there was no indication of any such relationship and assured him that in the event any such indication was discovered, the Committee would be immediately informed.

The Committee has received no further information from the Department about this matter since last June. For the purposes of completing our record on this subject, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Committee whether the Department has received any additional information about this subject since the above-described meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

MM/do

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 30, 1975

Subj: Committee Contact with Sam Giancana

To my knowledge the Committee's first contact with Sam Giancana occurred on June 9, 1974, when Patrick Shea of the Committee staff received a telephone communication from Robert Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, Texas. It is my information from talking to Mr. Shea that Mr. Bennett called the Committee to advise that Sam Giancana was admitted to the Methodist Hospital, which was located at 6515 Bertner Street in Houston, Texas. Mr. Bennett's information was that Giancana was admitted to Room 402 of the Hospital under the care of a Dr. Debakey. Mr. Bennett also advised that Giancana was there for a gall bladder removal operation. I believe, although I am not positive, that Bennett also advised that Giancana was then under surveillance. My recollection at this time is not clear as to whether Bennett advised as to which agency or organization had Giancana under surveillance, but my impression is that it was not the F.B.I.

At about the time of this communication from Bennett, I, as Committee Counsel, had been attempting to locate Mr. Giancana.

I had discussed his possible testimony before the Committee with Chief Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, and Staff Director, William Miller. It is my recollection that we agreed that I should attempt to contact Giancana for the purposes of interviewing him in order to determine whether he would have sufficient information to warrant an appearance before the Committee as a whole. It is my memory that we did decide that he was of sufficient importance to be interviewed by the Staff, i.e., for me to interview him.

During this same period of time, I discussed with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller whether we should consider issuing a subpoena for Mr. Giancana while he was in the hospital. I made this suggestion because of an impression I had that Giancana was difficult to locate. I should add that I see absolutely nothing prejudicial or improper or discourteous in the issuing of a subpoena, but rather regard a subpoena as a valid method of obtaining testimony before a Congressional Committee. In any event, my discussion with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller resulted in a decision to have me contact Mr. Giancana over the telephone and offer him an opportunity to appear before the Committee voluntarily and to have me interview him if he so agreed. If he did not agree, we would then take it before the Com-

mittee as to whether a subpoena should be issued for Mr. Giancana. Because of the events that followed we never reached the point of bringing before the Committee the question of whether Giancana should be subpoenaed to testify.

After the initial phone call from Bennett to Shea, I telephoned Bennett on two different occasions. My telephone contact with Bennett was for the purpose of our locating Giancana and a telephone number at which I could reach him. Bennett initially indicated to me, as described earlier in this memorandum, that Giancana was in the hospital. My recollection is that on my second telephone call with Bennett, he informed me that Giancana was now out of the hospital and staying at the Warwick Hotel. Finally, I recall calling the Methodist Hospital in Houston and asking to speak to Mr. Giancana. I recall that the hospital authorities indicated that they had no such person by that name in the hospital. I do not recall the precise date of this telephone communication to the hospital. It is my recollection that the name used by Giancana was Doc Brown. I am uncertain whether Bennett told me Giancana was using "Doc Brown" at both the hospital and the hotel, but I believe he said that the alias was used at the hospital. Bennett advised that Giancana had been visited by several relatives and gave me the names of a couple of persons

who he thought were Giancana's sons-in-law. The only name I remember is that of Tisci.

In either the second or possibly a third conversation with Bennett, he told me that Giancana had now checked out of the hotel and was either on his way back to his home in Oak Park, Illinois, or with his daughter in California. He provided me with the telephone number of the daughter in California and suggested I obtain Giancana's home number from the information directory in Illinois.

The telephone conversations with Bennett occurred, to the best of my recollection, during the week of June 16, 1975. It is possible, however, that the first conversation occurred later in the week of June 9. It is my recollection that my second telephone conversation with Bennett occurred on Thursday June 19. In any event, I am certain that I attempted to contact Giancana by telephone on Thursday, June 19. I was unable to get anyone to answer the telephone in California and did not have an opportunity to attempt to obtain the Illinois number. I learned Friday, June 20 that Giancana had been shot and killed in his home in Oak Park, Illinois on the evening of June 19.

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence

agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

[illegible] COUNTY'S WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
EDITION
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion started. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

Related Story Page A5

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania [illegible]

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Levien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.

MEMORANDUM

TO: FRITZ AND BILL

FROM: MIKE EPSTEIN

DATE: JUNE 20, 1975

SUBJECT: GIANCANA

I expect that no one will write off the alleged Giancana murder as a "third-rate homicide," and that it will grow and grow and grow. It is clearly the most volatile media issue of the season.

Given the barest outlines of what allegedly happened, and taking them at face value, we have a responsibility to take action under 18 U.S. Code, Section 1505:

> Whoever ... by ... force ... endeavors to ... impede any witness ... in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by ... any committee of either House ... or
>
> Whoever ... by ... force ... obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to ... obstruct, or impede ... the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by ... any committee of either House ...
>
> Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

In short, if Giancana was a "witness" (which status he might have achieved by mere location contacts made by staff) and he was killed to prevent his appearance; or indeed even if he wasn't yet a "witness" but this was a "message" to all witnesses to keep quiet (e.g. Roselli and Maheu), there is a violation of law which <u>we</u> might have the responsibility to investigate.

Beyond what our responsibility is, it seems clear to me that most extreme possibilities of what might actually have happened dictate that we come up with a well-reasoned position and plan -- after careful, deliberate, intensive

consideration of all avenues of approach, pitfalls, suspected motives, etc. Most important of all, it seems to me, is our acceptance of the fact that maybe we don't even have anyone on our staff with sufficient experience, sophistication, background, and investigative maturity to deal with this situation.

As a first step, I urge your decision to convene a planning session to decide what the second step will be.

I can't emphasize enough the need for well-thought-out planning here. Who knows where this will lead? And at a minimum, some months from now, Senator Church may be asked, "What did you do the day after you learned that Giancana had been killed?"

My stream of consciousness on kinds of things to consider would include: What our public statement on this should or should not be, security for other witnesses, immediate contact with other key witnesses (to reassure them), secrecy of witness lists and immunity applications, secrecy of place, time and even fact of interview, meetings with Justice organized crime section, Chicago strike force, local law enforcement people in Oak Park and Illinois, obtaining all FBI investigative reports (they're in it per tonight's Star), getting background on all law enforcement officials in Illinois who will be involved (whom do you trust?), is this a diversion which we're being sucked into, how do we avoid that (hire someone just for this), how do we show we care so other witnesses (known or unknown) won't dry up, etc. etc. etc.

NOTE: Mike can be reached after 6:45 tonight at (802) 863-2652.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mike Madigan
FROM: Ed Greissing
DATE: August 13, 1976
SUBJECT: Mention of Carlos Marcello in the 4/23/76 transcript of John Rosselli.

On April 23, 1976 during Mr. Rosselli's appearance before the Schweiker-Hart Subcommittee, we took the opportunity to question him about any information he might possess regarding the New Orleans Mafia Chieftan, Carlos Marcello.

Our interest in Marcello developed from 1) the allegation that Marcello was tangentially involved with both Clay Shaw and David Ferrie; the fact that Marcello was deported by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and that the assassination of President Kennedy was a possible retaliation,

In my telephone conversation with Jim Johnston, 8/13/76, he could think of no other reasons why we questioned Rosselli about Marcello. If you would like to talk to Jim about this matter, his telephone number is 780-6203.

Ref to Troff. or X

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 23, 1975

Subj: Additional Roselli Questions

Inquire when in the discussions between Roselli and the CIA did any suggestion appear with regard to both Che Guevera and Rauol Castro, in addition to the discussions involving Fidel only.

Query whether Roselli has heard the term "ZRRIFLE" --- note Helms to Harvey memorandum of 12 February 1962, giving approval for use of unvouchered funds.

Harvey — how long after Boyd Page

I.G. Report references first delivery of the pills in early 1961. Second delivery of the pills in early 1962 -- inquire re: Roselli's date recollection.

Jake Esterline had possession of the cigars already treated with poison in March through August 1960 in Florida. Esterline apparently destroyed them before he left in June of 1961 -- Roselli's knowledge of Esterline or the cigars?

Roselli's knowledge of thallium salts operation to put in Castro's shoes when left outside hotel room on trip?

ok but no break

I.G. Report indicates First Phase from August 1960 through April 1961 and Second Phase from April 1962 through February 1963.

Q to R – H

Inspector General's Report states that Maheu was instructed to tell Roselli that Maheu represented businesses (Wall Street) who had interests in Cuba and who wanted to eliminate Castro and were willing to pay $150,000.

Roselli -- Trafficante's gambling interests in Cuba -- interest in killing Castro?

I.G. Report indicates "first meeting" to be 14 September 1960 in New York City, with Maheu, Roselli and O'Connell present.

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and that Giancana was to arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba -- meeting for Roselli/Maheu/Giancana meeting in Fountainbleu Hotel in Florida week of 25 September 1960. I. G. Report indicates that Giancana told Maheu that he had a man (Trafficante) to serve as a courier going back and forth between Miami and Cuba.

R

I.G. Report indicates conversation in Roselli's presence wherein Giancana tells Maheu that Giancana is opposed to the use of guns -- no chance of escape?

R

Roselli named inside man in Cuba as Juan Orta -- then in Prime Minister's office in Havana.

R

I.G. Report indicates Dr. Gunn's notation of delivery of the first batch of pills to be 10 February 1961? Roselli timing?

R us before Bay of Pigs? – how far

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli's man, Orta, had "easy access" to Castro, and that he was involved in a "rake-off on gambling profits."

I.G. Report has Roselli giving the pills to Trafficante, rather than directly to the Cuban? NO

Did Harvey actually tell Roselli to cut off the project slowly so as to avoid creating hard feelings on the part of the Cubans in the latter part of 1962? NO

I.G. Report in "Second Phase" indicates Roselli telling O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who could take over the job from Orta. Report indicates this man's name is Varona, and that Trafficante probably knew Varona in his efforts to take over gambling once Castro was out.

Does Roselli know Edward Moss and the Cellini's offer of money to Varona to be used against Castro?

I.G. Report indicates that Trafficante told Varona that he (Trafficante) had clients who would pay big money to get rid of Castro -- Roselli's knowledge of this -- time frame March/April 1961 -- figures mentioned from various witnesses are (1) $50,000 (2) $25,000 (3) $10,00 plus $1,000 worth of communications equipment. <u>NOTE</u>: O'Connell's testimony of $50,000 being taken to Florida and put in a safe deposit box to be paid C.O.D. upon accomplishment of Castro mission.

I.G. Report has Harvey taking over in February 1961 but only of the "executive action capability." The Report indicates 15 November 1961 as date Harvey says Bissell told him to include Cuba in ZRRIFLE program, and to take over syndicate connection --- Roselli's knowledge of either of these dates? NOTE: Are ZRRIFLE and Castro assassination plans synonymous?

I.G. Report gives 8 and 9 April 1962 in New York City as the meeting place for the first introduction of Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli. NOTE: O'Connell feels that Harvey met Roselli prior to this meeting -- meeting took place at -- Savoy Plaza/Savoy Hilton Hotel where Roselli stayed -- dinner at the Elk Room -- drinks at the Copacabana -- table across from Phyllis MacGuire with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace performing -- seats changed so that Roselli would not be seen by MacGuire -- Roselli's recollection?

June of 1963 Harvey left for Rome.

April 18, 1962 -- Dr. Treichler's records showing delivery of four pills to "OC."

September 1961, last casino in Havana closed.

I.G. Report references Roselli's having a man known as "Maceo" or "Garcia - Gomez" and "Goday". The report describes him as a Cuban who spoke Italian -- Roselli's recollection? -- time frame?

The I.G. Report has April 1962 as the time period for the delivery of the rental truck with the rifles, etc. -- Roselli's recollection of what was inside? -- Rifles with telescopic sites for assassination purposes? Communications equipment -- what type? NOTE: Roselli's recollection regarding joint surveillance by Harvey and Shackley in one car and O'Connell and Roselli in another car?

May 1962 I.G. Report indicates that Roselli reports to Harvey that the pills are in Cuba -- references to all calls to Roselli going to the Friars Club and Roselli's calls going to Harvey's home number -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1962 -- I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that Varona had sent a three-man team into Cuba and that the pills were "inside."

September 1962 -- I.G. Report references Roselli meeting Harvey in Miami on 7 and 11 September. Roselli tells Harvey that a second three-man team was sent in by Varona -- a team of militia to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard -- that the first team is already inside and safe? --- Roselli's recollection of facts?

January 1963. I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that "militia team" prepared for take-off -- and that they never did? -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1963. I.G. Report reference last meeting between Roselli and Harvey -- Roselli met by Harvey at Dulles Airport -- Roselli stayed at home of friend of Harvey's -- Harvey's home closed up per overseas trip -- Harvey called by FBI having seen Roselli/Harvey at restaurant -- FBI had Roselli under surveillance -- Roselli's recollection of facts? -- Time period?

I.G. Report indicates that Maheu put in contact with Giancana for tap through Roselli -- Roselli's advance knowledge?

* * *

O'Connell's Testimony

O'Connell's recollection is that Orta's man would not go through with it and that the pills were returned to O'Connell by Roselli. O'Connell's recollection then is that the second plan was a call from Roselli and Maheu indicating the use of a chef. The pills were sent down and again returned when this plot failed.

O'Connell is unclear which of the aforementioned schemes took place before the Bay of Pigs. He indicates, however, the use of Varona to be after the Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell has the first introduction of Roselli and Harvey as being in the Miami airport.

O'Connell's testimony is that he received a call from Maheu who said that Giancana was upset about Phyllis MacGuire seeing

Dan Rowan. Maheu said that he had been requested to place a tap for Giancana and that Giancana might "stop helping" on the assassination plot if this tap was not placed. O'Connell checked with Edwards and received the go-ahead. O'Connell indicates that Maheu was authorized to pay for DuBois out of the month given him on the assassination plan.

O'Connell states that he recalls November 1960 as the time period of the delivery of the pills for Roselli through Trafficante?

O'Connell recollection that "chef" incident after Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell states that Varona's price was $50,000 -- $10,000 worth of communications equipment in addition.

O'Connell introduced by Roselli to Varona as "Mr. Olds."

* * *

Harvey Testimony

Harvey places the fall of 1961 as the time period in which ZRRIFLE was to be applied to Cuba.

Harvey reference to pressure from the Kennedys to topple the Castro regime clandestinely and not by means of any attack. Roselli's hearsay knowledge of this?

Harvey states that he recalls firearms in the truck, possibly "sniper-scope rifles."

Harvey states that as soon as the missile crisis was over, i.e., late 1962, he indicated to Roselli that he wanted the project cut off, although gradually so as not to create hard feelings.

Roselli's knowledge of Greenspun's safe -- break-in in 1971 -- 1967 meeting between Greenspun, Garrison, Roselli, etc.?

I.G. Report reference to "air contamination" in early 1960 efforts -- Roselli hearsay knowledge?

E. B. Williams' knowledge re Maheu/Roselli/Greenspun meetings in 1967?

Roselli knowledge re Angell Luis Castillo (U.S. in 1968) and Jerry Henning (training of Cuban teams)?

Roselli knowledge of explosives along with guns valued at $5,000 -- U-Haul truck delivery -- surveillance by Chief JMWAVE?

Late 1962-Early 1963 -- Roselli knowledge of skin-diving suit implemented with poisons?

##

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing you today on behalf of the Select Committee about the recent death of Samuel Giancana. As you are no doubt aware, his name has been raised in the context of allegations concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's possible involvement in so-called political assassinations.

Based on information available to the Committee, it was obvious that he might be knowledgeable about the political assassination matter. Although Mr. Giancana had not actually been subpoenaed to testify by this Committee, he had been approached by members of the staff for a possible interview. Since this might involve violation of federal statutes pertaining to obstruction of a Congressional Committee investigation, the Select Committee is requesting that you instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep it fully informed of all information coming to the Bureau's attention pertaining to Mr. Giancana's death. In making this request, the Committee is not conceding its right to conduct its own investigation of this matter. However, it is acting in the spirit of cooperation on a question of mutual concern to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. Therefore, we request 24-hour-a-day protection by the United States Marshall Service for the following witnesses which the Committee has subpoenaed, intends to subpoena, has interviewed, or intends to interview:

(Alternative paragraph:

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. We would like to discuss with members of your staff the necessity for special arrangements by the United States Marshall Service to ensure the safety of witnesses who have or might have to contact with the Committee pertaining to these matters.)





NEW YORK
VINCENZO MANGANO
(MISSING SINCE 1951)
NEW YORK
JOSEPH PROFACI
(DECEASED 1962)
THE MAFIA ORGANIZATIO
TAMPA, FLORIDA AREA
ALFONSO DIECIDUE
(DECEASED)
1947
SANTO TRAFFICANTE, SR.
(DECEASED 1954)
ELDER
2
SALVATORE SCAGLIONE
@ "SAM"
ELDER
3
GAETANO
@ "JOE"
TOP MAN
1
4
FRANK DIECIDUE
FBI #784739 B
7
ANGELO BEDAMI
FBI #1849088
6
AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA
TAMPA PD #41671
8
CIRO BEDAMI
FBI #865273 A
9
JOE BEDAMI
FBI #82699 A
10
PHILIP PIAZZA
COSTA LONGO
18
DOMENICK FURCI
@ "NICK"
FBI #318519 B
15
ANGIELO LO SC
@ "FANO"
NON MEMBER ASSOCIA

EXHIBIT No.


N THE
LEGEND
A INTER-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
B CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
C COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
D CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
2 GAMBLING
3 SHYLOCKING
4 LABOR RACKETEERING
5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
7 COUNTERFEITING
8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
9 BOOTLEGGING
10 BRIBERY
11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
12 TAX EVASION
13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
16 HIJACKING
17 CONTEMPT
18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
00 CHART REFERENCE NUMBER
SAM CACCIATORE TRAFFICANTE
@"TOTO"
FBI #4924718
A 1, 13, 21 C
B 20, 19 D
12
NICK SCAGLIONE
FBI #2586844
A 17 C 1
B 17 D 2
13
HENRY TRAFFICANTE
FBI #625515 B
A 1, 5, 21 C
B 1, 9 D 2, 10
CENTRAL & EAST
COSTAL AR
STEFANO SCAGLIONE
@"STEVE"
FBI #285845 C
A 2 C 18
B D 2
17
ALFONSO SCAGLIONE
@"AL"
FBI #4091276
A 12 C 12
B 12 D 12
19
SALVATORE JOE LORENZO
@"SINGING SAM"
FBI #5136887
A 7, 8, 9 C
B 13, 1 D 2, 17, 11, 12, 18
20
JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI #2924250
A C
B 5 D 2
21
SAMUEL CACCIATORE
@"SAM"
A 1, 5, 13 C
B 1, 6 D 2
AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATES
HARLAN BLACKBURN
Rudy Mach
Don Mach
Dan Fussel
Buddy Parron
Glen Brechen
Tommy Berry
Clifford Bell
Joe Wheeler
Max Reid
Mary Cardan
Phil Riffe

LEGEND

- **A** INTER-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- **B** CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- **C** COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- **D** CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
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  - 3 SHYLOCKING
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  - 5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
  - 6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
  - 7 COUNTERFEITING
  - 8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
  - 9 BOOTLEGGING
  - 10 BRIBERY
  - 11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
  - 12 TAX EVASION
  - 13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
  - 14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
  - 15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
  - 16 HIJACKING
  - 17 CONTEMPT
  - 18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- **00** CHART REFERENCE NUMBER



ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 17, 88TH CONGRESS

PART 2

OCTOBER 10, 11, 15, AND 16, 1963

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. And then Sergeant de la Llana, will you identify yourself, please, sir?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Jack de la Llana, Tampa Police Department. I have been with the police department for 9 years, and attached to the homicide division for 4 years before starting the criminal intelligence unit of the Tampa Police Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had previous police service?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. My first experience was 9 years ago, when I started first with the force.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief Brown, do you have a statement, a prepared statement?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a copy of it before me, and I see it has several pages. Do you wish to read all of it?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would like to read it to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Neil G. Brown, chief of the Police Department of the city of Tampa, Fla.

I have been a member of the Tampa Police Department for the past 16 years, and I have been chief of the department for the past 4 years. Prior to my appointment as chief, I served as inspector of detectives. I am a graduate of the National Police Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a member of the Tampa Bay Area Chiefs of Police Association and of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

With me here today is Sgt. Jack de la Llana who, at my direction, formed our department's first criminal intelligence unit in February of 1962, and has been its director since that time. Sergeant de la Llana also holds the important post of chairman of the Florida Intelligence Unit, a statewide agency which coordinates information amongst intelligence units in cities throughout the State of Florida.

In addition to Sergeant de la Llana, whose diligent work and knowledge of criminal operations has provided much of the foundation for my statement to you, I feel fortunate in being accompanied also by Sgt. William Branch of the intelligence division of the Orlando Police Department. Sergeant Branch is presently attending the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been a member of the Orlando Police Department since 1951, and a detective sergeant since 1956. He is particularly familiar with organized gambling operations in the central Florida area, and I believe his presentation of that situation will be of material value to this inquiry.

I feel privileged to be able to testify before you today. I believe that the facts I can present here about organized crime operations in Tampa will help you and the American public realize the seriousness of this problem, and our Nation's emergent need for further Federal legislation to combat an evil that has clearly expanded beyond the powers of municipal law enforcement to contain, suppress and eliminate it.

Tampa has a large and respected Italian population, who are considered in all respects to be an asset to our community. Unfortunately, a small percentage of this group of citizens have achieved

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Academy of the Federal
Tampa Bay Area Chiefs
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coordinates information
at the State of Florida.
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population, who are con-
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a notoriety greatly disproportionate to their numbers, because of their continuous activity in criminal and racketeering enterprises. The people of our city refer to this group as "the Sicilian underworld" or "the Mafia."

Our growing concern with this criminal group was crystallized in 1956 when a Hillsborough County grand jury was empaneled in Tampa to investigate and determine the truth of allegations that the Mafia was then operating in Tampa. The pertinent part of that grand jury's report stated:

> * * * there are some individuals who believe that a Mafia or Black Hand exists and operates in this community, but they are in the minority. * * * The evidence presented, the volume of written material examined, and witnesses interviews point to the existence in this community of an organized crime element whose methods of operation are similar to the pattern of the Sicilian Mafia as we understand it. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, let me ask you, prior to this development before the grand jury, before the grand jury made this finding, were you the law enforcement officials or in the police department?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you suspicious that such an organization existed in your city?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes; law enforcement has been aware that this has been there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was something, you felt confident, but you were unable to bring it out in concrete proof; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had been trying to combat it without being able to get it out in the open?

Mr. BROWN. That is exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. BROWN (reading):

> * * * our records indicate that the vast majority of our unsolved crimes stem from underworld activity involving persons of Sicilian or Italian ancestry * * *

The CHAIRMAN. We had some startling information here the other day from the Chicago chief of police with respect to some 976 murders, gangland style, that had been committed over a period of years, and only 2 of them had been solved. That is, officially solved by court determination or court action.

Mr. BROWN. That is typical.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ratio in your community, if you can give us some idea about it?

Mr. BROWN. I will bring that out in my statement, but it is just like Chicago.

The CHAIRMAN. Something along that line?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck me as one of the most frightening developments of information that I have heard regarding crime. I just couldn't believe that 976 murders, and apparently just murder in the first-degree fashion, could be committed in an area like Metropolitan Chicago over a period of years, and only 2 of them could be solved. It thoroughly demonstrates to me the great menace and the danger of organized mobs committing crime.

You say: "Well, they probably killed each other pretty much." That may be true, but they kill each other because of the extortionate

operations that they are engaged in, to the detriment of the public at large, and to the detriment of innocent people who can't help themselves. It focuses and emphasizes how serious this menace is.

Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Notwithstanding these findings, the grand jury concluded that there was no national or local Mafia in Tampa. I would like to submit as exhibit 1 a certified copy of the report of the grand jury dated March 30, 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, this report of the grand jury will be received and it may be made exhibit No. 44, and exhibit 1 to this witness' testimony.

I may later direct it be printed, but as of now we will just let it be filed as an exhibit for reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BROWN. It seems likely to me that the grand jury failed to acknowledge without qualification the presence of the Mafia in Tampa because it sought a pattern of Mafia operations similar to the historical Sicilian tradition of primitive and direct extortion, rather than the sophisticated and polished control of rackets that now characterize that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it from that last statement that you feel that they have considerably improved their technique.

Mr. BROWN. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Of crime operations.

Mr. BROWN. Very much.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question, Chief, there?

As I understand what you have just testified relative to the grand jury's report, they acknowledged that there was some evidence of the existence of Sicilian Mafia in the community, but apparently felt that evidence was not conclusive; is that a correct summary?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, Senator. The Tampa Police Department, however, has long been aware that many criminals in our area have local reputations as Mafiosi. My staff and I have made a careful evaluation of those reputations, based upon personal knowledge, criminal records, surveillance reports, personal histories, familial relationships, statistical analyses, reports from confidential informants, information from Federal and local law-enforcement agencies, and other customary police intelligence sources.

It is our considered conclusion that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that it controls most illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and that its members have interstate and international ties to other Mafia groups.

The organization of the Mafia in the Tampa area is best understood from a chart we have formulated which I submit to this subcommittee as our exhibit No. 2.

Senator MUSKIE. Before we get to that, Chief, may I ask another question? The grand jury to which you referred sat in 1956, am I correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. That is 7 years ago. Do you think you have accumulated additional evidence as to the existence of the Mafia in Tampa which would justify a new reference to the grand jury?

Mr. BROWN. Yes; I believe so.

Senator MUSKIE. Are you planning that?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This chart may be received as exhibit No. 45 and we will direct it be printed in the record if it can be, as far as it can be. The title of it is "The Mafia Organization in the Tampa, Fla., Area."
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" for reference and faces this page.)
The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the operations of this organized group are not confined just to the city limits of Tampa, but they are in the area?
Mr. BROWN. By all means; the entire area.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. This chart is now a part of the record and, if you wish to comment about it, we will proceed with your statement.
Mr. BROWN. The chart is keyed to show only the criminal, business, and familial interrelationships and activities of the persons named, although other criteria figured in our categorization of these persons. Of course, this chart cannot be considered as a definitive "table of organization" of the Tampa Mafia, because it is but a simplified representation of an organization that is in a constant state of flux, and about which we know we still have many things to learn.
However, I believe it is completely accurate in showing that Santo Trafficante is the boss of this criminal group. Indeed, it is to Santo Trafficante that Tampa owes the dubious distinction of having been represented at the notorious crime convention at Apalachin, N.Y., in November 1957.
The CHAIRMAN. I notice you designate or refer to this group as the Mafia. Would you say that it is the same group that has been referred to by the famous witness, Joe Valachi?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; it is.
The CHAIRMAN. Whether he calls it Cosa Nostra or the Mafia makes no difference. This is the organized crime group to which you referred?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Senator; this is the group.
Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question there?
Under this group, there is another group which you describe as nonmember associates and employees. Is that intended to suggest that the people who are so described know nothing about the identity of their employers and the organization of which they are a part?
Mr. BROWN. Senator, that is a part of the insulation of the group. They have many employees, and as we go into the statement, to show how in this gambling operation the seller is non-Sicilian in most cases, and he reports to another member up the ladder, and so on up. Many of these people are nonmembers of the Mafia as it is.
Senator MUSKIE. Do they know they are engaged in criminal activities?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. They know they are a part of a criminal organization?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. But they are not members?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What do they need to do to become members in the Tampa area?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think I can clarify that later on in the statement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born in Tampa on November 14, 1914. He was one of five brothers. He maintains residence today in Tampa and in Miami. He previously lived in Havana, Cuba, where he owned and operated gambling casinos under the Battista regime. When Fidel Castro took over, Trafficante's gambling operations were stopped. He was expelled from Cuba and returned to the United States. He inherited the control of the numbers racket in central Florida which his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., who died in 1954, and he continues to head this operation.

Testimony in the 1958 hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field identified Santo Trafficante, Jr., in the operation of the Sans Souci gambling casino in Havana. That testimony stated that Trafficante took over the Sans Souci from the Mannarino brothers in Pittsburgh, Pa. Gabriel Mannarino was a fellow delegate with Santo Trafficante, Jr., to the Apalachin crime convention in 1957.

Additional testimony named Trafficante, Jr., as the key figure in the Mafia in Tampa, stating, as the Tampa police had long known, that he succeeded his father as the major racketeer in the city.

Other information substantiated by our files reveals that Trafficante is an associate of such notorious criminals as Meyer Lansky, Joseph Bonanno, Sam Giancana, Aniello Dellacroce, Joseph Stassi, Sam Mannarino, Joseph Arcuri, and of Joseph Riccobono, also known as Staten Island Joe, who had been closely allied with the elder Trafficante, and was also discovered at the Apalachin meeting.

When Joseph Profaci's daughter Carmella married Anthony Tocco, son of Detroit mobster William "Black Bill" Tocco, in Brooklyn on June 4, 1955, one of the guests at the reception in the Hotel Commodore in New York was Santo Trafficante, Jr. Among those who also attended were 13 other persons who later attended the Apalachin conference, as well as other notorious Mafia figures, such as Frank Livorsi, Thomas and John Dioguardi, Tony and Albert Anastasia, and Thomas "Three Finger Brown" Lucchese.

There have been at least two known attempts on the life of Santo Trafficante: On January 2, 1953, he was shotgunned in a car on the streets of Tampa, receiving wounds in the arm. Later, in Cuba, four American mobsters who intended to kill Trafficante were told by Cuban police that they would have to do it on American soil.

Trafficante has been arrested in Tampa several times for investigation, because of our knowledge that he was deeply involved in gambling, even though we have not yet been able to obtain the quantum of proof necessary to a successful prosecution. He has also been picked up by the police for questioning about the gangland slayings of Rene Nunez, Angelo Giglio, and Joe Antinori.

Trafficante was a suspect in the Albert Anastasia murder on October 25, 1957, in New York because he had appeared in New York just before the murder. He was considered a likely suspect because there had been reports that Anastasia was then attempting to move

in on Trafficante's gambling operations in Cuba. Trafficante, using the alias "B. Hill," stayed with Anastasia in the latter's hotel suite, on the night of October 24, 1957, and moved out approximately 1 hour after Anastasia's murder in a nearby barber shop.

The Department's evaluation of Trafficante as the boss of the Mafia organization in Tampa was confirmed, of course, by the positive identification of the "Louis Santos of Havana, Cuba," apprehended at the Apalachin conference in November of 1957, as Santo Trafficante, Jr., of Tampa, Fla.

Furthermore, we have witnessed and documented many visits of out-of-town racketeers with Santo Trafficante and his fellow hoodlums of the Tampa area. These visitors give further indications that Trafficante is associated with Mafia members in other cities. For example, Louis Coticchia of Chicago, also known as Lou Brady, has been frequently seen visiting Trafficante and on one occasion they were seen boarding a plane together, heading for Miami.

Other known outside racketeers who have visited in Tampa with Trafficante gang members are John Joseph Vitale, Salvatore Lopiccolo, and Anthony Giardano, all known racketeers from St. Louis, Mo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I think at the present time, in interest of continuity, so that the record will read properly, Sergeant de la Llana has a statement with regard to a courier operation within the Mafia. In the interest of time, I am not going to ask him to read it, but I would like to have it introduced in the record.

Do you have that?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, I do.

Mr. O'DONNELL. How many pages does it consist of?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is five pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Give a better description of it and tell us what it is.

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is with reference to Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, and his visits to Tampa on various occasions, which first came to our attention on April 13, 1962. This subject has a long criminal record. I have an FBI record which I will also submit into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the FBI record be received and made exhibit No. 46 for reference.

(Document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 46" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement, is that a summary statement that you have made and prepared for the record?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received and printed in the record, either at this point or immediately following the prepared statement of the witness now testifying.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF SGT. JACK DE LA LLANA

One of the clear ties of the Trafficante organization with other criminal groups is reflected by the contacts with Trafficante made by a man who appears to act as a courier for the Mafia. Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, FBI No. 1427493, first came to the attention of our Department on April 13, 1962, when we observed him, in Tampa, in the company of Augustine Primo Lazzara and Frank Diecidue, two of the men on our Mafia chart. Because of this and other contacts made by Coticchia, our intelligent unit developed the following information about him which I think is of interest to this committee in giving a profile

of a hoodlum who is entrusted by the Mafia to act as a courier for them between the various groups.

Coticchia was born on February 25, 1920, in Cincinnati, Ohio. When he was arrested a couple of years ago, he gave as his occupation "industrial financier." He is presently reported to be interested in the operation of a company offering wired music in the Chicago area known as Symphonaire Sound Systems, Inc.

His criminal record shows that he was first arrested in 1936 in Ohio for robbery. In 1937 he was arrested in Miami, Fla., for investigation of a "shakedown." He was held for 4 days and released without charges. He was arrested again in Hot Springs, Ark., in 1938 for investigation and released with the understanding that he would leave the city.

In 1938, in Cleveland, Coticchia was arrested and charged with assault with intent to commit rape. He was convicted and received 1 to 15 years, of which he served 4 years, being released in 1941. He was arrested in 1942 in Los Angeles, Calif., on a warrant issued in Baltimore for grand theft. He was tried in Baltimore for receiving stolen goods and received 5 years in prison.

Coticchia was again arrested in Dallas, Tex., in 1961, by the U.S. marshals for violation of and for conspiring to violate the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, which case is still pending in the Southern District Court of New York. His last arrest known to us was on January 4, 1963, when he was arrested in Tampa for investigation of grand larceny. He was released due to insufficient evidence.

Coticchia worked as a "pit boss" in gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nev., and Havana, Cuba. He was involved in a scandal in 1960 in which mobsters attempted to take over a nationwide bail bond business.

Coticchia has been in and out of Tampa since our first observation of him and on every occasion he is in direct contact with Trafficante and Diecidue. On December 31, 1962, he purchased a new automobile in Tampa, paying the dealer $3,625.95 in cash. He then registered the car under the name of Jane Campbell. He remained in Tampa several days and was in constant contact with Trafficante and Diecidue.

On January 4, 1963, Coticchia was arrested in Tampa on suspicion of grand larceny and at the time of his arrest he had $1,775 in cash on his person. He had papers on him that showed he had resided previously at the Aloha Motel in Miami under the name Luiz Paulino Bailey from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He also had a paper with a list of gambling equipment and the name "Empress Lines, Ltd., Nassau—via *Wappen Von Hamburg*—German boat loading pier No. 3."

An investigation revealed this equipment had been shipped airfreight from Las Vegas to Nassau and placed in a German vessel, the *Wappen Von Hamburg*, which sails between Nassau and Miami. This equipment included 50 one-arm bandits, or slot machines, and was valued in excess of $65,000. The information received was that this vessel was to travel between Miami and Nassau as a floating gambling casino.

After Coticchia's arrest in Tampa, the telephone calls were checked at the motel. It showed that he had made several calls to Trafficante, Diecidue, and other associates of Trafficante. He had also made a long-distance call to Sonny's Restaurant in Miami Beach, which is owned by Thomas Altamura, FBI No. 511563, a Mafia member and another associate of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

I would like to submit for the record Coticchia's FBI record, and a photograph of him taken by my department when he was arrested in Tampa on January 4, 1963.

Another example of the Trafficante group's connections with Mafia figures in other parts of the Nation is: John Joseph Vitale, FBI No. 793259, of St. Louis, Mo. Vitale is well known to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and is reputed to be the Mafia leader in that area. He has a record of 13 arrests and a conviction for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act for which he received a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment. He has been arrested as a fence and is believed to deal in anything in which there is a large percentage of profit.

Police authorities consider him among the most dangerous of Mafia principals in the St. Louis area, and he is known to have underworld connections throughout the country. He appeared twice before the Senate Rackets Committee (August 19, 1958, and February 11, 1959) and each time refused to answer any questions, invoking the fifth amendment.

On April 17, 1963, Vitale flew from St. Louis to Tampa, using the name "Jack Howard." He visited the Diecidues for 4 hours and then flew back to St. Louis

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To me it does not seem probable that Vitale would go to the expense and trouble of flying to Tampa and returning the same day in order to settle a debt between two produce companies with which he has no known connections. More significantly, his use of an alias to run this errand, too, points out his own doubts that he was engaged in a legitimate errand.

These two examples, Coticchia's and Vitale's, indicate to us the interstate connections of the Trafficante organization, and point up the need for attacking the Mafia group on a national basis.

Mr. O'DONNELL. All right, we will continue.

Mr. BROWN. Some of Trafficante's men shown here on our chart gave sworn testimony before the Hillsborough County solicitor in 1953 concerning gambling in Tampa. They admitted that they had long been engaged in illegal gambling activities. They were forced to testify or face jail terms for contempt of court, because they had been granted immunity from prosecution for such crimes. Among those who testified were Frank Diecidue, Augustine Primo Lazzara, Nick Scaglione, Henry Trafficante, and James C. Longo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Are any of these individuals on the chart that you have introduced as exhibit 2?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, they are all on the chart.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante has himself been caught up in a typical Mafia technique of seeking to preserve and protect its illegal enterprises by the corruption of law enforcement and other public officials. This incident substantiated our intelligence that Trafficante was deeply involved in gambling operations, and it showed that he had major interests in gambling outside the city of Tampa.

The case was initiated in 1954 by a veteran St. Petersburg police officer, Detective Sgt. Harry Dietrich, who had obtained evidence of the operation of the Trafficante bolita ring. Bolita is a numbers racket of considerable importance in Florida, involving weekly payoffs based upon information taken from radio reports of the weekly Cuban lottery.

An attempt was made to bribe Sergeant Dietrich to ignore the operation of the ring. He was given a new car, a television set, some suits of clothing, and cash. Sergeant Dietrich accepted the bribes with the full knowledge and orders of his superiors, to whom he had immediately reported the initial bribery attempt.

As a result of his work, Santo Trafficante and his brother Henry were arrested. Both were charged with bribery and were convicted.

The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?

Mr. BROWN. This was in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same man that is now operating, and he is the boss?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Each received a prison sentence of 5 years. Santo Trafficante's conviction was later reversed in a higher court. His brother served his term and was recently released. Both brothers were subsequently indicted by the Federal Government for tax law violations.

We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property,

real or personal. His house, automobile, and all his other possessions are held in the names of others. However, we do not believe him to be destitute, for his control of gambling in the central Florida area alone must net him huge amounts of money. His operations there show, also, a characteristic Mafia method of utilizing non-Sicilian associates where it serves its criminal objectives.

Sergeant Branch, who has for the past 7 years been investigating gambling and other organized criminal activities in the Orlando area, will describe the Mafia's control, through the Harlan Blackburn organization, of lottery operations in central Florida. We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Branch is here with you?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

On the lower right-hand side of our chart we have depicted that group of Trafficante associates.

Sergeant Branch will here testify about the Blackburn group.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRANCH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BRANCH

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. BRANCH. I am a sergeant with the Orlando Police Department attached to the intelligence division, and I have been with them since 1951. I have been working in this type of work since 1956, with the cooperation of the Federal and State agencies in our area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It appears to be four or five pages. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

In the central Florida area the main gambling activity is known as bolita or Cuba. Bolita is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn daily. Cuba is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn weekly. Bettors can place bets on any number from 1 to 100 and receive a 60-to-1 return if they win. The Cuba winning number is the last two digits from the Cuban national lottery number which is five digits and is broadcast over a Havana radio station each Saturday shortly after 2 p.m.

The public is contacted by "peddlers" or "sellers," who receive a commission of 15 percent of their sales. "Pickup" men, who take the bets from the sellers to the "checkup houses," receive 20 percent of what they collect. Employees such as checkup men, adding machine operators, and supervisors above this position usually receive salaries for their duties.

Lottery operations in central Florida prior to 1948 were dominated first by Charlie Wall of Tampa and then by Sam Warren, an Orlando native. In that year Harlan Blackburn, FBI No. 1026922, a convicted felon, came into Orlando and began taking over bolita and Cuba gambling.

This man is on the chart also.

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Blackburn was born in Sand Lake, Fla., on April 13, 1919. In 1935, he was convicted of forging a U.S. Government check, for which he served 4½ years in prison. In 1943, he was sentenced to 2 years in the Florida State prison for cattle theft. He was again arrested in March 1956 for operating a lottery in Polk County, Fla., and received a 5-year prison sentence, but was released in 1959.

Senator MUSKIE. Did you say Mr. Blackburn was on the chart?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir. He is listed in the lower right-hand corner.

Senator MUSKIE. It is not on this chart?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; not on that one.

Senator MUSKIE. Blackburn is not a member of the Mafia, as such?

Mr. BRANCH. He is a subordinate that works under their direction; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he the same as Sam Warren?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; he is not. Sam Warren is dead.

He was then incarcerated for 60 days in Polk County for an earlier conviction of conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of Florida. He was most recently arrested on November 5, 1962, for failure to buy a Federal wagering tax stamp. He is presently out on bail awaiting trial.

Blackburn supervises the five lottery bankers who control central Florida gambling. These bankers are Rudy Mach, Joe Wheeler, Clyde F. Lee, Cecil Merritt, and Ralph Strawder. Mach has in his operation Don Mach, Dan Fussell, Buddy Parron, Glen Brechen, Tommy Berry, and Clifford Bell; Joe Wheeler has Max Reid, Mary Carden, and Phil Riffe; Clyde F. Lee has Jesse Joyner, Vasco Joyner, Mathew Smith, Macon Tribue, Julia Ciphon, Hoy Anderson, and Katherine Bradshaw; Cecil Merritt has Clayton Thomas, Sonny Brown, and George Solomon; and Ralph Strawder has Benny White, William Harrell, and Elvin Carroll.

With the exception of Carden, Riffe, Harrell, White, and Ciphon, all of these persons have criminal records and arrests for gambling and other crimes.

I have here copies of their FBI records and submit them for the subcommittee's record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be received in bulk as exhibit No. 47 for reference only.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BRANCH. These five exceptions have been connected with this operation for a number of years, however, and their names and amounts of gross and net collections appear in much of the evidence that we have secured from checkup houses. We have also sworn testimony from witnesses that these persons have been engaged in illegal gambling.

Senator MUSKIE. What is the size of their take?

Mr. BRANCH. I have that further along in my statement, sir.

The lottery operation of the Blackburn group extends from Orange County into all of central Florida and into the southern State of Georgia.

From 1948 until the latter part of 1953, our department established that Santo Trafficante, Jr., and his brother, Henry, personally were visiting Orlando and supervising the checkup houses that were conducting the lottery.

It has also been obvious to us that the Trafficante organization has controlled the Blackburn operation for at least the last 10 years. From our examination of seized records, and from the fact that in all raids on the checkup houses we have arrested persons having close family ties with the Trafficante organization who were acting as auditors for his interests. In addition, there has been heavy telephone toll traffic between the Trafficantes in Tampa and the Blackburn group in Orlando.

When Blackburn was arrested in 1953, a memorandum was found containing telephone numbers of Augustine Primo Lazzara, Salvatore J. Lorenzo, J. M. Cacciatore—uncle of Santo Trafficante, Jr.—and Santo Trafficante, Jr., and of the Nebraska and Flamingo Bars, both owned by the Trafficante family.

In 1957 a search of a gambling house in Orange County by a State officer, with the assistance of the Orlando Police, resulted in the arrest of several persons. One of these was Lorenzo and another person by the name of Leto, from Tampa. They both gave sworn statements at that time to the county solicitor that they were working for Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In November 1961, another raid was conducted by agents of the Internal Revenue Service in conjunction with the Orlando Police Department on a house in Orange County. There were six persons arrested, and among those were Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore. These two were cousins of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In July 1963, a raid on a gambling house in Sanford, Fla., by the IRS agents, with the assistance of the Orlando Police Department, established that it was another operation of Harlan Blackburn's, supervised by Clyde Lee. In the records seized there was the phone number of Trafficante's cousin, John Favata Cacciatore, and the phone number of the printing establishment employing Stefano Scaglione, who is also on the chart.

During the past 12 years that we know of at least three murders that have been due to fights for control of lottery operations in the Orlando area.

The fantastic amount of money taken in by these lottery operations has been repeatedly established by our raids of these gambling houses. For example, the raid in 1957 in Orange County, where Frank Ferreri and Sam Lorenzo were arrested, disclosed that the house was doing a gross business of $100,000 per week.

Senator MUSKIE. What were they paying out?

Mr. BRANCH. The profit on this operation runs about 50 percent.

The November 1961 raid in Orange County where Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore, cousins of Santo Trafficante, were arrested revealed that operation was doing a conservatively estimated gross of $160,000 per week.

The CHAIRMAN. With the same ratio of half applying there?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. When you say "net profit," this means after deductions of the commission which totaled 35 percent?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. And the prizes.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

The commission and also the prizes and what other operating expenses they may have such as automobiles, rent, telephone bills.

The latest raid, in July of this year, indicated a gross revenue of $250,000 per week.

From those figures——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that raid?

Mr. BRANCH. That was in Sanford, Fla., just 17 miles north of Orlando. These figures are established by the Internal Revenue agents and auditors.

From these figures, it is easy to see why the Mafia has moved so heavily into lottery gambling in central Florida and why gambling revenues are universally acknowledged to be the "lifeblood" of organized crime.

Any additional legislation that this subcommittee can promote to further restrict and inhibit gambling will, in our opinion, be a substantial blow to organized crime.

Senator MUSKIE. Did they actually pay off on those lotteries or was it dishonest in that respect, too?

Mr. BRANCH. Usually they pay off.

They don't pay off when we pull a raid on them or arrest them. They stop at that. But they are in operation the next week.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not pay off for that day?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; they don't.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unfortunate for the fellow that won, who cannot get his winnings.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If the law enforcement is pretty vigilant, I would be afraid to place a bet under those circumstances.

All right, Chief, if you will, you may proceed.

Stand by, Sergeant, as we may want to ask you some questions.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF NEIL G. BROWN—Resumed

Mr. BROWN. To understand the crime network Trafficante operates it is necessary to examine the modern era of crime in Tampa, which dates from the early 1920's. Its most violent episodes were between 1937 and 1945, when the Sicilian underworld was attempting to move in on all illegal gambling in Tampa. This period in the history of our city was referred to as "the era of blood."

Senator MUSKIE. Who coined that phrase, the gang or the newspapers?

Mr. BROWN. I think it was the newspapers, Senator.

During the 1920's, before the Sicilian underworld moved into the rackets to any great extent, one of our most notorious residents, Charles M. Wall, started his rise to become the acknowledged boss of most of the illegal gambling in the Tampa and central area of the State of Florida. He styled himself "dean of the underworld," and in 1953 he admitted to a Hillsborough County solicitor that he had made his living from illegal gambling. During 1945, Wall forfeited his leadership by entering into a partnership with Santo Trafficante, Sr.

The elder Trafficante was born in Sicily in 1886. He came to Tampa in 1904 and became a naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1950, he was one of the missing witnesses in the Kefauver crime hearings held in Tampa. He died on August 11, 1954. Police records do not show any arrest for Santo Trafficante, Sr.

In 1952, Wall declared that he was retiring, although he did not

state what he was retiring from. In April 1955, Wall's body was found in his home. He had been brutally beaten and his throat had been slashed. We have never discovered who the murderers were, nor have we determined their motive. Perhaps Wall was murdered because the killers learned he had admitted that he was Trafficante's partner in illegal gambling, and that he disclosed confidential facts about the Mafia.

In 1960, Sergeant de la Llana obtained—from a confidential source of known reliability—an astounding report about the Mafia and its operation in Tampa. The report had been obtained from Charles Wall in 1945, approximately 6 months after Trafficante, Senior, had made himself a partner in Walls' gambling enterprises.

Wall declared that from 1920 through 1945 he controlled gambling in Tampa and in the Florida counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Polk, and Orange. His rival for control of the gambling rackets was the local Mafia organization. This was headed, he said, by Santo Trafficante, Sr., the Diecidue brothers, James Lumia, Ignacio Antinori and Salvatore Italiano. Antinori was murdered on October 22, 1940; Lumia was murdered on June 5, 1950; and Italiano fled to Mexico in 1951.

Wall admitted that he had good reasons for going along with Trafficante, Senior, in 1945; previously the Mafia group had made three attempts on his life; the first was in 1937 as Wall was leaving a bank on the main street in Tampa; the second try occurred as Wall was leaving the garage behind his house; the third, in 1940, happened a few blocks from his house. In the third attempt, a truck passed the automobile in which Wall was riding and then stopped abruptly in front of the car. James DeSimone and Nicola Impostato, FBI No. 2716692, each armed with a shotgun, stepped from the truck and fired at Wall and his chauffeur. Both escaped with slight injuries. DeSimone and Impostato were known Mafia killers from Kansas City, Mo. They were staying with the Antinori family at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Wall still living?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; he was killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Later killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These three attempts failed but later he was killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Wall declared that the Mafia tried to make the public believe that the organization no longer existed in this country and that Mafia members pointed to the end of terrorism among Italian groups as evidence that the Mafia was gone from the underworld scene. Wall believed, however, that the organization had merely changed its type of operation. He said that other racketeers had once used the Mafia to monopolize rackets in major American cities. They had educated the Mafia so well in the process that the Sicilians had taken over the rackets themselves. Wall stated that the Mafia learned to consider extortion from Italian businessmen a "nickel-and-dime" business. They had discovered that public officials could be corrupted by bribery and that they could organize to take over the major rackets in the United States.

Wall declared that the Mafia was not dying out, but "was bigger and better than ever." He said that his partner, the elder Trafficante, had told him that there were some 10,000 active Mafia members in the United States. Wall stated that the Mafia leader in Tampa was

Santo Trafficante, Sr., and that he was well informed on the activities of the organization in the United States, in Sicily, and in other countries of the world. Trafficante had told him, Wall said, that the Mafia in the United States was directed by a local board in every city having a sizable Sicilian population. There was a national board, headed by Joseph Profaci in New York City, which was composed of the heads of the major local boards. Trafficante is reported to have said that Frank Costello, Vincent Mangano, and Joe Massie were influential members of the national board, and that Frank Nitti and Lucky Luciano were former members.

According to Wall's account, the Mafia was composed of two distinct groups, an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The general rule was that only natives of Sicily were admitted to the "inner circle," while American-born Italians were recruited into the "outer circle." Wall was told it was possible for a member to be transferred from "outer" to "inner" status when he performed an act of special merit, even though he had been born in the United States. The restrictions were not due to lack of trust by native Italians toward those of American birth, but because the "inner circle" usually took the major part of the proceeds of the Mafia's illegal activities and, therefore, preferred to keep the membership of the "inner circle" as small as possible.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you say that this chart represents the inner circle, Chief?

Mr. BROWN. At the very top portion, Senator, would be the inner circle.

Below that——

Senator MUSKIE. By the "top portion," do you mean——

Mr. BROWN. I would include in that that the three top men would be in the inner circle and those below that would be in the outer circle.

The CHAIRMAN. Those would only be in the inner circle so far as the Tampa area is concerned?

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the inner circle overall?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; this is just in the inner circle in the Tampa area.

The CHAIRMAN. But that gives an indication of how the overall organization is set up.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have it in here, but I may have missed it, but who was Wall talking to when he gave all this information?

Mr. BROWN. That was a confidential informant.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Very well.

(At this point Senator Javits entered the hearing room.)

Mr. BROWN. Wall believed the influential Mafia members in Tampa from 1930 through 1945 were: Santo Trafficante, Sr., Salvatore Italiano, James Lumia, and the Diecidue family—Alfonso, Antonio, Thomas, and Frank. The Diecidues and their in-laws opposed the leadership of Trafficante in the Tampa organization. Trafficante told Wall that Vincent Mangano, of the national board, supported the Diecidues but that he, Trafficante, was able to stay in power because he had Joseph Profaci's friendship.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question here?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. You refer to the national board. I do not recall any point in this hearing where there was this kind of a direct refer-

ence to a national organization in the Mafia. Was it referred to as such?

Mr. BROWN. This is the information as Wall has reported that it consisted of a national board.

Senator MUSKIE. Do you know who he identified as members of the national board?

Mr. BROWN. Well, Joe Profaci and Vincent Mangano were two of the members of the national board.

The CHAIRMAN. They are shown to be leaders of families, both of them.

Senator MUSKIE. But those same people are leaders of families in New York as testified by Valachi.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is your impression that the heads of the New York families made up a national board that had jurisdiction over Tampa, among other places?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, sir.

Wall declared that there were approximately 40 members of the Mafia living in the Tampa area and he believed that Trafficante's share of proceeds of their gambling operation was being divided with other members of the Mafia.

Information in our files from another confidential source confirms Wall's statement. In addition it reveals that Antonio Diecidue made annual trips to Miami for the purpose of renting a house for Vincent Mangano, who came down from New York every year to spend 2 or 3 months in Miami. This source stated that many important members of the Mafia visited Mangano in Florida, but that Trafficante never appeared.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask another question on the national board? Was it your impression that the national board members shared in the proceeds of the criminal activities in Tampa?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; they had a percentage.

Senator MUSKIE. Have you any idea what that percentage was?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; I have no idea.

The gray shadings on our chart depict the influence of each of these men. To me, it appears to be no small coincidence that in Tampa the Diecidue family lost stature from at least the early 1950's when Vincent Mangano disappeared; nor that Trafficante, Jr., the Profaci man, was in the immediate vicinity, when Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957.

Sergeant de la Llana's intelligence unit has prepared summaries of the men in Trafficante's organization, along with a commentary of relevant facts about each of them. So that our information may be available not only to the subcommittee, but to all police units to whom your reports are so valuable, I wish to submit these summaries and commentary for the record, as our exhibit 3a through t; and exhibit 4.

The CHAIRMAN. The summary to which you have referred may be received as exhibit 48——

Mr. O'DONNELL. Chief, as I understand it, these are summations, very brief summations, of the 19 individuals that are on the chart insofar as their criminal activity, their mode of business, their criminal history, et cetera; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 48.

(The documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 48" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You make reference to another exhibit. What is it?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you explain the other exhibit? Go into a little detail as to the various murders that you have on your exhibit 4, which will be a different exhibit in our hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair get this straight first.

The summary that he referred to has been made exhibit 48.

That is what you referred to as "our exhibit 3a"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say "through t; and exhibit 4." What is exhibit 4, your exhibit 4?

Mr. BROWN. Exhibit 4 is a brief summation on each of the subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your exhibit 3?

Mr. BROWN. They are arrest records of each of the individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Exhibit 48 is the arrest records.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your exhibit 4 is a brief summary of each person on the chart?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of his records and activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 49 for reference.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 49" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now the record is straight.

You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Our department has always found it a most difficult task to obtain evidence sufficient for successful prosecution of Mafia members, because the witnesses who might offer such evidence have always been reluctant to do so. The paramount reason, of course, is their fear of Mafia reprisals, since it is common knowledge in Tampa that the Mafia does not hesitate to use murder for such reprisals and the relative infrequency with which such professional murders are successfully prosecuted.

We have categorized certain homicides in the Tampa area, from 1928 to the present, as "gangland slayings." An examination of the circumstances of some of these murders emphasizes how the Mafia uses murder to discipline its membership, to revenge itself against violators of its code and to otherwise eliminate opposition to its criminal activities and goals. Of the 23 homicides on the list, only 1 has been solved. A ratio of less than 5 percent of solution—and that particular murder was cleared up because it apparently resulted from an argument, although it is possible that the slayer deliberately provoked the argument. It was not, therefore, a typical gangland slaying, although the killer and the victim were both underworld figures.

In startling contrast to the number of unsolved gangland slayings, an examination of all other Tampa homicides from 1958 through 1962 shows that we have had 145 murders and that only 4 are presently unsolved, a solution ratio of better than 97 percent. From 1960 through 1962, all 83 homicides in our city were solved.

The CHAIRMAN. What period is covered by the 23 gangland slayings that you make reference to?

Mr. BROWN. From 1928 through the present day.

The CHAIRMAN. In a period of about 30 years.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you identify them as gangland slayings as distinguished from the usual homicide cases that you have?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On those, according to your testimony, it has been impossible—or you have been unsuccessful, at least, in solving any of them except the one that appeared so obvious, and it would not possibly come within the category of "gangland slayings"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have included it as being the only one that was solved.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What are the characteristics of the gangland slayings that makes it so difficult to solve them as contrasted with your excellent record in other homicides?

Mr. BROWN. Of course, primarily it is because of witnesses who are reluctant to give the law enforcement any information whatsoever. In some of our killings—I recall one where we had nine witnesses in the room and nobody actually saw the murder or knew anything was going on.

Senator MUSKIE. So this fact has a direct bearing upon the question of immunity statutes, for example.

Mr. BROWN. That is right. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This, in other words, emphasizes the rigid discipline, the code of underworld law, that cannot be violated without suffering the penalty of death.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the nine who were in the room when the murder was committed, possibly every one of them knew what happened.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I would doubt that somebody did not know it. But, anyway, they know that the penalty for them talking would be death.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if they were inclined to, and I do not mean to say they were inclined to, even if one of them were inclined to talk, he knows what the penalty would be. And that makes it difficult. That is why you have the trouble in the gangland slayings, the silence, the threat, the intimidation of a death sentence, of their being executed by their underworld government if they talk.

Mr. BROWN. That is true.

Senator MUSKIE. Then, Chief, just to nail that point down, they seem to be more than concerned and clearly are more concerned for themselves and for their allies than they are about immunity against prosecution.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is true. They are afraid for their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. I have had these gangland slayings listed, with a few pertinent comments about each, and submit to the subcommittee this list as our exhibit 5.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received and be made exhibit No. 50.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 50" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

(At this point Senator Javits withdrew from the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. With few exceptions, those murders well reflect Joseph Valachi's testimony that Mafia members do live by violence and die by violence.

At least two of the unsolved murders on our list—that of Gus Perez in 1936 and of Joe "Pelusa" Diaz in 1958—were, in my opinion, directly attributable to the Mafia's knowledge or belief that the victims had given to legal authorities evidence incriminating Mafia members. A third murder—of Carl Carramusa, in 1945—taking place in Chicago, involved some Tampa Mafiosi, and is of particular interest in illustrating the Mafia zeal for vengeance against a member who violates its rules. It is of further significance, too, in demonstrating the difficulty of protecting witnesses against the Mafia—and is underlining Attorney General Kennedy's request for additional funds for that purpose, which request I strongly endorse.

The Carramusa case developed in Kansas City, Mo., with certain aspects related to the Mafia organization in Tampa. The principal figure in the case was Carl Carramusa, known as a minor member of the Mafia and a front man for the Mafia's narcotics traffic operation in Kansas City.

Carramusa was indicted in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Federal narcotic laws. His codefendants were Joseph DeLuca, Nicola Impastato, Paul Antinori, Joe Antinori, Charles Gerrgimina, Louis Ventola, Patsy Ventola, Charles Tiabi, Samuel Pernice, and Fellipo Fernice. Tampa's Mafia organization was one of the sources of supply for the Kansas City group, and at that time the narcotics trade in Tampa was headed by Paul Antinori and Joseph Antinori, who had inherited the narcotics leadership from their father, Ignazio Antinori. The elder Antinori had been murdered a few years before in a narcotics deal. All of the defendants in the Kansas City case were prosecuted successfully, primarily because Carramusa violated the cardinal Mafia code of l'omerta, or silence, testifying openly against them at their trial. After the trial, Carramusa went into hiding in Chicago with his wife and family, changing his name and beginning a new life under new circumstances.

Three years later, in June of 1945, while he was seated in his automobile, Carramusa's head was blown off by a shotgun blast. James Lumia, an associate of the Antinoris, was a suspect in this killing, but was himself murdered at Tampa in June of 1950. A prime suspect was the same Nicola Impastato, who had some years before attempted to kill Charles Wall.

In Tampa we have suffered also the frustration I know that many of my police colleagues in other cities have experienced—the deliberate recanting at trial of the original statements of complaining or key witnesses, because of their fear of Mafia reprisal. A clear instance of this frustration of law enforcement effort involved three of the ranking members of the Tampa Mafia.

One day in 1953, one Joe Castellano went to the Italian Club in Tampa to play cards with a group of friends. During the course of the evening, he talked to Salvatore Scaglione privately. Scaglione asked Castellano if he wanted to make a profit on a "hot load" of whisky. Castellano said he was interested, and they agreed to meet later that night.

At the meeting, Scaglione was accompanied by Joe Mistretta and Angelo LoScalzo. Castellano got into the front seat of a car provided by the others, and the four men drove to a thickly wooded area outside of Tampa city limits. Castellano was then attacked with a hammer, being hit repeatedly on the head. He managed to get out of the car, although he was badly hurt. He broke loose from his elderly assailants and ran away. He stumbled into a nearby house and asked to be taken to the constable's house, where he gave a statement about the incident, naming the three as his assailants. He swore to the county solicitor that he had no idea why he was beaten. Scaglione, Mistretta, and LoScalzo were arrested and charged with assault with intent to murder.

Joe Castellano disappeared for a period of time. After he was found, the case went to trial. Castellano changed his story completely and testified that he had injured himself while hunting on the night of the attack. The predictable result, of course, was a verdict for the defendants of "not guilty."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO FIGHT ORGANIZED CRIME

I believe firmly that it is almost impossible for the Police Department of the City of Tampa, or any other municipality, to cope effectively with the activities of a national or international crime syndicate such as these hearings show exists in the United States. One of the main problems is that the most dedicated, well-trained, and well-staffed police force is almost always limited legally and financially to the territorial boundaries of its municipality. For example, the Tampa Police Department is obviously interested in and informed about the activities of Santo Trafficante. However, in the past the department was unable to do anything about Trafficante's operations in pre-Castro Cuba; it has no jurisdiction or control of his illegal affairs in Miami and elsewhere in central Florida. The department could only record that he attended the Apalachin meeting in November of 1957, but it could do nothing about this obvious evidence that he was a high-ranking member of a national crime syndicate.

In the light of our experience with the Mafia in our own city's underworld, I submit for this subcommittee's consideration some suggestions for Federal legislation which I believe would certainly help local law enforcement agencies to fight organized crime more effectively.

1. More ample funds must be obtained by local agencies to recruit high caliber police personnel and to retain superior personnel having the experience and capabilities to understand, investigate, and prosecute organized criminal conspiracies. Because of the demonstrated interstate nature of organized crime, Federal legislation similar to

The Miami Herald

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Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that . . . Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting

some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power, according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

SECRET

delivered $10000 to

O'C in Fla

– Richard Scully Cain
AKA / Richard Scalzetti

CIA says no rel.

used ase under "contact clearance" since '63

Giancana driver?

– Jan 1 '59 full of gambling casinos

SECRET

1st Meet.

I surprised to be approached by CIA

person in Cuba
business interests

Order whatever to see him
- how
- where
- when

SECRET

Giancana file (Meyer Lansky's gambling operation in Havana)

Trafficante

- gaming casinos under Batista
- father died in 54 - inherited rackets
- intimate of Carlos Marcello
- T introduced in circa Sept 60 as "Joe"
- 1st attempt T delivered poison pills to "agent who had access to Castro" = failure
- T suggested another candidate
- [illegible] nominated Juan Orta - Cuban receiving kickbacks from gambling interests still had access to Castro

T gave pills to

- Dr Anthony Varona Cuban exile

SECRET

Attorneys Briefing

T — met w/ Roselli — July of this year

Calls be made — contacts — travel etc

Reptr — desc. — first lead — told about ? → concern over rpt in Fla?

followup interview after Roselli i.e. Roselli talking — T know etc

Dick — CIA memo — Bill Lynch

Who are we called after T got her call etc

T travels LA / Chicago etc — Name of LA guy

perjury involving alleged contribution to political organization in return for impairment of Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and judicial proceedings were not entitled to continuance or change of venue on ground that, though pretrial publicity was nationwide, exposure varied in certain sections of the country. U. S. v. Mitchell, D.C.N.Y.1973, 372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal dismissed 485 F.2d 1290.

§ 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement

(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if—

(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy;

(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and

(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which—

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member, or employee of such organization, except as compensation for actual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

(d) Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title VIII, § 802(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 936.

References in Text. Paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 501(c) (3) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Congressional Statement of Findings. Section 801 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "The Congress finds that illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof."

Priority of State Laws. Section 811 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "No provision of this title [enacting this section and section 1955 of this title, amending section 2516 of this title and enacting material set out as notes under this section and section 1955 of this title] indicates an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of a State or possession, or a political subdivision of a State or possession, on the same subject matter, or to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State or possession, or political subdivision of a State or possession."

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 91-452, see 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4007.

Index to Notes

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, c. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, c. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology. 80th Congress House Report No. 304.

References in Text. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in the text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

1962 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see 1962 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2567.

Notes of Decisions

Library references

Obstructing Justice ⟹7, 21.
C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 5, 22.

1. Constitutionality

Former section 241a of this title [now this section] providing that whoever "corruptly" endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness in proceeding, etc. was not unconstitutional for failure to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt contrary to U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and 6. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

2. Generally

This section covers any activity which would influence or intimidate witness who might be called to testify and is not limited to witness who has been called to testify with defendant's knowledge. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

3. Proceedings within section

The submission to the Naturalization Service of an application to file a petition for naturalization cannot, in a legal sense, have pendency throughout the entire United States within meaning of this section creating a criminal offense against one who corruptly attempts to obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of law, under which such a proceeding is had before a department or agency of the United States. Tarau v. U. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede due and proper administration of law in relation to a naturalization proceeding allegedly pending before Immigration Service, based on a false statement allegedly made in defendant's application for pardon regarding other arrests and convictions against him, naturalization proceeding was not pending in 1951 before the Service when the defendant made the application for pardon, nor when pardon was obtained by him, so as to authorize conviction, where at the time of charged offense the Service had no application in its hands, in that it regarded the naturalization application as not having been entitled to be submitted and returned it to defendant, and defendant subsequently submitted a new application in 1955 having no relation to what was done in 1951. Id.

"Proceeding" within this section includes any investigation which is directed by formal order of Securities and Exchange Commission and at which designated officer takes testimony under oath. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

sion Notes

2 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 sub- ted the catchline "Obstruction of edings before departments, agen- and committees" for "Influencing or ing witness before agencies and nittees" and punished the willful re- al, concealment, destruction, mutila- alteration or falsification of docu- s which were the subject of a de- d under the Antitrust Civil Process if done with the intent to prevent liance with a civil investigative de- d.

gislative History: For legislative his- and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.

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Proceeding" within this section in- les any investigation which is directed formal order of Securities and Ex- nge Commission and at which desig- ed officer takes testimony under oath. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

4. Witness within section

One whom defendant knew was probable witness before Senate Committee and who intended to testify was a "witness" though not under subpoena when defendant gave him false story to tell when and if he testified, for purposes of prosecutions for subornation of perjury and corruptly influencing witness to give false and perjurious information to Senate Committee investigators. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal.1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed. 2d 795.

5. Indictment or information

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, sufficiently charged an offense under this section dealing with influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees. U. S. v. Presser, D.C.Ohio 1960, 187 F.Supp. 64.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground that doctrine of res judicata applied because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee. Id.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground of double jeopardy, because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee, since same facts would not prove each case. Id.

An indictment for conspiracy to violate criminal code by subornation of perjury in proceeding before the Federal Petroleum Board was not subject to criticism that it was too vague, contradictory, duplicitous, uncertain and indefinite. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

6. Evidence

The "two witness rule" was not applicable in showing that defendant violated this section proscribing obstruction of justice by influencing witness to give false testimony and information to Senate Committee and its investigators, and testimony of one person alone was sufficient to convict. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal. 1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

Testimony of one person alone is sufficient to convict defendant for obstructing justice in influencing witness to give false testimony to Senate Committee and to give false and perjurious information to committee investigators. Id.

Evidence sustained convictions under counts charging corruptly inducing witness to testify falsely and corruptly influencing him to give false and perjurious information to investigators of Senate Committee. Id.

7. Questions for jury

Whether defendant charged with obstruction of justice in Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation by inducing person to testify falsely that he had purchased certain securities through firm of which defendant was head and had resold securities to that firm knew that witness would be asked to testify under oath was jury question. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

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The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

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Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

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6/22/61
Recd from
Mr. Bundy
ACBash

8 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 June 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which proscribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

2. Review of Political Action Projects

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group

suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.

4. STPOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.

7. TACKLE

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to be made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reservations of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Gilpatric supported the need for current information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Chinat crews, in his opinion, would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.

8. Nicaragua

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment remaining at Puerto Cabezas and of the need for negotiating with Somoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza. Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.

9. Cuba

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependents of the strike force and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Carrion and submit a formal proposal to an early meeting of the Special Group.

10. Minutes of Special Group Meetings

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and

retention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship between his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes. Mr. Dulles suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records and because some of the references contained therein involved the use of pseudonyms, the need of the Group might be satisfied by having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediately at hand to answer any questions put to them by higher authority.

THOMAS P. SCHREYER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate, and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

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*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 1954).

conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a *fait accompli*; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

III. Operations and olicy

Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship o an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have ot been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

2. <u>Covert political operations</u> technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

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The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

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(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolise contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support: and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

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5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be

enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

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CIA

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

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*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6, 13, 1954).

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conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassements when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

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This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

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There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support; and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organisation of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

5. <u>How to Establish Policy Control?</u> Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be

enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10023
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Withdrawal of United Nations Troops
DATE : 8/00/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1

SECRET

UTF 1470

CIA INFORMATION REPORT

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Congo

COUNTRY UNITED NATIONS/CONGO

SUBJECT WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS FROM THE CONGO

DOI AUGUST 1963

PADA NEW YORK, 7 AUGUST 1963

APPR 3

SOURCE MEDIUM LEVEL LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIAL /F/ WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

SECRET UTF-1470

DEFINITE PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN THE CONGO AT THE END OF 1963 DESPITE CONGOLESE PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA,S PLEAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE ONLY WAY OF COUNTERACTING THE WITH-DRAWAL WOULD BE TO FIND A NEW METHOD OF FINANCING THE CONGO OPERATION. UNDER SUCH A PLAN, THE IDEAL WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF 40-50 PERCENT STRENGTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT OF FUNDING METHODS, THE ABILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACCEPT SUCH OUTSIDE FUNDS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEBATE.

FIELD DISSEM U.S. MISSION

UTF-1470 8 AUGUST 1963

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE (HUGHES)9	AD/NE (MATTHIAS	AD/CI	DD/I	EXO

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10027
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers
DATE : 4/23/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 38: Cuba 4/21/63-4/30/63. Box 1.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OCI No. 1427/63

23 April 1963

Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers

1. The initial report on Fidel Castro's forthcoming visit to Moscow came from a usually reliable source with excellent contacts in Cuban government circles who obtained the information from a Cuban government official who has been an intimate acquaintance for many years and who has excellent high-level contacts throughout the Cuban leadership. The usually reliable source obtained the information on 25 March. The report was disseminated to the intelligence community on 27 March and reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin dated 29 March.

2. The substance of the report was that, despite his strong criticism of the Soviet Union, particularly concerning its actions during the missile crisis, Fidel Castro is not blinded to the need for Cuba to maintain good diplomatic relations with the entire "socialist camp." Castro was planning, according to the report, to go to Moscow for the May Day celebrations. He was planning, however, to remain in Moscow only three days. It was his intention, according to the report, to tell Khrushchev, in effect, that the USSR must assist Cuba but must at the same time understand that Castro does not intend to be a "docile satellite."

3. Information from the same source and sub-source was disseminated to the intelligence community on 30 March indicating that Castro was intending to visit Algeria on the same trip that took him to Moscow. This was reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 1 April.

4. The substance of the second report was that Castro "plans to visit Algeria in connection with" the visit to Moscow and that Algeria and the USSR are the only two countries he was planning to visit on that trip. The Algerian visit was planned in view of the "special relationship" that is said to exist between Castro and Ben Bella and also between Castro and Algerian Defense Minister Boumedienne.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10051
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 8/10/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1

SANITIZED NLK·01·048·4·3·3 55

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuban exiles

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA NICARAGUA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/556,052

SUBJECT POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUBAN EXILE BASE IN NICARAGUA

DATE DISTR. 10 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 JULY 1963

REFERENCES TDCS-3/555,529 IN 97132

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (9 AUGUST 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35,970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL-KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING ROMANI."

1. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 24 JULY 63, SALVADOR ROMANI, REPRESENTATIVE IN VENEZUELA OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION COMANDO UNIFICADO DE LA LIBERACION EN CUBA (UNITED COMMAND OF CUBAN LIBERATION - CULC), CLAIMED THAT A SMALL NUMBER CUBAN EXILES HAD ALREADY MOVED FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. IN EXILE CIRCLES IT IS BELIEVED THIS ACTION REFLECTS A PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA AND MANUEL ARTIME, SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXILE GROUP MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY - MRR). ROMANI DID NOT KNOW DETAILS OF AGREEMENT. IF IT ENTAILS ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE EXILE MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA,

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EXO
STATE/DIR									FBI	TREASURY	I&NS	COAST GUARD					

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES BEFORE DECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION.

2. NUCLEUS OF SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND EXILES WHO, ACCORDING TO ROMANI, HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED MILATARY TRAINING FROM MEMBERS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES. ROMANI CLAIMED U.S. POLICY IS TO FERMENT INTERNAL RESISTANCE IN CUBA AND TO STRENGTHEN THE RESISTANCE BY INFILTRATION OF TRAINED COMMANDO GROUPS OF EXILES. FOR THIS REASON THE U.S. CONTINUES TO GIVE TACIT SUPPORT FOR TRAINING OF EXILE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

3. ROMANI MADE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL EXILE PARTIES:

(A) CULC IS CONCENTRATING ON DISSEMINATION OF ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN CUBA TO PREPARE GROUND FOR INSURRECTION. IT FAVORS INFILTRATION OF SMALL MILITARY GROUPS BUT REJECTS A GENERAL INVASION.

(B) JURE (JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA), LED BY MANUEL RAY, CONSIDERS THE PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT IS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS IN CUBAN MILITIA AND ARMED FORCES.

(C) ALLIANCE OF MRP (MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR), SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS ON CUBAN MAINLAND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MORALE OF RESISTANCE FORCES IN CUBA.

(D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS), CLC (COMANDOS LIBRES DE CUBA) AND A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY A GENERAL INVASION WILL OVERTHROW THE CUBAN REGIME.

(E) FUR (FRENTE UNIDO REVOLUCIONARIO), LED BY AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO, IS WORKING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVTS FOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10052
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 6/28/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BUNDY-SMITH
~~BELK~~
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNGAN
FELDMAN
FORRESTAL
HIRSCH
JOHNSON
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
~~PEASLEY~~
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH
~~WIESNER~~

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/551,860
SUBJECT	CUBAN EXILE PLANS	DATE DISTR.	28 JUNE 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-JUNE 1963	REFERENCES	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	ENGLAND, LONDON (27 JUNE 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	OEL 3566

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING THE PERSONS MENTIONED".

1. AMAURY FRAGINALS ALONSO, ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR (POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT - MRP), THE SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, CLAIMED IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION DURING A VISIT TO VENEZUELA IN MID JUNE 63 THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE CUBAN MAINLAND. AT THE SAME TIME, PLANS ARE GOING AHEAD TO LAUNCH PLAN OMEGA. FRAGINALS SAID THAT PLAN OMEGA HAS THREE STAGES: (A) REORGANIZATION AND ARMING OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THROUGHOUT CUBA WHICH WILL BE LED BY LOCAL MEN WHO KNOW THEIR AREA;

(B) INCESSANT GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN BASES, THE CUBAN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR	FBI	I&NS	TREASURY														

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

ARMY AND THE MILITIA. THE PURPOSE OF THESE WILL BE TO CAUSE MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND RAISE THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PREPARATION FOR AN INSURRECTION; (C) COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF A GENERAL INSURRECTION.

2. FRAGINALS REMARKED THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF GUERRILLA GROUPS IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY BUT THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS. HE REVEALED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS RECEIVING BLUE-PRINTS, FROM INSIDE CUBA, OF MAJOR PLANTS. THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FUNCTIONS, SHIFTS, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF GUARDS. THE BLUE PRINTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY COURIER OR LETTER AND WILL BE USED FOR PLAN OMEGA.

3. FRAGINALS DESCRIBED THE LATEST ADHERENT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE FRENTE ANTI-COMMUNISTA DE LIBERACION (ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION FRONT - FAL), AS A CLANDESTINE GROUP WITHIN THE CUBAN ARMY. HE REFUSED TO GIVE FIGURES BUT ALLEGED THAT THE GROUP WAS EXPANDING AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE "FORTHCOMING WAR" IN CUBA. HE CONFIRMED THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO WAGE WAR ON FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10058
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : Director, CIA
TITLE : Activities of Cuban Trained Peruvian Guerrillas
DATE : 4/11/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 51: Cuba, Subjects intelligence material 6/63-7/63. Box 1

(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EYES ONLY

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Activities of Cuban-Trained Peruvian Guerrillas

1. The information in this memorandum comes from an extremely sensitive source who is currently a member of a group of Cuban-trained Peruvian guerrillas. No other dissemination has been made of the reports he has provided, in order to protect him and to insure that a channel is kept open to him. The information is being forwarded in this restricted manner at this time to furnish an insight into the extent of Cuban efforts to assist Latin American revolutionary movements. The Agency directed asset is working inside a network which is now assisting Cuban-trained Latin Americans to re-enter their own countries illegally, and to join with leftist revolutionary groups to overthrow the established governments.

2. The Agency asset was a member of a group of more than 70 Peruvians trained in Cuba from June until December 1962. His contingent traveled in small groups by way of Mexico. He received his first special assignment when he was appointed to stay behind in Mexico temporarily and to act as a clandestine contact with a Cuban Embassy official there. The Cuban gave him instructions and funds, and he directed the later groups which transited Mexico.

3. The Peruvian group was ostensibly in Cuba only to attend the July celebrations. According to our agent, some of the members themselves did not know in advance they were to be given training. The Cubans set the Peruvians up as self-contained units in secret training sites in Habana, where they were given political indoctrination and weapons. Later they were moved to rural hill areas for guerrilla training. The agent has described in detail these secret training sites, giving address of the houses and the locations of the guerrilla areas.

4. The agent was removed from his group for several weeks to undergo special training in secret communications techniques, in preparation for his current assignment.

5. At present, the agent acts as coordinator, helping the Peruvians to return illegally to Peru. He is in correspondence with

persons in numerous points of entry in Latin America and with contacts in several European capitals who assist the group on their clandestine return. Although many left Peru openly on valid papers, they are coming back illegally. Some have false documentation from other countries, primarily from Colombia; some have Peruvian passports issued in the names of persons now deceased; some are crossing the borders from neighboring countries clandestinely without showing any papers; and some go by small boats to isolated areas.

6. The agent is a member of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) of Peru which now plans to join with other leftist revolutionary groups to bring about a coup before the elections scheduled for June 1963. The agent knows of some 200 Peruvians who have received Cuban training, only a small percentage of whom are actually Communist Party members.

7. Approximately 300 persons have been named by the agent as being connected with the ring helping the Peruvians to reinfiltrate secretly. Attempts are being made to learn whether some of these, particularly those used as "Co-ordinators" or "Correspondence points" in Europe and the United States, are also connected with the illegal return of Cuban-trained guerrillas to other countries.

8. Paris has emerged as the center of the network. Groups of ten arrive weekly from Cuba to be sent on to various Latin American countries for eventual re-entry into Peru. The man in charge of the Peruvians is headquartered in Paris. From there, he has been directing the travel, sending instructions to his scattered subordinates, and receiving reports and information from contacts throughout the world, and handling funds.

9. Correspondence between members of the group is by cable and by letter. The security of communications is protected by several alternate systems of code and secret writing. Each of the trainees has been assigned a number, and letter and number designations are given to hotels and pensions. In cable correspondence, the ring uses these numbers to indicate which persons are traveling and where they may be reached. The content of the messages appears to relate to business matters, covering shipment dates and invoice numbers for example. Letter correspondence contains secret writing with relatively sophiscated systems, interspaced between lines of innocuous friendly or business letters. A dictionary is used for coded messages in either cables or letters, with page and word number referring to clandestine key words.

10. The ring takes great precautions to prevent tracing of the addressees. One of the important links is a woman whose Paris home has entrances on two different streets. She and her husband use the principal street address for their normal lives, but the back street address for the receipt of clandestine correspondence.

11. In this Cuban-sponsored subversive operation, routes of travel are planned to escape easy detection of the fact that a person has left his home, been trained, and has returned to his country. Most of the travel has been by way of Mexico and thence to Cuba, since it was possible to escape detection of the travel. The Cubans issued loose leaf inserts for the travelers' passports, rather than stamping a record of the travel in the document itself. The Mexican Government has recently begun measures to control this travel, but a large number have managed to enter and leave Cuba for Mexico without detection. Some of the travel to Cuba is by way of the Dutch and British West Indies.

12. Many of the returning trainees go through Paris and Prague. From Paris, the travelers fan out to a number of different Latin American countries, from which they attempt clandestine re-entry into Peru. Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil have been used extensively as Latin American entry points as the travelers leave Paris.

13. The agent reports that money for this extensive travel program has been deposited in Swiss banks by the Chinese Communists, via Cuba. MIR trainees were told not to ask for aid from the Soviets to avoid straining relations with China, "since it is backing them". Our asset was responsible for the safekeeping of approximately $15,000 when he arrived in Paris. The money had been parceled out among a number of trainees during the trip, and they handed it to the Paris coordinator there. Our asset was given $1,000 when he left Paris, which he was to use for documentation when he was ready to re-enter Peru. He reported that the cost of the travel of his group from Peru to Cuba was approximately $25,000, and that this money was brought to a local leader from Paris by courier before the trip.

14. The MIR plans to establish a cover importing company representing a French firm which exports cheap agricultural equipment. The branch in Peru will serve as a cover for activities involving the travel of MIR members and the transfer of funds. It will also be a clearing house for information and instructions. When the current group of trainees is back in Peru, another group will be sent out, and funded through the cover firm. The agent reports that

the next group will number approximately 100 men and that they will receive instructions in Algeria, North Vietnam, Laos, and China. The top leader of the Peruvian group has told his lieutenants that he will soon go to Algeria to start arrangements for this training.

15. The MIR has planned four fronts in Peru in its proposed revolution. One is in the south with headquarters in Cusco, another is in the central region in the Sierra, a third is in Lima, and the fourth is in northern Peru. The agent has named the leaders in charge of each of the four fronts.

16. Our asset makes frequent reference to internal disputes in the MIR between the old line Communists and those referred to as Trotskyites. The MIR leaders in Cuba felt that some of their own groups had joined with the Trotskyites and they discussed this problem with Fidel Castro. Castro promised not to let the so-called Trotskyites return to Peru until the others were already in place and in command of the several fronts. Some of the avowed Trotskyites were among the first to be sent back, however, and the MIR leaders are highly incensed. The leaders fear that the Trotskyites will endanger the movement, and they have been especially disturbed to find that two Cuban officers, who are known to be Trotskyites, had accompanied them from Cuba.

17. The Agency asset had first estimated that it would take at least two months for all of the Peruvians to return. The re-entry program had fallen approximately a month behind schedule because of unexpected problems of transferring funds and obtaining documents. Moreover, a Communist group in one of the neighboring countries which was to help them began to charge exorbitant amounts for its assistance. The Peruvians were obliged to wait until additional money was brought to them by courier.

18. The agent also estimated that at least another month or two would be required to complete plans for the revolution after all of the trainees were back. The leaders of the trainees complained that the MIR had not made adequate plans to receive the groups and had not developed its revolutionary plans soundly.

19. Recently, however, the operation has been increasing in tempo. The leaders of the MIR have been putting additional pressures on our asset and on others in the chain to speed up re-entry. A number of the trainees have spread out to small neighboring towns, ready to cross the border into Peru clandestinely. False documentation of these nearby countries is also being procured to assist others to cross into Peru "legally".

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10065
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Draft Briefing Notes: Funding
DATE : 2/18/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion, 2/18/1963. Box 1

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy ~~to ascertain and hard to~~ document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

5

arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know

that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM : Johnson
TO : Rostow
TITLE : Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961
DATE : 6/20/1961
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-6/30/1961. Box 1

2 SECRET

Sanitized NLK-75-26 NLK 02-31c, 1/03

June 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

Intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested, should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.)

It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just inside Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam. (South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.) The following table on operations for May was also presented.

	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Deserted
Viet Cong	824	30	37	none
GVN	240	158	none	41

The Local Currency Costs Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering three alternatives in descending order of preference:

a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency costs from its own resources.

SECRET

_b_. If the proposal under _a_ above is not adequate to obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85 million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of the additional 20,000 men.

_c_. If neither of the above proposals proves acceptable, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster cost for 1961.

As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the U. S. of our offer under _a_ above. On the basis of this offer, he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to initiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way toward solution.

<u>The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet Nam</u>

A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force containing his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but his proposal runs along the following lines.

Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming. The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos. Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary. Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should prove necessary.

Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions to the paper. There was a rather surprising degree of agreement that something along this line must be done or it will be virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at the time except Cottrell himself.) The ICA member and the representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than military action in Laos.

I made the following points about the proposal: First, I observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at the highest levels of government. I indicated that I would be unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I expressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that, unless we undertake military action in Laos, it would be virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agreed to take account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some agreement in the Task Force).

I ~~[struck out]~~ understand some of the feeling of frustration which has prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S. military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable that his objective could be achieved without such intervention. The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not think that this would be a good idea.

I think that there is a serious question as to whether the situation in Laos is not deteriorating so ~~seriously~~ that any likely political solution will ~~not~~ leave it as a serious source of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection, I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- i. e., a <u>clear</u> failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the

possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged indefinitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing. I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the Laos situation?

Other Matters

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.)

I also raised the question of whether food supplies were being cut off by the Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a Vietnamese.) I was told that the only ~~evidence~~ current evidence of Viet Cong action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice exports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange ~~revenues~~ reserves.

There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be desirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to permit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.

(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course. It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice had been surprisingly well maintained.)

Finally, I raised the question of what planning was being done to internationalize the border problem. In response Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the situation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries in the area sometime in July at which the border problem, among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy, whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means to involve the international community in the border question. Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives seem very much interested. Have you ever discussed this question with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)

Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a 100,000 man increase and also to make sure that our military activities in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was undesirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea. The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about the situation.

RHJ

Robert H. Johnson

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10078
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Opposition in Khanh Hoa Province
DATE : 9/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FILE

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/522,229
SUBJECT	1. OPPOSITION IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE TO ARMING MOUNTAIN TRIBESMEN AND TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM 2. CONFLICT AMONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES	DATE DISTR.	13 SEPTEMBER 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	LATE AUGUST 1962	REFERENCES	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 SEPTEMBER 1962)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 7923

SMITH-BUNDY
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
TAYLOR
BELK
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR.

1. ON 29 AUGUST 1962 BUI BO, GENERAL SECRETARY, KHANH HOA PROVINCE COUNCIL, GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR (CVTC), AND MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE, REPORTED TO CVTC HEADQUARTERS THAT KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ECONOMIC AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS FOR THE TRIBAL PEOPLE. THESE AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT THE TRIBESMEN MAY INDISCRIMATELY KILL INNOCENT VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MINGLE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE.

2. BO ALSO SAID THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCE ARE OPPOSED TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO

CONFIDENTIAL | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

PROVIDE TOO MUCH WORK, MATERIAL, AND MONEY. THIS OPPOSITION HAS BECOME SO STRONG THAT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS FORBIDDING ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR LABOR, MATERIAL, OR CASH.

3. BO REPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE, WHICH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, MAJOR LE TAP, IS UNABLE TO HANDLE. THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, BA (FNU), A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, IS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN TAP. TRUONG DINH CAC, WHO HOLDS THE POSITION OF DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS, A POSITION NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS THE REAL POWER IN THE PROVINCE. CAC WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE BY NGO DINH CAN, BROTHER OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND POLITICAL LEADER OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALL MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONTROL OF CAN AND HIS FACTION IN THE CAN LAO PARTY. BO DESCRIBED THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION, YANG (FNU), AS A GOOD MAN BUT COMPLETELY LACKING IN AUTHORITY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10079
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Possible severence of Cambodian
DATE : 9/17/1962
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FILE

CONFIDENTIAL *(When Filled In)* — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM · CAMBODIA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,837

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SEVERANCE OF CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

REFERENCES:

DATE OF INFO.: MID-SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL: 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7913

~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
~~HILSMAN~~
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
~~BELK~~
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A SENIOR OFFICIAL (B) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR.

1. LE VAN DONG, FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, SAID ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1962 THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY A RELIABLE SOURCE IN CAMBODIA THAT THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT /RKG/ IS PLANNING TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DECISION IS TO BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING ON EITHER 19 OR 20 SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE RKG MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WILL REQUEST THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-2

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10085
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnamese Communist Analysis of Efforts
DATE : 6/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

~~SMITH.BUNI~~ DUNGAN GILDNER KAYSEN PETERSEN SCHLESINGE ~~TAYLOR~~ BELK ~~FORRESTAL~~ KOMER RASKIN SAUNDERS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,760-

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 13 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 5 MAY 1962

REFERENCES FILE IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (20 MAY 1962)

APPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THIS IS AN ACCURATE TRANSLATION OF A GENUINE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7504

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL (C) IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS HEAD OF AN INTELLIGENCE NET REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Bundy

1. SET FORTH BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AS VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). THE AUTHOR OF THE ANALYSIS, WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN EARLY MAY 1962, IS A VC COMPANY COMMANDER IN BA XUYEN PROVINCE.

2. THE REVOLUTION IN SVN IS PASSING NOW INTO THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE IT (SVN) AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S UNION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAS POSTPONED THAT PHASE. THE US' HALF SUCCESS IS DUE TO USE OF COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, BUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT BECAUSE (INDISCRIMINATE) KILLINGS WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN THE FUTURE THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SVN, WITH

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA

VTF EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ITS HIGH-SACRIFICE SPIRIT AND ITS HATE-AMERICA IDEALS, WILL GET 90 PERCENT SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE US HAS USED ULTRA-MODERN MECHANIZED WEAPONS TO DESTROY ARMED UNITS BY TACTICS OF AREA PACIFICATION. THUS HARRASSED, THE VC ARE NEVER SECURE. THEIR POLICIES MUST NOW AIM AT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND AT UPHOLDING THE HARDSHIP-BEARING SPIRIT. MEANWHILE, VC ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT YET EXIST, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF THE PARTY. ECONOMICALLY, VC AGRARIAN REFORMS HAVE SOLVED THE LAND PROBLEM FOR THE PEASANTS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE FOOD SOURCE FOR THE TROOPS AND CADRES. (SOURCE COMMENT. "VC AGRARIAN REFORMS" REFER TO THE DE FACTO LAND EXPROPRIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE VIET MINH DURING THE 1945-54 WAR.) FOREST AND SEA RESOURCES ARE STILL SECONDARY AND BRING IN ONLY SOME SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TAXES. THE VC ARE MEETING GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT THE SVN PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL MILITARY MEASURES, I.E. STRONG ATTACKS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE SOLUTION THROUGH "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" REFERS TO THE BELIEF THAT, IF THE VC CAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT RELATIVE STALEMATE LONG ENOUGH, THE US WILL TIRE OF THE STRUGGLE AND SEEK SOME KIND OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION.)

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10086
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Views...Possible Coup D'Etat
DATE : 6/15/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

~~SMITH-BUNDY~~ DUNGAN GILDNER KONYTHEN PETERSEN SCHLESINGER ~~TAYLOR~~ BELK ~~FORRESTAL~~ KOMER RASKIN

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO.: TDCS -3/513,973

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF COLONEL TON THAT XUNG ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR.: 15 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

RETAIN OR DESTROY

DATE OF INFO.: EARLY JUNE 1962

REFERENCES: FILE IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 JUNE 1962)

APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.: FVS-7484

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM COLONEL TON THAT XUNG.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT XUNG HOLDS THE VIEWS STATED; HOWEVER, THE CONTENTS OF THE STATEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY TRUE.

1. COLONEL TON THAT XUNG, COMMANDER OF THE RANGER COMMAND, DURING A 3 JUNE 1962 LUNCHEON MEETING WITH TON THAT CHU, CHIEF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WERE GETTING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT SOME ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN TO CHANGE IT. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE PLANS WERE NOT GOING TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE AMERICANS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES, A BASICALLY LAW-ABIDING NATION, IS OPPOSED TO UNLAWFUL ACTS. SINCE A COUP D'ETAT IS CONSIDERED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TO BE AN UNLAWFUL PROCESS, THE US IS FORCED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH ACTIONS, AND THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OF ANY FUTURE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO UPSET THE CURRENT REGIME UNTIL THE ACTION IS ACCOMPLISHED.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	AID
VTF												EXO			

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10087
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnam Communist Activities
DATE : 8/23/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 8/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/520,365

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SAIGON AREA

DATE DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.: JUNE-JULY 1962

RETAIN OR DESTROY

REFERENCES: IN-10297

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL: 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7843

~~SMITH~~-BUNDY
DUNGAN
~~HANSEN~~
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~SALZER~~
BELK
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MILITARY SERVICE WHICH RECEIVED THE ITEMS SEPARATELY FROM OTHER OFFICIAL SERVICES.

1. DURING THE LATTER HALF OF JUNE 1962 MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED UNARMED VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) ENTERED THE SAIGON AREA AND WERE LIVING IN THE HOMES OF FELLOW VC IN THE FOURTH AND EIGHT DISTRICTS OF SAIGON. (FIELD COMMENT. THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF FVS-7681 (TDCS-3/517,156) WHICH REPORTED THAT BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE HUNDRED VC TERRORISTS AND SABOTAGE AGENTS HAD BEEN INFILTRATED INTO THE CAPITAL AREA.)

2. THE VC DISTRICT COMMITTEE FOR GO VAP (N 10-49, E 106-40) SENT AN ARMED PLATOON TO THE CITY TO OPERATE AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS CELLS.

3. A VC CADRE, AFTER TAKING A TRAINING COURSE IN LOC THUAN, TAY NINH PROVINCE, WAS SENT TO SAIGON TO SET UP A BASE AMONG LABORERS

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EX

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO BE USED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

4. FORTY VC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN 14 AND 16 YEARS OF AGE HAD COME TO SAIGON TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE AND KIDNAPPINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND U.S. PERSONNEL.

5. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG DINH HAD BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY IN ORDER TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DURING THE VC FALL AND WINTER CAMPAIGN. (FIELD COMMENT. POSSIBLY MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG VINH, DEPUTY OF NGHE AN PROVINCE TO THE SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM, IS MEANT.)

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10088
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Indication of Planning
DATE : 11/20/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 11/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/528,813
SUBJECT	INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	20 NOVEMBER 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	LATE OCTOBER 1962	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 NOVEMBER 1962)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8188

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) IN THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INFORMATION; FROM A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F) IN THE MINISTRY FOR CIVIC ACTION.

1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1962 MINISTER FOR CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU TOLD THREE OF HIS ASSISTANTS THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO ASSIST IN PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE PLANNING WOULD PROGRESS THROUGH MANY STAGES, BUT THE THREE ASSISTANTS WERE FIRST TO DRAFT A QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS TO BE FILLED OUT BY SELECTED PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO THIS FORM, PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY LIVED IN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL ACQUAINTANCES STILL KNOWN TO BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS LATTER SUBMITTED TO HIEU.

2. FIELD COMMENT. FVS-8137, TDCS-3/527,406, REPORTED, IN PARAGRAPH 3, NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENT AT THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MUST BECOME PART OF A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FE

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

REARMED POPULACE, WHICH WOULD CARRY THE BATTLE FORWARD INTO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NORTH VIETNAM. FVS-7934, TDCS-3/522,275, REPORTED THAT NHU, COMMENTING ON HIS 17 AUGUST REMARKS AT QUI NHON ABOUT A "MARCH TO THE NORTH" ASSERTED THAT THIS DID NOT IMPLY A MILITARY MARCH, BUT WAS HIS CONCEPT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE AN ATTRACTION FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH AND WOULD GRADUALLY UNDERMINE THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP THERE. PARAGRAPH 4 OF FVS-7867, CS-3/522,559, REPORTING A NEW VERSION OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY TO TIE IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE FROM THE HIGH PLATEAU OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, STATED THAT THE THIRD EPOCH OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY WAS OCCURRING, AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE NOW RETURNING TOWARD THE NORTH THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10094
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Ngo Dinh Nhu's Statement on Withdrawal of
DATE : 4/20/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

Bundy

Vietnam

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,531

SUBJECT: NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID

DATE DISTR. 20 APRIL 1963

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO.: LATE MARCH-EARLY APRIL 1963

REFERENCES: IN 21850

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AND 12 APRIL 1963)

APPRAISAL: SEE PARAGRAPH 7

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8804

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: PARAS 1 & 3: AMEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.
PARAS 2 &4: A FIELD GRADE OFFICER (F) OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

1. AT THE 5 APRIL MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS, NGO DINH NHU MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS CONCERNING AMERICAN FOREIGN AID:

A. THE AMERICANS HAVE STATED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO REVISE THEIR POLICY ON FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM; WE WILL REVISE OUR POLICY ON RECEIVING SUCH AID. WE MUST MARCH TOWARD THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF TERMINATING AMERICAN AID AND THE PEOPLE SHOULD LEARN TO DO WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE.

B. AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE FOLLOWING CATE-

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

GORIES OF PRIORITY. FIRST, AID WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INDEFINITELY, SPECIFICALLY THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION; WE WILL NOT SEEK A REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY, NOR WILL WE REQUEST AN INCREASE. SECOND AID WHICH CAN BE EVENTUALLY PHASED OUT. THIRD, AID WHICH CAN BE TEMINATED IMMEDIATELY.

C. ALL SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE ABOVE LIST OF PRIORITIES BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT INTENDED TO BE ANTIFOREIGN. FOREIGN AID WILL PROVIDE WITH THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION SO THAT WE CAN EVENTUALLY DO WITHOUT CONSUMER GOODS ASSISTANCE. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, FOREIGN AID WILL CEASE SOONER OR LATER, AND SO WE MUST STRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT. MEANWHILE WE MUST MAKE PROPER USE OF THE AID WE RECEIVE.

2. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1963 THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON ORDERS FROM NHU, ISSUED TO ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS INSTRUCTIONS TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO START PRODUCING WEAPONS, LAND MINES AND AMMUNITION IN HOME WORK SHOPS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING A DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

3. ON ABOUT 5 APRIL PHAM DUC TIEN, CHIEF OF CIVIC ACTION IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, ATTENDED A CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS IN BINH TUY PROVINCE AT WHICH NGO DINH NHU SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY AMERICAN ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT BOTH THE NUMBER OF THESE ADVISORS AND THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE REDUCED.

4. AT A MEETING OF VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS ON 10

APRIL 1963, VNAF COMMANDER COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN SAID THAT NHU HAD INSTRUCTED HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS AT A 5 APRIL MEETING TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID; NHU SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING AID AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING THE GVN AND WAS IMPINGING ON GVN SOVEREIGNTY. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF AMERICAN AID TO PRESSURE A RECIPIENT COUNTRY, HIEN CITED THE CUTOFF OF DELIVERIES OF GASOLINE TO THE ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE WHEN THE THAI GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO AGREE TO SOME (UNSPECIFIED) POINT; HIEN SAID THAT THE DELIVERY OF GASOLINE RECOMMENCED ONLY AFTER STRONG THAI GOVERNMENT PROTESTATIONS. (FIELD COHMENT. PRESUMABLY HIEN REFERS TO THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL TERMINATION BY THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1965 OF U.S. SUPPORT OF MILITARY AID PROGRAM POL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT.)

5. AFTER THE MEETING SEVERAL VNAF OFFICERS, INCLUDING MAJOR DANG DINH LINH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MATERIAL, MAJOR TRAN DO CUNG, ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND CAPTAIN HA DUONG DOAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BUDGET AND FINANCE, AGREED THAT THE VNAF WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITHOUT AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THAT, IN FACT, ANY WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT WOULD RESULT IN COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME.

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FIELD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

7. APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2. IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES USING AID TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE TOLD GVN OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID. THE REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO HIEN'S VERSION OF NHU'S STATEMENTS IS PROBABLY TRUE.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10095
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 4/22/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/654,285

SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PLAN TO REQUEST REDUCTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM
DATE DISTR. 22 APRIL 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. MID-APRIL 1963
REFERENCES IN 22329

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 APRIL 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8806

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSET OVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OVER THE LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. BY MID-APRIL 1963 A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY. MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT AS THE MAIN IRRITANT. DIEM IS ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER BLUNDERS AND, AFTER BUILDING UP A STRONG CASE, HE PLANS TO CONFRONT AMBASSADOR NOLTING AND USMACV CHIEF GENERAL HARKINS WITH IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITY, DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF U.S.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXXX	XXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SANITIZED NLK.01.197.6.6.3 1/15

PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE FORCE IS TOO LARGE AND UNMANAGEABLE.

2. SOME VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMERICANS WERE BEING QUESTIONED IN DETAIL BY PRESIDENCY STAFF MEMBERS AS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS QUESTIONED HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENCY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY, AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY WELL MOTIVATED, DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH APPROPRIATE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), MAAG (GENERAL TIMMES), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10097
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 4/25/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/544,961
SUBJECT	VIET CONG CONCENTRATION ON TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY IN THE CAPITAL AREA	DATE DISTR.	25 APRIL 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY APRIL 1963	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 APRIL 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8792

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; FROM SOURCES DESCRIBED AS VIET CONG PENETRATIONS.

— 1. IN EARLY APRIL 1963, WARD-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE VIET CONG (VC) SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE WERE INFORMED THAT TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THE AREA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD OPERATE UNDER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMITTEE. EVERY DISTRICT MUST DEVELOP ONE OR TWO TERRORIST GROUPS CONSISTING OF THREE CELLS EACH. OPERATIONS OF THESE GROUPS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN DISTRICTS BUT COULD BE EXPANDED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE, AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. AMERICANS WERE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF ALL OPERATIONS.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	VD/1
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. VC COUNTERPROPAGANDA PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY AND AWAIT TRANSFER ORDERS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT MANY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED INTO MILITARY SUBVERSION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV AID MAAG USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/547,672
SUBJECT	PLANS FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED VNQDD	DATE DISTR.	18 MAY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY MAY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 41761
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 MAY 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 8959

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE VNQDD IS BEING REFORMED; ITS CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL VIETNAM CANNOT BE JUDGED.

1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IN HUE, NGUYEN VAN LUC RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM THOAT XAC PHONG TRAO (TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT.. TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY INTO ENGLISH. THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT IN MIND AND SPIRIT; XAC MEANS BODY, I.E., PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATION; A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VNQDD.) THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE 1958 FROM THE VIETNAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY, PARTICULARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Kq OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE ITS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS THE OLDER LEADERS OF THE VNQDD, THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING A REVITALIZED REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC IS THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN VAN CU, ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.)

2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM'S TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL OVER CENTRAL VIETNAM, THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM

AND , AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE REGIME IN SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

3. LUC SENT A TRUSTED FOLLOWER, ONE VIET , TO SAIGON TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT. VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE, WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD IMMEDIATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS FOLLOWED LUC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET THOUGHT THAT LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,646

SUBJECT APPREHENSIONS OF VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN SINGAPORE REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 17 MAY 1963

REFERENCES IN 41548

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SINGAPORE (17 MAY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FSS 12881

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG. APPR: CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG HAS BEEN AN ARDENT AND DEVOTED SUPPORTER OF THE PRESIDENTAND OF NGO DINH NHU'S CAN LAO PARTY. HE IS A CATHOLIC AND A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF DR. TUYEN. THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE FELT TO BE REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS SINCERE.

1. SUMMARY. VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG CONSIDERS THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT NGU DINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE OFFICE OF EXCHANGES FROM HIS POSITION OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN FACTION OF THE CAN LAO (REVOLUTIONARY WORKER'S) PARTY; THE DENIGRATION AND REMOVAL FROM POWER AND AUTHORITY OF DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, DIRECTOR OF SEPES:; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HUE INCIDENT ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY 8 MAY IN WHICH BUDDHIST PARADERS

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
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WERE KILLED BY THE CIVIL GUARD. EACH OF THESE SEPARATE ACTS HAS SERVED TO WEAKEN THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE AND TO FURTHER NARROW , POSSIBLY TO A FATAL DEGREE, THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.

2. CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG FEARED THAT TUYEN'S DISMISSAL IN PARTICULAR WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSECURITY AMONG LOYAL SUPPORTERS AND PUBLIC SERVANTS OF THE REGIME WHO KNOW DR. TUYEN'S RECORD OF LOYAL SERVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS BROTHER, PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR NGO DINH NHU. THESE OFFICIALS CAN CERTAINLY QUESTION WHETHER ANYONE'S POSITION IN THE REGIME IS SAFE IF TUYEN COULD FALL FROM FAVOR. PHUONG STATED THAT SEVERAL FRIENDS OF HIS WITH LONG RECORDS OF SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND TO THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO HIM DESPONDENTLY ALONG THESE LINES. TUYEN HAD A BAD REPUTATION WITH MANY OFFICERS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND BUREAUCRACY AS THE HATCHETMAN AND TROUBLESHOOTER FOR NGO DINH NHU BUT NO ONE DOUBTED HIS DEVOTION TO NHU. YET NHU HAS STRIPPED HIM OF ALL REAL AUTHORITY SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF A SILLY WOMEN'S TIFF BETWEEN MADAME NHU AND MADAME TUYEN. ANY OBJECTIVE GVN OFFICIAL MIGHT QUESTION THE FRIVOLITY, INGRATITUDE AND LACK OF PERSPECTIVE OF A REGIME THAT ACTS THUS.

3. FURTHERMORE TUYEN WAS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING GVN OFFICIALS IN HIGH POSITION RESPECTED BY OPPOSITION LEADERS AND VIETNAMESE

INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. THOSE WHO DID NOT LIKE HIM AT LEAST TRUSTED HIS FAIRNESS AND BASIC EMPATHY WHEREAS THEY NEITHER TRUSTED NOR LIKED NHU EVEN THOUGH NHU HIMSELF WAS AN INTELLECTUAL.

4. WITHIN THE CAN LAO PARTY, WHICH IS STILL ONE OF THE SECRET MAINSPRINGS OF SUPPORT IN VIETNAM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NGO FAMILY, THE PARALLEL REMOVAL FROM AUTHORITY OF HUYNH VAN LANG HAS OCCASIONED SIMILAR DOUBTS AMONG THE PARTY'S RANK -AND-FILE. AS IN TUYEN'S CASE, CAN LAO MEMBERS CAN QUESTION WHAT VALUE IS LOYALTY AND SERVICE IF A MAN LIKE LANG CAN LOSE HIS POST.

5. THE EVEN MORE SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH MAY NARROW THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GVN TO A FATAL DEGREE WAS THE SHOOTING OF BUDDHIST PARADERS AT HUE ON THE OCCASION OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. THE HUE REGIME OF CENTRAL VIETNAM COUNSELOR NGO DINH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM'S EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS FEAR THAT THE GVN'S INCREASING PRO-CATHOLIC BENT WILL BE HARMFUL TO THE CHURCH AS WELL AS TO THE REGIME. CERTAINLY THE STUPID SUPPRESSION OF BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS FLAGS AT HUE ON 8 MAY (ON PRETEXT THAT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS CONNECTED TO VC COMMEMORATION OF THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY)
AND CONSEQUENT FATALITIES WILL AROUSE THE ANTAGONISM OF PREDOMINANTLY

BUDDHIST VIETNAM AGAINST BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CATHOLICS.

6. FROM REPORTS REACHING HIM PHUONG FOUND IT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN CENTRAL VIETNAM AUTHORITIES ORDERED POLICE TO EXECUTE THE DIRECTIVE BANNING FLAGS, INITIALY THE POLICE MERELY RESTATED THE ORDER BUT WOULD NOT RIP DOWN ANY BUDDHIST FLAGS. FINALLY SEVERAL CATHOLIC POLICE DID SO, BUT SOME BUDDHIST POLICEMEN REFUSED, SAYING THAT BUDDHIST FLAGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED JUST AS CATHOLIC FLAGS ARE FLOWN ON SAINTS DAYS. SUCH DEFIANCE OF ORDERS AT HUE IS QUITE RARE, PHUONG SAID.

7. THE CROWNING INSULT TO BUDDHISTS WHICH WILL FURTHER ENFLAME THEM AND ALSO REVIVE THE OUTCRY AGAINST NGO FAMILY RULE WAS THE NEWS OF HUE ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC'S PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT ASK BUDDHIST ASSOCIATIONS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM TO CONDEMN THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DISORDER OF THE HUE BUDDHISTS. ARCHBISHOP THUC REPORTEDLY WENT TO SAIGON TO DEMAND THIS. THE VC COULD NOT HAVE A BETTER PROPAGANDA WEAPON IF THEY HAD LAUNCHED THE INCIDENT AND DIRECTED THUC'S REACTION THEMSELVES.

8. BY SUCH ACTS THE REGIME IS DESTROYING CONFIDENCE AND LOYAL MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, INTELLECTUALS, PARTY SUPPORTERS, AND THE MASS OF NON-CATHOLIC PEASANTRY IN ITS MOST CRUCIAL TIME. IF THIS CONTINUES ONLY SYCOPHANTS AND XENOPHOBES WILL PREDOMINATE IN THE GVN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS PEOPLE, BUREAU-

CRACY, ARMY AND FRIENDLY ALLIES WILL DETERIORATE IN A WELTER OF PETTY JEALOUSIES, FEUDS, AND PREJUDICES.

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CONGEN ONLY) CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Vietnam

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN)

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863 FILE

SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST CHINA

DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 4-9 MARCH 1963

REFERENCES IN 89258

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, A CHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND A MEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND POSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.

1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT. THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THE FACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ADVISORS OF EITHER PARTICIPANT.

2. CHEN DELAYED HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 24 HOURS TO PERMIT HIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE TIME WAS DEVOTED TO PRIVATE TALKS. MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY INDICATION AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

3. MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS. CHEN IS ALSO THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM, WHICH IS CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT, I.E., DEMONSTRATIONS BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE CHINAT EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO PUB-LICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIR-FIELD AND COASTAL BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA.
OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN WERE THE CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL IS A LACKEY OF

PEIPING. CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATION WAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.

4. ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION, WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE TO THE AIRPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE DEPARTED. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

6

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/541,020
SUBJECT	THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME	DATE DISTR.	20 MARCH 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-MARCH 1963	REFERENCES	IN 89614
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MARCH 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8662

FILE

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C), WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR THIS REPORT IS TYPICAL OF VIEWS HELD BY CERTAIN OPPOSITIONISTS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE FELLOW-TRAVELLING CATEGORY. COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY GOVERNMENT PROVOKERS SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REACTION. THE LINE THAT DIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT, IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS SOME SEGMENTS OF THE LEFT. THE ESTIMATE CONTAINED HEREIN ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THE APPRAISAL THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OR TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, IS NOT ACCEPTED.

1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME, ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF A COMMITTEE OF NATIONALIST ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN MID-MARCH 1963, IN THE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), WHO MAY ALSO BE A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN A STUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. ALTHOUGH SEPES' CHIEF TRAN KIM TUYEN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION, HE HAS PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM TIME TO TIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS 8654, TDCS-3/540,447, REPORTED AN EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THESE INDIVIDUALS.)

2. ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS, THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HAO AND THE CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM.

3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER

UNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ARE HEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSE PRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUE COURSE. THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND IS COMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS A SUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCE IS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.

4. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL. THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME THE VC WITHIN THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL GO INTO ACTION.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10104
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 6/19/1963
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SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam,6/63. Box 2

11

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Viet-Nam

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS - 3/550,953
SUBJECT	GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WHITE PAPER ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE AND AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	19 JUNE 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	12-17 JUNE 1963	REFERENCES	IN 62883
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JUNE 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 9171

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

1. ON 17 JUNE 1963 GENE GREGORY OF THE TIMES OF VIETNAM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RETUNED FROM DALAT WHERE HE HAD SPENT FIVE DAYS WORKING ON A WHITE PAPER SETTING FORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM POSITON NOT ONLY ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE BUT ALSO ON THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. GREGORY SAID THAT MADAME NGO DINH NHU HAD ASKED HIM TO PREPARE THE PAPER AND, IN FACT, HE LIVED IN THE NHU VILLA IN DALAT WHILE HE WORKED ON IT.

2. GREGORY SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MADAME

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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NHU SUGGESTED BE INCLUDED IN THE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED, THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD AFTER ALL.

3. GREGORY STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, BUT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE UNITED STATES BUT POSSIBLY ALSO FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10113
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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S. Vietnam 50

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-81-269 NLK-89-15+ DOWNGRADED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,517

SUBJECT COUP D'ETAT PLAN OF NGO DINH NHU

DATE DISTR. 12 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 11-12 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 78592

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9305

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A GENERAL OFFICER (B) WHO EITHER ATTENDED THE MEETING OR WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

APPRAISAL NGO DINH NHU IS PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP; HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN.

(SUMMARY. NGO DINH NHU PROPOSED TO ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THEY STAGE A COUP D'ETAT AS SOON AS IMMEDIATELY POSSIBLE. THIS COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THE ARMY SHOULD TURN OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANS ON THE NEXT DAY.)

2. NGO DINH NHU TOLD A GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST PROVIDE THE ACTION REQUIRED. THE GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE AND IN ORDER TO REGAIN POPULAR RESPECT THEY MUST ENGINEER A COUP D'ETAT.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA (PROD WO) STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES) JCS CNO (OP 922 Y 1)

AFSSO DIA/CIIC NIC DFI/ACSI

WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

SECRET (When Filled In) — NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM — NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCS DB-3/655,517 | IN 78592 | PAGE 2

NHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.

3. NHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL. ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION. ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, IN FACT, HAS HE HAD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION, I.E., DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

4. NHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES AND THAT FAST ACTION WAS NECESSARY; IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IF THE COUP IS TO OCCUR; THIS WAS THE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE-MAKERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT MUST BE QUELLED. NHU QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE BUT THE FIVE RINGLEADERS, WHO WERE TO BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD USED THEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.

5. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIAN CONTROL. IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LE, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED

SECRET — NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM — NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.

6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE NHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALL OF THE NHU CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)

8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.

9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE

BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY. VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, III CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS; BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS. VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACING VICE PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10115
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM — BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/655,558

SUBJECT STATUS OF COUP D'ETAT PLANS OF TRAN KIM TUYEN'S GROUP

DATE DISTR. 16 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 15 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 80366

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9309

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

1. ON 15 JULY 1963 AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUP D'ETAT GROUP HEADED BY DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, CURRENTLY AN ADVISOR AT THE PRESIDENCY, SAID THAT THEIR NATIONALIST, ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP WOULD OCCUR "SOON." HOWEVER, AS THE VIET CONG WERE REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, THE COUP WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT DATE. THE COUP WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST PRESIDENT DIEM AS WELL AS THE NGO DINH NHUS AND THE GROUP PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM — BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA USIA OCI ONE OCR EXO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

SANITIZED NLK. 89.15

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		IN 80366
SECRET (When Filled In) — NO FOREIGN DISSEM — BACKGROUND USE ONLY	TDCSDB-3/655,558	PAGE 2

REGIME BEHIND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO.) (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9286 (TDCSDB-3/655,471), FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, REPORTED DETAILS OF TUYEN'S PLAN AND THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE BEFORE THE END OF JULY.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLY

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10116
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/553,724
SUBJECT	POSSIBLE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE	DATE DISTR.	17 JULY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-JULY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 80437
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-9314

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

APPR IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS RECALLED SOME OF ITS FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES; HOWEVER, WHETHER THE REASON IS TO DEFINE A NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S APPOINTMENT IS UNKNOWN. SEE HEADQUARTERS COMMENT, PARAGRAPH 2.

1. BY MID-JULY 1963 PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM WAS CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED OVER THE DESIGNATION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). THE APPOINTMENT SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO WIELD A "BIG STICK," AND THE GVN RECALLED A NUMBER OF ITS DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULTATION. AMONG THEM WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE, NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, RANGOON, AND SENEGAL AND SEVERAL OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE RECALLED OSTENSIBLY SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND A SEMINAR ON THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PROGRAM ABROAD; HOWEVER, THE GVN ACTUALLY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

WANTED TO DISCUSS ITS POSITION IN REGARD TO THE BUDDHIST SITUATION AND TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A NEW GVN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LODGE APPOINTMENT.

2. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. TDCS-3/552,830 REPORTED THAT BUU HOI, GVN AMBASSADOR TO THE IVORY COAST, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, UPPER VOLTA, AND SENEGAL WAS EXPECTED IN SAIGON ON 15 JULY. CS-3/533,307 REPORTED THAT NGO DINH NHU HAD STATED AT AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS' MEETING THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD FAILED TO ENROLL HIS PERSONNEL IN THE COURSE AT THE THI NGHE STRATEGIC HAMLET CENTER, AND THAT IF NECESSARY, THE MINISTER SHOULD RECALL HIS PERSONNEL FROM EMBASSIES ABROAD IN ORDER TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
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RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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S. Vietnam

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,605

SUBJECT MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ON THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 18 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 13-16 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 82003

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9322

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM A UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD-GRADE OFFICER; FROM GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.

APPR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH PROBABLY HOLDS THESE VIEWS [illegible] IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISGRUNTLED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM SINCE 1960, [illegible] EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NOT SO EXPRESSED HIMSELF PREVIOUSLY TO SOURCE (SEE PARA. 2.B).

1. SUMMARY. ON 16 JULY 1963 MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT DIEM, CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT, SAID THAT HE LACKED THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND ADVOCATED A CHANGE IN THE REGIME, BUT ASSERTED THAT NGO DINH NHU COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WOULD REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST DIVISION.

2. GENERAL MINH MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. PRESIDENT DIEM HAS CHANGED SO COMPLETELY THAT IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO REASON WITH HIM. IN THE EARLY DAYS HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND WAS VERY POPULAR THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO

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IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER AT THAT TIME TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANTS FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEN HE BEGAN SCREENING HIMSELF IN AND BY 1959 HE HAD LOST COMPLETE TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME TO HAVE CHANGED THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER 1960 DIEM CHANGED COMPLETELY, BECOMING CONVINCED THAT HE WAS OPERATING UNDER A MANDATE FROM HEAVEN. THIS WAS APPARENT IN HIS REMARKS ON 7 JULY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE COUNTRY WAS GUIDED BY "INTUITIVE WISDOM."

B. THE BUDDHIST ISSUE IS AN ILLUSTRATION OF DIEM'S IRRATIONAL ATTITUDE. DIEM TOLD MINH ON 13 JULY THAT THE BINH XUYEN, THE HOA HAO, AND THE CAO DAI WERE ALL STRONGER THAN THE BUDDHISTS. THEY HAD REGULAR ARMED TROOPS BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL ABLE TO DEFEAT THEM, SO WHY CANNOT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO DEFEAT THE MONKS, WHO HAVE NEITHER ARMS NOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION? MINH WAS UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SITUATIONS WERE NOT THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE RIGID STAND DIEM HAS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO THE BUDDHISTS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME MINH HAS MADE SUCH STRONG STATEMENTS AGAINST DIEM.)

C. THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM IS FAR FROM SETTLED. IT IS BECOMING WORSE AND UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CHANGES ITS POLICY THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL BUDDHIST SELF-IMMOLATIONS.

D. THERE MUST BE A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT. SOUTH VIETNAM

IS LIKE A YOUNG TREE; IT HAS FIRM ROOTS AND IS GROWING BUT IT MUST HAVE A PROPER ATMOSPHERE SO THAT ITS LEAVES, I.E., THE PEOPLE, CAN BREATHE. THIS IS LACKING IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

E. NGO DINH NHU CAN NEVER TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT; SHOULD HE SUCCEED, IT WOULD PROVE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) ARE RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE VC ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO REALLY FIGHT FOR THE PEOPLE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY, AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN KIM, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARE MINH'S CLOSE FRIENDS.)

F. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD MINH ON 5 JULY THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE SELF PRIDE OF CERTAIN KEY INDIVIDUALS, I.E., THE NHUS AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC, HAD BECOME INVOLVED. THO HAS BEEN WANTING TO RESIGN BUT WAS NOT EVEN PERMITTED TO SUBMIT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION; HE STILL INTENDS TO GO THROUGH WITH IT, HOWEVER. (FIELD COMMENT: FVS-9243, (TDCS-3/552,503, [illegible]) REPORTED THAT DIEM HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THO'S WRITTEN RESIGNATION, SUBMITTED ON [illegible] JULY. FVS-9256, TDCS-3/552,565, [illegible] REPORTED THO'S STATEMENT THAT HE WANTED TO RESIGN BUT WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO THE TIMING.)

G. IF THE MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE VC CAN BE CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE FOR A YEAR, THE ARMY CAN DISRUPT THE VC ARMED

INSURGENTS. THE WINNING OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VC IS NOT SIMPLY A MILITARY PROBLEM, HOWEVER, BUT ONE THAT REQUIRES THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND THIS IS LACKING.

H. NO TROUBLE IS ANTICIPATED FROM THE VC ON THE 20 JULY ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, BUT THE STUDENTS MIGHT CAUSE TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE OF OPPOSITIONIST NGUYEN TUONG TAM.

I. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE TIME BEING AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN NGHIEM WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF I CORPS, WHICH PLACES NGHIEM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AS THE TWO MEN DO NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH EACH OTHER. TRI'S PROMOTION WAS DESERVED BECAUSE HE IS A VERY STRONG FIGHTER. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9302, TDCSDB-3/655,512, REPORTED NHU'S STATEMENT THAT TRI HAD BEEN PROMOTED AND NAMED COMMANDER OF II CORPS. FVS-9267, (TDCS-3/552,485), REPORTED NGHIEM'S STATEMNT OF HIS DESIRE TO RESIGN FROM THE ARMY.)

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,739

SUBJECT GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH PLANS TO MAKE HIS FINAL DECISION SOON ON ANY ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME

DATE DISTR. 19 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 15 - 16 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 22714

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS - 9660

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER (F) ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH.

APPR KHANH MAY STILL BE THINKING ABOUT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION, BUT WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SUPPORT, HE WILL PROBABLY NOT INITIATE ANY ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MOUNTING A COUP D'ETAT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED SINCE AN INDIVIDUAL CONNECTED WITH THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP HAS SAID THAT KHANH MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, AND SINCE KHANH'S NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY DISSIDENT GENERALS.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1963 BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, II CORPS COMMANDER, SAID THAT HE WOULD DECIDE IN A DAY OR TWO WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. (FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS-9634, TDCSDB-3/656,637, FOR PREVIOUS REPORT ON KHANH'S PLANNING.) HE REMARKED THAT IF HIS DECISION WERE NEGATIVE, HE WOULD CEASE ALL PLANNING AND NOT REVIVE THE PROJECT. ON 16 SEPTEMBER KHANH SAID THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WOULD MULL OVER THE SITUATION FOR ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL DECISION. KHANH PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE II CORPS AREA ON 18

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CIB

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXXXXXXXXXX

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EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCS DB-3/656,739

IN 22714

PAGE 2

SEPTEMBER.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FORM 1-63 IK-1 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-63 (15-20-44-47)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10134
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 9/21/1963
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RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,771

SUBJECT PHAM NGOC THAO AND TUYEN GROUP READY TO LAUNCH COUP D'ETAT
DATE DISTR. 21 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963
REFERENCES IN 24185

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9674

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL CIRCLES WITH PARAGRAPH 1 FROM DUONG AND WITH PARAGRAPH 2 FROM LINH.

APPRAISAL: PLANS BY THE TUYEN GROUP TO LAUNCH A COUP D'ETAT ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING, BUT THE PRECISE TIMING AND CAPABILITY ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE.

1. THE MOVE TO OUST THE NGO FAMILY FROM POWER WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE WEEK BEGINNING 22 SEPTEMBER 1963, ACCORDING TO NGUYEN HUU DUONG, GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY IN THE SAIGON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND MEMBER OF THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP. DUONG SAID ON 19 SEPTEMBER THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU AND MEMBER OF BOTH THE TUYEN GROUP AND THE GROUP LED BY HUYNH VAN LANG, ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, HAD GIVEN HIM THIS INFORMATION. THAO HAD ALSO TOLD DUONG THAT GENERALS DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, AND LE VAN KIM OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WERE INVOLVED IN THE PLANS.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC			OCI	ONE	OCR				EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, WOULD MOVE ON HUE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THAO LAUNCHED HIS MOVE IN SAIGON, ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT NGUYEN NGOC LINH, KHANH'S AIDE, ON 18 SEPTEMBER. LINH ALSO SAID THAT THAO WAS READY TO MOVE WITHIN A WEEK TO OVERTHROW DIEM.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10135
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
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TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 10/4/1963
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RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/560,871
SUBJECT	PLANNED SUICIDE OF AMBASSADOR BUU HOI'S MOTHER, DIEU HUE	DATE DISTR.	4 OCTOBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	3 OCTOBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 32958
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 OCTOBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 9731

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG BUDDHISTS.

APPR: EARLIER ALLEGED INTENTIONS OF DIEU HUE TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN SUPPORT OF THE BUDDHIST CAUSE WERE WIDELY PUBLICIZED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SHE MIGHT DO SO.

1. BY 3 OCTOBER 1963 THE BUDDHIST NUN, DIEU HUE, MOTHER OF BUU HOI, VIETNAMESE SCIENTIST, AMBASSADOR TO SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND CURRENTLY THE GOVERNMNT OF VITNAM (GVN) OBSERVER AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), AD DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE, PROBABLY ON 5 OCTOBER. THREAT WAS TIMED FOR IMPACT ON THE UN BUT WAS NOT TO BE BY BURNING.

2. DIEU HUE HAD PREPARED A LETTER DENOUNCING HER SON AND CLIMING THAT BUDDHISM WAS STILL BEING PERSECUTED IN VIETNAM, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FORIEGN PRESS AND TO THE "CLANDESTINE" OPPOSITION BY HER COMPANION AND ATTENDANT, A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES: PLS PASS TO MR. HILSMAN)

YOUNGER NUN.

3. JUST PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE, THE COMPANION PLANNED TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE U. S. EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND TO SEEK ASYLUM THERE. SHE BELIVED HER LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AS THE GVN WOULD KNOW THAT ONLY SHE COULD HAVE DISTRIBUTED THE LETTER.

4. THICH THIEN HOA, PRESIDENT OF THE PRO-GVN UNION COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PURE BUDDHISM AND MOST OF THE OTHER MONKS AND NUNS AT THE AN QUANG PAGODA, WHERE DIEU HUE AND HER COMPANION RESIDE, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SUICIDE PLAN.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10137
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
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TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 10/8/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
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RESTRICTIONS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,133

SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 5 OCTOBER 1963

DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 33775

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL COMMENTARY

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE STAFF OFFICERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION.

1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF 29 SEPTEMBER-5 OCTOBER 1963 HAS BEEN A GREATER DEPTH OF REPORTING ON COUP PLOTTING, PROVIDING INFORMATION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AS TO THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED AND THEIR ALLOTTED ROLES. STILL LACKING, HOWEVER, IS SOLID INFORMATION AS TO THE COHESIVENESS OF VARIOUS GROUPS REPORTED READY TO LAUNCH A COUP AND TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | XXX | XXX | OCI | ONE | OCR | XXX | ORR | XX

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ENJOY FIRM LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH WE ARE STILL GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES.

3. THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, THE LIST OF DEMANDS ARE QUITE EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY MEN TO THE POSTS OF MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, CIVIC ACTION AND EDUCATION. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR CONTROL OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON POLICE AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER A PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNORSHIP. DON SAYS THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW GENERAL OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT DIEM TO ACCEDE TO THIS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD INDEED AMOUNT TO A VIRTUAL SURRENDER ON THE PART OF DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU. THE LATTER WILL PROBABLY GO PART WAY, HOWEVER, IN MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE MILITARY IN AN EFFORT TO DETER THE LATTER FROM ATTEMPTING AN EARLY COUP. THEIR TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF SEEKING TO ENMESH THE GENERALS IN TIME-CONSUMING NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE PROSPECTIVE REVAMPING OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION OF THE RETURN TO NORMALITY THAT IS BEING FOSTERED BY THE REGIME, THE ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON CONTINUES TO BE PERVADED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY. ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING, AS WELL AS

SEARCHES OF PRIVATE HOMES BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

5. THERE ARE SCATTERED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) IS PLANNING TO SPRING SOME SURPRISES ON THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS. NHU, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE GENERALS THAT IN A FEW WEEKS HE WOULD UNDERTAKE AN UNSPECIFIED ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NATURE WHICH NEITHER "THE WEALTHY NOR THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE." WE ALSO HAVE A REPORT THAT SWEEPING CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND CIVIL INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX WILL OCCUR. MORE FRIVOLOUS BUT PERHAPS SUGGESTIVE OF THE DESIRE BY THE REGIME TO EASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON ARE THE RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED. NATIONAL DAY WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDED THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN BE COMPLETED IN TIME.

6. A STRIKING THING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT OFF VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT, EITHER IN SAIGON OR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) INTENDED DISRUPTION AS A COMPANION TACTIC TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CALL FOR THE BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTIONS. NEITHER DURING THE ELECTIONS, NOR DURING THE PRECEDING BUDDHIST CRISIS, DID THE COMMUNISTS SEEM ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES. ESPECIALLY LACKING WAS THE EXERCISE OF THEIR MUCH VAUNTED CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM, RAISING SOME QUESTION IN OUR MINDS AS TO WHETHER VC ABILITY TO USE TERRORISM IN CITIES WAS AS GREAT AS WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF THE VC BOYCOTT APPEAL SINCE THE GVN IN MANY AREAS MORE OR LESS FORCED THE ELECTORATE TO VOTE AND IN AREAS WHERE ITS CONTROL WAS NOT THAT STRONG, THE REGIME ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSIFIED THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE.

7. ONE INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT IT HAS THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL IS THE FACT THAT COLONEL TUNG HAS RELEASED TWO COMPANIES OF SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

8. ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GVN SECURITY CONTROLS, THE STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ARE DEVELOPING PLANS FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DIVISION OF OPINION AMONG THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE BUDDHIST CRISIS AND SOME HAVE SINCE EMERGED. REPORTING RECEIVED TO DATE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT YET MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY IF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STUDENTS AND THE GVN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THE STUDENTS ARE FLEEING TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO JOIN THE VC ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTEDLY DID LEAVE SAIGON AND HUE TO AVOID ARREST DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN.

9. A REPORT FROM A VIETNAMESE TRADE UNION OFFICIAL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NHU-MANELI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE GVN-DRV RAPPROCHEMENT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE SOURCE FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER, HO CHI MINH HAD AT ONE TIME INDICATED TO A FORMER FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTH VIETNAM HIS DISCOURAGEMENT OVER CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, HIS DISTASTE FOR THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE DRV, AND HIS RESTIVENESS OVER SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF AN UNSPECIFIED NATURE. LALOUETTE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO NHU WHO,

ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, LEAKED IT TO JOSEPH ALSOP, THUS BETRAYING THE CONFIDENTIAL FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH HO. THE FRENCH ALLEGEDLY FEEL THIS PUT LALOUETTE IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION; HENCE, HIS FAILURE TO RETURN TO SAIGON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH REALLY CONSIDER NHU'S "INDISCRETION" AS SERIOUS, AS THEY LET ON. SOURCE CLAIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANELI TOLD NHU PRRCTICALLY THE SAME STORY ABOUT HO'S PREOCCUPATIONS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR, DCM), USMACV (HARKINS), CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10138
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TITLE :
DATE : 10/9/1963
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—JOHNSON
—KLEIN
—KOMER
—PARROTT
—SCHLESINGER
—PRESS OFFICE
—FILE

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FM CIA

TO DIRNSA

STATE RCI (HUGHES)

JCS

CNO (OP922Y1)

AFSSO USAF

DIA/CIIC

NIC

DFI/ACSI

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ZEM

17702

SECRET NOFORN

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO SIDDEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT PLANS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, OTHER HIGH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AND THICH TRI QUANG, AND BURN THE CHANCERY

DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8OCTOBER 1963)

APPRISAL SEE BELOW

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,149

DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

RIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9753

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

ITS REPRESENTATIVES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EITHER GVN-SPONSORED OR INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, MAY TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS REPORT ARE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN DUY BACH, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), SAID THAT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUGHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO ALLOW A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY UNDER COVER OF WHICH ABOUT 100 GVN AGENTS WOULD ATTACK THE EMBASSY AND ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING EMBASSY OFFICIALS AFTER WHICH THE CHANCERY WOULD BE SET AFIRE.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 BACH SAID THAT EARLIER ON THE SAME DAY A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WERE ORGANIZING A DEMONSTRATION WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY WITHIN "THE NEXT FEW DAYS" DURING OFFICE HOURS AND PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. THE STUDENTS PLANNED TO PRESENT A STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE PROTESTING THE REPRESSION OF STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BY THE GVN. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9749, (NOT YET RECEIVED), FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, REPORTED THE ARREST OF 130 SAIGON STUDENTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER BY SPECIAL POLICE.) THE STUDENTS ALSO TOLD BACK (AND BACH SAID THAT HE HAD CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES) THAT NGO DINH NHU, MINISTER OF CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU, AND COMMANDER

OF EMBASSY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MELVIN L. MANFULL, AND SPECIAL ASSISTANTS MESSRS. FREDERICK W. FLOTT AND JOHN M. DUNN, AS WELL AS THICH TRI QUANG, BUDDHIST LEADER CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE CHANCERY. THE GVN AGENTSWOULD THEN BURN THE CHANCERY.

3. BACH REMARKED THAT NORMALLY THE GVN PERMITTED NO DEMONSTRATIONS BUT, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNED INFILTRATION OF GVN AGENTS, THE GVN WOULD ALLOW THIS PARTICULAR (PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED)(X) DEMONSTRATION BUT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. (FIELD COMMENT. AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED ON 8 OCTOBER THAT A NUMBER OF POLICE WERE GOING TO MASQUERADE AS STUDENTS AND DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE BUILDING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

6. (X) HEADQUARTERS COMMENTAC MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

SCP-1

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10139
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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RESTRICTIONS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/562,014

SUBJECT RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT NHU BE MADE PRIME MINISTER

DATE DISTR. 15 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. EARLY OCTOBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 39851

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9764

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CIRCLES, FROM CUONG.

APPRAISAL: THE CABINET OFFICERS MAY HAVE MADE SUCH A RECOMMENDATION.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN HOANG CUONG, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SAID THAT ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

2. ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT THO TOLD CUONG THAT IN EARLY OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER CUONG SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10142
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
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PAGES : ~~3~~ 4
SUBJECTS :
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RESTRICTIONS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

Sanitized - [illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Bundy

SECRET (When Filled In) | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD | BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/656,830
SUBJECT	HUYNH VAN LANG COUP MOVE TIMING	DATE DISTR.	24 SEPTEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	24 SEPTEMBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 25834
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 SEPTEMBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-9691

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF HUYNH VAN LANG, FROM LANG.

APPRAISAL: THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS INDICATING THAT A COUP IS BEING PLANNED AND SOME OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN AGREES WITH THAT IN OTHER REPORTS. CLAIMS OF SUPPORT INDICATED HEREIN CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED AT THIS TIME, NOR CAN THE ACTUAL TIMING OF THE COUP.

1. SUMMARY. HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, SAID ON 24 AUGUST 1963 THAT HIS COUP GROUP WAS GOING TO LAUNCH A COUP BEFORE 5 OCTOBER AND PROBABLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER BECAUSE TROOPS WILL BE IN SAIGON AT THAT TIME. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES GENERALS TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL OF II CORPS, AND DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED. LANG CLAIMS TO HAVE SIX DIVISIONS

SECRET | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD | BACKGROUND USE ONLY | CIB | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		EXO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

PLUS AIRBORNE, MARINE, AND ARMOR ELEMENTS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUP. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI IS ALSO WORKING WITH THE GROUP.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF THE COUP:

A. IT IS TO BE INITIATED BEFORE 5 OCTOBER, POSSIBLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER. TROOPS WILL BE BROUGHT INTO SAIGON ON 26 SEPTEMBER FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. MILITARY UNITS WILL REHEARSE ON 28 SEPTEMBER FOR THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY PARADE, AND THESE TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. GENERAL KHIEM WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE THAT HE TROOPS BROUGHT TO SAIGON WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULD SUPPORT A COUP.

B. NO COUP HAS BEEN INITIATED AS YET BECAUSE EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT IT BE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS. LONE ATTEMPT WAS CANCELLED AT THE POINT OF EXECUTION BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED.

C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TO BLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE. THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR, IS THE VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAME THROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE.

D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALS KHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOIN

THE COUP ATTEMPT. COLONEL BUI DINH DAM, SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER, IS BELIEVED READY TO SUPPORT THE COUP BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED. COLONEL NGUYEN HUU HANH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IV CORPS, WHO IS A COUP GROUP MEMBER, BELIEVES THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER, WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP BUT OTHER GROUP MEMBERS ARE NOT CONVINCED.

E. GENERAL KHIEM WILL COMMAND THE COUP FORCES. MAJOR LAM TRANG THO, FORMER SECOND ARMOR SQUADRON COMMANDER AND NOW WITH THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, WILL COMMAND ARMOR UNITS, INCLUDING SOME ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD SQUADRON PLUS THE FIRST TANK COMPANY AND THE FIFTH MECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY OF THE FIRST ARMOR SQUADRON.

F. THREE BATTALIONS OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE UNDER A MAJOR WILL JOIN ARMOR UNITS IN THE SHOCK FORCE.

G. THE THIRD MARINE BATTALION UNDER CAPTAIN MAHVIET BANG WILL SERVE AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

H. LIEUTENANT COLONAL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU, WILL NOT COMMAND THE SHOCK TROOPS BUT WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY FUNCTION DURING THE COUP.

I. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN DINH PHAT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE CHIEF, WILL COME TO SAIGON AND ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE.

J. MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH REGIMENT, FIFTH DIVISION, WILL SUPPORT THE COUP WITH HIS FORCES. ALSO INVOLVED IS THE FIFTH RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE FIFTH DIVISION.

K. GENERAL KHANH WILL COMMAND SIX DIVISIONS, ASSISTED BY GENERAL TRI. THESE DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-FIFTH, TWENTY-THIRD, AND THE NINTH. ACCORDING TO KHANH, COLONEL BUI DZINH, NINTH DIVISION COMMANBER, IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM BUT WILL SUPPORT HIM IN THE COUP.

L. TIMING FOR THE COUP WILL PROBABLY BE 1000 HOURS, 1400 HOURS, OR 0500 HOURS, SO THAT FAVORABLE UNITS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WILL BE ON DUTY. THESE HOURS ALSO FALL BETWEEN THE NORMAL HOURS FOR CHANGING THE GUARD.

M. ARRIVAL OF HIGH-LEVEL UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCOURAGED THE COUP GROUP WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH THEM PRESENT IN SAIGON. THE GROUP HAS EVEN SPECULATED THE ARRIVAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING A COUP OF ITS OWN; ARTICLES IN THE VIETNAM PRESS WERE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10143
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,842

SUBJECT 1. NGO DINH NHU INTENTION TO DEAL WITH VC
2. ATTEMPTS OF PHAM NGOC THAO TO ARRANGE AIR FORCE SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9-20 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 26062

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9684

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A FIELD GRADE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICER (F).

APPR: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THAO HAS PLANNED A COUP AND HAS SOUGHT VNAF SUPPORT AS REPORTED. THE SUBSTANCE OF THAO'S TALKS WITH DIEM AND NHU CONCERNING NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG AND NHU'S PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGED. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT NHU WOULD MAKE A DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH THAO IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT NHU IS CONSIDERING SUCH ACTION. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE TALKED WITH THAO

1. SUMMARY. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSPECTOR FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENT DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU ABOUT NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THAT NHU HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WAS "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT NHU WAS PLANNING MAJOR CHANGES TO MAKE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST NATIONS. THAO HAS SOLICITED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

C.I.B. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXXXXXXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR														

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLANS TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

2. THAO SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK 9-15 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT DIEM SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DIEM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE. THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY POPULAR BUT THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKED NHU BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT NHU WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE VC. THAO SAID THAT DIEM WAS ANGERED AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THAO THIS INFORMATION. THAO REPLIED THAT THIS OPINION WAS COMMONLY HELD BY CIVIL SERVANTS, THE GENERAL PUBLIC, AND THE AMERICANS.

3. ON 16 SEPTEMBER NHU SUMMONED THAO AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VC. THAO BELIEVED THAT NHU HIMSELF HAD TOLD AMERICAN AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THAT LODGE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAO. NHU CALMED DOWN AND LATER IN THE INTERVIEW ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT HE TOLD NHU THAT NHU DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE WOULD BE PLAYING A DANGEROUS GAME IN DEALING WITH THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. AMBASSADOR LODGE HAS NEVER MET THAO.)

4. THAO SAID THAT NHU PLANNED TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, WHICH THAO SAID, WOULD MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. (FIELD

COMMENT. THAO DID NOT STATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING NHU'S PLANS.) ACCORDING TO THAO, NHU'S CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS WAS VIA THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

5. ON 2Ø SEPTEMBER 1963 THAO SPOKE TO A RANKING VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICER CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VNAF SUPPORTING A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID THAT:

A. THE VNAF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY FIGHTING BECAUSE RESISTANCE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE OVERCOME IN THREE HOURS.

B. THE COUP LEADERS WANTED THE VNAF TO HINDER OR STOP THE FORCES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER FROM ASSISTING FORCES LOYAL TO THE DIEM REGIME.

6. THAO WANTED VNAF SUPPORT TO STOP CAO ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED THAT CAO MIGHT NOT NOW SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AS STRONGLY AS IN THE PAST. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR THIS JUDGEMENT:

A. CAO DID NOT ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW IN THE IV CORPS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING MARTIAL LAW IN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON 21 AUGUST.

B. RECENTLY, CAO HAS KEPT HIS TROOPS HEAVILY COMMITTED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

C. CAO APPEARED TO BE REMAINING ALOOF FROM EVENTS IN SAIGON.

D. CAO HAS MADE REPEATED REQUESTS TO THAO TO VISIT HIM AND

(5) 5

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(WHEN FILLED IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCS DB-3/656,842 IN 26062 PAGE 4

HAS OFFERED HIS PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO THAO FOR SUCH A VISIT.

7. THE VNAF OFFICER WHOM THAO APPROACHED REPLIED THAT COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, WAS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE REGIME AND, PARTICULARLY, TO NGO DINH NHU. HE ALSO TOLD THAO THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT ACTION VNAF OFFICERS WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT OF A COUP. THAO REPLIED THAT IF HIEN FAILED TO COOPERATE, HE COULD EASILY BE KILLED.

8. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(WHEN FILLED IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FORM 1K-1 1-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-63 (15-20-44-4)

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10149
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,031

SUBJECT FURTHER PLANNING OF LANG COUP GROUP

DATE DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 31379

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (30 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9725

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF LANG, FROM LANG.

APPR: LANG MAY BE MAKING COUP PLANS AS REPORTEDBUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER INDIVIDUALS NAMED MAY BE INVOLVED CANNOT BE JUDGED. GENERAL TY PROBABLY HAS SUPPORTED THE GENERALS' DEMANDS ON PRESIDENT DIEM. THE MEETING OF DIEM WITH THE TROOP COMMANDERS POSSIBLY TOOK PLACE AS REPORTED. LANG PROBABLY HOLDS THE VIEWS CITED.

1. SUMMARY. ON 3Ø SEPTEMBER 1963 HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY SAID THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, CHIEF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS), HAD REINFORCED THE GENERALS' DEMANDSFFOR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS BUT THAT SOME GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE COUP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIEM INITIATES REFORMS. BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JGS, WASCOONCERNED ABOUT VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON. HE AND OTHER GENERALS WANTED TO BE ASSURED OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT A COUP SUCCEEDED. COLONEL DO MAU, CHIEF, MILITARY SECURITY

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY CIB

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXXXXXXXXXXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR														

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-

SERVICE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS TO ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT DIEM'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY OFFICERS DURING WHICH THE LATTER RECEIVED GIFTS OF MONEY. LANG'S PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE COUP HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND HE HAS STARTED SELECTING MEMBERS OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT. LANG HAS ADVISED POSTPONING THE COUP UNTIL HIS GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

A. LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES, MET WITH OTHER GENERALS ON 26 OR 27 SEPTEMBER AND THEN SAW PRESIDENT DIEM TO URGE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS, INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERALS TO THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR.

B. GENERAL KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS WERE BECOMING CONVINCED THAT REFORMS ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT THE ENTIRE NGO FAMILY HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE.

C. KHIEM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON AND THE COUP PLOTTERS FEARED POSSIBLE VC EXPLOITATION OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT.

D. KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS DID NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT A COUP UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT THEM IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED.

E. COLONEL DO MAU, WORKING THROUGH LIEUTENANT COLONELS NGUYEN CAO KY, 1ST TRANSPORT GROUP COMMANDER AND DO KHAC MAI, VNAF CHIEF OF STAFF, HAS INDEPENDENTLY ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VNAF OFFICERS TO MOUNT A COUP AND ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. LANG'S GROUP BELIEVED THAT MAU WAS TOO INDISCREET BUT PLANNED TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SITUATION IF THE VNAF DID BEGIN A COUP. (FIELD COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAI AND MAU WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE REGIME.)

F. GENERAL KHIEM CLAIMED THAT HELICOPTER UNITS WERE INCLUDED IN THE LANG COUP GROUP.

G. PRESIDENT DIEM RECENTLY SUMMONED MILITARY OFFICERS, WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND ABOVE, WHO COMMANDED TROOP UNITS IN AND NEAR SAIGON AND GAVE THEM SUMS OF MONEY RANGING FROM 30,000 TO 100,000 PIASTERS. THE MONEY OSTENSIBLY WAS SEIZED FROM THE VC. COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THIEN, VIETNAMESE ARMOR COMMANDER, RECEIVED 100,000 PIASTERS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED HIM TO RENEW HIS ALLEGIANCE TO DIEM. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT THE COUP HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT OTHERS WERE NOT AND HAVE JOINED THE COUP GROUP.

(FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS 9712 (TDCS-3/560,375) FOR THAO'S STATEMENT T THAT NHU HAD GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO MILITARY OFFICRS.)

H. DIEM HAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER. ACCORIDNG TO GENERAL KHIEM, DIEM HAS GIVEN HIEN ORDERS TO USE THE VNAF FOR COUNTERCOUP ACTION AND FOR EVACUATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF NECESSARY.

I. DIEM OFFERED LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, INSPECTOR OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS, THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE WHILE NHU OFFERED HIM COMMAND OF THE SPECIAL FORCES. THAO, HOWEVER, HAS NOT WAVERED IN HIS SUPPORT OF THE COUP.

3. LANG SAID THAT HE HAS URGED DELAY IN MOUNTING THE COUP UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VOID FOR THE VC TO EXPLOIT. HE SAID THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE HIS IDEAS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LANG'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WOULD REPLACE PRESIDENT DIEM. THE TERM MINISTER WOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULD BE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD NOT DIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF A SHADOW CABINET:

A. GENERAL KHIEM, MINISTER OF SECURITY

B. VO VAN HIEN, CURRENTLY A SAIGON LAWYER, MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

C. LANG, EITHER MINISTER OF ECONOMY OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR FINANCE.

D. NGUYEN TON HOAN, PROMIENT OPPOSITION LEADER IN EXILE, MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

E. NGUYEN THAI, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE UNITED STATES, EITHER MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR CIVIC ACTION.

F. MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR DEFENSE.

G. NGUYEN HUY NGHIA, GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR INTERIOR.

H. NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER DIEM CURRENTLY IN EXILE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I. AU TRUONG THANH, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIST, DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

J. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE.

LANG HAS CONTACTED ALL OF THE ABOVE EXCEPT NGHIA, CHAU AND HOA. HE HAS SENT A CATHOLIC PRIEST TO PARIS TO CONTACT CHAU AND WAS PLANNING TO CONTACT THE OTHERS EVENTUALLY.

4. LANG SAID THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE INCLUSION OF TRAN KIM TUYEN, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS GVN CONSUL GENERAL TO CAIRO, IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THAO HAS ASSURED TUYEN'S SUPPORTERS IN SAIGON THAT TUYEN WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE COUP.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : Bundy
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CAS 79407

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-03-330 + DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

October 30, 1963

~~TOP~~ SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

FROM McG. Bundy, White House

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition IMPLIED IN YOUR MESSAGE that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are

~~TOP~~ SECRET EYES ONLY

better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.

~~4. With respect to money for coup group you are authorized to make such clandestine disbursements as you consider secure and effective from available CAS piasters.~~

4. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team. Our only modification of existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish

all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instructions should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution, when time permits.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 7. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U. S. -controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,

such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that it should succeed.

7. We have your message about return to Washington and ~~if announcement has not already been made~~, we suggest that ~~it~~ all public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia
DATE : 7/11/1962
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1

SECRET

S T A T U S   R E P O R T

ON

S O U T H E A S T   A S I A

J U L Y   11, 1 9 6 2

PREPARED BY:

TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

VIET-NAM

Current Overall Evaluation

The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing to improve its military, and to a limited extent, its political and economic position. Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories and none appear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses.

On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued well. Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however, in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion). This may be due to reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes. The GVN took several good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and several rural social and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consumer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries continued good.

Fearing that the prospective Laos settlement will facilitate Viet Cong activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam itself, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself. There is no response as yet.

Progress on Action Program

1. VC Activity

Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27 June and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July 4. The lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mobility and performance of the GVN forces. Observing that this appears to be a period of VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV reports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate platoons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce. MACV J-2 estimates infiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June, but this information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltration since.

In spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included some main force personnel. For the period 20-27 June the VC suffered a reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC and 141 friendly forces.

Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies. Unconfirmed reports raise the possibility that the VC are attaining an anti-aircraft capability.

(Following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of July 3)

2. Strengthen popular support. The GVN took several steps to generate more popular support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 release of 794 prisoners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven" holiday (anniversary of Diem's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GVN officials, and a Presidentially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his participation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Diem in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National Assembly.

Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and for the people in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres. Ngo dinh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the strategic hamlet program) is concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the election of hamlet officials by secret ballot instead of by customary show of hands. This is now being done in some hamlets.

4. Seek International Support

(a) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16, but did not apologize or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions were taken to avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that in spite of these precautions the frontier may have been violated, points out that any such inadvertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border control committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border cooperation.

Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed coastal islands, was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further trouble between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.

(b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country representatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings, Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership on the ICC. The Belgians, French, Italians and the UK have not yet responded.

Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being worked out with Wellington and Saigon.

10. Military Civic Action

The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple. In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet were also air dropped.

12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plans

Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction. Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as the military move into VC territory.

Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for what is theoretically a full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set up there. The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in advance of the move. establishment of military control over the area so that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a very short period for the physical move).

Montagnards. Latest information developed as a result of joint surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more a long term problem than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Montagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably continue, particularly if the GVN provides adequate food and security.

Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and receiving minimum food, shelter and security.

The Embassy comments that while this information somewhat reduces the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed, national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Vietnamese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC pressures and more may do so.

Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for 490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.

Future Plans. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the pacification of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be presented to the Embassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly developing plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.

15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.

Village Radios. As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village radios were installed and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains were started.

Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops because of the effect on Asian opinion. Decision and action will be delayed until the Governor's return from Geneva.

20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Effort.

Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for agricultural efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon. One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.

Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned hospital surgical suites began on schedule.

Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.

25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.

Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN

war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating no difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspapers.

28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.

The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and physical arrangements are underway.

THAILAND

Current Situation Evaluation

The RTG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RTG has not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO Council of Representatives in mid-July.

On July 2 the US began the redeployment of 1,000 Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over this move was lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).

On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and one in Lampang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Communist propaganda ring operating out of Northeastern Burma.

Progress on Action Program

1. Improved Logistic Facilities

We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield improvement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military engineeringequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right-of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.

2. Internal Security Plan

We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to cable summaries of those portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic components of the entire plan during Secretary McNamara's forthcoming trip to Honolulu.

LAOS

Current Situation Evaluation

The principal remaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including SEATO, having been resolved, it is anticipated that the new Accords may be signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible refusal of the GVN to sign. The GVN's position stems from its belief that so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of SVN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Laos and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN.

Progress on Action Program

There has been little progress on our action program. We are concentrating at present on the following problems:

1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing Souvanna with the material assistance he requires by enlisting contributions from other Free World nations.

2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with respect to the GVN, GRC, Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the interim we are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.

3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to the essential heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.

4. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out their undertaking.

1a

BURMA

Current Situation Evaluation

The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted by incidents on July 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army. These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian political supporters.

Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate, though not dramatically. A special Government amnesty offer expired June 30 without producing significant response from the insurgents.

Progress on Action Program

1. Political

It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary Council will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.

2. Economic (AID)

No new developments.

3. Military

a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military "sales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2 carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency operations. This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit for the United States.

b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program. 117 prospective students have been processed for the coming year.

CAMBODIA

Current Situation Evaluation

Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia. Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, and it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia and Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietnamese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam. Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting in Bangkok has developed.

Progress on Action Program

1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's protest against the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.

2. Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of disappointment that military budget support was not included.

3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T-28 aircraft, first increment of sixteen, have arrived in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of Ambassador Sprouse.

4. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out, and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10120
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 12/00/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 430: Kennedy, Reactions to Death Miscellaneous, 11/22/63-6/18/64. Box 5

TELEGRAM IN ORMATION REP RT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS: NO FOREIGN DISSEM

__ALEXANDER
__BELK
__BRUBECK
__CHASE
__DINGEMAN
__DUNGAN
__ECKEL
__FORRESTAL
__JOHNSON
__KILDUFF
__KLEIN
__SCHLESINGER
__SMITH, WM. Y.

COUNTRY: SOVIET BLOC / YUGOSLAVIA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/566,658

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF YUGOSLAV AND BLOC DIPLOMATS ON THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF KENNEDY ASSASSINATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 6 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.: 25-29 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES: 74578

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: GREECE, ATHENS (28 NOVEMBER, 2 DECEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT STATEMENTS ARE ACCURATELY REPORTED)

FIELD REPORT NO. EKA 4230

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A GREEK POLITICAL OBSERVER (B) WITH CONTACTS AMONG BLOC DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS, FROM THE DIPLOMATS MENTIONED BELOW.

FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED)* BEING TAKEN BY SOVBLOC AND YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATS IN GREEK CIRCLES:

1. ON 25 NOVEMBER 63, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO GREECE PEKO DAPCEVIC EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY WOULD NOT CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, ADDING THAT HE IS CERTAIN SOVIET UNION IS WELL DISPOSED TO CONTINUE FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH WEST. DAPCEVIC SAID THERE HAS BEEN "A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE" ON PART OF SOVIET PEOPLE IN PAST FEW YEARS FROM EARLIER ATTITUDE THAT ALL AMERICANS AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE WAR MONGERS TO CURRENT THINKING THAT AMERICANS, LIKE SOVIETS,

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS: NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EX

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-

DEC - 6 1963

REALLY WANT PEACE. ZENITH OF THIS CHANGE CAME WHEN UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED IT WAS WILLING TO SELL WHEAT TO SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO DAPCEVIC, THIS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR FEELING IS NOW SO FAVORABLE TOWARD AMERICANS THAT EVEN IF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WANTED TO REVERSE THIS FEELING, IT COULD NOT EASILY DO SO.

2. ON 26 NOVEMBER, CZECH FIRST SECRETARY VAKLAV SVESTKA STATED THAT CZECH EMBASSY IN ATHENS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REACTION OF PRAGUE TO THE ASSASSINATION, BUT FEELING OF CZECH EMBASSY PEOPLE IN ATHENS WAS THAT U S POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE MATERIALLY. SVESTKA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ASSASSINATION WILL HAVE DELAYING ACTION ON IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS: UNDER KENNEDY THINGS WERE MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING, AND CHANGE OF PRESIDENT NOW WILL OF NECESSITY SLOW DOWN THE COURSE OF EVENTS BECAUSE "PERSONAL FACTOR" IS NOW MISSING. KENNEDY HAD DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ACHIEVED ACCEPTANCE OF SOVBLOC (PORTION GARBLED)* POPULATIONS AS PEACE LOVING MAN; JOHNSON HAS TO ESTABLISH THIS FOR HIMSELF NOW, AND IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME.

3. ON 29 NOVEMBER, SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY VITALIY NOVIKOV STATED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE WITH ONLY ONE YEAR BEFORE ELECTIONS JOHNSON AS NON-ELECTED PRESIDENT IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BASIC KENNEDY

POLICIES. SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, OVER FUTURE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ASSASSINATION CLEARLY SHOWS RADICAL RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS ARE STRONG, HAVE SUPPORTERS IN LOCAL POLICE AND POLITICAL CIRCLES AND ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEIR IDEALS. IT ALSO REVEALS, NOVIKOV SAID, STRENGTH OF REACTION IN AMERICA TO KENNEDY POLICIES SOVIET PEOPLE FEAR THAT RIGHT-WING WILL BE DOMINANT.

4. ON 29 NOVEMBER, RUMANIAN AMBASSADOR MIRCEA BALANESCU SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BLOC POLICY VIS-A-VIS WEST AND ANY INCREASE IN TENSION WOULD BE RESULT OF CHANGED AMERICAN POLICY.

5. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCNELM CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL).

6. *HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTIONS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF THEY MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10440
RECORD SERIES : Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re:
DATE : 9/3/1961
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Cuba, Meetings on Refugees, Box 4. Box 7.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

COUNTRY BRAZIL CHINA CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/485,732

SUBJECT OFFER OF SUPPLIES AND MEN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND CUBA

DATE DISTR. 3 SEPTEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. WEEK OF 27 AUGUST 1961

REFERENCES IN 23204

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO (2 SEPTEMBER 1961)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HBR 2529

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A BRAZILIAN PROFESSOR (C) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADERS.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 27 AUGUST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA BOTH OFFERED MATERIAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING QUOTE VOLUNTEERS UNQUOTE, TO LEONEL BRIZOLA, GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL, WHO WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE IN BRAZIL TO ASSURE THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF VICE PRESIDENT JOAO GOULART UPON THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS. BRIZOLA DID NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE MORAL SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO QUOTE CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR UNQUOTE OF BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CRISIS. (FIELD COMMENT: BRIZOLA OBVIOUSLY WAS AFRAID THAT IF THE OFFERS WERE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERVENE. THE OFFER OF AID BY CASTRO LEAKED

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO THE PRESS; THAT OF MAO DID NOT).

2. 2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCARIB. CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10452
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/1/1962
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETAIN OR DESTROY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/650,938

SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

DATE DISTR. 1 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO.: 1 AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES: IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

~~SMITH BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: PARAS. 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU.
PARAS. 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG.
PARA. 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.

2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	~~USIA~~	OCI	ONE	~~OCR~~	~~ORR~~	~~OO~~	DIA	CIB

VTF EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

7. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

8. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

9. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

10. FIELD COMMENT. CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

12. FIELD COMMENT. AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.

13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10453
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/14/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

FILE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RETAIN OR DES

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/651,039

SUBJECT VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. EARLY AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES IN 43629

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7782

SMITH-BUNDY
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
…ERSEN
SCHLESING…
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
FORRESTAL
…ENSON
…EN
KOMER

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS, FROM ANOTHER VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST.

APPR. ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT WERE MADE AS INDICATED, IT IS CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER ACTUALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST ON 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLES AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH, THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS BELIEF THAT A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS, AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM. HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IS A NEUTRALIST COALITION

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CIB

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	AID	DIA EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IN 43629

THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTS, INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHERE ROBERTS ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE/ JOURNALIST AND AMBASSADOR HOHLER. THE/ JOURNALIST HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOME TIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ROBERTS HAD ARRANGED THE MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH HIM. NEITHER THE/ JOURNALIST NOR ROBERTS HAD MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THEIR VIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE/ JOURNALIST ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT, FAR FROM BEING NEUTRALIST MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION SINCE HE BELIEVES NEUTRALISM TO BE NO MORE THAN A MAJOR STEP TOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVER AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNISTS. ROBERTS POINTEDLY DISAGREED WITH AMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORT UNDER WAY AND THE GAINS ALREADY APPARENT. ROBERTS DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM [illegible] NGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONS.

ROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLY EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE AMERICANS.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE/ JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER/ MAY HAVE BEEN ONE DATELINED SAIGON, 29 JUNE 1962, APPEARING IN AN EARLY JULY ISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED "INTRA-PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM - MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?" THE/ JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT AND MISINTERPRETED VARIOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED, WHICH /LED HIM TO CONSIDER THE/ JOURNALIST A NEUTRALIST. THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED INVOLVED, WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE AS FOLLOWS: "STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM HERE WERE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING - BY THE PRO-SOVIET GROUP, WILL EXERT A TEMPERATE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS. UNLESS THE SCALES ARE TURNED BY PEIPING IN FAVOR OF ITS PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH IN ON THE RED DISPUTE, THE CHANCES WERE NOT DISMISSED OF A LONGER TRUCE IN TOTTERING LAOS, AND EVEN OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM.")

5. (FIELD COMMENT: IN A LATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, R. A. BURROWS, ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT

THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED. IN CRITICIZING THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME, BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD FAIL TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE, MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY JUNTA, POSSIBLY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.)

6. (FIELD COMMENT. US AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, FREDERICK E. NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAS NEVER GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HE HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR NOLTING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. AMBASSADOR NOLTING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE, AND WITH THE POSSIBILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER

ON 8 AUGUST THAT, WHILE HE CONSIDERS FRENCH POLICY BOTH IN PARIS AND IN SAIGON TO HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE FEELS THAT THE BRITISH HAVE A CONTRARY POLICY MORE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE US. NHU SAID THAT HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT CAUSE HIM CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE BRITISH ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND INITIATED THE COMMENT THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAD SAID TO HIM RECENTLY THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAM OR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS "UNTHINKABLE.")

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10454
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report
DATE : 9/25/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 9/22/62-9/27/62. Box 6.

Vphel'd via RAC 1/15 13

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETAIN OR DESTROY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/523,453

SUBJECT: PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST-SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS

DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

REFERENCES: IN 20321

DATE OF INFO.: MID SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL: 2

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7977

~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
__DUNGAN
__KAYSEN
__KILDUFF
__PETERSEN
__SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
__BELK
__JOHNSON
__KLEIN
__KOMER
__RASKIN
__SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SAIGON, WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON, THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/NATIONALIST CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

2. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL, AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10460
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Task Force Status Report
DATE : 0/00/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 332 R & S, Southeast Asia Task Force Reports 4/11-6/13/63. Box 6.

STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS

CAMBODIA

A CIA source in the Chinese Nationalist diplomatic mission in Saigon has reported GRC plans to assist dissident Cambodian leader Son Ngoc Thanh in a political action campaign against the Sihanouk government. The GRC is also exploring Thanh's capability for penetrating the Cambodian government and the feasibility of assassinating Sihanouk.

NORTH VIETNAM

Over 700,000 CIA-designed leaflets were dropped into the Haiphong/Lay Kay areas in April. The objective of this operation, in addition to familiarizing the DRV population with the anti-communism symbol on the leaflets, is to create a diversion within North Vietnam proper which may dissipate DRV security strengths in response to psywar and deception activities, and thus lessen DRV capability for action in South Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAM

A two-month Civic Action Ministry training course for 229 montagnard cadres was completed in April. The first priority of these graduates, in direct satisfaction of requirements levied by General Rosson during his visit, is formation of fixed teams for use at Special Forces camps. Included in the course were 45 Vietnamese civic action cadre, all tribal dialect speakers, who will serve as team chiefs.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10491
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Appeal to President Kennedy
DATE : 1/24/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

COUNTRY	CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/499,631
SUBJECT	APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS IN PHNOM PENH	DATE DISTR.	24 JANUARY 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	20 JANUARY 1962	REFERENCES	IN -15274
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (20 JANUARY 1962)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	FDP 1560

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU.

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN PROTECTIVE CUSTODY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER COLONEL NGUYEN CHANH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESE

LANGUAGE VERSION.

2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES" WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE CS-3/486,609 AND FDP 1168/TDCS-3/473,682 IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10493
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Comments
DATE : 1/28/1962
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/500,097

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 25 JANUARY 1962

REFERENCES IN 18750

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7006

BUNDY
TAYLOR
KAYSEN
BELK
R. JOHNSON
[illegible]
[illegible]
GOLDBER
DUNGAN

RETAIN OR DESTROY

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER (C) WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.

1. ON 25 JANUARY 1962, TRAN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. (FIELD COMMENT. (TDCS-3/500,042) FVS-6999 BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITICAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL NGHIEM.) SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

2. LY SAID THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. LY WAS AWARE THAT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EXO

AID

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

29

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL** TDCS -3/500,097 IN 18750 PAGE 2

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. LY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT. TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF (CS-3/474,755) FVS-5908 HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIEM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED THAT, WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT DIEM.)

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets
DATE : 2/20/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Hillsman asked that this be called to your attention BKS

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/502,553
SUBJECT	STRATEGIC HAMLETS	DATE DISTR.	20 FEBRUARY 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-FEBRUARY 1962	FIELD NO.	FVS-7075 IN 30145
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962)		
APPRAISAL	IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG CORRECTLY REPEATED NHU'S STATEMENTS.		

FILE

RETAIN OR DESTROY

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B), WITH PARAS. 1-3 FROM NGO DINH NHU, AND PARA. 4 FROM BUI VAN LUONG.

1. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, STATED ON 14 FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SO ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD BE PLACED IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA

ADDED: EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SMITH-BUNDY DUNGAN GILDNER KAYSEN PETERSEN SCHLESINGER TAYLOR BELK FORRESTAL KOMER RASKIN SAUNDERS

2. THE PROGRAM AS PLANNED BY NHU HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.

A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE POPULATION.

B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE VIETNAMESE LIFE. NHU STATED THAT IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. NHU COMPARED THE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTO THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF ASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL POWER. NHU STATED THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONG THIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING BICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE OF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET, HE REITERATED, WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT, NHU SAID, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. HE DEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED THAT AT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS IN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULL APPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD BROUGHT OUT IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD DEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, AFFORD A BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY, E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH MOVEMENTS, ETC.

3. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS WITH A GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL POINT TO THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-7034, TDCS-3/501,110 GAVE AN ACCOUNT, FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AT THE MEETING.) HE STATED THAT HE

WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE. THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. NHU SAID THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START AGAIN.

4. MINISTER OF INTERIOR BUI VAN LUONG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION ON 13 FEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT NHU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE PROGRAM. NHU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10032
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Embtel 660 (Saigon) Re: Task Force on Vietnam
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PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
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OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 11/16/61-11/17/61, box 195. Box 8

3

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

SECRET

43
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Control: 9439
Rec'd: NOV. 16, 1961
3:50 a.m.

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FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 660, INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 268

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

TASK FORCE VN

REF: EMBTEL 627

1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF NEW MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE (COLONEL NGUYEN VAN Y VICE GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA) FALL INTO TWO GENERAL FIELDS, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL POLICE. BOTH CAS AND USOM HAVE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIME BEEN STYMIED BUT WITH CHANGE BELIEVE REAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. THIS WILL REQUIRE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED PROGRAMS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, TRAINING, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL U.S. PERSONNEL FOR NECESSARY LIAISON AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT.

2. CAS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED TO ITS HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION SERVICE, TO SERVE AS "SPECIAL BRANCH" OF SURETE, WHOSE CHARTER AT PRESENT COVERS BOTH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ORDINARY INVESTIGATIONS. THIS "SPECIAL BRANCH" WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT PROVINCE LEVELS AND BE MANAGED THROUGH REGIONAL DIRECTORATES. AT EACH REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, CAS WOULD PROPOSE ASSIGN AT LEAST ONE CAS OFFICER TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON AND COLLABORATION. CONCEPT WOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION HIS EFFORT INTO VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE FOLLOWING CAS COMMITMENT:

A. CAS OFFICERS FOR DIRECTORATES AT HUE, NHA TRANG, BAN ME THUOT, BIEN HOA, SAIGON/CHOLON, AND CAN THO, AS WELL AS ALREADY

SECRET

EXISTING PERSONNEL FOR LIAISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PERSONNEL WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY INTERPRETERS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

B. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION TRAINING TO VIETNAMESE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF NEW SPECIAL BRANCH, TAKEN FROM EXPERIENCED SURETE OFFICERS.

C. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO GIVE PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICERS FUNDS TO OPERATE AGENT NETWORKS IN PROVINCES. EXACT SUM NOT YET DETERMINED BUT WILL BE SEEN TO BE SUBSTANTIAL BY MULTIPLYING NUMBER OF PROVINCES (38) BY REASONABLE MONTHLY SUM FOR EACH PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ENABLE HIM HIRE AGENTS AND PAY OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

3. USOM EQUALLY DETERMINED PROSECUTE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER COLLABORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE WITH REGULAR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS OF SURETE, TO PROVIDE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ON EFFECTIVE NATIONAL BASIS TO BOLSTER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO CONTRBUTION CRIME -- DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC. THIS WOULD COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE, SURETE AND RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE:

A. CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR.

B. A DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE SEPARATE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES.

C. THE ADOPTION OF A REALISTIC TRAINING PROGRAM, GEARED TO AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM OF COMMODITY PROCUREMENT.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE. USOM ENVISIONS DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND UPON RECIPIENTS'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INTRODUCTION OF NEW CONCEPTS.

4. THIS BEING MADE TASK FORCE MATTER DUE MY CONVICTION IT IS SUBSTANTIAL WE MOVE FORWARD IN BOTH ABOVE FIELDS TO MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHAT APPARENTLY

IS REAL NEW BREAK IN SITUATION. URGE FULLEST SUPPORT FROM TASK FORCE LEVEL AND ABOVE OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY BY CAS AND USOM, AND SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR NECESSARY PERSONNEL AND BUDGET ADDITIONS WHICH MAY BE INVOLVED.

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MM

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
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RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. I, BOX 32

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RESTRICTIONS : 1B
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COMMENTS : DOC. #158

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/658,582

SUBJECT CUBAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION

DATE DISTR. 18 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 82930

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 16 DECEMBER 1963

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAS BEEN A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

1. FIDEL CASTRO WAS VERY UPSET OVER THE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. THE TOP CUBAN LEADERSHIP WAS SURE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION FOR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST CUBA WOULD NOT OVERTHROW THE RÉGIME.

2. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE CUBAN GOVT., ON ORDERS FROM CASTRO, IS NOT TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PUBLIC OR DO ANYTHING TO IRRITATE HIM. ACCORDING TO CUBAN GOVT. LEADERS, CASTRO WANTS TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAYS AND DOES ABOUT CUBA,

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OXX	XXX FBI
STATE/DIR	REPCINCLANT	I&NS	TREASURY													EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

AND GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE, IF HE FEELS SO INCLINED, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10061

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

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CUBA

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CURRENT STATUS : Redact
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COMMENTS : DOC. #170

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 170

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/658,469

SUBJECT ALERT STATUS OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AS RESULT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 13 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 DECEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 79459

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 9 DECEMBER 1963

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A SENIOR CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO IS AN ASTUTE OBSERVER AND HAS DEMONSTRATED MATURITY, DISCERNMENT, AND RELIABILITY IN HIS PAST REPORTING.

1. ABOUT 2 DAYS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD BEGAN TO RECEIVE A SERIES OF MESSAGES PLACING THEM ON A SPECIAL ALERT STATUS. THESE MESSAGES WERE OBVIOUSLY DUE TO APPREHENSION BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST THE MISSIONS. THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WERE EXHORTED TO EXERCISE EXTREME VIGILANCE, TO MOUNT A NIGHT-AND-DAY WATCH OF MISSION PREMISES, TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE WERE "NO COMPROMISING

—BUNDY-SMITH
—ALEXANDER
—BELK
—BRUBECK
—CHASE
—DINGEMAN
—[illegible]
—[illegible]
—FORRESTAL
—JOHNSON
—KILDUFF
—KLEIN
—KOMER
—SAUNDERS
—SCHLESINGER
—SMITH, WM. Y.

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	FBI

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FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

DOCUMENTS ON THE PREMISES," AND TO BE ON GUARD AGAINST HOSTILE PROVOCATIONS.

2. ONE CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO, FOLLOWING HIS USUAL PRACTICE, REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE PERMISSION TO ACCEPT A LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO CUBA, WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST FORMALLY SUBMIT HIS REQUEST BY CABLE. HE DID SO ON 29 NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL 6 DECEMBER THAT HE RECEIVED THE AUTHORITY TO QUIT HIS POST.

3. AS OF 9 DECEMBER THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION FROM HAVANA THAT THE ALERT ORDER WAS TO BE CONSIDERED REVOKED.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10063

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

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TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/24/1963
PAGES : 2

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CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/13/1993

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COMMENTS : DOC. #188

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

188

COUNTRY URUGUAY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,829

SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 24 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 67186

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (23 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2414

BUNDY-SMITH, ALEXANDER, BELK, BRUBECK, CHASE, DINGEMAN, DUNCAN, ECKEL, FORRESTAL, JOHNSON, KILDUFF, KLEIN, KOMER, SAUNDERS, SCHLESINGER, SMITH, WM. Y.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B).

1. RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/ (CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING TO STONE THE EMBASSY. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES. KENNEDYS ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME).

2. THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDEO HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE 3000 PERSONS MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

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RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10064

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

190

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,826

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF CUBAN OFFICIALS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 23 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CHILE, SANTIAGO (22 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

BUNDY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
BRUBECK
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNGAN
ECKEL
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CHILEAN WHO HAS A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO ACQUIRED THROUGH PROLONGED ASSOCIATION WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE EMBASSY. HE IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE REPORTER.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE AS REPORTED.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

A. ON 22 NOVEMBER JOSE TOHA, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CHILEAN CUBAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE AND DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-CASTRO LEFTIST PRESS ULTIMA HORA, INFORMED PEDRO MARTINEZ PIREZ, CHARGE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO, THAT KENNEDY HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED. TOHA SAID "ESTE ASUNTO DE KENNEDY SE ESTA PONIENDO COLOR DE HORMIGAS" (POSSIBLY MEANS ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY LOOKS LIKE IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS). MARTINEZ COMMENTED THAT HE HEARD THAT THE PERSON ARRESTED WAS PRESIDENT OF A FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE AND THAT IF THE YANKEES OR CIA ASSASSINATED KENNEDY TO RESUME THE ASSAULT ON CUBA, THEN A THIRD WORLD WAR

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS — NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR																	

I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT Exo

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WOULD START. HE SAID THINGS ARE VERY CLEAR AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED HIM, THE CONTRADICTIONS ARE WELL DEFINED AND THE MOMENT WAS VERY SPECIAL, LIKE THAT OF THE MAINE. MARTINEZ SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOW IN THE MOST DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IN LATIN AMERICA, THE WORLD, GOULART, ARGENTINE PETROLEUM, PERUVIAN LANDS, CHILEAN MINES AND IN GENERAL ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA. TOHA SAID HE WAS VERY WORRIED AFTER READING THE CABLE TRAFFIC. MARTINEZ ADDED THAT IF THE USA IS THINKING OF INVADING CUBA THEN THEY MUST HAVE EVERYTHING ALL PREPARED AND ALL THE STRATEGY READY AND THEREFORE THE ALARM MUST BE GIVEN SO THAT CUBA CAN BE PREPARED.

B. THE CUBAN CONSUL AT VALPARAISO CALLED THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO TO DETERMINE POLICY IN THE MATTER OF FLYING THE FLAG AT HALF MAST. THE REPLY WAS THAT THERE ARE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA AND THAT NO OFFICIAL WORD HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM CUBA, SO THEREFORE NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS AGAINST PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECREED OFFICIAL MOURNING INCLUDING FLYING FLAGS AT HALF MAST.)

C. MARTINEZ REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER STATEMENTS PREFERRING TO WAIT FOR OFFICIAL WORD FROM HABANA. SEVERAL TIMES HE DENIED THAT THE ASSASSIN WAS INVOLVED IN THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE INSISTING THAT THIS PERSON IS ONLY A SUSPECT AND THAT EXTREME RIGHTISTS OR SEGREGATIONISTS ARE TO BLAME. MARTINEZ SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO PUT THE BLAME ON CUBA.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

CUBAN TRAINING OF
LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

27 March 1963

SECRET

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

27 March 1963

CUBAN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

OCI No. 0515/63

27 March 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Training of Latin American Subversives

SUMMARY

1. We estimate that at least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received guerrilla training or political indoctrination in Cuba.

2. We have recorded the travel of 5,059 Latin Americans to Cuba in 1962, and reporting to date indicates that at least another 417 went during the first two months of 1963.

3. Field replies to a survey estimate that there were about 11,000 arrests in Latin America during the past 15 months for terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla activity, or other subversive activity. Only a small percentage of those arrested, however, were brought to trial; almost all were released after varying periods of detention.

4. Current efforts to improve and exploit reporting on travel to Cuba had not made themselves felt during the reporting period. The security services of Latin American countries accordingly were unable, with isolated individual exceptions, to establish Cuban direction, instigation or training of arrested subversives.

5. Incidence of guerrilla, terrorist, and sabotage activity at present is highest in Venezuela, Peru, and--in the form of largely non-political banditry--Colombia. There is sporadic guerrilla activity in and around Nicaragua and Guatemala, and a guerrilla potential in Ecuador and Brazil.

DISCUSSION

A. Recruitment of Trainees

1. Candidates for subversive training in Cuba are selected by the leftist organizations sponsoring such activity in their homeland. These organizations are not always Communist, particularly in countries where the regular Communist leadership is less militant than other extremist groups. One training group of Argentines included Peronists, Trotskyites, and Vanguard Socialists. A Peruvian group has sent to Cuba for extended guerrilla training youths who are not members of any organizations but have expressed leftist ideas.

2. In countries where there is Cuban diplomatic representation, candidates are screened by the embassy's G-2 officer. We have no information on how approval is granted in countries which have no diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Travel

1. There is a concerted effort to conceal or obscure the amount of travel to Cuba, the identities of the travelers, and the length of their stay. Documents are falsified and such devices as detachable visas, circuitous travel, and some surreptitious border crossing are used.

2. Since the October crisis, the only Western Hemisphere access to Cuba by scheduled airline has been through Mexico. Throughout the reporting period Mexican authorities have been photographing passports of travelers arriving from or leaving for Cuba, and relaying the information to interested OAS members. In some cases the travelers themselves have been photographed.

3. Cuban embassies, however, have been issuing visas on separate sheets of paper to avoid any record of Cuban travel in the passport. In addition, since some passports are fraudulent, the Mexican report of Cuban travel may neither reach the correct country nor permit identification. At this agency's suggestion, Mexican travel control authorities late in February began stamping passports to show arrival from or departure for Cuba. While this effectively counters the device of the detachable visa in the

case of legitimate passports, most Latin American countries have inadequate personnel and administrative machinery to scrutinize the passports of returning travelers.

4. Travel control in Mexico City logged 4,912 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, and 969 in the first two months of 1963. (These figures do not cover access by other routes prior to the quarantine in 1962, and include Cubans as well as all other nationalities. Accordingly they do not correlate with totals for legal and illegal travel to Cuba derived from available reporting in the individual Latin American countries. It should also be noted that a "legal" traveler in Mexican reporting may be listed as an illegal traveler by his homeland, either because he had no authorization to visit Cuba, or because of fraudulent documentation.)

5. Anniversary celebrations, goodwill tours, and international conferences afford pretexts for travel to Cuba ostensibly unconnected with subversive training. Identities of trainees are usually protected by pseudonyms, at least during actual training, and the guerrilla candidate may return to his Havana hotel every few days to maintain a fiction of sightseeing. There have also been reports that trainees have for cover purposes attributed extended stays in Cuba to detention by Cuban police.

6. Prior to the October crisis, there was some direct travel to Cuba from Central American countries, and occasional Cubana charter flights, but the main jump-off points were Mexico City, Curacao, and Trinidad. A Canadian non-scheduled airline has operated a few flights between Canada and Havana, carrying both personnel and cargo. Cuban freighters call fairly regularly at Mexican ports, and some Latin American trainees could reach Cuba aboard Cuban ships picking up rice in British Guiana. There is small ship traffic, of unknown but limited extent, between Cuba and neighboring islands.

7. Soviet and Czech airlines continue transatlantic service to Cuba, and Iberian airlines on 11 February announced resumption of a schedule of two flights a month to Havana via the Azores. Aeroflot has occasionally sought and received permission

to land at Recife, Brazil, en route to Havana, and may have picked up some passengers

8. Controlled sources who have undergone guerrilla training, and a comparison of inbound and outbound travelers identified by travel controls make it clear that at least in the case of guerrilla trainees one leg of the travel is often by way of bloc countries and Western Europe. We know of Latin Americans given Cuban training who appear on no travel controls, suggesting that travel in both directions was either by way of the bloc or completely surreptitious.

9. A center providing funds and forged passports for travel to Cuba is known to exist in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Cubans are known to provide forged passports for some of the returning trainees. One group of Argentines returning through Prague and Western Europe was furnished with both Cuban and Ecuadorean passports, to be surrendered in Montevideo prior to re-entering Argentina.

C. Numbers of Trainees

1. Our estimate that 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received subversive training in Cuba is derived from a combination of travel information, debriefing of controlled sources who have taken training, penetrations of sponsoring organizations, and in a few cases from the records of cooperating Latin American security services.

2. Monitoring of travel into Cuba gives some indication of how many have stayed long enough to receive training, but does not permit differentiation between military training and political indoctrination. We cannot establish a hard total or be certain about length of visit because of travel via the bloc. Forged documentation obscures an accurate nationality breakdown of the travelers.

3. The hardest figures on guerrilla trainees by nationality are obtained from established and reliable sources who have access to such information through sponsoring organizations and in a number of cases have themselves taken such training in Cuba. We do not, however, have enough such sources to provide independently a comprehensive total of Latin America. Only a few of the local Latin American security services have adequate assets for contributing such information.

D. Training

1. The scope of training varies with the time available. One agent who participated in a four-week course in mid-1961 received basic training covering cross-country movement of guerrillas, use and maintenance of weapons, and basic guerrilla tactics. Another clandestine source who spent nearly six months in Cuba in 1962 devoted more than 10 weeks of training to weaponry, communications, the fortification of defense positions, combat tactics, general strategy, map-reading, security, and sabotage. Both men reported considerable time devoted to political indoctrination and physical conditioning.

2. One controlled agent reported that his entire group was required to fill out an extensive questionnaire aimed at developing targets in the homeland for sabotage, subversion of military and police, illegal entry and movement, operation of dummy business concerns to cover clandestine operations, and possible zones for air-drops.

3. Extensive use is made of Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare. The trainees also use a handbook by Alberto Bayo, former colonel in the Spanish Republican air force who trained the original guerrilla group with which Castro invaded the Sierra Maestra. Thousands of copies of these books, in Spanish or in Portuguese, have been printed or mimeographed and are circulating in Latin America. Some have been specifically revised for individual countries.

4. We also have reports of related courses of instruction, lasting as much as six to eight months, in such fields as espionage, psychological warfare, political action, agent communications, and military medicine. Some of the trainees are women.

5. Most of the instructors of the guerrilla warfare courses are Cuban. There are some reports of Spanish instructors. Del Bayo himself is too old to participate actively, but apparently has an "emeritus" connection. General Enrique Lister has been reported to be associated with guerrilla training. There have been a number of reports, without hard confirmation, that Soviet and satellite instructors handle some of the more sophisticated training in such matters as sabotage and espionage.

6. Reports of trainees indicate that weapons training is confined to weapons they will be able to obtain, maintain, and replenish in their own countries. We have reliable and corroborative reports that trainees and sponsoring leaders alike have been told Cuba does not intend to supply appreciable quantities of weapons because a guerrilla must be self-sustaining. It should be noted that while Cuba does supply some funds, guerrilla handbooks also suggest that bank robberies make guerrillas self-sufficient in this respect. Leftist militants have in fact resorted to robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina

E. Subsequent Employment and Countermeasures

1. Clandestine reporting has established a number of incidents of sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla activity and other subversive action in which individuals known to have received training in Cuba have participated. The clearest cases involved the establishment of local guerrilla training camps by Ecuadoreans and Brazilians returning from training in Cuba. In each case, however, our evidence of the guerrilla training in Cuba comes from clandestine sources, there is no legal evidence of such Cuban instruction, and there has been no move to prosecute. All 48 arrested in Ecuador were released after short detention. Two individuals arrested in connection with the Peasant League training activities in Brazil are still known to be detained.

2. The records maintained by Latin American security services are inadequate and far from standardized, so that it has been difficult to establish a statistical approach to arrests for all types of subversive activities. Available reporting indicates at least 11,000 such arrests since 1 January 1962, but a survey shows that most of these arrests amounted to little more than detention and some interrogation. There were relatively few trials and convictions, probably not exceeding five per cent of arrests.

3. Some of those arrested were released for lack of evidence. In other cases, for example in Ecuador, Brazil, and in Peru until last January, there has been little evidence of any inclination on the part of the government to prosecute. In cases where trials have taken place, the local security services have frequently

been unable to establish any Cuban connection, as in the case of the 139 guerrillas tried in Venezuela last fall.

4. In the absence of a comprehensive statistical approach, information on arrests, trials, and the involvement of Cuban trainees in subversive activities is given in the individual country reports attached to this memorandum.

F. Purpose and Propaganda

1. Fidel Castro stated in July 1960: "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been taking the line in public that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance need be exported. In private, they have been offering training and financial and technical assistance to Latin American revolutionaries. While Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR restrains a wholehearted endorsement of the more militant Peiping attitude, Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart insist both in public speeches and in private remarks to visiting Communists that "Socialism" can be brought about in Latin America only by force.

2. Direction and support by propaganda is on a massive scale. The work of Radio Havana and of the Prensa Latina news service is backed up by bulk mail and even air freight shipments. Postal and customs authorities in Panama, for instance, are destroying a monthly average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda which is entering or being sent through Panama. Costa Rica averaged 10 tons in 1962.

3. Radio Havana's international service, started in May 1961, now leads all Latin American international services in program hours. It broadcasts a weekly total of 188 hours of propaganda in languages including Spanish, Portuguese, Haitian Creole, English, French, and Arabic. This includes 108-1/2 hours in Spanish to the Americas, 7 hours in Portuguese, 7 hours in Haitian, and 17-1/2 hours in English to the Western Hemisphere. It also originates black broadcasts on occasions such as the disorders in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, and makes transmitters available to Latin American exile groups.

Attached annexes discuss Cuban training of Latin American subversives on a country-by-country basis.

27 March 1963

ARGENTINA

1. About 500 Argentines are estimated to have traveled illegally to Cuba for training in subversive activities. One training group alone, given guerrilla warfare training over a six-month period in 1962, varied in number from 34 to 50. For the past four months departures from Argentina for Cuba have averaged 35-40 a month. Argentine intelligence says 80 of the 500 are known to have received guerrilla training; the number is probably considerably higher.

2. The federal district around Buenos Aires records no arrests for guerrilla activity. There were 155 arrests and three convictions for sabotage in 1962, and 14 arrests, but no convictions, to date in 1963. Records on terrorist activity show 468 cases, 60 arrests, and 27 convictions in 1962; 121 cases, two arrests and two convictions in 1963. Argentine police also list 628 arrests in 1962 and 1963 on the broader charge of "subversive activity."

3. Altogether police files show 1,285 incidents of sabotage or terrorism, of which 425 were committed by unknown persons. Police have no evidence that any of those arrested or convicted are known to have received training in Cuba.

4. None of the individuals known to have received extensive Cuban training hold influential positions, but the following individuals in position of influence have traveled to Cuba and may have received some training:

Fanny Edelman, former secretary-general of the Argentine Communist women's organization UMA, presently assigned to foreign liaison of the Argentine Communist Party.

Maria Josefa de Mastroberti, prominent member of the Cuban Solidarity Committee for Argentina.

Osaias Leon Schujman, director of the Federation of Communist Youth, national deputy for the Argentine

Communist Party, reportedly a supplier of false passports for travel to Cuba.

Jorge Francisco Timossi, former Argentine representative for Prensa Latina.

Hector Villalon, prominent Peronist close to Peron.

5. Argentine guerrilla training units in Cuba have been mixed, including Peronists, Communists, and Vanguard Socialists. There are indications that the most active recruitment is carried on by the Argentine Communist Party and by the Communist-influenced left wing of the Peronist movement, under the direction of John William Cooke in Cuba. His wife, Alicia Cooke, lives in Montevideo, Uruguay, which is the principal center providing funds and forged documentation for the recruits.

6. An Argentine taking a six-month course received training in weapons, marksmanship, explosives, ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, sanitation, closed and open order drill, and construction of defenses. Weapons used included Mauser and Garand rifles, Brownings, Thompson submachineguns, bazookas, 81-mm mortars, and a 57-mm recoilless cannon.

27 March 1963

BOLIVIA

1. About 500 Bolivians traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and 25 in the first two months of 1963. There have been no arrests of pro-Cuban agitators for sabotage, terrorist, guerrilla, or other subversive activities in Bolivia to date.

2. We can identify by name 214 of the travelers to Cuba. The individuals who killed a number of anti-Communists during a pro-Cuban demonstration on 26 October 1962 were identified as having visited Cuba. Six of these agitators were indicted but released when government investigators placed the blame for the incident on anti-Communists.

3. Otherwise there have been no known incidents which might be attributed to Cuban training.

4. Zenon Barrientos Manani, a national deputy belonging to the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), since his return from Cuba has been reported without confirmation to be organizing guerrilla forces among Bolivian peasants. The same untested source said Barrientos was active in supplying weapons to Peruvian guerrillas and had aided Peruvian guerrilla leader Hugo Blanco during a reported Bolivian visit by Blanco.

5. Other Bolivians in positions of influence who have been in Cuba long enough to receive training include:

Daniel Saravia Quiroz, secretary-general of the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB). (Saravia, however, is reported to have changed his beliefs since his travel to England.)

Baldomero Castel, COB leader.

Oscar Salas, mine leader.

Oscar Sanjines, leader of the Cochabamba Labor Federation.

Ofelia Altamirano de Sabrabi, factory workers' leader.

Student and youth leaders Andres Soliz Rada, Dulfredo Rua, Walter Quisbert Barrios, and Alberto de la Barra.

PCB leading members Mario Manje and Hilario Claure.

Alcides Monasterios, national deputy of the left-wing sector of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

6. In January 1963, there were 60 Bolivian scholarship students in Cuba who had attended compulsory 20-day courses of military instruction. The Cuban charge in Bolivia reportedly said last month that Cuba expected to give more than 80 scholarships to Bolivians in 1963.

7. The Bolivian government in June 1961, published documents purporting to prove that left extremists had been corresponding with the Cuban Embassy in an effort to obtain arms and instruction for pro-Castro "combat groups." While Bolivia has had extensive paramilitary formations ever since the MNR defeated the armed forces and seized control, and while the extreme left of the MNR in particular has strong militia units, we know of no paramilitary formations linked directly with Cuban subversion.

8. We assume, however, that some proportion of the 500 legal travelers received indoctrination while in Cuba.

27 March 1963

BRAZIL

1. Approximately 400 Brazilian nationals traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and another 24 the first two months of 1963. A total of about 50 Brazilians are believed to have received specific guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, starting with a contigent of 12 men in July-August 1961. We know of 19 Brazilian specifically. A defecting Cuban army officer who claims to have run a base for guerrilla training reports that 37 Brazilians took courses there at a time which does not coincide with the 19 cases in our records.

2. At least four of the guerrilla trainees in the original contingent of 12 were connected with the guerrilla training camps of the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, exposed by the Varig air crash documents. At least six such camps were established, and each was to have 30 men and at least one leader trained in Cuba. Only one of the Cuban trainees is known to have been arrested. Altogether there were only three arrests, although 24 additional warrants were issued.

3. All of the Brazilians we can identify as guerrilla trainees have come from the regular or the dissident Communist party or the Marxist-oriented Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Trainees sent by the Leagues were in some cases also members of the regular Communist party.

4. Brazilians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Clodomir dos Santos Morais, number two man in the Peasant Leagues, and principal agent in setting up the training camps; still in custody.

Joaquim Ferreira, Pedro Motta Barros, Rivadiva Braz de Oliveira, and Amaro Luiz de Carvalho, Peasant League leaders. (Ferreira, a lawyer, is a former economist for SUDENE, development agency for the impoverished northeast. Barros and de Oliveira are also student leaders, and Barros is a Communist Party youth leader.)

Florentino Alcantara de Moraes, Pernambuco state leader of the regular Communist Party of Brazil.

Carlos Danielli, Angel Arroyo, Mauricio Grabois, and Joao Amazonas, leaders of the dissident Communist Party.

27 March 1963

CHILE

1. There were 551 legal travelers from Chile to Cuba in 1962, and another 110 in the first two months of 1963. (Anniversary celebrations tend to make travel in January higher than the monthly average.) In addition, field reports show about 400 illegal travelers in 1962, under a definition which lists nationals of one country who obtain their Cuban visas in a third country as "illegal."

2. We have no hard clandestine evidence of Chilean guerrilla trainees. A defecting Cuban army lieutenant has told reporters that a base he commanded gave 19 Chileans guerrilla training in late 1961. Since neither travel to Cuba nor the large Communist party is illegal in Chile, a Chilean national has little reason, other than the intention to take subversive training, to conceal travel to Cuba. On this basis it would appear to be a safe assumption that more than half of the illegal travelers probably received military or political indoctrination.

3. The only known arrests in the past 15 months for subversive activity took place in October 1962, when five members of the Progressive Socialist Movement (MSP) were arrested following an explosion while they were assembling bombs in a downtown Santiago apartment. Four of the five were released after three days; the fifth, whose hand had been blown off, was given a jail sentence. The bombs were to have been used against the U.S. embassy.

4. Julio Stuardo, leader of the MSP and one of those arrested, had traveled to Cuba, but is not known to have received any particular training. He had been photographed prior to the bombing incident with Cuban embassy officials believed to be intelligence officers.

5. There are no Chileans in positions of influence who are known to have received training in Cuba. However leftist Senator Salvador Allende, the probable FRAP candidate in the next presidential election, has made numerous visits to Cuba.

27 March 1963

COLOMBIA

1. We have record of about 400 Colombians who traveled to Cuba legally during the past year, and no record of any illegal travel. Approximately 100 appear on manifests via Curacao, and 65 via Mexico City. Travel information on the remaining 235 is based on agent reports and liaison.

2. Of these 400, 37 are reported to have received training in guerrilla warfare, one in counterintelligence, and one attended a staff or cadre school.

3. Most of those selected for training are members of either the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) or the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). Both are made up of revolutionaries, dissident Communists, and recruits from the ranks of labor, students, and the unemployed lower classes. Both receive Cuban financial support, and are attempting--without appreciable success to date--to coordinate operations with the bandit gangs terrorizing the violence areas of Colombia.

4. Two guerrilla leaders imprisoned in 1961--Eddie Aristizabal of MOEC and Tulio Bayer--and one killed in 1961--Antonio Larotta of MOEC--were reported to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Larotta's training was in 1959.

5. Colombian army statistics (which the U.S. army attaché considers on the high side because of the statistical procedures used) list 2,582 rural bandits captured and 1,029 individuals detained on suspicion of involvement in rural banditry in 1962, and 300 captured and 134 detained in the first two months of 1963. The Colombian army has no statistics on subsequent trials, but on the basis of past experience it is estimated that about two percent of all those arrested and detained--i.e., about 80 persons--were convicted and sentenced. The bandits are not considered guerrillas in a political sense, although some Cuban propaganda has been found on dead bandits. There were 388 bandits killed in rural areas in 1962, and 89 in 1963.

6. According to official records, there were 13 terrorist attempts in Colombia during 1962, in the course of which nine terrorists were captured, and one was killed. Three of those captured--all members of FUAR--were convicted. One of the three, Alvaro Santiago Paz of Cali, is known to have traveled to Cuba. To date in 1963 there have been 15 terrorist attempts, including eight in Bogota. There have been 16 captured and one killed in Bogota preparing or attempting terrorist acts. One terrorist, identified as a FUAR member, was convicted in Cali. One terrorist, not yet identified, was captured in Medellin.

7. Santiago is the only captured subversive known to have been in Cuba. Three leading members of MOEC--Aristizabal, mentioned above; Pedro Abella; and Fabio Molino--are known to have received training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

COSTA RICA

1. A total of 216 Costa Ricans visited Cuba in 1962. As many as 30 probably received paramilitary training.

2. In February, 1963, 21 Costa Ricans returned from visits of four to six months. It has been reliably established that nine of them were trained as instructors in guerrilla warfare, and one was trained as an organizer and instructor for militia training. The length of stay suggests that the remaining 11 also received paramilitary instruction. Three other Costa Ricans, including one woman, known to have gone to Cuba for such training are not yet reported to have returned to Costa Rica.

3. Two Costa Rican Communist leaders are reported independently by fairly reliable sources to have stated that guerrilla warfare training camps are to be established in Costa Rica. The purely Costa Rican aspect makes this a new development; guerrilla activity in Costa Rica hitherto has centered in the relatively wild and lightly policed northeastern frontier area, and has been targeted against Nicaragua.

4. There have been no arrests for sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla activity in Costa Rica. About 50 have been temporarily detained for subversive activity, and one individual was arrested and jailed for one year. (This does not include about 30 suspected subversives detained during President Kennedy's visit.)

5. Nineteen of the 30 Costa Ricans believed to have received guerrilla training in Cuba are known by name. Of the 19, the only ones in positions of influence are Oscar Morera Madrigal, San Jose physician, and Modesto Ruiz Ruiz, leader of the Communist labor union in the banana zone.

27 March 1963

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. The Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1963 arrested 120 persons for sabotage, terrorism, or other subversive activity. Of these, 45 were held for an appreciable time, tried, or sentenced. This includes 33 who were deported. Of these, three are known or believed to have received training in Cuba.

2. There were 15 incidents in all, five of which are considered to have been inspired by Cuban trainees. The remainder were caused by people not believed to have had any Cuban training.

3. There is no hard evidence of legal or illegal travel from the Dominican Republic to Cuba since 1 January 1962, although some of the deportees may have returned from Europe to Cuba. The best available estimate is that about 25 Dominicans may have gone to Cuba illegally. We have an unconfirmed report that three Dominicans went to Cuba for guerrilla training, and 12 others are believed to have stayed long enough for appreciable training or indoctrination.

4. Individuals in positions of influence, known or believed to have received training in Cuba, include:

Juan Ducoudray Mansfield of the Dominican Communist party.

Rafael Faxas Canto of the leftist 14th of June group.

Gustavo Machado Baez, director of the Agrarian Reform Institute (rumored to have been trained in Cuba, but we have no previous traces.)

Labor leaders Jose Estrella and Jacobo Armach.

Student leader Luis Gomex Perez.

Tomas Parmenio Erickson Alvarez, a leader of the pro-Communist MPD party.

Andres Ramos Peguero, MPD, recently sentenced to 30 years in prison

27 March 1963

ECUADOR

1. In 1962 there were an estimated 208 legal travelers from Ecuador to Cuba, including 50 who went for sports events. As of December, about 80 members of Communist and Communist-front youth groups had been in Cuba since June undergoing guerrilla training.

2. Travel reports showed 40 to 60 Ecuadoreans entering Cuba through Mexico in the first two months of 1963.

3. At least 15 Ecuadoreans trained in Cuba are known to have engaged in paramilitary activities of a training nature following their return.

4. Army forces in April 1962 rounded up 48 members of URJE, a Communist-front youth group, at a training camp 50 miles west of Quito. Seven of those arrested had been trained in Cuba. None of the 48 was tried, and none was held for more than six weeks. This was the group whose leaders the Communists subsequently expelled from URJE amid published charges that they had wasted $44,000 in Cuban funds.

5. Including the 48 URJE guerrillas, there have been an estimated 75 arrests in 1962 and 1963 for guerrilla and terrorist activity, distribution of Communist propaganda, and painting of Communist slogans on walls. All of the propagandists were released after several days of detention.

6. There have been three known terrorist attempts, including the bombing of a theater and a radio station. Most of the participants are identified in clandestine reporting. They include several who have probably had training in Cuba.

7. Ecuadoreans in positions of influence who have had training in Cuba include URJE leaders Mario Vera Arrata, Jefferson Quevedo, Enrique Medina, Carlos Alvardo Loor, and Milton Mejia; and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, secretary-general of the Ecuadorean Communist Youth (JCE) and JCE leader Ketty Romoleroux.

8. We estimate that there are at present about 200 men in paramilitary units. Four corroborative reports establish that the regular Communist Party of Ecuador is forming a paramilitary command of 10 squads of 10 men each scattered throughout the country.

9. Cuban travel does not show in Ecuadorean passports, and is primarily by way of Mexico. There are seven recorded cases of travel via Prague, and two via Paris.

27 March 1963

EL SALVADOR

1. Approximately 100 Salvadorans traveled to Cuba in 1962, and eight more have gone in 1963. Most of them attended party meetings or celebrations for one or two weeks. About 20 continued to Bloc countries. There is no evidence that any received guerrilla training or extensive political indoctrination.

2. Since passage of a new law in September, 1962, Salvadoran authorities have been arresting returning Salvadorans suspected of having gone to Cuba. Several now are in jail awaiting trial. Almost all Salvadoran travel to Cuba is through Mexico with detachable Cuban visa. A number of Salvadorans have remained in Cuba because of the police crackdown in El Salvador.

3. There are no known paramilitary units or related activity.

4. There have been 196 recorded arrests since the beginning of 1962 for terrorist or subversive activities. None of those arrested has been convicted or even tried, but 66 were held for an appreciable time--about 15 for as long as nine months. We believe that three of those arrested had had some type of training in Cuba. There is no record of any arrests for guerrilla or sabotage activity.

5. Records show a total of 25 subversion incidents: eight by unknown persons; three involving individuals believed to have received training in Cuba; and 14 involving persons not believed or known to have had any Cuban training.

6. Other than two prominent Communist labor leaders, Luis Felipe Cativo and Jose Delfino Perez, Cuban trainees are not known to have any positions of influence in El Salvador.

27 March 1963

GUATEMALA

1. There were about 80 illegal travelers from Guatemala to Cuba in 1962, of whom we believe 20 to 30 received training in guerrilla and sabotage techniques. Identified trainees have remained in hiding since their return. Guatemalan Communists have contingency plans for paramilitary operations, but have been waiting for other elements to create a favorable opportunity for such action.

2. Cuba in the past has furnished funds for illicit purchase of weapons by non-Communist elements, such as the "13 November" movement of ex-Lieutenant Yon Sosa, which has sporadically undertaken unsuccessful military operations against Guatemalan army garrisons. The Cubans have cited the greater militancy of non-Communist groups in explaining such funding operations to the Guatemalan Communists.

3. Cuba gives asylum to former Guatemalan President Arbenz and other leading members of his regime, and affords them propaganda facilities.

4. Arrest statistics in Guatemala are inconclusive because of the waves of detentions during periods of tension. During nearly daily disturbances in January-March 1962 in which an estimated 40 were killed, for example, about 1,000 were arrested under state of siege. A few were exiled to El Salvador, but most of those arrested were released after several days.

5. Similarly, there were a number of arrests on charges of terrorism or subversion during the first half of 1962, but no trials. Communists inspired and controlled most of the street disturbances, but the mobs were made up of all anti-regime elements, and no known incidents can be attributed to the individuals trained in Cuba. Numerous copies of Che Guevara's handbook for guerrillas were passed out early in 1962 to serve as a "do-it-yourself" handbook on sabotage and terrorism.

6. There have been an estimated 60 incidents, ranging from the almost daily explosion of homemade bombs in some periods to the assassination of the judicial police chief, dynamiting of a water reservoir, and sabotage of a gasoline storage tank. The government has attributed almost all such acts to "Castro-Communists." Cuban trainees were very probably involved, but there is no good evidence of identity.

7. On 12 March 1962 Guatemalan troops encountered a group of 20 Communist guerrillas near Salama, and killed 18. Members of this group may possibly have been trained in Cuba. On 27 March 1962 the army captured 10 guerrillas infiltrated from Mexico, where they had been organized and supplied by Guatemalan Communist exiles with the knowledge of the Cuban embassy. This group was held for military court martial, and there has been no further word of disposition.

8. Five Communists arrested in early December in the act of posting propaganda were released after several days of detention. On 14 February 1963, 13 Communists, including two members of the central committee, were arrested on charges of subversion and planning an insurrection, and are still held. Several of these had traveled to Cuba, but there is no evidence of any training.

9. The reported leader of the Guatemalans known to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, returned to Guatemala alone on 17 April 1962 and went underground. He was most recently reported scouting the Salama area for possible arms cache sites. The Guatemalan Communists recently formed a "military commission," divided into secret cells, to direct insurrectional activity, possibly due to begin in June or July.

27 March 1963

HAITI

1. There is no firm evidence on legal or illegal travel from Haiti to Cuba. The traffic, if any, is probably small. We believe there is clandestine movement by small boat between the two countries.

2. More than 50,000 Haitians live in eastern Cuba, concentrated around Santiago. Most are employed as cane field laborers.

3. Exile sources claim that 400 of these workers have been trained for subversive activities and that some of the trainees have already returned to Haiti. We have no supporting evidence, however, have detected no returning trainees, and know of no pro-Castro paramilitary groups in Haiti.

4. There are two clandestine Communist parties in Haiti, The leader of one of them, Rene Depestre, is in Cuba and reportedly works on Cuban propaganda beamed at Haiti.

5. The only known incident involving Communists was an attempted demonstration at the U.S. Embassy on 31 October. Advance warning from a clandestine source within the Communist party, who said the instructions for the demonstration came from Cuba, enabled police to forestall the incident. Several of the youths involved may have been detained briefly by the police.

6. No Haitian occupying any position of influence is known to have received any training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

HONDURAS

1. There were 92 legal travelers from Honduras to Cuba in 1962 and 21 to date in 1963. Twelve travelers continued to Soviet bloc countries. Most of the travel to Cuba was for one or two weeks, precluding any extensive paramilitary training, but a definite correlation can be established between the return of Hondurans from Cuban visits and the intensity of propaganda and labor agitation. Honduran exiles in Cuba carry on a virulent propaganda campaign over Radio Havana, calling for revolution.

2. There are no known Honduran paramilitary formations, and other Central American Communists are known to have criticized the Honduran Communist Party for lack of militancy. The PCH obtained a series of 16 different military manuals in October, 1962, including manuals on the use of the carbine, explosives, and demolition techniques.

3. As in the case of Costa Rica, there are guerrilla units of Nicaraguan exiles based in thinly patrolled Honduran frontier areas, receiving support from Cuba and raiding sporadically into Nicaragua in the hope of sparking a mass uprising. One group under Carlos Fonseca Amador has about 40 men.

4. Since 1 January 1962, there have been only two arrests for subversive activity in Honduras. Neither man is known to have received training in Cuba, and both were released after short detention without trail. Three other individuals have been charged with subversive activity but no action was taken.

5. Hondurans in leading organizational positions known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Labor: Manuel Noe Rodriguez Reyes, Floresmila Castro, Luis Banegas Izaguirre, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Jesus Otavio Hernandez, Darios Hector Toledo, Regina de Lainez, Anibal Moradelo, Felex Vanencia, Ramon Sabillon Orellana, and Guadalupe Reyes.

Students: Randolfo Espinsosa Mourra, Rolando Orellano Cruz, Oscar Duron, Ulises Ekonomo Torres, Carlos Falck Contreras, Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaquez, Leonidas Velasquez Funes, and Rodil Rivera Rodil.

Communist Party: Dionisio Bejarano Ramos, Luis Manuel Zuniga, Agapito Robledo Castro, Rigoberto Padilla Rush, Feliciano Protillo Lara, Gustavo Andara Bulnes, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Longino Becerra, Mario Sosa Navarro, Luis Andres Pineda Villalabos, and Rodolfo Aguiluz Berlioz.

Women: Antonia Suazo Bulnes, Gladas Tablada Ortiz, Rosa Suarez de Moncada, Diana Maria Gomez, and Constanza HH. Caballero.

Education: Medardo Mejia Paniagua and Mariano Mendez Avila.

27 March 1963

MEXICO

1. Mexican nationals traveling to Cuba totaled 238 in 1962 and 157 in the first two months of 1963.

2. A fairly reliable source reported in mid-1962 that about 150 Mexicans were receiving guerrilla training at Minas del Frio, Cuba. A defecting Cuban Army lieutenant told the press in Brazil that 70 Mexicans were trained at his base at San Julian in late 1961. These reports are regarded with reserve, however, particularly in the light of our knowledge that Cuba does not wish to damage its relations with Mexico as long as Mexico City is the principal Cuban "window" to Latin America.

3. Arrests for subversive activities have not been numerous. In the most recent case, six professors and two students at the University of Morelia were arrested for participation in Fidelista protests over the dismissal of the University's Communist rector. One teacher, a Guatemalan Communist militant who visited Havana for 17 days in 1961, is still imprisoned and will probably be deported. Another professor had probably visited Cuba.

4. A Nicaraguan Communist was deported in January and an Argentine Communist newsman in November 1962 for pro-Castro activities. Two Cubans were arrested on arrival in February 1962 and deported as agitators.

5. Mexican government agents on 24 May 1962 killed Ruben Jaramillo, Mexican Communist and guerrilla fighter, at Morelos, and subsequently arrested one of his guerrilla associates, Jorge Martinez Rosillo, who had been a friend of Raul Castro since the Castros' training period in Mexico. Jaramillo had been invited to Cuba in 1961, but there is no record of his travel; Martinez Rosillo was in Havana for 20 days in 1961.

6. Communist factions have touched off numerous disturbances at the national university in Mexico City and provincial universities. Anti-Communist

students charge that direction, material, and financial support for these disturbances is channeled through students who have received training in agitation while visiting Cuba as "athletes." More than 50 Mexican students attended the Latin American University Games in Cuba last October.

7. Mexican authorities continue to confiscate large amounts of propaganda from travelers returning from Cuba. For example, three students at Morelia attempted to bring 100 kilograms of propaganda material into Mexico on 31 August 1962.

8. Mexicans who have visited Cuba and probably received training or directives include more than 30 prominent writers, teachers, and leftist party leaders.

27 March 1963

NICARAGUA

1. About 75 Nicaraguans have traveled to Cuba during the past 18 months. Nicaraguan security authorities list 22 as known to have received guerrilla warfare training there.

2. Of the 22, eight were arreated when they returned to Nicaragua to carry on anti-Somoza activities. Two have been sentenced to prison and the other six were released after interrogation.

3. Cuba has dealt with, financed, and supported a succession of Nicaraguan exile movements, but Guevara recently told visiting Central American Communists that none of these had developed a satisfactory level of popular support. Nicaraguan exiles maintain small guerrilla bands across the borders in both Costa Rica and Honduras, making sporadic incurions, but to date they have evoked no internal support and have been effectively rounded up or driven back by the Nicaraguan National Guard.

4. Eight Nicaraguans were tried in June, 1962, for conducting terrorist training. They were caught while studying the manufacture of bombs under an instructor trained in Cuba. Nicaraguan authorities seized arms, ammunition, explosives, and 700 pounds of propaganda. A Nicaraguan found with an arms cache in April 1962 reportedly told interrogators the arms had come from Cuba. A Nicaraguan who had gone to Cuba in mid-1962, ostensibly for a surgical operation, was caught shortly after his return with supplies of explosives intended for terrorist bombings.

5. Altogether there have been five major subversive incidents in Nicaragua since 1 January 1962, four of which involved individuals known or believed to have received training in Cuba. Perpetrators of the fifth incident are unknown. A total of 41 persons were arrested. Nineteen were held for an appreciable time, and 14 were tried and sentenced. Seven of the total 41 are known or believed to have been trained in Cuba.

6. A number of minor incursions into Nicaragua, mainly from the Honduran border, have been mounted by the Cuban-supported, Communist-dominated National Liberation Front (FLN). At least nine of the FLN members engaged in these raids are known or believed to have had Cuban training.

7. Influential Nicaraguans known to believed to have received indoctrination and training in Cuba include:

Carlos Adan Perez Bermudez, Eligio Alvarez Montalvan, and Reinaldo Viquez Ruiz, leaders of both the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PSN) and the Communist-front Republican Mobilization (MR).

Francisco Rolando Alvarado Lopez, (PSN) leader of the Communist labor front. (In custody)

Ricardo Francisco Osejo Zeledon, Orlando Quinones Torres, and Guillermo Andres Baltodano Serrano, youth front leaders influential among students.

Juan Jose Lorio Garcia, PSN central committee member.

Adrian Sanchez Sancho, Communist labor leader (still in Cuba.)

Abdul Sirker Urroz, PSN leader (believed still in Cuba.)

FLN leaders Marco Antonio Melendez Delgado (in custody,) Socrates Noel Flores Vivas, Ivan Sanchez Arguello, Orlando Quant Quintana, and German Pomares Ordonez.

8. Agapito Fernandez Garcia, a federal deputy of the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, was in Cuba for 10 days during the January anniversary celebration and may have received some form or instruction or indoctrination.

27 March 1963

PANAMA

1. Panama lists 56 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962 and two thus far in 1963. Altogether, however, 64 Panamanians are identified, on the basis of their political backgrounds and known length of stay in Cuba, as probably having gone to Cuba for either political indoctrination or guerrilla training. Of these 64, 38 almost certainly received guerrilla training.

2. Eighteen guerrilla trainees returned to Panama in February, 1963, after stays of four to six months. Six were detained briefly by the Panamanian security service, and the 12 others who returned a few days later were not arrested.

3. Training for Panamanians apparently started at least as far back as 1961. A guerrilla trainee from another country, attending a course with five Panamanians in July, 1961, was told by Cuban instructors that the Panamanians were being given more rigorous training than other nationals because they had special sabotage assignments in the Canal Zone.

4. We have, however, no indication of any paramilitary groups, activity, or training in Panama.

5. Panamanian security authorities maintain no statistics on subversive incidents, and many are not reported to central authority. There have been a considerable number of minor incidents, mainly by unknown perpetrators. Other than continuing sabotage activity against the United Fruit Company installations in Chirique Province, the most spectacular incident was the brief declaration of revolt last August by Manuel Jose Hurtado, a former Panamanian major, and 16 adherents. Hurtado, a strong anti-Communist, was motivated by personal problems.

6. Since 1 January 1962, there have been about 67 individuals arrested, some of them repeatedly, for subversive activities. Of this group, eight are known

to have received training in Cuba. Some of the arrests were made to forestall subversive activity.

7. Panamanians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Narcisco Cubas Perez and Cesar Jose Dubois, leaders of the Vanguardia de Accion Nacional (VAN) which hopes to take part in 1964 elections.

Peasant leaders Leovilgildo Barrias de Garcia and Leonidas Alveo.

Leftist student activists Rolando Ernesto Carrasquilla, Jose Modesto Herrera, and Herminio Garrido.

Eliseo de la Hoz, Communist student leader.

Labor leaders Lacides Ceballos, Andres Galvan, Inocencio Garibaldi, Victor Manuel Lombardo, Jack White, and Jose del Carmen Serracin, the latter a leader of Chiriqui Province banana workers.

Jorge Pena and Felix Gonzalez, Communist leaders among the San Blas Indians.

Ezequiel Rios, municipal leader of La Chorrera.

8. In addition, the following are believed to have received training or guidance in Cuba:

Thelma King, national assembly deputy, who boasts of close personal friendship with Fidel Castro and has visited Cuba five times in the past year.

Senior VAN leader Jorge Enrique Turner Morales.

Miguel Porcell and Ruperto Luther Thomas, Communist leaders at the national level.

Alvaro Menendez Franco, member of the municipal council of Panama.

27 March 1963

PARAGUAY

1. About 60 Paraguayan nationals traveled to Cuba in 1962. It is estimated that over the past two years as many as 120 have been in Cuba long enough to receive appreciable political or military training. The preponderance of Paraguayan nationals visiting Cuba are political exiles living in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil.

2. The Paraguayan Government forbids its nationals to visit Cuba, but cannot control travelers who visit neighboring countries which have Cuban missions and then proceed illegally to Cuba.

3. There are no reports that paramilitary trainees are active inside Paraguay. There is considerable evidence that some returnees have joined exile formations waiting on the Paraguayan border for a favorable occasion for incursions.

4. Since January, 1962, at least 1,000 persons have been arrested for guerrilla, sabotage, terrorist or other subversive activity, but only an estimated 140 were held for any appreciable length of time. We know of only one scheduled for trial, and none of those arrested is known to have received training in Cuba.

5. Most of the arrests have stemmed from about 10 major incidents, of which two involved sabotage and terrorism, one guerrilla activity, and the remainder subversion. There is a rumor that the unknown individual who placed a bomb in an Incarnacion bank had been trained in Cuba. Perpetrators of the other incidents have been identified, and none is known or believed to have received any training in Cuba.

6. Federico Tatter and Anibal Garcete were reported to have returned from Cuba in late 1962, Tatter to take over military direction of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), and Garcete to organize cane workers. We know of no other Cuban trainees who may be in positions of influence among Paraguayans.

27 March 1963

PERU

1. At least 181 Peruvians visited Cuba in 1962 on visits long enough to permit indoctrination, and according to an agent who participated, more than 150 of them were given guerrilla training. Following the training, 90 of these were designated by Peruvian leftist militant leaders as members of the "Peruvian National Liberation Army."

2. Over the past two years more than 235 Peruvians have been identified as travelers to Cuba. Last December two top Peruvian Communists said that over the past year the militant Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) had sent 200 to 300 Peruvians to Cuba, in groups of 12 to 15, for guerrilla training.

3. An estimated total of some 5,000 persons have taken part in acts of sabotage, terrorism, assaults on police outposts, bank robberies, land invasions, destruction of haciendas, strike violence, and riots. The ruling junta in January launched a major round-up and arrested 729 Communists and leftists, of whom we estimate that 50 to 100 may have been trained in Cuba. There are still 209 in jail, of whom only one is a known Cuban guerrilla trainee. The junta has announced a series of mass trials to be held in Lima and provincial centers, charging the violence was part of a Soviet-Cuban conspiracy to make Peru a Communist state. In the course of the violence there have been 18 killed, including four police, and 165 wounded.

4. Out of a total of 137 recorded acts of violence, 49 were clearly sponsored or controlled by Communist elements. Three Cuban nationals and four Peruvians trained in Cuba were identified among leaders of the striking miners who caused damage estimated at $4,000,000 to the Cerro de Pasco smelter at La Oroya in December. The Cubans have not been apprehended.

5. The violence in the Quillabamba-Cuzco-Puno area is attributed to the Indian and peasant guerrillas of Hugo Blanco. Local officials estimate Blanco's force at 2,000, but this is probably an exaggeration. Blanco and his lieutenants are not known to be Cuban-trained or Cuban-supplied.

6. Some of the 158 guerrillas known to have been trained in Cuba have been in hiding and inactive ever since the January round-up, and others are known to be waiting outside the country. The MIR leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda, was believed to be in Cuba and now is in Europe.

7. Guerrilla groups have sporadically attacked police stations for weapons, and robbed banks for funds. MIR members teamed with common criminals in April 1962 in a $100,000 bank robbery in a suburb of Lima, dividing the proceeds 50-50. Part of the loot is believed to have reached Hugo Blanco. MIR has brought in from Cuba a reported 5,000 copies of a special miniature edition of Alberto Bayo's guerrilla handbook. There is also a manual on guerrilla operations based on Bayo's and Guevara's books but written specifically for Peru.

8. Peruvian police in March 1962 broke up a small guerrilla training operation and determined that among those arrested, one was a former resident of Cuba, another had received Cuban training in clandestine operations, and a third, caught with radio equipment, admitted having used it to communicate with Cuba. The local guerrilla candidates were issued kits including rifles of Czech manufacture. All of those arrested were soon released, but some were re-arrested in the January round-up.

9. Prominent Peruvians who may have received indoctrination on visits to Cuba include nine student and youth leaders including two presidents of student organizations; seven leading journalists; three labor union leaders; and nine former members of parliament.

27 March 1963

URUGUAY

1. There were about 115 legal travelers to Cuba from Uruguay in 1962, and an additional 20-25 in January 1963. About 25, mainly Paraguayan exiles resident in Uruguay, are believed to have traveled illegally.

2. Probably no significant portion of the Uruguayan travelers went for guerrilla warfare training. Cuba apparently wants to preserve Montevideo, which is host to the most extensive Communist diplomatic missions in all South America, as a gateway and base of operations, as in the case of Mexico.

3. Cuban subversion activity oriented toward Uruguay appears to consist largely of developing and maintaining enough political action and propaganda assets to counter any Uruguayan inclination to oust or restrict the activities of Cuban and Bloc missions.

4. The only arrests for sabotage occurred during the recent electricity and telephone strike, which arose from worker grievances and had no Cuban connection. All of those arrested were released within a week.

27 March 1963

VENEZUELA

1. We have no acceptable figure on Venezuelan travel to Cuba. Liaison services maintain no records, and have no such capability.

2. Reports from travel control points show 128 Venezuelan nationals traveling to Cuba, but only 48 returning. The names of most of those returning do not appear on the lists of those who went to Cuba. In the few cases where round-trip travel can be established, the stay was generally short. We must conclude that Venezuelans who went to Cuba for training traveled at least one way, and in some known instances both, clandestinely.

3. On the basis of usually reliable agent reports, we believe that more than 200 Venezuelans received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1962. Castro has made it plain that he assigns the first priority for revolution to Venezuela.

4. At present there are probably about 100 men involved in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) paramilitary command attempting to terrorize the Federal District of Caracas. Sources in both the PCV and the Government of Venezuela estimate there are another 300 guerrillas in the field, although we know of no more than 150, in small units of about 20 men, who are under coordinated PCV command. Including terrorist groups of university students and paramilitary party formations in Maracaibo and other large cities, the total number involved in violence probably does not exceed 600. Only seven known to be engaged in these operational are known to have been in Cuba long enough for training.

5. The PCV, however, in the first months of 1963 has proven itself capable of implementing the terrorist and sabotage operations which last October it could only plan. Organization and coordination have improved, and sabotage has reached a level of sophistication in technique and materials which implies either the presence of outside experts or else a highly advanced stage of training.

6. The guerrillas committed themselves to field operations prematurely in 1962 and, denied support or sympathy by the peasantry who are strongly pro-Betancourt, were rounded up or dispersed. A total of 139 were tried by special military courts last fall following the Puerto Cabello and Carupano revolts. More than 110 were given substantial prison sentences. Four at the most are believed to have been in Cuba long enough to receive training.

7. Altogether there have been an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 arrests since the beginning of 1962, but there have been no trials or jail sentences other than those of the guerrillas mentioned above. All others were held for varying lengths of time, most of them for less than 90 days. Most of those arrested have been released either for lack of evidence, or by civil judges who are generally either inefficient or open to corruption. Possibly 50 of those arrested may have received some training in Cuba, but government interrogators have so far been unable to obtain any admission of Cuban training, and no travel records are maintained which would give leads for such interrogation.

8. The number of incidents leading to arrests are estimated at 250. The principal incidents have been the uprisings of the Puerto Cabello and Carupano garrisons; the October/November sabotage of the Lake Maracaibo oilfields; the hijacking of the freighter Anzoategui in February and the earlier theft of five French paintings from the Museum of Fine Arts; burning of the Sears-Roebuck warehouse and dynamiting of highway bridges in February; pipeline sabotage in March; the recent capture of two PCV paramilitary groups; a bank robbery in February by men wearing the armband of the Communist "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN); and the indiscriminate shooting in Caracas in January and February in the wave of terrorism designed to deter Betancourt's visit to Washington.

9. The majority of the Communist-directed incidents have been carried out by members of the PCV paramilitary groups who in general have not themselves had Cuban training, but are trained and directed by instructors who have in turn been trained in Cuba and in some cases in Communist China.

10. Voice radio transmitters in Caracas and in outlying cities have been heard in conversation with a voice transmitter in Cuba.

11. Principal personalities known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Members of the PCV central committee: Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Rafael E. Martinez, Radames Larrazabal, Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, Douglas Bravo, German Lairet, and Joaquin Araujo Ortega.

Other political leaders: Simon Saiez Merida, Americo Martin, Romulo Henriquez, Jr., and Domingo Alberto Rangel of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); Fabricio Ojeda, Jose Vincente Rangel, and Victor Jose Ochoa of the URD.

Labor leaders: Cesar Millan, Horacio Scott Power, Hector Marcano Coello, Laureno Torrealba, Helo Cruz Villegas, and Vicente Pinate.

Student leaders: Alfredo Maneiro, Freddy Munoz, Jose Rafael Tenorio, Alcides Villalba, Jose Linares, Hector Rodriguez Bauz, and Julio Escalona.

Educators: Hector Mujica, Fruto Vivas, Humberto Cuenca, and Jose Vincente Scorza.

27 March 1963

OTHERS

1. There have been about 40 legal travelers from British Guiana to Cuba. Some Latin American travelers could be carried without much chance of detection on Cuban freighters hauling rice. Local papers and opposition parties have charged that some of the students sent to Cuba did not have proper academic qualifications for their studies, implying their travel, was for other purposes. There are no reliable reports, however, that any Guianese have received subversive training in Cuba. Any Cuban training for British Guianese would presumably be designed to support rather than subvert the government of Premier Cheddi Jagan. There have been no arrests for subversive activity, and no incidents of terrorism, sabotage, or subversion. There have been riots, but not Cuban-connnected.

2. Jamaica sent 593 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, probably accounted for largely by the 20-25,000 Jamaicans resident in Cuba. There is no evidence of guerrilla training for any Jamaicans, and there have been no arrests for guerrilla, sabotage, or terrorist activity. Subversion is confined largely to public oratory defying the Jamaican authorities. A British Guianese Communist studying in Jamaica, who is believed to have received training in Cuba, instigated a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in October, 1962, by six members of the "Friends of Cuba Committee;" one Communist was arrested, fined, and released as a result for "obstructing traffic." Two university instructors and two other teachers are believed to have received indoctrination in Cuba.

3. Surinam and Trinidad report no subversive incidents, no arrests, and no evidence of Cuban subversive training for any of their nationals. Trinidad listed two legal travelers in Cuba in 1962.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10445

RECORD SERIES : NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX 1

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Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : MCCONE, JOHN
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/21/1964
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
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DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

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COMMENTS : DOC. #12

20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 - Alone

1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him he was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I should make my own arrangements.

2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials. This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief, Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and looked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.

3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I hoped this was true - that we certainly were taking advantage of everything that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.

4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.

I told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods. The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him about it next week.

ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade with Cuba.

5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine. The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.

JAM/mfb

JFK Assassination System
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Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10002-10012

RECORD SERIES : NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/18/1963
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SUBJECTS :
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DOCUMENT TYPE : DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introductory Statement

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat stems less from the subversive efforts of traditional Communist movements than from Cuban support of any and all active revolutionary and terrorist movements.

B. These distinctions are not precise. In some countries, Castro's original success has spurred the established Communist movement to action, and he supports it. In others, the old-time Communists may even oppose radical action at this time, and Castro works with more active and more militant revolutionists.

C. In any event, we know of only two countries--Mexico and Uruguay--where Castro appears inclined for the time being to forego inciting violence, and this only because he wants a favorable climate for his operations into other countries.

II. Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities.

A. Cuban support takes many different forms. We have occasional evidence of direct participation by Cuban nationals, as in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. While we have not been able to come up with the kind of airtight proof a court would require that weapons move directly from Cuba to these same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most logically would come from Cuba.

B. But by and large, our evidence shows that Cuba is not now attempting a large program of physical support for Latin American revolutionaries. It is, rather, concentrating on supplying the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance they require.

C. In essence, Castro tells would-be revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing

something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

D. So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it will flourish.

III. Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban subversion in Latin America, I should note that Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution.

A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women.

1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January.

2. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran party member and leader of the FALN)), says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

B. This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist group in Venezuela, the MIR. The result has been the creation of the FALN, or Armed Forces of National Liberation.

1. The FALN is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These have also been designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington.

2. I do not wish to minimize the violence in Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of

experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out after ten at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion of both our people and the embassy that this is not a threat to government control. It is one thing for a group of young men to race down a dark street firing a machinegun from a speeding car. It is quite a different matter to stand up to the armed forces, or seize and hold government buildings.

3. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. I shall explain in more detail later how we arrive at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our best estimate now is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962.

   a. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves

premature ly last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration.

b. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

JFK Assassination System
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Agency Information

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CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
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CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/21/1998

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COMMENTS :

6

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know

that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

JFK Assassination System
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Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10002-10069

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, MEXICO, LOPEZ MATEOS VISIT, BOX 61

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : STATE
FROM : DEAN RUSK
TO : THE PRESIDENT

TITLE :

DATE : 02/18/1964
PAGES : 5

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DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
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CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #9

999

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Lopez Mateos Visit
Bundy
Orig to Dungan

SECRET FEB 18 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos

We do not expect to make any major political decisions but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations which exist between Mexico and the United States. These relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same relationship exists with you but want to be reassured. A warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that relationship.

We want to stress the identity of interests of our two countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit of El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.

Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the United States.

Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government and no important decision is made without his approval. He has followed an "independent" foreign policy but knows that good relations with us, especially in the economic sphere, are essential to his country. At times his foreign policy has been too independent--for example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural relations with Communist China.

But

SECRET

GROUP 2
Exempted from

But when fundamental issues are at stake we have usually found him understanding and willing to be helpful--controlling travel of Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offering help on Panama.

Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after elections in July. Power is therefore drifting toward Diaz Ordaz.

Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed Lopez Mateos will raise.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on points to be raised at the meeting

MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES

1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations

We desire to continue close working relations with Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.

We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political and geographic position to help control Castro/Communism. Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican control measures.

Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within an OAS context.

2. Red China

The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in March has prompted speculation that these two countries are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we should let him know we are aware of his assurances.

3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress

Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-ECOSOC and has named the Director General of the Bank of Mexico as its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated with us in providing extensive training facilities for Latin American technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to make a greater

contribution

contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts to promote private enterprise and we also want to encourage Mexico along this line. We should continue to cooperate with Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting economic development.

4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the International Boundary and Water Commission study these problems and recommend a solution.

5. Control of Narcotics

Mexico and the United States are cooperating in controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.

6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana

An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if Mexico desires and will share the cost.

MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE

1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado

The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of President Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time" of the salinity problem. We can agree but should avoid any commitment on timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem of the

groundwater

groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that the Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned about saline drainage discharged into the river by Mexico and want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early solution to this problem.

2. Bracero Program

The Mexican Government is privately seriously disturbed about the termination of this program. Congressional opposition to it is strong and we cannot commit ourselves to continue the program. We are looking into the problem to see if anything can be done to help Mexico. One possibility is an expanded community development program in Mexico through private channels (P.L.480 foodstuffs through U. S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is interested.

3. Mexico's Concern about U. S. Trade Policies

Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and meat and other products and United States cotton policies which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world market. We recognize that we are natural markets for each other. We desire to expand trade, promote competition and develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the present level of access to each other's market but we would not be able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our market in each commodity or a share in increased consumption.

4. Chamizal Settlement

Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. He wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-Ciudad Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal settlement. We should only agree to consult later in the year on an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.

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SECRET
JLM - PBM/1
February 18, 1964

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SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
by: Robert M. Sayre

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Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on points to be raised at meeting.

SECRET

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SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert M. Sayre (MEM)

4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

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Drafted by:	Cleared by:
ARA:MEX:RMSayre	ARA - Mr. Mann
	Interior - Mr. Carr
	Mr. Lanning
	Labor - Mr. Goodwin
	Treasury - Mr. Giordano
	E - Mr. Johnson
	FE - Mr. Green
	L - Mr. Kearney

S/S-S Hawthorne Mills, Room 7239A, Ext. 6958

JFK Assassination System
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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TO	ROUTING NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-082/93 B]

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Channels

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET

Cia - Codeword Mat.

11/26 28
2

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR ASSESSES JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

FR WASHINGTON: BRAZILIAN EMBASSY 26 NOV 63

TO RIO DE JANEIRO: FOREIGN MINISTRY URGENT 825

(TWO-PART MESSAGE COMPLETE)

NR. 825.

CONFIDENTIAL.

THE PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, AS WELL AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BROUGHT HIM TO POWER, SEEM TO INDICATE THAT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WILL PROBABLY ADHERE TO THE FOLLOWING BASIC DIRECTIVES:

1. IN THE SHORT RUN, AS A NATURAL RESULT OF THE MOMENTUM OF A STRONG ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS THAT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, NO PROFOUND CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY (PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALREADY STATED THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY):

2. IN THE LONGER RUN, HOWEVER, ONE CAN FORESEE:

A) IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVER THE WHITE HOUSE "STAFF" (WHICH REFLECTED THE STRONG

PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS MARKED INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY), THERE PROBABLY WILL BE:

I) NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FROM THE KENNEDY LINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL TEND TOWARD A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE;

II) IN THE FIELD OF RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, OR MORE PRECISELY WITH FRANCE, A LESS RIGID ATTITUDE AND ONE OF GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRENCH POSITION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING A UNITED WESTERN FRONT VIS-A-VIS THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY THE KREMLIN:

III) IN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, THE INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CERTAINLY BE MORE ENLIGHTENING THAN ANY PREDICTION MADE AT THIS TIME;

B) IN THE FIELD OF DOMESTIC POLICY, THERE WILL POSSIBLY BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE WITHIN THE LINE OF "COMPROMISE"; THE NEW PRESIDENT, MUCH MORE THE CONSERVATIVE THAN THE INNOVATOR, WITH INTIMATE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONGRESS, AND A SOUTHERNER, WILL HAVE MORE FACILITY IN GAINING APPROVAL OF THE

BIG BILLS ("CIVIL RIGHTS," "FISCAL REFORM," "MEDICAL AID," "AID TO THE AGED," ETC.) PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WILL ACCEPT MORE CONSERVATIVE FORMULAS OF COMPROMISE; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL ALSO TEND TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE WITH REGARD TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY; HOWEVER, RADICAL CHANGES CANNOT BE EXPECTED, SINCE JOHNSON WILL ALSO FACE THE PRESSURE OF THE MORE LIBERAL WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND ANY MORE PRONOUNCED SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY WOULD BE FATAL TO THE HOPES FOR VICTORY IN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION.

ROBERTO CAMPOS

JFK Assassination System
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(Security Classification)

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist forces kept up their high post-coup level of activity over the weekend.

b. The most significant action was an attack early yesterday morning against a US special forces training camp some 30 miles from Saigon.

c. When the smoke cleared after a sharp fight, four US soldiers were missing and at least 35 South Vietnamese were dead.

d. Late yesterday morning, the Viet Cong shot down two aircraft supporting a government operation in the extreme south, and damaged twelve more. Two more Americans are missing in this action.

e. Back in Saigon, the new regime's troubles with the ambitious General Ton That Dinh continue.

f. He is still angling to get control of the important strategic hamlet program and has yet to give up command of the Third Corps, which the generals assigned to another of their number earlier in the month. This corps is of particular significance in that it surrounds Saigon.



MALAYSIA

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Indonesia-Malaysia

a. Sukarno is beefing up the subversive aspects of his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.

b. Intercepted Indonesian messages indicate that regular army units will shortly begin infiltration operations across the border into Sarawak and Sabah.

c. Seven thousand regular army troops in Indonesian Borneo, the messages show, are getting an intensified course in guerrilla tactics. This training is to be completed next month.


d. Other messages speak of the arrival, beginning today, of a battalion of regulars from West Java. (INTERCERPTS throughout)

3. Venezuela

a. The weekend was marred only by sporadic and minor acts of terrorism in several cities. Government security forces have the situation generally under control.

b. The Venezuelan Air Force is stepping up its efforts to track down and destroy intruder aircraft. The Venezuelans are convinced that planes have been ferrying supplies to pro-Castro guerrillas in the mountains of the northwest.

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
630919 5
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BRAZIL
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
Maracaibo
Cabimas
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Guanare
Barquisimeto
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
Caracas
Los Teques
San Carlos
San Juan de los Morros
El Calvario
San Fernando de Apure
Cúcuta
La Asunción
Carúpano
Cumaná
Barcelona
Puerto La Cruz
Caripito
Maturín
Tucupita
El Tigre
Puerto Ordaz
Puerto Ayacucho

c. The Betancourt government has scheduled a press conference tomorrow to break the story that a three-ton cache of Cuban arms has been unearthed. A formal accusation against Cuba is to be made before the Organization of American States a week from today.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Iraq

a. The air of tension in Baghdad dissipated somewhat after the government lifted the curfew and once again permitted private vehicles on the streets.

b. Neither the city nor its new rulers are, however, at ease. Troops are still very much in evidence.

c. The new regime apparently is not convinced that the hard core of the Baath Party and its paramilitary supporters have been put down for good.

5. Syria

a. We have information that a showdown between the moderate and extremist factions of the ruling Baath Party in Syria is fast approaching.

(Cont'd)

b. A clandestine source identifies Prime Minister Hafiz as the leading figure on the side of moderation. General Umran heads the doctrinaire extremists.


c. It was a split along the same lines that brought about the Baath Party's fall from power in Iraq.

6. Italy

a. Premier-designate Moro expects that the program for a "center-left" coalition government will be approved today by the four parties involved.

b. Details of the foreign policy planks are not yet available, but they were drafted with the thought that the death of President Kennedy makes it more important for Italy to play an active role within the Western alliance.

c. After the program has been approved, the final selection of a cabinet can be undertaken. This could take the rest of the week.


CAIRO
JORDAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
UAR
(EGYPT)
Aswan
Ras Banas
Yenbo
Medina
SAUDI ARABIA
RIYADH
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
Khamis Mushait
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Boundary undefined
SANA
Marib
Al Hudaydah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
STATUTE MILES
0
400
630801 3
SAUDI ARABIA
Abha
Zahran
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Major road
Other road or track
0 STATUTE MILES 100
UNCLASSIFIED
Harad
Maydi
Abs
Hajjah
Umran
Wadi al Jawf
KAMARAN (U.K.)
Raudha
Marib
SANA
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
Al Hudaydah
Ibb
Qatabah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
Ad Dali
Mocha
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ETHIOPIA
FRENCH SOMALILAND
ADEN

YEMEN

7. UAR-Yemen-Egypt

a. The Saudis told our embassy in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi village near the Yemeni border was attacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft.

b. It was the second time this month that Yemeni-based Egyptian aircraft have struck across the border into Saudi Arabia.

c. As in the previous cases, the Saudis have lodged a formal complaint with the UN Observation Mission.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NOTES

A. Oswald Press stories to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald recently visited Mexico City are true, according to our information. Oswald visited both the Cuban and the Soviet embassies on 28 September. He was trying, we are told, to arrange for visas so that he could travel to the USSR via Havana. He returned to the US on 3 October.

B. Brazil A new round of military promotions and reassignments will be made public today. The present instability of the Brazilian political scene is reflected in the numerous reports of coup plots which this event has precipitated.

C. USSR At last report the three Soviet range instrumentation ships were dead in the water 500 miles south of Johnston Island, roughly the same position they occupied for last year's extended range ICBM shots. No announcement closing this area of the Pacific to shipping has been made and there is no activity as yet at the Tyuratam missile test center, but we look for some action in the next few days. (INTERCEPTS)

D. Algeria We have a report from a good clandestine source that a group of army officers is plotting with Defense Minister Boumedienne to overthrow Ben Bella. A growing estrangement between the two has been apparent for some time, but this is the first good indication that Boumedienne is making common cause with those who wish to turn Ben Bella out of office.

(Cont'd)

E. Australia - Communist China Peiping has signed contracts for just over one million tons of Australian grain to be delivered early next year. We had been expecting the Chinese Communists to enter the market, since they had another mediocre grain crop this year. Peiping has been buying close to five million tons of grain for the past several years.

F. Congo We hear that the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville had booked 75 places on a flight to Brussels last Saturday. There is still no information on whether any Soviet Embassy officials have actually departed, however.

G. Berlin There was no new harassment of Allied access routes to Berlin over the weekend. A total of 16 flares were fired last evening near Tempelhof Airfield, but we connect these with Communist efforts to prevent escapes from East Berlin. East German police were observed stringing barbed wire in the same area a short time later.

H. Laos The neutralists claim to have made significant gains in their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng area. They have not, however, been able to dislodge the Pathet Lao from positions within artillery range of the town's airport.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

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4

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq-Syria

a. The shaky new accommodation between the two countries following the recent coup in Iraq has been threatened by Syria's action in granting asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the exiled leader of the extremist wing of the Iraqi Baath.

b. Saadi had arrived in Syria unannounced following a brief stay in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a message asking Syria to expel him on grounds that sheltering him was a breach of agreement.


c. Both regimes continue to be troubled with internal dissension with affairs in one deeply tangled with those in the other.

d. In Syria, as we mentioned yesterday, the Baathist regime is split between moderates who desire a broadening of the government's power base, and a doctrinaire faction which wants to keep all control of the government in Baathist hands.

e. In Iraq, the pull is more away from the Baathists. Two ministers have threatened to resign unless the government adopts an openly pro-Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the government feels secure enough to ease up on curfew and transport restrictions imposed since the coup.

(Cont'd)

SECRET



SECRET

f. Iraq has announced that the military union with Syria remains in force, and that a new commander of the joint armies will be announced soon.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Laos

a. Intercepted neutralist messages on Sunday reported that government forces had finally secured Vang Vieng and its airfield, long held by the Pathet Lao. They also told of the capture of Ban Namone farther south on Route 13.

b. The neutralist, rightist Lao Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces hope to sustain their coordinated clearing action until remaining Pathet Lao pockets in this area north of Vientiane are cleared.

c. Such operations in Laos have often been followed by a Communist riposte. We have a few indicators that something could be up on the Communist side, but these are so far very tenuous indeed.

d. One such indicator is a stand down in the last two weeks on the Hanoi-controlled military communications net in Laos which could

(Cont'd)

point to a change in the disposition or strength of Communist forces. Other enemy nets are normal.

e. There are also unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the Plaine des Jarres.
(INTERCEPTS)

3. South Vietnam


a. According to press reports, Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped out two of the government's strategic hamlets in the central highlands about 250 miles north of Saigon.

b. More than 1,000 inhabitants in the hamlets--who are minority tribesmen--are missing and possibly have fled into the mountains. They abandoned a significant quantity of weapons to the Viet Cong.

c. These attacks not only suggest continued erosion of the government's programs to win over tribal support, but also signal that stepped-up Viet Cong pressure against the new regime is spreading to the north.

(Cont'd)

22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK



32609 8-63

d. This Communist effort is aimed at discrediting the post-Diem regime before the new leadership is able to get its feet on the ground and capture the loyalty and respect of people in the provinces.

e. Although the Viet Cong still continues to draw its main strength from local recruiting, a steady stream of cadre and training personnel continues to make its way to the south from North Vietnam along the Laotian border.

f. We are now reasonably sure that at least 784 persons infiltrated from the north during 1963 and the actual total may be much higher.

4. USSR

a. There have been no further developments in Soviet preparations for a series of extended range ICBM shots to the Pacific.

b. We probably should have had by now an announcement closing an area roughly 500 miles south of Johnston Island to shipping. We suspect the Soviets may have delayed it in order not to appear to be rattling rockets immediately after President Kennedy's death.

(Cont'd)

c. The USSR may repeat last year's performance of multiple firings from a prototype operational complex at Tyuratam. Three such launchings were attempted at five-minute intervals in May 1963; two succeeded.

d. We also do not rule out the possibility of firings from operational sites as opposed to the test center at Tyuratam. We observed the first such firing on 22 October from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400 miles northeast of Moscow. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

5. USSR-Berlin

a. Embassy Bonn feels that the Soviet Union may be seeking at least a temporary modus vivendi on the autobahn without prejudicing its juridical position, which can be used to cause difficulties there in the future.

b. The embassy bases this on the Soviet replies to the Western notification to the USSR on 29 October regarding harmonized convoy procedures--two oral statements on 16 November and a note of 21 November.

(Cont'd)

c. The Soviet note was designed to make a record, showing that the USSR exercises "control" of the autobahn and that the recent incidents resulted from US refusal to comply with "existing procedures."

d. On the other hand, the Soviet procedures described in the oral replies seem to reflect actual Allied practices, though there is enough ambiguity to afford the USSR flexibility in any future actions.

6. Brazil

a. The danger of an immediate coup against the Goulart regime has receded with the reported decision of Second Army Commander General Bevilaqua not to join the coup plotters.

b. Bevilaqua, who has been something of a storm center, may have been asked to hand over his command today as part of a series of reassignments made by President Goulart to keep the military off balance.

c. On the other side of the coin, there is widespread belief that Goulart himself will at some time resort to a coup to establish an authoritarian regime.

(Cont'd)

d. As one example Raneiri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies and next in line for the presidency, told Ambassador Gordon on Saturday that he profoundly mistrusts Goulart's intentions and intends to maintain the strictest congressional vigilance.

e. Our station in Brazil believes that Goulart is living in a dream world. He seems either out of touch with reality or very poorly informed. Public opinion is not with him and the tradition that political power should only be transferred constitutionally is very strong in the army, coup reports notwithstanding.

f. The biggest danger from this quarter is that the opposition may resort to some illegal act, giving Goulart the excuse to take over.

NOTES

A. Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian contingent from the UN force in the Congo.

B. Communist China - Africa The Guinean ambassador in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some Afro-Asian countries. He is to stop first in Egypt and then visit several other African countries including Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Chou would be the highest ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa. (INTERCEPTS)

C. Indonesia-Philippines Two good sources have reported that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal. No reasons have been advanced for the visit. Our chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head off Philippine recognition of Malaysia.

D. Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz. The elections are still on for Sunday, and we look for a maximum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization.

E. Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels. They are expected to book onward passage for Moscow. It is reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet property.

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
5

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


SECRET
HAVANA
ISLE OF PINES
CUBA
SAM SITE
Nipe Bay
U.S. Naval Base
0
100
NAUTICAL MILES
63 11.26 6

1. Cuba

a. Cuban tents are now beginning to appear at a number of the SAM sites--further evidence that training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment has begun as scheduled.

b. High-altitude photography taken this past weekend shows these tents at six SAM sites in western Cuba. These sites are in addition to those at which we noted the presence of Cuban interpreters as we reported on Saturday.


c. This training should be completed by next May or June.

d. Just before the training started, we noted a series of moves involving the relocation of eight of the SAM sites.

e. The purpose, it appears, was to shift the mission of the system from an area defense of the island as a whole to point defense of specific targets, particularly Havana. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Syria-Iraq

a. Syrian leaders have acceded to pressure from Iraq and have expelled Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali Saadi. He has gone to Athens


PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS
(by % of total vote)
1961 General Election
1963 Local Election
36.7
37.0
Republican Peoples' Party (RPP)
34.8
45.9
Justice Party (JP)
13.7
6.5
New Turkey Party (NTP)
14.0
2.8
Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)
0
3.1
Nation Party (NP)
0.8
4.3
Independents (or unreported vote)
0
0.4
Turkish Labor Party (TLP)
631125 C

b. This is an earnest of the desire of moderate Baathist leaders in Damascus to preserve workable relations with Iraq, partly as a counterbalance to Cairo and partly to preserve what remains of Baathist influence in Baghdad.

c. Intercepts show at least some Syrian troops will remain in Iraq at the request of Iraqi officials.

d. Preparations had been under way for these forces to withdraw; retention of at least some in Iraq is another sign that both regimes hope to preserve something of the relations they once had. (Includes INTERCEPTS)


3. Turkey

a. Prime Minister Inonu's coalition government is about to collapse.

b. It has long been shaky. Last week it was dealt a severe setback when the opposition Justice Party, heir of the Menderes regime, emerged from local elections as the country's majority party.

(Cont'd)

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE



631021 2A

SOVIET GRAIN PRODUCTION

(million metric tons)

	ALL GRAINS		WHEAT ALONE	
	Soviet Official	US Estimate	Soviet Official	US Estimate
1958	141	125	77	63
1959	126	100	69	55
1960	134	100	64	46
1961	137	115	67	55
1962	148	115	71	57
1963	--	100-110	--	42-46

631021 2B

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Now the Peasant Party, one of the three in the coalition, has voted to pull out, and probably will do so as soon as Inonu gets back from Washington. Another partner, the Turkey Party, has wanted to pull out, and apparently has stayed in only because of pressure from the military.

d. A new coalition is at least a theoretical possibility, with a number of independents taking the place of the Peasant Party, but Inonu probably would not be prime minister.

e. The military are working for an all-party coalition. This way, they feel, they could keep tabs on the Justice Party, but the Justice Party is not likely to buy this arrangement.

f. As matters now stand, the military would take over the government itself before it would let the Justice Party form one.

4. USSR wheat

a. Soviet President Brezhnev has told the Iranian prime minister that the decision to buy wheat abroad was taken to avoid lowering reserves, which he has described as ample for one or two years. We think the situation is more serious than that.

(Cont'd)

b. This year's harvest was clearly very bad. The weight of evidence suggests that Soviet grain stockpiles have been far drawn down this year and are not sufficient to protect the country from another poor harvest.

c. Our estimate is that total grain production each year since 1958 has been well below that year's level of 125 million tons, while the population has continued to grow.

d. We have seen from intercepts signs of extensive slaughtering in anticipation of fodder shortages during the winter. This runs counter to Khrushchev's oft-stated plan to build up the livestock industry.

e. We have also noted that the extensive wheat purchases weaken the USSR's gold reserves at a time when it hopes to expand its imports of machinery for a huge chemical fertilizer program.

f. In addition, we have seen signs of stringent measures to protect the grain supply, accompanied by public discontent in some areas over the absence of bread.

(Cont'd)

5. Communist China - Argentina

a. Peiping last week contracted for some 300,000 tons of wheat (cost about $20,000,000) from Argentina.

b. This adds to the 1,000,000 tons just contracted for with Australia, but is still far below the 5,000,000 tons the Chinese have normally imported in recent years. Additional suppliers will be hard to find.

c. A large sale, apparently involving some $56,000,000 worth of meat, is apparently also being arranged. This is interesting, not only for the sizeable foreign exchange outlay, but also for the concern it shows for improving the diet of the mainland's urban population.

d. The same caloric value could be obtained from grains at a fraction of this cost. (INTERCEPTS throughout)

6. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President and party boss Novotny has gone to Moscow, evidently for economic talks, judging by the composition of his delegation.

b. Novotny's background of Stalinist excesses have put him on the wrong side of Khrushchev. They also have given rise to control problems, particularly in the fractious Slovak party where pressures for liberalization have made their mark.


c. Party problems and Novotny's leadership may thus also come under review.

d. A curious sign of the times is the fact that, although President Novotny is in Moscow, the presidential flag has remained up at the official residence. It might simply have been an oversight, but the symbolism will not be lost to the people in Prague.

7. Cambodia

a. Cambodia, as expected, has asked the Geneva co-chairman to call the Geneva conference participants together (in Djakarta) to discuss measures "to ensure the internationally guaranteed and controlled neutralization of Cambodia."

(Cont'd)



Khamis Mushait
SAUDI ARABIA
W. Najran
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Qizan
Al Muwassam
Maydi
KAMARAN (U.K.)
Salif
SANA
Jihannah
Sirwah
Marib
Harib
YEMEN
Al Hudaydah
RED SEA
Mocha
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOM.
0
25
50 MILES
13 SEPTEMBER 1963
SYRIA
JORDAN
IRAQ
Cairo
U.A.R. (EGYPT)
Ras Banas
Red Sea
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
SAUDI
Riyadh
ARABIA
SUDAN
Khartoum
Sana
YEMEN
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa

33905

b. Last year when this came up, the French were inclined to go along with some such idea.

c. They have indicated to us that they still feel Sihanouk should not be turned down, and Sihanouk is obviously hopeful that they will exert pressure on us and the British.

d. Sihanouk seems to be hoping for at least a rump session attended by conferees who are willing to do his bidding.

8. Egypt-Yemen

a. An Egyptain military message reporting to Cairo on operations in Yemen this past weekend indicated that poison gas (referred to as "ghurab" in Egyptian military traffic) was used against royalist tribesmen in the northwest.

b. This is the first time we have noted its employment since last summer, although another intercept shows that the Egyptian command has continued to authorize its use.

(Cont'd)

c. It is basically a tear gas, but in such highly concentrated form that it has caused the death of a number of Yemenis.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

9. Congo

a. Opposition leftist Congolese exiles, operating from Brazzaville across the river, are reported to be plotting to assassinate Congolese Premier Adoula and some of his ministers.

b. It is supposed to happen sometime after 8 December.

c. Meanwhile, agents are being infiltrated with money to buy off opposition to a takeover immediately thereafter by radical nationalist Gbenye.

d. Adoula's government already knows that this group of left-wing subversives, which now numbers about 50, is being helped by the Communist bloc.

e. It operates fairly freely in the loose circumstances which now obtain in Brazzaville. Its activities may soon become a serious source of friction between the two countries.

NOTES

A. South Korea With 85 percent of the vote in, Pak Chong-hui's Democratic Republican Party has already won an absolute majority in the National Assembly elections held yesterday.

B. Venezuela The country's three major presidential candidates were the targets of unsuccessful assassination attempts yesterday as Communist-led terrorists moved into the final week of desperate attempt to wreck next Sunday's elections. A US Embassy official was also the intended recipient of a "Christmas package" containing a bomb. Yesterday a US rubber warehouse was set afire and destroyed by terrorists.

C. Indonesia-Philippines We have what is about as sure a sign as we can get that Sukarno will be going to Manila as reported yesterday. A reliable source tells us Sukarno has sent advance word to two of his favorite Philippine girl friends that he will be arriving on 28 November.

D. Indonesia-Malaysia Indonesian-inspired press reports yesterday claimed a British military plane was shot down near the North Borneo border. British Intelligence tells us the story is concocted; no aircraft are reported missing.

E. Cuba The alert in the Cuban military which we noted immediately after President Kennedy's death has been lifted. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

F. Cambodia Cambodia is cutting its diplomatic representation abroad to a bare minimum as an austerity measure following curtailment of US aid. Sihanouk announced last week that this would be done, saying that missions in Communist countries would not be affected since those countries "protect" Cambodia. Curiously enough, among the missions being closed down are those in New Delhi and Rangoon. (Includes (INTERCEPTS)

G. USSR-US Pravda this morning reports on Gromyko's talks with President Johnson, giving top play to Senator Fulbright's remarks about the desirability of a meeting between the President and Khrushchev.

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

I. De Gaulle on NATO strategy.

II. Common Market official appraises President Johnson. (Sensitive INTERCEPT)

JFK Assassination System
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6

President Read during Briefing by McCone
BKS


THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

OFFICIAL USE ONLY



1. Venezuela

a. The country's six presidential candidates have swung into the home stretch of their campaigns. So have the terrorists, who are still trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's vote.

b. There is little doubt that the terrorist effort has all-out Cuban support. Castro looks on Venezuela as his prime target in Latin America and would do everything in his power to prevent President Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have tried to intimidate the candidates by harassing political rallies, bombing their party headquarters in various cities, and threatening them with assassination. They have tried to scare voters from the polls by creating a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Kidnappings, like the one yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault, are part of the pattern.

d. The government counterattack is under the personal direction of Betancourt, who is as determined to finish out his term and turn over power to a freely-elected successor as Castro is to prevent this.

(Cont'd)

e. Yesterday it was announced that the carrying of firearms by anyone outside the security forces was forbidden until the elections are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have been called up to protect the polls. Leaves are being cancelled and all security forces are maintaining a high state of alert.

2. South Vietnam

a. We now have a fuller account from official US sources of the Viet Cong attack on two mountain villages mentioned in Tuesday's Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear that the earlier press versions, which spoke of 1,000 missing villagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information is that the attack, in company strength, was successfully repulsed. The Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties; government losses were six killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

(Cont'd)

d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the higher level of military activity they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has called for more attacks in an effort to destroy strategic hamlets and "develop" Viet Cong forces. In support of this, Viet Cong communications traffic has been unusually heavy and has involved a large volume of high priority traffic and special alert patterns.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Israel

a. We have some reason to believe that the Israelis are developing a surface-to-surface missile of their own.

b. A reliable clandestine source says that an Israeli representative is trying to buy US stable platforms for the inertial guidance system of a missile with a range of 300-350 miles. He wanted delivery in six to twelve months. There have been several earlier reports that

(Cont'd)

Israel is buying missile components in the US and England.

c. We think this missile program is independent of another Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's contract with a French firm, Marcel Dassault, for the development of a system which will be able to deliver a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles.

4. USSR-India

a. Moscow has promised the Indians to ship the equipment for one surface-to-air (SAM) training site early next month.

b. The Soviets had agreed to provide eight SAM sites. The rest will probably not be sent until the Indians have learned to handle the equipment about a year from now.

c. As we noted last Sunday, there are some Indians who have doubts about the Soviet willingness to live up to the letter of their military aid agreements with New Delhi.

(Cont'd)

d. They call into question especially the contract for the Soviets to set up in India a facility to assemble MIG fighters--an enterprise which has appeared somewhat impractical from the beginning.

e. We do note, however, that Soviet aircraft specialists working on the project were still in New Delhi in early November. (INTERCEPTS)

5. Burma


a. Ne Win has followed up his action in breaking off talks with the Burmese Communists by arresting over 700 of their number.

b. Ne Win had been trying to lure the faction-ridden Communists into a "national front." However, he found the demands of the Communist negotiators, some of whom had only just returned from long exile in Peiping, to be impossible.

c. This will probably lead to renewed fighting between the army and Communist guerrillas in the hills.

d. More trouble can also be expected from the rebellious ethnic minorities like the Karens and the

(Cont'd)


South Vietnam
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Mekong
PHNOM PENH
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
Quang Ngai
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Tuy Hoa
Cheo Reo
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
Phuoc Vinh
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
My Tho
Vung Tau
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
STATUTE MILES
0
150
34235

Kachins, whose demands for greater autonomy have been rejected in Rangoon.

e. US officials on the spot doubt that the army, hobbled by poor leadership and its many political responsibilities, will be any more effective in dealing with the problem this time than in past anti-insurgency campaigns.

6. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk has signed an accord setting up regular air service between Cambodia and Communist China. A similar agreement with Hanoi is in the works.

b. These lines are significant largely as gestures by Peiping and Hanoi to bolster Sihanouk's sense of importance. Neither would be a paying proposition commercially and both could flounder before the first paying passenger enplanes unless rights to overfly Laos can be obtained. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

7. Greece

a. It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.

(Cont'd)

b. His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis' party on the right or from the Communists. The military has apparently been pressing Karamanlis to withhold that support. He does not need much urging.

c. The military has also let it be known that it would consider Papandreou's acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.

d. In addition to this military string-pulling, the royal family is also meddling--not for the first time. Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intends to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.

e. This would then open the way, the palace calculates, for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.

8. Brazil

a. President Goulart and his opponents are keeping political tensions in Brazil high.

(Cont'd)

b. Comments by Goulart, that "social disaster" is sure if his program is not passed soon, have drawn sharp rejoinders from moderate and conservative figures and have fed rightist coup plotting.

c. Strains are also growing in the military following the arrest of a young officer who refused last month to execute an order to arrest Governor Lacerda, a leading conservative spokesman and likely presidential candidate.

NOTES


A. USSR Simultaneous activity this morning on the Tyuratam missile test range, satellite tracking nets and Soviet space support ships in the Atlantic probably represented an attempt to launch an unmanned earth satellite. The launch apparently failed on the pad or was cancelled at the last moment. It may be tried again soon. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree.

C. Turkey The New Turkey Party has followed the Peasant Party in withdrawing from the present three-party coalition government. This means that the coalition has to all intents and purposes collapsed, even though no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this weekend.

D. Thailand The Thai doctors attending Sarit now admit for the first time that the Prime Minister is in critical condition. Our doctor agrees with this prognosis. US officials in Bangkok believe that the most likely successor would be Thanom Kittikachorn, now deputy prime minister and minister of defense. Thanom is not likely to last long, however, since he is neither a strong personality nor a figure of great weight in the military hierarchy.

(Cont'd)



MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
LIBYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
MAURITANIA
NIGER
MALI
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA
UPPER VOLTA
CHAD
SUDAN
FR. SOMAL.
ETHIOPIA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SOMALI REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
UGANDA
KENYA
CONGO
GABON
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
RWANDA
BURUNDI
RWANDA BURUNDI
ZANZIBAR
CABINDA
ANGOLA
FED. OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND

E. Indonesia-Philippines A Philippine foreign office man states that everything was set, as we noted yesterday, for Sukarno to visit Manila today. This official says, however, that the visit was postponed as a result of Macapagal's decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral.

F. Indonesia Djakarta is giving every indication that it will hold up final action on the long-pending oil contracts with US companies in an attempt to smoke us out on the question of US aid policy toward Indonesia.

G. Rwanda-Burundi Tribal refugees from Rwanda, now in Burundi, seem bent on making trouble between the two countries. Some 3,000 of their number were reported yesterday to be moving toward the frontier. They have little military capability, but blood could flow and require UN intervention.

H. USSR-Congo As a further token of the withdrawal of Soviet diplomats we have noted that the Soviet diplomatic communications link between Moscow and Leopoldville was shut down last Saturday. (INTERCEPTS)

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8

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 NOVEMBER 1963

TOP SECRET

1. Venezuela

a. Election campaigning ended at midnight, but boosters for the several candidates continued to mill about streets of Caracas in defiance of terrorist threats to shoot anyone who ventured out for the next three days.

b. The terrorists, it seems, were all but drowned out by the carnival air.

c. The FALN, meanwhile, is trying to bargain off Colonel Chenault for as high a price as it can, demanding variously release of all its comrades, of all women detained by the government, and of the six hijackers who have been returned from Trinidad to custody in Venezuela.

2. Sino-Soviet dispute

a. The Chinese Communists will have nothing to do with the idea of bilateral talks with the Soviets under present circumstances.

b. Chinese party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the select few in Peiping's ruling circle, recently told a group of visiting Latin Americans that such a meeting could accomplish nothing.

(Cont'd)

c. Teng put the issue of another meeting of world Communist parties even deeper into limbo by saying that Peiping would be in favor only when assured of the support of a majority of the world parties.


d. Moscow, for its part, has apparently stopped thinking about another gathering of world Communist party representatives.

e. The feelers it put out after the conclusion of the test-ban treaty were received coldly by some of the fraternal parties. They felt such a meeting could only make matters worse with the Chinese.


f. Indeed, Peiping saw this to be Moscow's purpose, and when the idea failed to take hold,the Chinese took it to be a setback for Khrushchev personally.

g. Their reaction to Khrushchev's subsequent call for a cessation of open argument was to press the offensive, and this they have been doing in roundly abusive terms since.

(Cont'd)



Submarine Ballistic Missile Launches in the Soviet Far East



"G"-Class Submarine

h. The forthcoming Afro-Asian visits by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have awakened suspicions that the Chinese are in hot pursuit of a second Bandung-type conference--a more rewarding enterprise from their point of view.

3. USSR

a. Yesterday and on Thursday, we detected what we believe to have been operational training launches of standard 350 nautical mile submarine-based ballistic missiles.

b. Two and possibly four missiles were fired from submarines based in the Petropavlovsk area to the impact area at Klyuchi.

c. Seven similar instances have been detected previously this year, and there may have been others. (INTERCEPTS)

4. Kenya - Communist Bloc

a. The Soviet Bloc will soon gain an important propaganda outlet in Nairobi, communications hub for East Africa.

b. Plans are for a state-controlled news agency to be set up by the Kenyan government when it

(Cont'd)

achieves independence on 12 December. This will fall under the jurisdiction of communications minister Oneko, who has well developed contacts within the Soviet Bloc.

c. TASS has already agreed to equip the new agency, and Kenyan requests for further financial and techincal help are being discussed in Prague and Moscow.

d. Kenyan journalists have been training in Prague and, on return, will find ready employment in the new agency.

5. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President Novotny returned from Moscow on Thursday after signing a renewal (for another 20 years) of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

b. He apparently got little else out of Khrushchev. The final communique was conspicuously cool.

c. There were no Soviet concessions, nor were there the usual references to Czech "progress" or to public support for Novotny's leadership.


6. South Vietnam

a. The first suicide by burning to occur under the new regime was witnessed today by bystanders at a crowded intersection in Saigon where a young girl went up in flames.

b. A note she left behind said she was protesting the war of Vietnamese against Vietnamese. At the intersection are three villas which house the ICC delegations.

c. There were no Buddhist overtones.

d. Some think the Viet Cong encouraged her, but if they did, they did not write her script. They would have said it is the Americans who are fighting the Vietnamese.


South Vietnam
ARMY CORPS BOUNDARIES
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
I Corps
LAOS
Quang Ngai
THAILAND
II Corps
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
III Corps
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
Phan Rang
Phuoc Vinh
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Chau Phu
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
Cho Lon
Capital Military District
My Tho
Vung Tau
IV Corps
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
SECRET
0 STATUTE MILES 150
33752

NOTES

A. South Vietnam Plans are now afoot to shuffle South Vietnam's Corps commanders so that General Khanh, considered by General Harkins to be the best of the lot, will take over in the crucial delta (IV Corps) area. General Dinh, the ambitious Minister of Security, is still resisting pressure to relinquish command of the III Corps area, and is not involved in the current shuffle.

B. Cuba-USSR There are about 8,000 Soviets in Cuba, 5,000 of these military, according to a bloc official in close touch with Soviets in Havana. The figures are close to our own estimate of 4,000 to 7,000. Some withdrawals continue.

C. Cambodia-Vietnam Sihanouk seems to feel that cutting off his nose to spite his face was not enough. Now he says he will formally recognize North Vietnam if the US does not silence the Khmer Serei radio. South Vietnam will cut Cambodia's primary access to international markets via the Mekong river if he does. (INTERCEPT)

D. Indonesia-Cambodia Sukarno apparently plans to go to Cambodia on an official visit following his trip to Manila. The Cambodian ambassador in Djakarta has advised Phnom Penh that Sukarno plans to leave for Manila on 6 December and directly from there for Phnom Penh on the 10th. He will stay three days. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

E. Coal and Steel Community Coal and Steel community members at their next meeting on Monday will probably vote to raise community steel tariffs by an average of nine percent. This would bring the tariffs of each member into line with Italy's, the highest in the community. Only the Dutch oppose the idea.

F. British Guiana - Cuba GIMPEX, trading arm and source of funds for Jagan's party, has worked out a deal to supply the country's major electric utility next year with fuel oil from Cuba. Texaco and Esso have been the traditional suppliers.

G. Brazil-US A press report from Rio cites "well informed sources" to the effect that Goulart plans soon to invite Mrs. Kennedy to visit Brazil so that Brazil can pay her the honors which it had planned to render the late President.

H. Cuba-Morocco A three-man Cuban delegation is on its way to Morocco to try to patch up relations broken by Morocco because of Cuba's assistance to the Algerians in their border war. (INTERCEPTS)

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

The effect in France of the President's death.

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TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist efforts to discredit the new Saigon regime stayed in high gear this week.

b. The number of armed attacks was off from the high of the previous week but still some 50% above the year's weekly average.

c. These attacks have been, for the most part, small-scale efforts directed against the government's paramilitary forces in the villages. They have been designed more for their psychological impact than for immediate military gain.

d. A high volume of messages on Viet Cong military and political communications nets indicates a probable continuation of this effort.

e. The new government is responding by stepping up its own military operations. It is also setting about the hard job of revamping the Diem government apparatus and harnessing broader popular support for the war effort.

f. The generals have been dealing fairly effectively with

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO (Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA (U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port-of-Spain
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BRAZIL
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
CARACAS
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Guanare
Barquisimeto
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
Los Teques
San Carlos
San Juan de los Morros
El Calvario
Barcelona
Cumaná
Carúpano
La Asunción
Caripito
Maturín
El Tigre
Tucupita
Puerto Ordaz
San Fernando de Apure
Cúcuta
Puerto Ayacucho
Río Orinoco
Río Apure
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Río Caura
Río Caroní
Río Negro
Río Uraricoera
Río Branco
Selected railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
630730

their new responsibilities. There are, however, a few signs of dissension within this group and between it and civilian politicians.

g. One of the more ambitious and troublesome figures is the able but opportunistic General Ton That Dinh, the new Minister of Security. He has been travelling about the country spreading the idea that the coup was largely his doing and seems bent on developing his own independent base of power. He is a man to watch.

h. The new regime has also embarked on a purge of high military officers who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis and failed to get on the right side soon enough. (INTERCEPTS)

2. Venezuela

a. The death toll from the terrorist outburst in Caracas last Tuesday and Wednesday now stands at about 30.

b. This is the high water mark thus far in the campaign of the Castro-supported Communist extremists to disrupt the national elections a week from tomorrow.

(Cont'd)


c. The Betancourt government has struck back hard. Its new unified command over the security forces, set up at US urging, passed this initial test with flying colors.

d. At least 500 extremists were arrested and the round-up is still going on. Their removal will hamper the Communist drive against elections in major cities like Caracas.

e. We now expect the elections to be held on schedule, a considerable achievement under the circumstances. The elections will be followed, however, by a Communist effort to prevent the March inauguration of the victor.

f. The rub here is that none of the presidential candidates commands President Betancourt's considerable assets for dealing successfully with the harsh realities of Venezuelan politics. The constitution prevents Betancourt from succeeding himself.

g. In the background, as always, looms the military, which could intervene if the president-elect shows signs of being soft on communism.


CUBA
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites
HAVANA
HAVANA EAST
Mariel
Artemisa
Santiago de las Vegas
Remedios
SAN JULIAN
(Training site)
Isle of Pines
Holguin
Santiago de Cuba
U.S. Naval Base
New site
Unchanged site
Estimated range
0 50 100
NAUTICAL MILES
34095
11 OCTOBER 1963
SECRET

3. USSR-Cuba

a. In the past week we intercepted Cuban military messages which show that Cuban interpreters are now posted at several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites on the island.


b. We think this means that on-site training of Cubans has begun on schedule. Field training is to last six months, after which the SAM system may be turned over to Castro.

c. In the past month some 1,500 Soviets arrived in Cuba. Most of these were probably SAM experts, sent to monitor the training.

d. Prior to their coming, we had detected no more than a few hundred Soviet military personnel entering Cuba since the October crisis last year.

e. We estimate that at least 15,000, and probably closer to 18,000, have been withdrawn in the intervening 13 months, leaving, very roughly, 4,000 to 7,000. Those remaining are for the most part advisors whose main functions are to train and supervise Cubans in the use of weapons turned over to them.

(Cont'd)


COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN
Kiel
Stralsund
Hamburg
Buechen
Schwanheide
Lauenburg
Horst
Bremen
Neuruppin
Prenzlau
SOVIET
ZONE
POLAND
Wittenberge
Liebenwalde
Havel
Wriezen
Stendal
Rathenow
EAST BERLIN
Mittelland Canal
Vorsfelde
Oebisfelde
Hannover
Helmstedt
Marienborn
Magdeburg
Jueterbog
Cottbus
Limit of Polish Administration
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Dessau
Elbe
Walkenried
Ellrich
Halle
Kassel
Herleshausen
Wartha
Hoenebach
Gerstungen
Probstzella
Ludwigstadt
Juchhoeh
Gutenfuerst
Toepen
Hof
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Main
Railroad
Autobahn
Road
Canal
Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
Soviet
Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
East
West
KILOMETERS
0
100
UNCLASSIFIED
32166

f. All Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba last year have been withdrawn or turned over to the Cubans. The only significant exception is the SAM system.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Berlin

a. We have had an indication that Soviet harassment of Allied access routes to West Berlin will shift this weekend to the air corridors.

b. The Soviet man at the Berlin air traffic control center told the Allied representatives yesterday that Soviet transports would be using the air corridors for brief flights during the next five weekends.

c. Moscow has tried on a number of past occasions to assert its right to restrict Allied use of the air corridors. In early 1962, the Soviets attempted to reserve "blocks" of air space for their own use. They have since demanded that Western flights stay between stipulated altitudes, that we file flight plans in advance and provide prior notice of border-crossing times.

(Cont'd)

d. This sort of harassment stopped in the spring of 1962 when Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was interested in a serious discussion of a Berlin settlement. Moscow may hope that the threat of more of this sort of harassment will jog the US into talks on Berlin.

5. Iraq-Syria-UAR

a. It now appears that President Arif's role in last Monday's coup in Baghdad may have been virtually that of a bystander.

b. According to our latest information, Arif was wakened early that morning and given five minutes to join up. Tahir Yahya, now prime minister, was reportedly the organizer.

c. Whatever Arif's role may have been, the coup was primarily an effort by the Iraqi Army to curtail the activities of the extreme wing of the Baath Party. The Baath is an Arab nationalist political organization, active throughout the Arab world, which has been ruling Iraq and Syria.


(Cont'd)

d. The coup group has not thrown all Baathists out of the government; there are party members in the new cabinet.

e. Syrian Baathists have welcomed this retention of their Iraqi brothers. Their attitude springs from the recognition that the Baath in Syria cannot stay afloat without support from Iraq. Even so, we hear talk of coup plotting in Damascus.

f. The reaction of Nasir's Egypt, which passionately desires to see the Baath go under, has been exactly the opposite. Cairo has been backing off its all-out support for the coup ever since the new cabinet was announced.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS



33741

TOP SECRET
DINAR

NOTES

A. USSR New activity involving Soviet range instrumentation ships in the Pacific appears to be forthcoming. Three instrumentation ships left Petropavlovsk 12 days ago and are apparently headed for the more distant Pacific impact area, 6,500 miles from Tyuratam. We are looking for extended range ICBM tests but we do not exclude a space event. There has so far been no announcement closing the area. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Congo-USSR Soviet embassy personnel have not yet left Leopoldville, but their departure is expected momentarily. They were ordered out of the country after the Congolese turned up good documentary evidence of their complicity in anti-government plots. One of the items taken off a Soviet diplomat the other day was a letter from an anti-Adoula leader now in Brazzaville asking for funds and arms to overthrow the Leopoldville government.

C. Britain The Labor Party scored again in the Dundee West by-election Thursday, increasing its 1959 majority of 719 to a thumping 4,955. Heartened by this, Labor is now pushing for general elections at once. Prime Minister Home is not likely to accede.

D. Ecuador The military junta which has run Ecuador since July may be about to come unstuck. We have a report that one of the less savory members of the group, air force Colonel Freiles, will try to take over full control this weekend. We are not sure of the reliability of this report, but Freiles is known to have been making motions in this direction.

(Cont'd)

SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLES - COSMOS SERIES

1962 - 1963

SECRET

1962

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 1 (Sputnik 13)	12:00:00 (EST.) 16 Mar '62	Kapustin Yar	96.35	529	117	49°	Decayed 25 May '62
Cosmos 2 (Sputnik 14)	1715:18 6 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	102.5	842	115	49°	Decayed 19–20 Aug '63
Cosmos 3 (Sputnik 15)	0400:12 24 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	93.8	389	124	49°	Decayed 17 Oct.'62
Cosmos 4 * (Sputnik 16)	1002:56 26 Apr '62	Tyuratam	90.6	178	161	65°	Recovered 29 Apr 62
Cosmos 5 (Sputnik 17)	0259:49 28 May '62	Kapustin Yar	102.75	865	110	49°	Decayed 2 May '63
Cosmos 6 (Sputnik 18)	1600:00 (EST.) 30 June '62	Kapustin Yar	90.6	194	148	49°	Decayed 8 Sept '62
Cosmos 7 * (Sputnik 19)	0918:30 28 July '62	Tyuratam	90.1	199	113	65°	Recovered 1 Aug '62
Cosmos 8 (Sputnik 22)	0500:00 (EST.) 18 Aug '62	Kapustin Yar	92.93	326	138	49°	Decayed 17 Aug '63
Cosmos 9 * (Sputnik 26)	0940:00 27 Sept '62	Tyuratam	90.9	191	163	65°	Recovered 1 Oct '62
Cosmos 10 (Sputnik 27)	0900:01 (EST.) 17 Oct '62	Tyuratam	90.2	205	113	65°	Recovered 21 Oct '62
Cosmos 11 (Sputnik 28)	0655:00 (EST.) 20 Oct '62	Kapustin Yar	96.1	497	132	49°	Decayed 6 June '63
Cosmos 12 (Sputnik 32)	0924:40 22 Dec '62	Tyuratam	90.45	243	114	65°	Recovered 30 Dec '62

1963

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 13 (Sputnik 34)	0830:00 21 Mar '63	Tyuratam	89.77	182	111	64° 58"	Recovered 29 Mar '63
Cosmos 14 (Sputnik 36)	1059:59 13 Apr '63	Kapustin Yar	92.1	276	143	48° 57"	Decayed 29 Aug '63
Cosmos 15 * (Sputnik 37)	0829:58 22 Apr '63	Tyuratam	89.77	200	93	65°	Recovered 27 April '63
Cosmos 16 (Sputnik 38)	0850:00 (EST.) 28 Apr '63	Tyuratam	90.4	218	112	65° 01"	Recovered 5 May '63
Cosmos 17 (Sputnik 39)	0300:00 (EST.) 22 May '63	Kapustin Yar	94.8	425	140	49°	In orbit, silent since 31 May'63
Cosmos 18 (Sputnik 40)	1034:07 24 May '63	Tyuratam	89.44	163	113	65° 01"	Recovered 2 June '63
Cosmos 19 (Sputnik 43)	0600:00 (EST.) 6 Aug '63	Kapustin Yar	92.2	280	146	49°	In orbit, transmitting
Cosmos 20 (Sputnik 44)	0929:58 18 Oct '63	Tyuratam	89.55	168	111	65°	Recovered 26 Oct '63
Failure	24 Oct '63	Kapustin Yar	-	-	-	-	-
Cosmos 21 (Sputnik 46)	0623:39 11 Nov '63	Tyuratam	88.5	124	105	64° 50"	Decayed 14 Nov '63
Cosmos 22 (Sputnik 47)	1034:25 16 Nov '63	Tyuratam	90.3	211	111	64°56"	Recovered 22 Nov '63

E. <u>Thailand</u> Prime Minister Sarit, who suffers from an incurable liver disease, is failing. Doctors attending him, including one of our own, give him no more than six months more. Sarit has attempted to arrange for an orderly succession when he does go. The chances of this are not good; Thai politicians and military figures are already jostling one another for position.

F. <u>USSR</u> Cosmos 22, launched a week ago, was recovered yesterday. It is the eleventh unmanned satellite to be recovered. All recoverable satellites have been launched from Tyuratam, the main Soviet missile test center, and recovered after three to ten days aloft. A series of non-recoverable satellites has been fired from Kapustin Yar.
(See Chart)
(INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/31/201

Agency Information

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RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10091

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : S-M (IV-W)

Document Information

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TO :

TITLE : DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM C. STURBITTS

DATE : 04/16/1975
PAGES : 113

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
CIA
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CUBAN EXILES
FERRIE, DAVID
STURGIS, FRANK
HUNT, E. HOWARD
MIAMI
NEW ORLEANS
SHAW, CLAY
STURBITTS, WILLIAM C.
GARRISON, JIM

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COMMENTS : Unknown whether name is releasable.

CONTENTS

178-10002-10091

178-10002-10215

178-10002-10279

1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

2 ON CIA ACTIVITIES

3 - - -

4 Langley, Virginia

5 Wednesday, April 16, 1975

6 Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for

7 examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities,

8 the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary

9 Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the

10 Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50

11 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings

12 being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and

13 transcribed under her direction.

14 APPEARANCES:

15 On behalf of the Commission:

16 GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

17 ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

18 - - -

19

20

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25

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Thereupon,

3 WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

4 called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA

5 Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:

7 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the

10 record?

11 A William C. Sturbitts.

12 Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some

13 weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and

14 Waiver"?

15 A Right.

16 Q You understand that document is still in effect?

17 A Sure.

18 Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

19 A You mean the Agency or --

20 Q That is right.

21 A Central Intelligence Agency.

22 Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

23 A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for

24 Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

25 Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

1 your employment with the Agency?

2 A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence

3 Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special

4 detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans,

5 which is now the Directorate of Operations.

6 Q What year were you put on that detail?

7 A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

8 Q And what did that detail involve?

9 A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

10 Q And how long were you on that detail?

11 A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

12 Q Between 1964 and 1973?

13 A (Nods in affirmative.)

14 Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

15 A Yes, January.

16 Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Were you stationed in Washington?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected

23 with the operations of the Miami Station?

24 A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide.

25 I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

1 Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

2 Q Run out of --

3 A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones

4 were run out of Europe.

5 Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect

6 to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the

7 operations of the Miami base?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

10 A Yes, sir.

11 Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban

12 operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami

13 Station?

14 A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he

15 was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know

16 it. Well, I will come back to that.

17 Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

18 Q What years was he Chief?

19 A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He

20 left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's

21 say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline.

22 He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

23 Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which

24 you were assigned for the 9-year period?

25 A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

1 Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald.
2 And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations
3 Group.
4 Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was
5 it attached to one of the area divisions?
6 A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing
7 called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And
8 that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome,
9 and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff.
10 It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the
11 Deputy Director, Plans.
12 Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?
13 A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it
14 was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.
15 Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the
16 Bay of Pigs?
17 A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around --
18 in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in
19 September, something like that, 1961.
20 Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities
21 Staff?
22 A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the
23 Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went
24 back into the Western Hemisphere Division.
25 Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

1 A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around
2 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then
3 later DDP.
4 Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr.
5 Harvey held after he left Task Force W?
6 A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.
7 Q And is he still with the Agency?
8 A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.
9 Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?
10 A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives.
11 He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm.
12 Harvey is a lawyer.
13 Q Indianapolis area?
14 A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest,
15 Indiana.
16 Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force
17 W?
18 A It was the overall Cuban operations.
19 Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station estab-
20 lished?
21 A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down
22 there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.
23 Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?
24 A Oh, yes.
25 Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

1 Station running any operations against Cuba?

2 A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

3 Q Yes.

4 A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a

5 forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type

6 thing.

7 Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was

8 established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban

9 operations?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami

12 Station?

13 A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

14 Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special

15 Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

16 A Right, except that at the present time the Station

17 has no Cuban operations.

18 Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations termi-

19 nated?

20 A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down

21 there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was

22 in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

23 Q And have those operations been terminated entirely

24 or are they now run out of the Washington area?

25 A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

1 There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

2 Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of

3 the Washington area?

4 A Right.

5 Q Is that correct?

6 A Right. Worldwide.

7 Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may

8 have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassina-

9 tion attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination

10 attempts that have been mounted --

11 A Right.

12 Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your

13 activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such

14 attempts?

15 A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say

16 attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too

17 strong a word.

18 Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of

19 any such discussions?

20 A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions,

21 I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald

22 in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put

23 it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on

24 with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as

25 I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

1 a telescopic sight.

2 Q Who wanted them?

3 A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think

4 at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going

5 on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another

6 reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald

7 met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representa-

8 tive of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

9 I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that

10 we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing

11 them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

12 Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

13 You said there were 19 volumes of documents with

14 respect to this.

15 A 19 files, manila.

16 Q All having to do with possible assassination?

17 A All having to do with this whole time period and --

18 can we go off the record for a minute?

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 BY MR. MANFREDI:

21 Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you

22 had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr.

23 Fitzgerald?

24 A I simply overheard it, that is right.

25 Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

1 heard?

2 A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

3 Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

4 A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other

5 people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time,

6 in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace

7 and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations

8 took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of

9 thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody

10 was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

11 Q This was in Paris?

12 A Yes.

13 Q I see.

14 Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

15 A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff.

16 He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with

17 Cuban military-type.

18 Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received

19 instructions with respect to this activity from another

20 component of the Government?

21 A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether

22 they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty

23 positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision.

24 And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was

25 overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

1 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided,
2 he did a number of things.
3 Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall
4 in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of
5 Fidel Castro was discussed?
6 A No, not really.
7 Q You referred to this as the first occasion.
8 A This is the first --
9 Q Was there a second?
10 A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it
11 discussed.
12 Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently
13 underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation
14 -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came
15 to your attention after this discussion in the garden in
16 Paris?
17 A The only other thing that came to my attention was
18 that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight
19 that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know,
20 but that is what I was told.
21 Q When did you learn that?
22 A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964,
23 around February, something like that.
24 Q Off the record.
25 (Discussion off the record.)

1 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

2 BY MR. MANFREDI:

3 Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by

4 the name of Frank Sturgis?

5 A Indeed.

6 Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in

7 the press?

8 A No. It is what is contained in the files.

9 Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files,

10 particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division,

11 in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any

12 connection with the Agency?

13 A I have.

14 Q What were the results of that search?

15 A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

16 Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about

17 an employment relationship?

18 A That is what I am speaking of.

19 Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of

20 the Agency?

21 A No.

22 Q Was he ever a contract employee?

23 A No.

24 Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

25 A No.

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1 Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the
2 Agency?
3 A Not to my knowledge.
4 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
5 pated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against
6 Cuba?
7 A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this
8 Agency.
9 Q How did you learn of those operations?
10 A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.
11 Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?
12 A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the
13 thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop
14 over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and
15 by the Bureau office in Miami.
16 Q Do you know who financed his activities?
17 A I have no idea.
18 Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were
19 indirectly financed by the Agency through --
20 A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of
21 fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself
22 with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me
23 to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't
24 destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."
25 Q Off the record.

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1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

3 BY MR. MANFREDI:

4 Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr.

5 Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

6 A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

7 Q And what is the volume of that material?

8 A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee

9 called for them the other day after the article in the paper,

10 I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and

11 they returned them Monday afternoon.

12 Q Do you know who examined those files?

13 A No, I don't.

14 Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts

15 the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

16 A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits

17 of so-called information.

18 Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged

19 narcotics traffic?

20 A Recently it has been.

21 Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office

22 in Miami?

23 A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami

24 to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the

25 FBI.

1 Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an
2 established contact?
3 A No manner.
4 Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to
5 collect information from Mr. Sturgis?
6 A I can't speak to that but the records that we have
7 don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact
8 somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file
9 on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin
10 American Division before they did anything since we do hold
11 the file.
12 Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?
13 A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any
14 information relating to an individual appearing in the press
15 as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.
16 Q Personnel or personality file?
17 A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.
18 Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection
19 or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?
20 A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know
21 each other. They have to know each other from their days
22 in Cuba.
23 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
24 pated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?
25 A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

1 I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a
2 boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations
3 and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run,
4 sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in
5 any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever
6 do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs
7 to the Agency.

8 Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain
9 a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting
10 together his own crew?

11 A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a
12 Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of
13 the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have
14 some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive
15 his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

16 Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis
17 along on any of these operations?

18 A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was
19 trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

20 Q And that would be for a period of time between
21 Shackley and Henze?

22 A Yes.

23 Q 1964 to 1966?

24 A Something like that.

25 Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

1 activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during
2 your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during
3 your 9-year tenure with those groups.
4 A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board
5 intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign
6 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary
7 activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about
8 the breadth of the thing.
9 Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?
10 A Right.
11 Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary
12 operations. Were these operations run out of southern
13 Florida?
14 A Right.
15 Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of
18 the country that participated in these activities?
19 A Not to my knowledge.
20 Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami
21 that were used in these activities?
22 A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As
23 I said, we did have a Key West base.
24 Q Were there any other bases in that area of the
25 country that were utilized in these operations?

1 A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have
2 training facilities for the UDT teams.
3 Q What is a UDT team?
4 A Underwater demolition.
5 Q Where were those bases located?
6 A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys,
7 along that long peninsula going down there. There were a
8 number of sites. I really can't recall them.
9 Q Were there any other sites within the United States
10 in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people
11 participating in these activities?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
13 Q Where were these people trained?
14 A What do you mean?
15 Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.
16 A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys.
17 Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained
18 at the Domestic Training Station.
19 Q Where is that located?
20 A That is down in Virginia.
21 Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these
22 raids?
23 A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to
24 understand at this time that we had a great many contract
25 employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

1 Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was
2 conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another
3 entity of the --
4 Q DDO?
5 A DDO.
6 Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about,
7 training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special
8 Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special
9 Operations Group, is that correct?
10 A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably
11 some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic
12 Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I
13 would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would
14 probably staff the training facility with their people who have
15 the expertise in paramilitary operations.
16 Q Now, were the people that were being trained at
17 these facilities basically Cuban refugees?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people
20 were American citizens?
21 A No.
22 Q Or had become American citizens.
23 A I would assume a great many have.
24 Q By this time.
25 A By this time, yes.

1 Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community
2 in Miami? Do you have any idea?
3 A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is
4 probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a
5 military people.
6 Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert
7 action. How do you distinguish between those two categories
8 of activities?
9 A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The
10 paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days
11 we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was
12 media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-
13 type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel
14 seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a
15 Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in
16 the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings
17 that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned
18 in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them
19 because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was
20 -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was
21 forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.
22 We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them
23 hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.
24 He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them
25 in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

1 type of thing.

2 Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

3 A Yes, covert action.

4 Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-

5 type operations?

6 A Yes.

7 Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

8 A Yes.

9 Q What other types of harassment activities did you

10 run that would fall under this covert action category?

11 A Well --

12 Q Would economic warfare be --

13 A That was sort of something separate unto itself.

14 This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a

15 decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

16 Q What special group is that?

17 A It is now called the Forty Committee.

18 Q Is that 302 Committee?

19 A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all,

20 it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then

21 it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between

22 there and now it is the Forty Committee.

23 Q All right. We will return to that a little bit

24 later, but what other types of harassment were you running

25 against Castro --

1 A This is what I was trying to think of.

2 Q -- that would be considered covert action?

3 A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement,
4 media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't
5 remember. I know we had a number of things going against him.
6 We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some
7 extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply,
8 particularly when they were countries that we had treaties
9 with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

10 Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said
11 you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you
12 referring to?

13 A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we
14 were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal
15 activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would
16 phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control
17 regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the
18 Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of
19 Commerce, the Export Control people.

20 I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally
21 U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of
22 thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying
23 to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where
24 we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we
25 or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

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1 executives of these American companies and ask them to tell
2 their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts
3 and the other things that Castro might need. We had the
4 Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S.
5 companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry.
6 We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600
7 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying
8 any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated
9 effort to really isolate them.
10 Q All right. And that is what you were referring to
11 as moral suasion?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Anything else in that category?
14 A Not really. None that I can think of.
15 Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign
16 companies?
17 A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless,
18 the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops
19 to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down
20 flat.
21 Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of
22 supply?
23 A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing
24 program. If there was a single source of supply for a
25 particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

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1 the market.

2 Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

3 A Yes.

4 Q -- domestic market?

5 A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

6 Q In all cases?

7 A The cases that I was associated with, it was all

8 sold abroad.

9 Q What kind of purchases were made?

10 A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased

11 some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

12 Q What?

13 A Bright Stock.

14 Q What is that?

15 A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of

16 her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical

17 commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar,

18 melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this

19 type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So

20 we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for

21 which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually

22 sold in Africa.

23 Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that

24 were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

25 A No.

1 Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any
2 other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of
3 supply to Cuba?
4 A Well, we did provide through third country agents
5 who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce
6 Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had
7 replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.
8 Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?
9 A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all
10 over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact,
11 the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des.
12 and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.
13 Q Mr. Dillon?
14 A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.
15 Q But --
16 A But you must remember that these American --
17 Q Mr. Connors?
18 A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers,
19 well, their places were nationalized and they were only too
20 happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona
21 fide business. These things were transshipped through two
22 or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.
23 Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.
24 A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what
25 we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

1 our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was
2 on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the
3 extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know
4 it was one of the parts of the program.
5 Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are
6 referring to?
7 A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they
8 weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a
9 gray area some place.
10 Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international
11 law, the laws of the United States?
12 A I would have to go back and review the thing. I
13 really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.
14 Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?
15 A I would think probably down in the Records Center some
16 place.
17 Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some
18 time during the lunch hour?
19 A No. It is forty miles away.
20 Q Well, is there some place in the building where
21 you could refresh your memory?
22 A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped.
23 This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material
24 has been retired.
25 Q What category of activity would we be talking about

1 when we refer to extra-legal activities?

2 A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't

3 think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one

4 parts of the program that we were involved in.

5 I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might

6 tell me what that is.

7 Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to

8 come back to that.

9 A All right.

10 Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal

11 activities that were run against Castro?

12 A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are

13 probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran

14 the economic program.

15 Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection

16 with the economic program?

17 A Yes.

18 Q We talked about media placement during this nine-

19 year period. To what are you referring when you refer to

20 media placement?

21 A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our

22 propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers

23 and magazines throughout the world.

24 Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio

25 stations?

1 A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

2 Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines

3 published within the United States?

4 A Not to my knowledge, no.

5 Q These were essentially foreign publications?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community

8 in Miami?

9 A No. The intent was to get world opinion against

10 Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

11 Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those

12 handled?

13 A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

14 Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations

15 were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

16 A No. We only had the one radio station but we did

17 contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

18 Q For broadcasts to what areas?

19 A For broadcasts to Havana.

20 Q And the station in New York, was that received also

21 -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United

22 States?

23 A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a

24 particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it

25 on short-wave or what they did.

1 Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

2 A Reach Cuba.

3 Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to

4 as Swan. Were there others?

5 A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in

6 Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami,

7 I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

8 Q Where was Radio Swan located?

9 A On Swan Island.

10 Q Where is Swan Island?

11 A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

12 Q As far as you can recall, were there any other

13 radio stations in the United States that were utilized to

14 broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

15 A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that

16 I recall right now.

17 Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups

18 affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American

19 public to support those propaganda activities?

20 A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of

21 thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

22 Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were

23 run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

24 A Oh, yes.

25 Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

1 Cuban propaganda?

2 A Not to my knowledge.

3 Q And that would include both the publications and the

4 radio?

5 A Right.

6 Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of

7 moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of

8 economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

9 A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the

10 regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We

11 worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in

12 the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I

13 guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from

14 about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like

15 that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept

16 saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and

17 we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because

18 some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting

19 this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day,

20 this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was

21 lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any

22 place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he

23 could.

24 So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in

25 New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

1 real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

2 It was this type of thing that obviously he was

3 trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any

4 money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't

5 want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of

6 activities.

7 Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S.

8 companies enlisted in that effort?

9 A Oh, yes.

10 Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and

11 businessmen?

12 A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great

13 many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the

14 American community, by American bankers, and obviously they

15 lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the

16 lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this

17 type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it

18 was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

19 Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from

20 these businessmen?

21 A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you

22 know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if

23 we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would

24 happen to the market price. This type of thing.

25 Q They were used as consultants, basically.

1 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

2 Q We have spoken about the investment American business

3 had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American

4 organized crime --

5 A No.

6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in

8 Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

9 Q The casinos were run --

10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force

11 during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this

12 type of thing.

13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

14 A It was a criminal element.

15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

16 A Right.

17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist

18 the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner

19 whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

20 A No.

21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

22 A Oh, yes.

23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either

25 Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

1 of years ago.

2 Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's

3 name?

4 A Yes, as I recall.

5 Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

6 A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

7 Q In connection with --

8 A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

9 Q In connection with the casinos or --

10 A No.

11 Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

12 A No.

13 Q You know of no instance in which organized crime

14 figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

15 A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge

16 of that whatsoever.

17 Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures

18 of that type --

19 A No.

20 Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

21 A No.

22 Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have

23 talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other

24 types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's

25 Cuba?

1 A Well, we used all-source information to find out what
2 his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for
3 instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned
4 by the General Services Administration, finally got back into
5 production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short
6 supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was
7 buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this
8 French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to
9 the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control
10 people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these
11 le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked
12 into the thing and indeed they did.
13 Q Who owned the mine?
14 A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it
15 over.
16 Q I see.
17 A General Services Administration. And it was leased
18 out for operation. But the ownership rested with the
19 Government.
20 So the Treasury simply made the French provide a
21 Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they
22 export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives
23 and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless
24 steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply
25 -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

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1 country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter
2 of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in
3 New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it
4 around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel
5 found other sources and export privileges to the United States
6 were restored.

7 You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise
8 or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that
9 simple.

10 Q Were there any other instances that you can recall
11 of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of
12 American business firms?

13 A I know we were in touch with a great many American
14 business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other
19 instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American
20 business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of
21 any other such instances?

22 A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time
23 with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were
24 powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg
25 people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

1 they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's
2 representatives around the world if they got any orders from
3 the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.
4 We did the same thing with --
5 Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg
6 compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?
7 A No.
8 Q Were they compensated for the loss of business
9 involved in that activity?
10 A No. No.
11 Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from
12 other companies.
13 A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.
14 Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in
15 that manner?
16 A No. Not a one.
17 Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any
18 companies?
19 A No. No.
20 Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought
21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with
22 Cuba?
23 A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with
24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country
25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

1 Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause
2 in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot --
3 foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with
4 the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country.
5 And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried
6 to twist their arm.
7 Q Other than insuring that these companies refused
8 to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were
9 legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did
10 you receive from American business?
11 A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would
12 receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they
13 received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type
14 of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing
15 to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in
16 some instances they might call me and I would just give them
17 a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.
18 Q Any other types of support solicited or received by
19 the Agency from American business?
20 A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one
21 firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know
22 how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of
23 fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough,
24 that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the
25 government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

1 outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-
2 tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.
3 Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --
4 A Yes.
5 Q -- in dealings with these companies?
6 A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even
7 the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.
8 Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started
9 but didn't really discuss that in any depth.
10 What kind of paramilitary operations were run
11 against Cuba by the CIA?
12 A Maritime operations.
13 Q Is that the extent of it?
14 A That is the extent of it.
15 Q Were there any aerial operations?
16 A Not to my knowledge.
17 Q Leaflet drops?
18 A No.
19 Q Bombing?
20 A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as
21 I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.
22 Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Aerial photography, and so forth.
25 A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

1 be requested and that is about it.

2 Q And those were run out of the United States?

3 A Oh, yes.

4 Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-

5 military activity other than maritime operations.

6 A No. I really can't, no.

7 Q Am I correct that those operations were manned

8 by CIA contract employees?

9 A Right.

10 Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

11 A Right.

12 Q And some CIA officers?

13 A Right.

14 Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services,

15 involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

16 A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember

17 that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we

18 probably have people on detail from other -- from the military

19 branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think

20 that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also

21 had people detailed into the Agency.

22 Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime

23 operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the

24 United States and in part outside of the United States. Is

25 that correct?

1 A I would think probably the major portion of it was
2 conducted within the United States.
3 Q The Keys would be considered within the United
4 States.
5 A Oh, yes.
6 Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted
7 outside the United States?
8 A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not
9 to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall
10 but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done
11 domestically.
12 Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within
13 this category of maritime operations?
14 A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating
15 agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage
16 raids. That is about the extent of it.
17 Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it
18 shortly after the Bay of Pigs?
19 A I would -- I think these operations were probably
20 at their height during the period about 1963 through, say,
21 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December
22 1968, something like that.
23 Q Why was the program terminated?
24 A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't provid-
25 ing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were
2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return
3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

5 A Yes.

6 Q What do you mean by that?

7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify
8 him and capture him.

9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that
10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the
11 Forty Committee?

12 A Every operation received a specific approval from
13 the Forty Committee.

14 Q In advance?

15 A In advance.

16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for
17 initiating such an operation?

18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.
19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,
22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have
23 one of these operations and the request would go from here
24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty
25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

1 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say
2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because
3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper
4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these
5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of
6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were
7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military
9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire
10 thing was coordinated.
11 Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations
12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?
13 A No.
14 Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking
15 about?
16 A You are not talking about a very big volume of
17 operations because of the planning that had to go into these
18 things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing
19 they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.
20 Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having
21 run 300 operations.
22 A I have seen that.
23 Q Is that inaccurate?
24 A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He
25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

1 tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one
2 of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother
3 ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to
4 see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore
5 before you go. So he may have considered that all these train-
6 ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-
7 pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.
8 Q Now, from what specific locations were these
9 operations launched?
10 A They were mostly launched from the Keys.
11 Q Any other locations?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
13 Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and
14 run sabotage operations that were conducted?
15 A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against
16 the Texaco refinery.
17 Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?
18 A What used to be the Texaco refinery.
19 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
20 (Discussion off the record.)
21 THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning
22 went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.
23 We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this
24 type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It
25 was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as
2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out
3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type
4 of operation that we did.

5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn
6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we
7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and
8 exfiltrations.

9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

10 A Not to my knowledge.

11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that
13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him
14 back. He wouldn't walk.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out
20 of the Keys other than what you have just described?

21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage
22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained
23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down
24 crank cases. Things of this nature.

25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

1 all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our
2 own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We
3 contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped
4 it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.
5 The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the
6 automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking
7 down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have
8 everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive
9 equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because
10 Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to
11 extend the credit.

12 The railroad system was in total disaster. The
13 Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus
14 the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment
15 because they were used to good American equipment. And these
16 were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

17 Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of
18 any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run
19 from a base in the United States?

20 A No.

21 Q I know there has been some paramilitary training
22 in the United States.

23 A Oh, yes.

24 Q In connection with other operations.

25 A Oh, sure.

1 Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that
2 were actually run out of the United States?
3 A No.
4 Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique
5 situation.
6 A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.
7 Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in
8 Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as
9 the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.
10 A That is right.
11 Q What kind of equipment did these people have?
12 A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe
13 up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers,
14 rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to
15 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were
16 painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but
17 they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun any-
18 thing. They were extremely well armed. We had our under-
19 water demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.
20 Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover
21 in the Miami area?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one
24 firm?
25 A No. Variety.

1 Q Fishing companies?

2 A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine

3 supply. In all, I think during the period that the station

4 and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-

5 official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

6 Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any

7 legitimate commercial activities?

8 A Not to my knowledge, no.

9 Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with

10 firms in that area?

11 A These are probably what we would call devised

12 facilities. They were probably registered with the State of

13 Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one

14 was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of

15 existence and started up a new one.

16 Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running

17 these operations?

18 A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as

19 I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that

20 contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent

21 under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys.

22 Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He

23 came back -- he might come back once a month, or something

24 like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks

25 if he got some time off.

1 Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were
2 actually stationed full-time in the Keys.
3 A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.
4 Q Were there any operations run out of the United
5 States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of
6 sugar or anything of that sort?
7 A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the
8 Puerto Rican thing?
9 A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind.
10 Would you describe that for me?
11 A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of
12 opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar
13 to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to
14 it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or
15 something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.
16 In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the
17 drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and
18 put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came
19 up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was
20 a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to
21 put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it
22 acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the
23 individual, and some of this was done. And then when it
24 leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar
25 firm buy it back from the Soviets.

1 Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

2 A Yes.

3 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

6 BY MR. MANFREDI:

7 Q Are there any other operations in which crops were

8 -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

9 A No. No.

10 Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

11 A In Cuban products?

12 Q Yes.

13 A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in

14 those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel.

15 The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total

16 chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have

17 anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving.

18 There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around

19 with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of

20 experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there.

21 I forget -- several other European and American companies that

22 had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-

23 ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

24 Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to

25 Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

1 on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too
2 high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in
3 Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin
4 and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type
5 of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and
6 this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this
7 type of thing.

8 But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we
9 didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade
10 and cut off his sources of supply.

11 Q When was the Miami Station established?

12 A As a station?

13 Q Yes.

14 A I think in September 1961.

15 Q And that was several years before you became involved
16 in Cuban matters?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature
19 within the United States, Agency facilities?

20 A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

21 Q Yes.

22 A A station as such?

23 Q Yes.

24 A No. You have some communications facilities that
25 you really call stations because here again, they are not

1 directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of
2 overseas communications.
3 Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and
4 Office of Security officers, and so forth.
5 A Right.
6 Q But I am talking about actual stations.
7 A Operating stations, no.
8 Q This is the only such station in the United States
9 as far as you know, is that correct?
10 A Right.
11 Q And was this station established to deal primarily
12 with Cuban activities?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Cuban-related matters?
15 A With Cuba, period.
16 Q Did it have, when it was established, any other
17 responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?
18 A Not to my knowledge.
19 Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?
20 A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other
21 countries in the Hemisphere.
22 Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban
23 activities, what was the size or the number of personnel
24 attached to that Station?
25 A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a
couple

1 couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the
2 Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees,
3 independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was
4 obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its
5 height it had over 500 people in it.
6 Q Full-time Agency people?
7 A No, no.
8 Q Combination of contract and --
9 A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff
10 employee.
11 Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract
12 people?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?
15 A Oh, yes.
16 Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in
17 Miami? Physical facilities.
18 A Well, they were located on the south campus of the
19 University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at
20 the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained
21 unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn
22 well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the
23 Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.
24 Q Official cover?
25 A No. Non-official.

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1 Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

2 A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first
3 one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a
4 President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

5 Q Engaging in any business?

6 A No.

7 Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community,
8 how long could a non-official cover last?

9 A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research
10 activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put
11 one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing,
12 for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

13 Q Yes, I understand.

14 A So it was a research activity and the only people that
15 ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You
16 know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept
17 any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this
18 type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of
19 this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumera-
20 ble other covers with different activities. The guard
21 force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar
22 to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think
23 that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the
24 Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other
25 Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

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1 Q And this particular Station, then, was under the
2 supervision of the group we have been discussing?
3 A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.
4 Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume
5 responsibilities for the Miami Station?
6 A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the
7 Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western
8 Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.
9 Q Is there presently a Miami Station?
10 A Oh, yes.
11 Q And how large is it at the present time?
12 A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the
13 Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present
14 time because we are in one of these periods where we are
15 reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year
16 there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.
17 Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions
18 were being performed by the Miami Station?
19 A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I
20 think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of
21 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this
22 type of thing. Covert action.
23 Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in
24 the deposition?
25 A Yes.

1 Q Which of these activities, if any of them were
2 actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?
3 A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably
4 counterintelligence.
5 Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence
6 activities in the Miami area?
7 A Yes, sir.
8 Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counter-
9 intelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting
10 in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?
11 A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I
12 recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that
13 came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a
14 number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a recep-
15 tion center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation.
16 The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and
17 we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration
18 and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the
19 preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill
20 out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-
21 type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would
22 look at the forms and based on previous experience or what
23 they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they
24 might have some information of intelligence value, they would
25 reinterrogate them.

1 It was in this manner that this gal came to our
2 knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined
3 that obviously she was receiving messages and she was
4 sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance
5 on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and
6 indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock
7 or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found
8 it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that
9 was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved
10 in.
11 Q Were there many activities of that type?
12 A Not really. You have got to remember that the
13 Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large
14 squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, some-
15 thing like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of
16 hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty nega-
17 tive. This was one of the reasons that obviously from --
18 in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts
19 which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting
20 to Case Officers and they would report on things in the
21 community, of people they thought were suspect and this type
22 of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau
23 and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved
24 in CI activity.
25 Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

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1 activities in that area was primarily a function of the over-
2 whelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability
3 to properly staff the thing?
4 A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot
5 of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section
6 of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is
7 known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy
8 the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers
9 from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a
10 relationship there that had gone over a period of years
11 between the Agency and the Bureau.
12 MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.
13 (Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of
14 the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this
15 same day.)
16 - - -
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1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 Thereupon,

3 WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

4 called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA

5 Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:

7 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the

10 Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the

11 largest CIA station in the world?

12 A. The largest CIA station in the world.

13 Q. At its height?

14 A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

15 Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record

16 what the AMOTS were.

17 A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence

18 organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the

19 overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro

20 ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into

21 Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

22 Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism

23 for Security Agency?

24 A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of

25 Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

1 Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

2 A. Cuban exiles.

3 Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

4 A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures

5 but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

6 Q. Go ahead.

7 A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

8 Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the

9 three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

10 A. No.

11 Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami

12 Station?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

15 A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were --

16 they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed

17 by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin

18 American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another

19 smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under

20 another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it

21 was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly

22 owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted,

23 incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

24 Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly,

25 were paid by the CIA?

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1 A. That is right.

2 Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

3 Q. Oh, yes.

4 A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made

5 up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to

8 debriefings?

9 A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles

10 or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their

11 time here had acquired new information.

12 Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings

13 conducted?

14 A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa

15 Loca.

16 Q. That is the Air Base?

17 A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the

18 reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

19

20 Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had

21 a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into

22 small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them

23 down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any

24 interference and this type of thing.

25 Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

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1 A. You mean in terms of years?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from
4 about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course --
5 we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out
6 and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off
7 about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

8 Q. I see.

9 A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just
10 terminated that part of the activity.

11 Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came
12 in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other
13 intelligence gathering functions --

14 A. No.

15 Q. In the community?

16 A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I
17 would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could
18 have been used to debrief people within the community, within
19 the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these
20 people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an
21 On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he
22 had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people
23 were directly under his control. Though the organization as it
24 was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing,
25 but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

1 Of course, if these people went out and did something on
2 their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously.
3 You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or
4 ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they
5 leave, we don't know what they are up to.
6 Q. Did they have CIA credentials?
7 A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this
8 commercial cover.
9 Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these
10 people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing
11 capacity, I should say?
12 A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a
13 standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence
14 interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions,
15 morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when
16 these people were debriefed and the debriefer wrote up the
17 report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station.
18 If the debriefing report contained something of positive
19 intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the
20 Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot
21 down some additional requirements and ask that that person be
22 recontacted and asked specific questions.
23 Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this
24 smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?
25 A. This was their prime purpose.

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1 Q. How large was that particular group?

2 A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside,

3 I think there were about five debriefers with the support people

4 which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative

5 types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15

6 in that group, if there were that many.

7 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

8 (Off the record discussion)

9 BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

10 Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS

11 could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in

12 resettling Cuban emigres?

13 A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

14 Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

15 A. Health, Education and Welfare.

16 Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

17 A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole

18 airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when

19 you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the

20 Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were

21 processed through the Center and then they had a place down on

22 Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of

23 course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to

24 stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and

25 care for them in Freedom House.

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Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. For each Cuban refugee?

3 A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I
4 recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget,
5 we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens
6 of thousands, I would think.

7 Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files
8 which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

9 A. No way.

10 Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determina-
11 tion?

12 A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can
13 become nationalized out in California and your record of
14 nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for
15 two years. That is how far they are behind.

16 Q. So I take it --

17 A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean,
18 there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

19 Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the
20 CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who
21 are now American citizens?

22 A. Absolutely true.

23 Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain
24 derogatory information about the individuals involved?

25 A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

1 course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from
2 anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a
3 Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people
4 as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask
5 that all the information on that individual be assembled so that
6 we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know,
7 everything right down the line. In case of some of the more
8 important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared
9 where we had enough information. But this is one of the things
10 these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the
11 first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would
12 start looking through the papers or anything else to come up
13 with anything they could on what the guy's current activities
14 are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.
15 Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence
16 service of Cuba?
17 A. Right.
18 Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function
19 in addition to recruitment of agents?
20 A. Right.
21 Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence,
22 gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the
23 traditional skills, is that correct?
24 A. That is about right.
25 Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

1 purposes other than recruitment?
2 A. Well --
3 Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these
4 files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible
5 internal security problem?
6 A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We
7 would simply task them with through your sources what do you
8 have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we
9 wanted the information on anybody.
10 Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several
11 million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to
12 make generalizations about the kind of information that is in
13 those files?
14 A. Well, that is right.
15 Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask
16 you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of
17 these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as deroga-
18 tory information?
19 A. I would assume so.
20 Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects
21 of those files may now be American citizens?
22 A. Right.
23 Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to
24 study that particular situation?
25 A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

1 You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel,
2 whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their
3 names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these
4 are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards
5 were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them
6 at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with
7 what the machine system had to see if there was updated informa-
8 tion in the machine system that would show that this guy had
9 become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --
10 Q. Excuse me, off the record.
11 (Off the record discussion)
12 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.
13 BY MR. MANFREDI:
14 Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind
15 where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are
16 presently here in Washington?
17 A. The cards and what is left of the files.
18 Q. That is the soft cover files?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And --
21 A. I assume they are either here or down at the
22 Records Center.
23 Q. And where is the computer system?
24 A. You mean our machine system? We have --
25 Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

1 information on the cards?

2 A. Right down on the third floor.

3 Q. That is not the hydro system?

4 A. Oh, no, no.

5 Q. This is a separate --

6 A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division

7 uses this particular system.

8 Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

9 The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I thought they were going out in June.

12 A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

13 Q. I see.

14 A. But they have all been let go. They were let go --

15 they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to

16 go find a job.

17 Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in

18 Miami at this time?

19 A. no.

20 Q. So there are no records in Miami?

21 A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

22 Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities

23 in the Miami community?

24 A. No. No.

25 Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

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1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that

3 was not doing debriefings?

4 A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would

5 send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere

6 to train some of the local services in those countries. They

7 served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in

8 listening posts where we had audio --

9 Q. Foreign listening posts?

10 A. Oh, yes, foreign.

11 Q. Any domestic listening posts?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

14 A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall

15 don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but

16 to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance

17 conducted by them.

18 Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record,

19 I don't know where it could be.

20 Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they

21 conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

22 A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban

23 community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-

24 Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

25 and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

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1 agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies
2 up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the
3 Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess
4 about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they
5 started to tighten up.
6 I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing
7 alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when
8 there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these
9 militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked
10 up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau,
11 this type of thing.
12 Q. These people were arrested?
13 A. Oh, yes.
14 Q. Prosecuted?
15 A. Not really.
16 Q. Any of them American citizens?
17 A. Not to my knowledge.
18 Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?
19 A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they
20 are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't
21 know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on
22 so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here.
23 He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever
24 served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted
25 but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

1 I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went
2 to jaul or not.
3 Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-
4 Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS
5 engage in?
6 A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence --
7 I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest
8 at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.
9 Q. Cubans were?
10 A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well
11 on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and
12 young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't
13 -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to
14 identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.
15 Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?
16 A. With the Bureau, yes.
17 Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were
18 in a better position to do it?
19 A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big
20 factor.
21 Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation
24 in the community?
25 A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

1 Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin require
2 ments on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently
3 because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in
4 what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular
5 operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans
6 were doing, then we would task our people with that.

7 For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into
8 Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then
9 there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was.
10 But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the
11 boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when
12 it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As
13 a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200
14 Cuban troops.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Off the record discussion)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q. Were the communications they were intercepting
20 exclusively foreign communications?

21 A. Exclusively foreign communications.

22 Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus
23 of which was the United States?

24 A. No.

25 Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS

3 has been prepared by one of your members.

4 A. That is right.

5 Q. What is his name?

6 A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last

7 name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have

8 to get that for you.

9 Q. What is the title of the study?

10 A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical

11 series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The

12 AMOT Organization."

13 Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

14 A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What

15 we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside

16 what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things

17 the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-

18 wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. At intervening periods of time.

21 Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

22 A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

23 Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

1 activities of the AMOTS?

2 A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using

3 this gent..

4 Q. First started using what?

5 A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

6 Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activi-

7 ties?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try

12 and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

15 (Off the record discussion)

16 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you

18 this. There have been some allegations in the press that

19 prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents

20 of the CIA.

21 Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join

22 us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the

23 Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things

24 had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

25 the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

1 published materials that he was the person who was in charge of
2 organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which
3 would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall
4 where that was?

5 A. That could be quite true.

6 Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire
7 files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particu-
8 larly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts
9 between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

12 A. There is no relationship.

13 Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of
14 the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any
15 nature with Frank Sturgis?

16 A. To my knowledge that is true.

17 Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your
18 testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

19 A. Extremely emphatic.

20 Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that
21 he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

22 A. Exactly.

23 Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity
24 of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

25 A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

1 Q. YOu mean a source of --

2 A. Source of information of another agent. Another

3 agency agent.

4 Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

5 A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but

6 it is entirely possible that that could have happened without

7 being a matter of record.

8 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance what-

9 ever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any

10 kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

11 A. To my knowledge, nothing.

12 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence

13 whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or

14 indirectly by the Agency?

15 A. To my knowledge, no.

16 Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer

17 to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that

18 you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the

19 basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

20 A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

21 Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with

22 the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all,

23 can you tell us when that began in 1963?

24 A. When the Special Activities Group --

25 Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

1 Group began?

2 A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

3 Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of

4 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been

5 involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United

6 States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being

7 sponsored by the Agency?

8 A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to

11 have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro

12 factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the

13 CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these

14 fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency

15 or the U.S. Government.

16 Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear

17 to be otherwise?

18 A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this

19 type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that

20 it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface

21 itself.

22 Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr.

23 Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be

24 involved in the CIA organizations?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami
2 area?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere
5 in the United States? I am asking now particularly with
6 reference to New Orleans.
7 A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am
8 really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was
9 sort of a sideshow to Miami.
10 Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the
11 same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded
12 by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?
13 A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had
14 the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for
15 subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through
16 New Orleans.
17 Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean
18 by that?
19 A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we
20 were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of
21 income for them to continue what they were doing. A great
22 number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select
23 people were -- well, they were selected and then they were
24 talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or
25 whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

1 to get the funding through to the organizations.

2 These people were normally prominent people and --

3 Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through

4 the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

5 A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend

6 of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity

7 and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this

8 type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and

9 the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend

10 you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is

11 the way the funding went into the fronts.

12 Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people

13 in New Orleans?

14 A. I would think so. I believe so.

15 Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom

16 that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be

17 involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

18 A. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with

20 the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance

21 to Cubans or Cuban groups?

22 A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had

23 a great many people that did this.

24 Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

25 funding source?

1 A. This I do not know either.

2 Q. Pardon?

3 A. This I don't know.

4 BY MR. MANFREDI:

5 Q. Where would that information be available?

6 A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was

7 down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

8 Q. Is he in the building?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is his name?

11 A. Bill Kent.

12 Q. Bill Kent'

13 A. Yes.

14 BY MR. OLSEN:

15 Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

16 A. He is still with the DDO.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

19 A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I

20 think Career Management Group Staff.

21 Q. Is he officed near you?

22 A. No. He is down in the basement.

23 BY MR. OLSEN:

24 Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

25 that were used to provide funds to the --

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any

5 of them in New Orleans?

6 A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took

7 llace in New Orleans.

8 Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary

9 for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

10 A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

11 Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago

12 but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

13 I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963

14 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern

15 United States, talked about and believed that they were involved

16 in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

17 A. That is right.

18 Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression

19 that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in

20 the southern United States about plans or prospects for the

21 assassination of Fidel Castro?

22 A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have

23 got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost

24 their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

25 blamed it all on one man.

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with

3 Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries

4 engaged --

5 A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

6 Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Never met him?

9 A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

10 Q. You would not have known anything about his where-

11 abouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

12 A. Can we go off the record?

13 (Off the record discussion.)

14 THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

15 BY MR. OLSEN:

16 Q. I would like to have it on the record.

17 A. Do you have a particular day?

18 Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with

19 Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on

20 any particular day.

21 A. No.

22 Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

23 A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing,

24 but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

25 Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

1 day to the next where he was?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf

4 of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

7 A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent

8 one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't

9 too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the

10 time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which

11 showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

12 Q. Was this just fairly recently?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr.

15 Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the

16 Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave

17 during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but

18 that the records were not available as to how much sick leave

19 or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

20 A. Well --

21 Q. Am I mistaken?

22 A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a

23 sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day.

24 I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer.

25 He is the chap that got that for me.

1 Q. Can you check that for us?

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. And give us the results of that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Because this is much more detailed information than

6 I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the

7 Agency.

8 A. All right. I will do that.

9 BY MR. MANFREDI:

10 Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

11 A. Let me have a piece of paper.

12 Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which

13 is 351-5106.

14 THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

15 BY MR. MANFREDI:

16 Q. That is the day.

17 A. 1963.

18 Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation

19 made?

20 A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I

21 don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether --

22 I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

23 Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the

24 inquiry?

25 A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

1 Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

2 A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt

3 who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of

4 European Division.

5 Q. When was that inquiry received?

6 A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

7 BY MR. OLSEN:

8 Q. About the first time these photographs began to be

9 circulated?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. About the bums in Dallas?

12 A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry

13 came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was

14 Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently

15 made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

16 Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm

17 Magazine?

18 A. That is right.

19 Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with

20 the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that

21 Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

22 A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way

23 I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who

24 have the contact with the Office of Finance.

25 Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long

3 I think probably I saved you some time.

4 We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte

5 rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough

6 to be fair.

7 Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w

8 some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

11 A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the

12 relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t

13 Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff

14 members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for

15 the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

16 Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

17 A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relation

18 ship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relation-

19 ship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha

20 might come to the attention of the press involving true names

21 and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any

22 particular time.

23 Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami

24 for propaganda purposes?

25 A. No. No.

1 Q Would you know if that were the case?

2 A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was
3 a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these
4 people as well as they were assigint us.

5 Q What assistance would you render for members of
6 the press in Miami?

7 A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor
8 we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of
9 areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations
10 would give him background briefings and this type of thing
11 on the developments within a given country.

12 Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

13 A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami
14 Herald received probably a little more attention than the
15 other papers, principally because it was a large paper and
16 their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout
17 the Hemisphere.

18 Q Was he also used as a source?

19 A No.

20 Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive
21 similar briefings?

22 A Yes.

23 Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time
24 about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these
25 organizations?

1 A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were
2 principally interested in the leadership of the organizations.
3 Once the organization was established and the leadership took
4 over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess,
5 getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.
6 Q What were their functions, the fronts?
7 A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic
8 thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a
9 political organization in exile.
10 Q Did they conduct any operations?
11 A No, not that I know of.
12 Q Just like a political party?
13 A Like a political party.
14 Q How many of these fronts were there?
15 A There were several of them. I really don't remember
16 the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary
17 Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one.
18 And there were some others.
19 Q The RDF?
20 A FRD.
21 Q I see.
22 A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the
23 Democratic Revolutionary Front.
24 Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?
25 A I would think not. I really don't know.

mbh 3

1 Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

2 A No. There was but there isn't any more. There

3 hasn't been one there for years.

4 Q When was it disbanded?

5 A I think the station was established around 1958

6 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it

7 went out of existence in 1958.

8 Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

9 A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

10 Q Do you know what function it was performing?

11 A (Nods in negative.)

12 Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked

13 in the Cuban community for the CIA?

14 A He worked with these fronts, too.

15 Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the

16 community?

17 A Intelligence functions. Well --

18 Q Was he collecting information?

19 A Sure. If he got information that he thought was

20 worthwhile he would pass it on.

21 Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three

22 or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

23 A Yes. He was a contract employee.

24 Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such

25 contract employees?

1 A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard,
2 or they were at that time. But here again, you always have
3 ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to
4 be surfaced.
5 Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in
6 the business of collecting intelligence information in the
7 Cuban communities in Miami.
8 A Right.
9 Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can
10 you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that
11 we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?
12 A No, not really. No.
13 Q I think you previously described them for me as the
14 eyes and ears into the Cuban community.
15 A Right.
16 Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami
17 which was their headquarters, did they not?
18 A Exactly.
19 Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to super-
20 vise that facility.
21 A Yes.
22 Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?
23 A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go
24 out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't
25 they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

mbh 5

Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

1 Beach where any convention activities were to take place,
2 employees of catering services, limosine service, employees
3 in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It
4 is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it.
5 Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.
6 Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested
7 all foreign nationals?
8 A All foreign nationals.
9 Q Was there any check made to determine whether
10 any of them were American citizens?
11 A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement
12 that they have identified these people by nationality before
13 we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time
14 they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens
15 which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could
16 not trace.
17 Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and
18 1972?
19 A That is right.
20 Q And where were these names traced?
21 A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The
22 Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check
23 here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had
24 more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.
25 Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

1 A Through Agency files.

2 Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI

3 on this as well?

4 A Oh, yes.

5 Q And in effect,they were getting an all-Agency name

6 check --

7 A Right.

8 Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

9 A Yes.

10 Q -- to a candidate?

11 A Well, they were just trying to determine who might

12 be a security threat.

13 Q That is right. Potential threat.

14 A Yes.

15 Q For what political parties -- strike that.

16 In 1968 was this service provided for both political

17 conventions?

18 A Both political conventions.

19 Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

20 A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held

21 there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

22 Q These requests did come from the Secret Service

23 rather than --

24 A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director

25 of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

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1 support.

2 Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to

3 that tracing activity?

4 A I have all the names that have been traced.

5 Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there

8 any reason those records have been maintained?

9 A Well, because we were told to maintain them when

10 the Watergate thing broke.

11 Q I see.

12 A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

13 Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various

14 places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban

15 groups?

16 A I was not aware of it until I was told of it.

17 I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on

18 the part of these people or whether they were instructed to

19 do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

20 Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets

21 were located?

22 A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another

23 place. I forget where it was.

24 Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these

25 persons were Cubans?

SECRET

1 A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history
2 that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying
3 to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized
4 this,which I fully doubt.
5 Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?
6 A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony
7 Sforza.
8 Q Is he still alive?
9 A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know
10 whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the
11 AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with
12 Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.
13 Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.
14 What kind of an investigation have you conducted?
15 A I have talked to people, which is really all you
16 can do. There is no other way you can do it.
17 Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone,
18 authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify
19 any of the persons who participated in the picketing?
20 A No.
21 Q With what frequency did this activity occur?
22 A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.
23 Q This was in New York City?
24 A New York City and Miami.
25 Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

1 the AMOTS engaged in?

2 A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

3 Q Any political activity.

4 Do you know of any other activities that they have

5 conducted within this country, they or any of their members

6 have conducted within this country that we have not already

7 discussed this afternoon?

8 A No.

9 Q Any political activities? Any operations?

10 A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain

11 select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban

12 defectors. In other words, live with them until they are

13 resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity

14 they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of any-

15 thing else.

16 Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have

17 been attribited to --

18 A I have heard of some allegations which have never

19 been proven.

20 Q What are the allegations?

21 A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances

22 and this type of thing.

23 Q Have those allegations been made with any fre-

24 quency?

25 A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

1 Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out
2 and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we
3 made file checks and this type of thing. One particular
4 activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller
5 Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of
6 context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise.
7 These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York
8 and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan
9 -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were
10 supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some
11 of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a
12 memory exercise.

13 Q With what frequency were those kinds of training
14 exercises conducted?

15 A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt
16 that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained
17 in trade craft.

18 Q And did their trade craft training include such
19 things as surveillance?

20 A Sure.

21 Q And break-ins?

22 A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I
23 said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinter-
24 preted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they
25 could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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1 said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell
2 me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it?
3 This is just for observation.
4 Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have
5 been proven. Have any of them been proved to your
6 satisfaction?
7 A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.
8 Q I take it you do not believe they took place other
9 than the training exercise?
10 A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.
11 Q Do you know of any instances where members of that
12 group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry
13 in this country?
14 A No.
15 Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of
16 the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the
17 Miami Station within this country?
18 A Legality? No.
19 Q How about the propriety?
20 A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up.
21 No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or
22 the propriety of having the Station.
23 Q There have been some allegations in the press and
24 elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of
25 that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

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1 A No.

2 Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some

3 articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of

4 a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various

5 operations in this country.

6 A You mean this country?

7 Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some

8 other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge

9 of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type

10 of operation within this country?

11 A No.

12 Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided

13 any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

14 A No. Not to my knowledge.

15 Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

16 A No.

17 Q Establishment of businesses?

18 A No.

19 Q No?

20 A No.

21 Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed

22 the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups,

23 revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre,

24 Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported

25 by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

1 A Not to my knowledge.

2 Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached

3 to Mr. Colby?s statement?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

6 A You mean the Miami Station thing?

7 Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

8 A Yes.

9 Q You wrote it?

10 A Yes.

11 Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references

12 to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are

13 there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

14 A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you

15 want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize

16 the hell-out of Juanita Castro.

17 Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

18 A You are familiar with all that and that is by the

19 board now, too.

20 Q She was doing --

21 A Propaganda.

22 Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

23 A Yes.

24 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of

25 intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

1 area now by the Miami Station?

2 A There are no domestic activities at all in the

3 Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back

4 here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely

5 and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

6 Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon --

7 does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban

8 situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

9 A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have

10 a career agent who has been with us for a good many years

11 in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans

12 who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S.

13 who have relatives in Cuba.

14 Now, this is done principally with the idea of a

15 recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this

16 type of thing. He does contact these people all over the

17 United States. If we come across an individual that looks like

18 he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him,

19 we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we

20 find out where relatives and these types of people are, we

21 will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact

22 these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or what-

23 ever.

24 Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this

25 country, as access agents.

bh 16

1 A Right.

2 Q Just like foreign associates would do.

3 A Exactly.

4 Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who

5 are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the

6 Miami-Cuban community?

7 A No. None.

8 Q That entire apparatus has been --

9 A Has been dismantled.

10 Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the

11 Miami Station?

12 A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14,

13 as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal

14 year.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out

20 of Miami?

21 A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of

22 Headquarters.

23 Q And even from the Headquarters location there are

24 no paramilitary operations?

25 A No.

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1 Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity
2 being conducted still?
3 A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility
4 that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated
5 by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated
6 now.
7 Q The Miami Station is under official cover.
8 A Yes.
9 Q And it has been decreased to how many people?
10 A Between 11 and 14.
11 Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with
12 respect to Cuba?
13 A Absolutely none.
14 Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to
15 other Latin American countries?
16 A To Caribbean countries.
17 Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are
18 other Agency stations in the Caribbean?
19 A Yes.
20 Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts.
21 If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome
22 to do so.
23 A No, I have nothing.
24 Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the
25 Commission for your cooperation.

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1 A Sure.

2 Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

3 A That is all right.

4 Q Thank you again.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the

6 deposition was concluded.)

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/31/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10215

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DEPOSITION OF (A CIA EMPLOYEE)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/16/1975
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SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
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CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CUBAN EXILES
FITZGERALD, DESMOND
STURGIS, FRANK
HUNT, E. HOWARD
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
ORGANIZED CRIME
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
STURBITTS, WILLIAM
GIANCANA, SAM

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Thereupon,

3 WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

4 called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA

5 Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows:

7 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

8 BY MR. MANFREDI:

9 Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the

10 record?

11 A William C. Sturbitts.

12 Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some

13 weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and

14 Waiver"?

15 A Right.

16 Q You understand that document is still in effect?

17 A Sure.

18 Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

19 A You mean the Agency or --

20 Q That is right.

21 A Central Intelligence Agency.

22 Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

23 A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for

24 Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

25 Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

1 your employment with the Agency?

2 A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence

3 Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special

4 detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans,

5 which is now the Directorate of Operations.

6 Q What year were you put on that detail?

7 A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

8 Q And what did that detail involve?

9 A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

10 Q And how long were you on that detail?

11 A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

12 Q Between 1964 and 1973?

13 A (Nods in affirmative.)

14 Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

15 A Yes, January.

16 Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Were you stationed in Washington?

19 A Yes.

20 Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected

23 with the operations of the Miami Station?

24 A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide.

25 I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

1 Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

2 Q Run out of --

3 A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones

4 were run out of Europe.

5 Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect

6 to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the

7 operations of the Miami base?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

10 A Yes, sir.

11 Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban

12 operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami

13 Station?

14 A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he

15 was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know

16 it. Well, I will come back to that.

17 Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

18 Q What years was he Chief?

19 A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He

20 left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's

21 say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline.

22 He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

23 Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which

24 you were assigned for the 9-year period?

25 A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

1 Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald.
2 And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations
3 Group.
4 Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was
5 it attached to one of the area divisions?
6 A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing
7 called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And
8 that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome,
9 and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff.
10 It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the
11 Deputy Director, Plans.
12 Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?
13 A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it
14 was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.
15 Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the
16 Bay of Pigs?
17 A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around --
18 in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in
19 September, something like that, 1961.
20 Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities
21 Staff?
22 A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the
23 Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went
24 back into the Western Hemisphere Division.
25 Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

1 A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around
2 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then
3 later DDP.
4 Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr.
5 Harvey held after he left Task Force W?
6 A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.
7 Q And is he still with the Agency?
8 A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.
9 Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?
10 A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives.
11 He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm.
12 Harvey is a lawyer.
13 Q Indianapolis area?
14 A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest,
15 Indiana.
16 Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force
17 W?
18 A It was the overall Cuban operations.
19 Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station estab-
20 lished?
21 A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down
22 there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.
23 Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?
24 A Oh, yes.
25 Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

1 Station running any operations against Cuba?

2 A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

3 Q Yes.

4 A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a

5 forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type

6 thing.

7 Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was

8 established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban

9 operations?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami

12 Station?

13 A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

14 Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special

15 Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

16 A Right, except that at the present time the Station

17 has no Cuban operations.

18 Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations termi-

19 nated?

20 A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down

21 there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was

22 in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

23 Q And have those operations been terminated entirely

24 or are they now run out of the Washington area?

25 A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

1 There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

2 Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of

3 the Washington area?

4 A Right.

5 Q Is that correct?

6 A Right. Worldwide.

7 Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may

8 have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassina-

9 tion attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination

10 attempts that have been mounted --

11 A Right.

12 Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your

13 activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such

14 attempts?

15 A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say

16 attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too

17 strong a word.

18 Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of

19 any such discussions?

20 A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions,

21 I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald

22 in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put

23 it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on

24 with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as

25 I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

1 a telescopic sight.

2 Q Who wanted them?

3 A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think

4 at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going

5 on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another

6 reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald

7 met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representa-

8 tive of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

9 I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that

10 we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing

11 them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

12 Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

13 You said there were 19 volumes of documents with

14 respect to this.

15 A 19 files, manila.

16 Q All having to do with possible assassination?

17 A All having to do with this whole time period and --

18 can we go off the record for a minute?

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 BY MR. MANFREDI:

21 Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you

22 had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr.

23 Fitzgerald?

24 A I simply overheard it, that is right.

25 Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

1 heard?

2 A A fellow named Néstor Sanchez.

3 Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

4 A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other

5 people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time,

6 in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace

7 and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations

8 took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of

9 thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody

10 was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

11 Q This was in Paris?

12 A Yes.

13 Q I see.

14 Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

15 A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff.

16 He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with

17 Cuban military-type.

18 Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received

19 instructions with respect to this activity from another

20 component of the Government?

21 A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether

22 they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty

23 positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision.

24 And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was

25 overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

1 part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided,
2 he did a number of things.
3 Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall
4 in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of
5 Fidel Castro was discussed?
6 A No, not really.
7 Q You referred to this as the first occasion.
8 A This is the first --
9 Q Was there a second?
10 A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it
11 discussed.
12 Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently
13 underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation
14 -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came
15 to your attention after this discussion in the garden in
16 Paris?
17 A The only other thing that came to my attention was
18 that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight
19 that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know,
20 but that is what I was told.
21 Q When did you learn that?
22 A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964,
23 around February, something like that.
24 Q Off the record.
25 (Discussion off the record.)

1 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

2 BY MR. MANFREDI:

3 Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by

4 the name of Frank Sturgis?

5 A Indeed.

6 Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in

7 the press?

8 A No. It is what is contained in the files.

9 Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files,

10 particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division,

11 in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any

12 connection with the Agency?

13 A I have.

14 Q What were the results of that search?

15 A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

16 Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about

17 an employment relationship?

18 A That is what I am speaking of.

19 Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of

20 the Agency?

21 A No.

22 Q Was he ever a contract employee?

23 A No.

24 Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

25 A No.

1 Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the
2 Agency?
3 A Not to my knowledge.
4 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
5 pated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against
6 Cuba?
7 A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this
8 Agency.
9 Q How did you learn of those operations?
10 A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.
11 Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?
12 A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the
13 thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop
14 over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and
15 by the Bureau office in Miami.
16 Q Do you know who financed his activities?
17 A I have no idea.
18 Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were
19 indirectly financed by the Agency through --
20 A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of
21 fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself
22 with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me
23 to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't
24 destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."
25 Q Off the record.

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

3 BY MR. MANFREDI:

4 Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr.

5 Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

6 A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

7 Q And what is the volume of that material?

8 A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee

9 called for them the other day after the article in the paper,

10 I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and

11 they returned them Monday afternoon.

12 Q Do you know who examined those files?

13 A No, I don't.

14 Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts

15 the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

16 A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits

17 of so-called information.

18 Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged

19 narcotics traffic?

20 A Recently it has been.

21 Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office

22 in Miami?

23 A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami

24 to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the

25 FBI.

1 Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an
2 established contact?
3 A No manner.
4 Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to
5 collect information from Mr. Sturgis?
6 A I can't speak to that but the records that we have
7 don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact
8 somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file
9 on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin
10 American Division before they did anything since we do hold
11 the file.
12 Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?
13 A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any
14 information relating to an individual appearing in the press
15 as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.
16 Q Personnel or personality file?
17 A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.
18 Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection
19 or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?
20 A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know
21 each other. They have to know each other from their days
22 in Cuba.
23 Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever partici-
24 pated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?
25 A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

1 activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during
2 your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during
3 your 9-year tenure with those groups.
4 A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board
5 intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign
6 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary
7 activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about
8 the breadth of the thing.
9 Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?
10 A Right.
11 Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary
12 operations. Were these operations run out of southern
13 Florida?
14 A Right.
15 Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?
16 A Yes.
17 Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of
18 the country that participated in these activities?
19 A Not to my knowledge.
20 Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami
21 that were used in these activities?
22 A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As
23 I said, we did have a Key West base.
24 Q Were there any other bases in that area of the
25 country that were utilized in these operations?

1 A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have
2 training facilities for the UDT teams.
3 Q What is a UDT team?
4 A Underwater demolition.
5 Q Where were those bases located?
6 A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys,
7 along that long peninsula going down there. There were a
8 number of sites. I really can't recall them.
9 Q Were there any other sites within the United States
10 in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people
11 participating in these activities?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
13 Q Where were these people trained?
14 A What do you mean?
15 Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.
16 A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys.
17 Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained
18 at the Domestic Training Station.
19 Q Where is that located?
20 A That is down in Virginia.
21 Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these
22 raids?
23 A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to
24 understand at this time that we had a great many contract
25 employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

1 Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was
2 conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another
3 entity of the --
4 Q DDO?
5 A DDO.
6 Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about,
7 training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special
8 Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special
9 Operations Group, is that correct?
10 A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably
11 some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic
12 Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I
13 would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would
14 probably staff the training facility with their people who have
15 the expertise in paramilitary operations.
16 Q Now, were the people that were being trained at
17 these facilities basically Cuban refugees?
18 A Yes.
19 Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people
20 were American citizens?
21 A No.
22 Q Or had become American citizens.
23 A I would assume a great many have.
24 Q By this time.
25 A By this time, yes.

1 Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community
2 in Miami? Do you have any idea?
3 A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is
4 probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a
5 military people.
6 Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert
7 action. How do you distinguish between those two categories
8 of activities?
9 A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The
10 paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days
11 we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was
12 media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-
13 type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel
14 seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a
15 Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in
16 the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings
17 that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned
18 in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them
19 because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was
20 -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was
21 forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.
22 We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them
23 hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.
24 He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them
25 in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

1 type of thing.

2 Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

3 A Yes, covert action.

4 Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-

5 type operations?

6 A Yes.

7 Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

8 A Yes.

9 Q What other types of harassment activities did you

10 run that would fall under this covert action category?

11 A Well --

12 Q Would economic warfare be --

13 A That was sort of something separate unto itself.

14 This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a

15 decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

16 Q What special group is that?

17 A It is now called the Forty Committee.

18 Q Is that 302 Committee?

19 A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all,

20 it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then

21 it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between

22 there and now it is the Forty Committee.

23 Q All right. We will return to that a little bit

24 later, but what other types of harassment were you running

25 against Castro --

1 A This is what I was trying to think of.
2 Q -- that would be considered covert action?
3 A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement,
4 media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't
5 remember. I know we had a number of things going against him.
6 We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some
7 extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply,
8 particularly when they were countries that we had treaties
9 with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.
10 Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said
11 you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you
12 referring to?
13 A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we
14 were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal
15 activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would
16 phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control
17 regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the
18 Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of
19 Commerce, the Export Control people.
20 I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally
21 U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of
22 thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying
23 to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where
24 we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we
25 or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

1 executives of these American companies and ask them to tell
2 their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts
3 and the other things that Castro might need. We had the
4 Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S.
5 companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry.
6 We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600
7 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying
8 any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated
9 effort to really isolate them.

10 Q All right. And that is what you were referring to
11 as moral suasion?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Anything else in that category?

14 A Not really. None that I can think of.

15 Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign
16 companies?

17 A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless,
18 the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops
19 to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down
20 flat.

21 Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of
22 supply?

23 A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing
24 program. If there was a single source of supply for a
25 particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

1 the market.

2 Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

3 A Yes.

4 Q -- domestic market?

5 A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

6 Q In all cases?

7 A The cases that I was associated with, it was all

8 sold abroad.

9 Q What kind of purchases were made?

10 A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased

11 some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

12 Q What?

13 A Bright Stock.

14 Q What is that?

15 A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of

16 her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical

17 commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar,

18 melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this

19 type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So

20 we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for

21 which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually

22 sold in Africa.

23 Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that

24 were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

25 A No.

1 Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any
2 other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of
3 supply to Cuba?
4 A Well, we did provide through third country agents
5 who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce
6 Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had
7 replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.
8 Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?
9 A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all
10 over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact,
11 the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des.
12 and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.
13 Q Mr. Dillon?
14 A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.
15 Q But --
16 A But you must remember that these American --
17 Q Mr. Connors?
18 A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers,
19 well, their places were nationalized and they were only too
20 happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona
21 fide business. These things were transshipped through two
22 or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.
23 Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.
24 A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what
25 we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

1 our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was
2 on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the
3 extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know
4 it was one of the parts of the program.
5 Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are
6 referring to?
7 A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they
8 weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a
9 gray area some place.
10 Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international
11 law, the laws of the United States?
12 A I would have to go back and review the thing. I
13 really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.
14 Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?
15 A I would think probably down in the Records Center some
16 place.
17 Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some
18 time during the lunch hour?
19 A No. It is forty miles away.
20 Q Well, is there some place in the building where
21 you could refresh your memory?
22 A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped.
23 This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material
24 has been retired.
25 Q What category of activity would we be talking about

1 when we refer to extra-legal activities?

2 A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't

3 think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one

4 parts of the program that we were involved in.

5 I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might

6 tell me what that is.

7 Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to

8 come back to that.

9 A All right.

10 Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal

11 activities that were run against Castro?

12 A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are

13 probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran

14 the economic program.

15 Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection

16 with the economic program?

17 A Yes.

18 Q We talked about media placement during this nine-

19 year period. To what are you referring when you refer to

20 media placement?

21 A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our

22 propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers

23 and magazines throughout the world.

24 Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio

25 stations?

1 A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

2 Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines

3 published within the United States?

4 A Not to my knowledge, no.

5 Q These were essentially foreign publications?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community

8 in Miami?

9 A No. The intent was to get world opinion against

10 Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

11 Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those

12 handled?

13 A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

14 Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations

15 were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

16 A No. We only had the one radio station but we did

17 contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

18 Q For broadcasts to what areas?

19 A For broadcasts to Havana.

20 Q And the station in New York, was that received also

21 -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United

22 States?

23 A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a

24 particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it

25 on short-wave or what they did.

1 Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

2 A Reach Cuba.

3 Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to

4 as Swan. Were there others?

5 A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in

6 Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami,

7 I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

8 Q Where was Radio Swan located?

9 A On Swan Island.

10 Q Where is Swan Island?

11 A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

12 Q As far as you can recall, were there any other

13 radio stations in the United States that were utilized to

14 broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

15 A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that

16 I recall right now.

17 Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups

18 affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American

19 public to support those propaganda activities?

20 A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of

21 thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

22 Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were

23 run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

24 A Oh, yes.

25 Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

1 Cuban propaganda?

2 A Not to my knowledge.

3 Q And that would include both the publications and the

4 radio?

5 A Right.

6 Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of

7 moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of

8 economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

9 A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the

10 regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We

11 worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in

12 the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I

13 guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from

14 about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like

15 that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept

16 saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and

17 we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because

18 some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting

19 this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day,

20 this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was

21 lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any

22 place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he

23 could.

24 So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in

25 New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

1 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

2 Q We have spoken about the investment American business

3 had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American

4 organized crime --

5 A No.

6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in

8 Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

9 Q The casinos were run --

10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force

11 during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this

12 type of thing.

13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

14 A It was a criminal element.

15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

16 A Right.

17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist

18 the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner

19 whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

20 A No.

21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

22 A Oh, yes.

23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either

25 Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

1 of years ago.

2 Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's

3 name?

4 A Yes, as I recall.

5 Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

6 A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

7 Q In connection with --

8 A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

9 Q In connection with the casinos or --

10 A No.

11 Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

12 A No.

13 Q You know of no instance in which organized crime

14 figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

15 A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge

16 of that whatsoever.

17 Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures

18 of that type --

19 A No.

20 Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

21 A No.

22 Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have

23 talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other

24 types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's

25 Cuba?

1 A Well, we used all-source information to find out what
2 his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for
3 instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned
4 by the General Services Administration, finally got back into
5 production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short
6 supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was
7 buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this
8 French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to
9 the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control
10 people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these
11 le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked
12 into the thing and indeed they did.

13 Q Who owned the mine?

14 A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it
15 over.

16 Q I see.

17 A General Services Administration. And it was leased
18 out for operation. But the ownership rested with the
19 Government.

20 So the Treasury simply made the French provide a
21 Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they
22 export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives
23 and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless
24 steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply
25 -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

1 country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter
2 of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in
3 New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it
4 around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel
5 found other sources and export privileges to the United States
6 were restored.

7 You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise
8 or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that
9 simple.

10 Q Were there any other instances that you can recall
11 of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of
12 American business firms?

13 A I know we were in touch with a great many American
14 business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other
19 instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American
20 business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of
21 any other such instances?

22 A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time
23 with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were
24 powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg
25 people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

1 they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's
2 representatives around the world if they got any orders from
3 the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.
4 We did the same thing with --
5 Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg
6 compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?
7 A No.
8 Q Were they compensated for the loss of business
9 involved in that activity?
10 A No. No.
11 Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from
12 other companies.
13 A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.
14 Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in
15 that manner?
16 A No. Not a one.
17 Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any
18 companies?
19 A No. No.
20 Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought
21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with
22 Cuba?
23 A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with
24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country
25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

1 Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause
2 in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot --
3 foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with
4 the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country.
5 And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried
6 to twist their arm.
7 Q Other than insuring that these companies refused
8 to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were
9 legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did
10 you receive from American business?
11 A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would
12 receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they
13 received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type
14 of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing
15 to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in
16 some instances they might call me and I would just give them
17 a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.
18 Q Any other types of support solicited or received by
19 the Agency from American business?
20 A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one
21 firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know
22 how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of
23 fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough,
24 that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the
25 government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

1 outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-
2 tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.
3 Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --
4 A Yes.
5 Q -- in dealings with these companies?
6 A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even
7 the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.
8 Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started
9 but didn't really discuss that in any depth.
10 What kind of paramilitary operations were run
11 against Cuba by the CIA?
12 A Maritime operations.
13 Q Is that the extent of it?
14 A That is the extent of it.
15 Q Were there any aerial operations?
16 A Not to my knowledge.
17 Q Leaflet drops?
18 A No.
19 Q Bombing?
20 A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as
21 I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.
22 Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Aerial photography, and so forth.
25 A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

1 be requested and that is about it.

2 Q And those were run out of the United States?

3 A Oh, yes.

4 Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-

5 military activity other than maritime operations.

6 A No. I really can't, no.

7 Q Am I correct that those operations were manned

8 by CIA contract employees?

9 A Right.

10 Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

11 A Right.

12 Q And some CIA officers?

13 A Right.

14 Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services,

15 involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

16 A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember

17 that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we

18 probably have people on detail from other -- from the military

19 branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think

20 that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also

21 had people detailed into the Agency.

22 Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime

23 operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the

24 United States and in part outside of the United States. Is

25 that correct?

1 A I would think probably the major portion of it was
2 conducted within the United States.
3 Q The Keys would be considered within the United
4 States.
5 A Oh, yes.
6 Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted
7 outside the United States?
8 A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not
9 to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall
10 but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done
11 domestically.
12 Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within
13 this category of maritime operations?
14 A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating
15 agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage
16 raids. That is about the extent of it.
17 Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it
18 shortly after the Bay of Pigs?
19 A I would -- I think these operations were probably
20 at their height during the period about 1963 through, say,
21 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December
22 1968, something like that.
23 Q Why was the program terminated?
24 A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't provid-
25 ing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were
2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return
3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.
4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.
5 A Yes.
6 Q What do you mean by that?
7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify
8 him and capture him.
9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that
10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the
11 Forty Committee?
12 A Every operation received a specific approval from
13 the Forty Committee.
14 Q In advance?
15 A In advance.
16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for
17 initiating such an operation?
18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.
19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.
20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.
21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,
22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have
23 one of these operations and the request would go from here
24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty
25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

1 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say
2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because
3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper
4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these
5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of
6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were
7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military
9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire
10 thing was coordinated.
11 Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations
12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?
13 A No.
14 Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking
15 about?
16 A You are not talking about a very big volume of
17 operations because of the planning that had to go into these
18 things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing
19 they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.
20 Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having
21 run 300 operations.
22 A I have seen that.
23 Q Is that inaccurate?
24 A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He
25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

1 tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one
2 of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother
3 ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to
4 see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore
5 before you go. So he may have considered that all these train-
6 ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-
7 pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.
8 Q Now, from what specific locations were these
9 operations launched?
10 A They were mostly launched from the Keys.
11 Q Any other locations?
12 A Not to my knowledge.
13 Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and
14 run sabotage operations that were conducted?
15 A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against
16 the Texaco refinery.
17 Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?
18 A What used to be the Texaco refinery.
19 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
20 (Discussion off the record.)
21 THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning
22 went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.
23 We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this
24 type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It
25 was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as
2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out
3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type
4 of operation that we did.

5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn
6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we
7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and
8 exfiltrations.

9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

10 A Not to my knowledge.

11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that
13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him
14 back. He wouldn't walk.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out
20 of the Keys other than what you have just described?

21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage
22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained
23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down
24 crank cases. Things of this nature.

25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

1 Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that
2 were actually run out of the United States?
3 A No.
4 Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique
5 situation.
6 A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.
7 Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in
8 Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as
9 the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.
10 A That is right.
11 Q What kind of equipment did these people have?
12 A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe
13 up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers,
14 rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to
15 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were
16 painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but
17 they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun any-
18 thing. They were extremely well armed. We had our under-
19 water demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.
20 Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover
21 in the Miami area?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one
24 firm?
25 A No. Variety.

1 Q Fishing companies?

2 A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine
3 supply. In all, I think during the period that the station
4 and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-
5 official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

6 Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any
7 legitimate commercial activities?

8 A Not to my knowledge, no.

9 Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with
10 firms in that area?

11 A These are probably what we would call devised
12 facilities. They were probably registered with the State of
13 Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one
14 was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of
15 existence and started up a new one.

16 Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running
17 these operations?

18 A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as
19 I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that
20 contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent
21 under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys.
22 Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He
23 came back -- he might come back once a month, or something
24 like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks
25 if he got some time off.

1 Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were
2 actually stationed full-time in the Keys.
3 A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.
4 Q Were there any operations run out of the United
5 States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of
6 sugar or anything of that sort?
7 A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the
8 Puerto Rican thing?
9 A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind.
10 Would you describe that for me?
11 A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of
12 opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar
13 to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to
14 it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or
15 something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.
16 In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the
17 drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and
18 put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came
19 up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was
20 a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to
21 put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it
22 acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the
23 individual, and some of this was done. And then when it
24 leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar
25 firm buy it back from the Soviets.

1 Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

2 A Yes.

3 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

6 BY MR. MANFREDI:

7 Q Are there any other operations in which crops were

8 -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

9 A No. No.

10 Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

11 A In Cuban products?

12 Q Yes.

13 A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in

14 those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel.

15 The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total

16 chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have

17 anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving.

18 There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around

19 with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of

20 experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there.

21 I forget -- several other European and American companies that

22 had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-

23 ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

24 Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to

25 Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

1 on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too
2 high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in
3 Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin
4 and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type
5 of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and
6 this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this
7 type of thing.
8 But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we
9 didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade
10 and cut off his sources of supply.
11 Q When was the Miami Station established?
12 A As a station?
13 Q Yes.
14 A I think in September 1961.
15 Q And that was several years before you became involved
16 in Cuban matters?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature
19 within the United States, Agency facilities?
20 A You mean, targeted against the opposition?
21 Q Yes.
22 A A station as such?
23 Q Yes.
24 A No. You have some communications facilities that
25 you really call stations because here again, they are not

1 directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of
2 overseas communications.
3 Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and
4 Office of Security officers, and so forth.
5 A Right.
6 Q But I am talking about actual stations.
7 A Operating stations, no.
8 Q This is the only such station in the United States
9 as far as you know, is that correct?
10 A Right.
11 Q And was this station established to deal primarily
12 with Cuban activities?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Cuban-related matters?
15 A With Cuba, period.
16 Q Did it have, when it was established, any other
17 responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?
18 A Not to my knowledge.
19 Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?
20 A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other
21 countries in the Hemisphere.
22 Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban
23 activities, what was the size or the number of personnel
24 attached to that Station?
25 A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a
couple

1 couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the
2 Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees,
3 independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was
4 obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its
5 height it had over 500 people in it.
6 Q Full-time Agency people?
7 A No, no.
8 Q Combination of contract and --
9 A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff
10 employee.
11 Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract
12 people?
13 A Yes.
14 Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?
15 A Oh, yes.
16 Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in
17 Miami? Physical facilities.
18 A Well, they were located on the south campus of the
19 University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at
20 the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained
21 unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn
22 well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the
23 Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.
24 Q Official cover?
25 A No. Non-official.

Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

1 Q And this particular Station, then, was under the
2 supervision of the group we have been discussing?
3 A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.
4 Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume
5 responsibilities for the Miami Station?
6 A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the
7 Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western
8 Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.
9 Q Is there presently a Miami Station?
10 A Oh, yes.
11 Q And how large is it at the present time?
12 A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the
13 Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present
14 time because we are in one of these periods where we are
15 reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year
16 there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.
17 Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions
18 were being performed by the Miami Station?
19 A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I
20 think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of
21 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this
22 type of thing. Covert action.
23 Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in
24 the deposition?
25 A Yes.

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counter-intelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

1 It was in this manner that this gal came to our
2 knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined
3 that obviously she was receiving messages and she was
4 sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance
5 on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and
6 indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock
7 or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found
8 it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that
9 was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved
10 in.

11 Q Were there many activities of that type?

12 A Not really. You have got to remember that the
13 Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large
14 squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, some-
15 thing like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of
16 hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty nega-
17 tive. This was one of the reasons that obviously from --
18 in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts
19 which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting
20 to Case Officers and they would report on things in the
21 community, of people they thought were suspect and this type
22 of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau
23 and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved
24 in CI activity.

25 Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

1 activities in that area was primarily a function of the over-
2 whelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability
3 to properly staff the thing?
4 A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot
5 of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section
6 of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is
7 known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy
8 the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers
9 from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a
10 relationship there that had gone over a period of years
11 between the Agency and the Bureau.
12 MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.
13 (Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of
14 the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this
15 same day.)
16 - - -
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AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

1 Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

2 A. Cuban exiles.

3 Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

4 A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures

5 but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

6 Q. Go ahead.

7 A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

8 Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the

9 three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

10 A. No.

11 Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami

12 Station?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

15 A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were --

16 they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed

17 by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin

18 American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another

19 smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under

20 another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it

21 was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly

22 owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted,

23 incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

24 Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly,

25 were paid by the CIA?

1 A. That is right.

2 Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

3 Q. Oh, yes.

4 A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made

5 up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to

8 debriefings?

9 A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles

10 or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their

11 time here had acquired new information.

12 Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings

13 conducted?

14 A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa

15 Loca.

16 Q. That is the Air Base?

17 A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the

18 reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

19

20 Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had

21 a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into

22 small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them

23 down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any

24 interference and this type of thing.

25 Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

1 A. You mean in terms of years?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from
4 about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course --
5 we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out
6 and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off
7 about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

8 Q. I see.

9 A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just
10 terminated that part of the activity.

11 Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came
12 in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other
13 intelligence gathering functions --

14 A. No.

15 Q. In the community?

16 A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I
17 would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could
18 have been used to debrief people within the community, within
19 the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these
20 people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an
21 On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he
22 had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people
23 were directly under his control. Though the organization as it
24 was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing,
25 but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

1 Of course, if these people went out and did something on
2 their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously.
3 You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or
4 ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they
5 leave, we don't know what they are up to.

6 Q Did they have CIA credentials?

7 A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this
8 commercial cover.

9 Q Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these
10 people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing
11 capacity, I should say?

12 A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a
13 standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence
14 interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions,
15 morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when
16 these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the
17 report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station.
18 If the debriefing report contained something of positive
19 intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the
20 Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot
21 down some additional requirements and ask that that person be
22 recontacted and asked specific questions.

23 Q Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this
24 smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

25 A. This was their prime purpose.

1 Q. How large was that particular group?

2 A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside,
3 I think there were about five debriefers with the support people
4 which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative
5 types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15
6 in that group, if there were that many.

7 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

8 (Off the record discussion)

9 BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

10 Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS
11 could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in
12 resettling Cuban emigres?

13 A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

14 Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

15 A. Health, Education and Welfare.

16 Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

17 A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole
18 airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when
19 you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the
20 Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were
21 processed through the Center and then they had a place down on
22 Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of
23 course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to
24 stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and
25 care for them in Freedom House.

1 Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them
2 to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the
3 relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do
4 with that whatsoever.
5 Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the
6 two groups, what was the name of that group again?
7 A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.
8 Q. We can call them LASER for short?
9 A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated
10 the two groups was for security because we had one group housed
11 over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we
12 couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so
13 that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some
14 cover.
15 Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged
16 in?
17 A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection
18 of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals
19 inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every
20 refugee that came through the reception center. They provided --
21 they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a
22 monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.
23 The information these people collected as opposed to the
24 information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That
25 came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. For each Cuban refugee?

3 A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I
4 recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget,
5 we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens
6 of thousands, I would think.

7 Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files
8 which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

9 A. No way.

10 Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determina-
11 tion?

12 A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can
13 become nationalized out in California and your record of
14 nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for
15 two years. That is how far they are behind.

16 Q. So I take it --

17 A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean,
18 there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

19 Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the
20 CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who
21 are now American citizens?

22 A. Absolutely true.

23 Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain
24 derogatory information about the individuals involved?

25 A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

1 course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from
2 anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a
3 Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people
4 as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask
5 that all the information on that individual be assembled so that
6 we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know,
7 everything right down the line. In case of some of the more
8 important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared
9 where we had enough information. But this is one of the things
10 these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the
11 first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would
12 start looking through the papers or anything else to come up
13 with anything they could on what the guy's current activities
14 are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.
15 Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence
16 service of Cuba?
17 A. Right.
18 Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function
19 in addition to recruitment of agents?
20 A. Right.
21 Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence,
22 gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the
23 traditional skills, is that correct?
24 A. That is about right.
25 Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

1 purposes other than recruitment?

2 A. Well --

3 Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these

4 files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible

5 internal security problem?

6 A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We

7 would simply task them with through your sources what do you

8 have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we

9 wanted the information on anybody.

10 Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several

11 million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to

12 make generalizations about the kind of information that is in

13 those files?

14 A. Well, that is right.

15 Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask

16 you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of

17 these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as deroga-

18 tory information?

19 A. I would assume so.

20 Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects

21 of those files may now be American citizens?

22 A. Right.

23 Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to

24 study that particular situation?

25 A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

1 You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel,
2 whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their
3 names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these
4 are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards
5 were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them
6 at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with
7 what the machine system had to see if there was updated informa-
8 tion in the machine system that would show that this guy had
9 become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --
10 Q. Excuse me, off the record.
11 (Off the record discussion)
12 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.
13 BY MR. MANFREDI:
14 Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind
15 where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are
16 presently here in Washington?
17 A. The cards and what is left of the files.
18 Q. That is the soft cover files?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And --
21 A. I assume they are either here or down at the
22 Records Center.
23 Q. And where is the computer system?
24 A. You mean our machine system? We have --
25 Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

1 information on the cards?

2 A. Right down on the third floor.

3 Q. That is not the hydro system?

4 A. Oh, no, no.

5 Q. This is a separate --

6 A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division

7 uses this particular system.

8 Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

9 The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

10 A. No.

11 Q. I thought they were going out in June.

12 A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

13 Q. I see.

14 A. But they have all been let go. They were let go --

15 they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to

16 go find a job.

17 Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in

18 Miami at this time?

19 A. no.

20 Q. So there are no records in Miami?

21 A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

22 Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities

23 in the Miami community?

24 A. No. No.

25 Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that

3 was not doing debriefings?

4 A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would

5 send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere

6 to train some of the local services in those countries. They

7 served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in

8 listening posts where we had audio --

9 Q. Foreign listening posts?

10 A. Oh, yes, foreign.

11 Q. Any domestic listening posts?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

14 A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall

15 don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but

16 to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance

17 conducted by them.

18 Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record,

19 I don't know where it could be.

20 Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they

21 conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

22 A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban

23 community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-

24 Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

25 and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

1 I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went
2 to jaul or not.
3 Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-
4 Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS
5 engage in?
6 A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence --
7 I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest
8 at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.
9 Q. Cubans were?
10 A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well
11 on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and
12 young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't
13 -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to
14 identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.
15 Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?
16 A. With the Bureau, yes.
17 Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were
18 in a better position to do it?
19 A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big
20 factor.
21 Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation
24 in the community?
25 A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

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1 would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did
2 come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the
3 Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens
4 to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know
5 the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as
6 well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

7 Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities
8 were they engaging in?

9 A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in
10 electronic intercept.

11 Q. Where was that done?

12 A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

13 Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What ere they intercepting?

16 A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the
17 commo. for the infiltration.

18 As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made
19 available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with
20 the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications
21 nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another
22 important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards,
23 sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior
24 network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage
25 is dictated by NSA.

WARD & PAUL

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1 Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin require
2 ments on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently
3 because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in
4 what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular
5 operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans
6 were doing, then we would task our people with that.
7 For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into
8 Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then
9 there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was.
10 But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the
11 boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when
12 it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As
13 a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200
14 Cuban troops.
15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.
16 (Off the record discussion)
17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.
18 BY MR. MANFREDI:
19 Q. Were the communications they were intercepting
20 exclusively foreign communications?
21 A. Exclusively foreign communications.
22 Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus
23 of which was the United States?
24 A. No.
25 Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS

3 has been prepared by one of your members.

4 A. That is right.

5 Q. What is his name?

6 A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last

7 name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have

8 to get that for you.

9 Q. What is the title of the study?

10 A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical

11 series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The

12 AMOT Organization."

13 Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

14 A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What

15 we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside

16 what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things

17 the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-

18 wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. At intervening periods of time.

21 Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

22 A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

23 Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

1 activities of the AMOTS?

2 A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using

3 this gent..

4 Q. First started using what?

5 A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

6 Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activi-

7 ties?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try

12 and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

15 (Off the record discussion)

16 MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you

18 this. There have been some allegations in the press that

19 prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents

20 of the CIA.

21 Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join

22 us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the

23 Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things

24 had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

25 the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

1 A. No.

2 Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during

3 the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in

6 connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the

7 period of 1959 to '61?

8 A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert

9 Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

10 Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in

11 this country?

12 A. No. Cuban people abroad.

13 Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the

14 Bay of Pigs?

15 A. I would have to review the record to really answer

16 that. I don't know.

17 Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami

18 area?

19 A. He commuted quite a bit.

20 Q. Between Washington and --

21 A. Washington and Miami.

22 Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early

23 '61?

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

SECRET

1 published materials that he was the person who was in charge of
2 organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which
3 would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall
4 where that was?
5 A. That could be quite true.
6 Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire
7 files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particu-
8 larly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts
9 between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Or Frank Fiorini?
12 A. There is no relationship.
13 Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of
14 the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any
15 nature with Frank Sturgis?
16 A. To my knowledge that is true.
17 Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your
18 testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?
19 A. Extremely emphatic.
20 Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that
21 he was never a contract agent of the Agency?
22 A. Exactly.
23 Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity
24 of being an informer or informant to the Agency?
25 A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

1 Q. YOu mean a source of --

2 A. Source of information of another agent. Another

3 agency agent.

4 Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

5 A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but

6 it is entirely possible that that could have happened without

7 being a matter of record.

8 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance what-

9 ever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any

10 kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

11 A. To my knowledge, nothing.

12 Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence

13 whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or

14 indirectly by the Agency?

15 A. To my knowledge, no.

16 Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer

17 to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that

18 you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the

19 basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

20 A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

21 Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with

22 the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all,

23 can you tell us when that began in 1963?

24 A. When the Special Activities Group --

25 Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

1 Group began?

2 A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

3 Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of

4 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been

5 involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United

6 States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being

7 sponsored by the Agency?

8 A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to

11 have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro

12 factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the

13 CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these

14 fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency

15 or the U.S. Government.

16 Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear

17 to be otherwise?

18 A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this

19 type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that

20 it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface

21 itself.

22 Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr.

23 Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be

24 involved in the CIA organizations?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami
2 area?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere
5 in the United States? I am asking now particularly with
6 reference to New Orleans.
7 A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am
8 really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was
9 sort of a sideshow to Miami.
10 Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the
11 same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded
12 by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?
13 A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had
14 the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for
15 subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through
16 New Orleans.
17 Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean
18 by that?
19 A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we
20 were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of
21 income for them to continue what they were doing. A great
22 number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select
23 people were -- well, they were selected and then they were
24 talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or
25 whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

1 to get the funding through to the organizations.

2 These people were normally prominent people and --

3 Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through

4 the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

5 A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend

6 of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity

7 and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this

8 type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and

9 the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend

10 you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is

11 the way the funding went into the fronts.

12 Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people

13 in New Orleans?

14 A. I would think so. I believe so.

15 Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom

16 that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be

17 involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

18 A. Not to my knowledge.

19 Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with

20 the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance

21 to Cubans or Cuban groups?

22 A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had

23 a great many people that did this.

24 Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

25 funding source?

1 A. This I do not know either.

2 Q. Pardon?

3 A. This I don't know.

4 BY MR. MANFREDI:

5 Q. Where would that information be available?

6 A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was

7 down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

8 Q. Is he in the building?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. What is his name?

11 A. Bill Kent.

12 Q. Bill Kent'

13 A. Yes.

14 BY MR. OLSEN:

15 Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

16 A. He is still with the DDO.

17 BY MR. MANFREDI:

18 Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

19 A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I

20 think Career Management Group Staff.

21 Q. Is he officed near you?

22 A. No. He is down in the basement.

23 BY MR. OLSEN:

24 Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

25 that were used to provide funds to the --

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any

5 of them in New Orleans?

6 A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took

7 llace in New Orleans.

8 Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary

9 for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

10 A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

11 Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago

12 but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

13 I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963

14 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern

15 United States, talked about and believed that they were involved

16 in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

17 A. That is right.

18 Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression

19 that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in

20 the southern United States about plans or prospects for the

21 assassination of Fidel Castro?

22 A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have

23 got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost

24 their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

25 blamed it all on one man.

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with

3 Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries

4 engaged --

5 A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

6 Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Never met him?

9 A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

10 Q. You would not have known anything about his where-

11 abouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

12 A. Can we go off the record?

13 (Off the record discussion.)

14 THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

15 BY MR. OLSEN:

16 Q. I would like to have it on the record.

17 A. Do you have a particular day?

18 Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with

19 Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on

20 any particular day.

21 A. No.

22 Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

23 A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing,

24 but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

25 Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

1 day to the next where he was?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf

4 of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

7 A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent

8 one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't

9 too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the

10 time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which

11 showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

12 Q. Was this just fairly recently?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr.

15 Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the

16 Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave

17 during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but

18 that the records were not available as to how much sick leave

19 or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

20 A. Well --

21 Q. Am I mistaken?

22 A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a

23 sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day.

24 I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer.

25 He is the chap that got that for me.

1 Q. Can you check that for us?

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. And give us the results of that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Because this is much more detailed information than

6 I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the

7 Agency.

8 A. All right. I will do that.

9 BY MR. MANFREDI:

10 Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

11 A. Let me have a piece of paper.

12 Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which

13 is 351-5106.

14 THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

15 BY MR. MANFREDI:

16 Q. That is the day.

17 A. 1963.

18 Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation

19 made?

20 A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I

21 don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether --

22 I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

23 Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the

24 inquiry?

25 A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

1 Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

2 A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt

3 who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of

4 European Division.

5 Q. When was that inquiry received?

6 A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

7 BY MR. OLSEN:

8 Q. About the first time these photographs began to be

9 circulated?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. About the bums in Dallas?

12 A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry

13 came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was

14 Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently

15 made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

16 Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm

17 Magazine?

18 A. That is right.

19 Q. And did I understand you to say that in checking with

20 the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that

21 Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

22 A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way

23 I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who

24 have the contact with the Office of Finance.

25 Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

1 A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick

2 leave, and then on duty status the following day.

3 BY MR. MANFREDI:

4 Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's

5 previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

6 A. (Nods in negative)

7 BY MR. OLSEN:

8 Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that

9 records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

10 A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

11 Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday

12 or on the next day, Saturday?

13 A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the

14 22nd was a Friday.

15 Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief

16 memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting

17 documents you can find?

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

20 I think that covers the subject matter.

21 MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want.

22 Can you think of anything else?

23 MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

24 MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

25 (Off the record discussion)

1 BY MR. MANFREDI:

2 Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long

3 I think probably I saved you some time.

4 We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte

5 rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough

6 to be fair.

7 Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w

8 some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

11 A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the

12 relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t

13 Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff

14 members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for

15 the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

16 Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

17 A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relation

18 ship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relation-

19 ship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha

20 might come to the attention of the press involving true names

21 and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any

22 particular time.

23 Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami

24 for propaganda purposes?

25 A. No. No.

1 Q Would you know if that were the case?

2 A . No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was
3 a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these
4 people as well as they were assigint us.

5 Q What assistance would you render for members of
6 the press in Miami?

7 A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor
8 we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of
9 areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations
10 would give him background briefings and this type of thing
11 on the developments within a given country.

12 Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

13 A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami
14 Herald received probably a little more attention than the
15 other papers, principally because it was a large paper and
16 their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout
17 the Hemisphere.

18 Q Was he also used as a source?

19 A No.

20 Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive
21 similar briefings?

22 A Yes.

23 Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time
24 about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these
25 organizations?

1 A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were
2 principally interested in the leadership of the organizations.
3 Once the organization was established and the leadership took
4 over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess,
5 getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.
6 Q What were their functions, the fronts?
7 A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic
8 thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a
9 political organization in exile.
10 Q Did they conduct any operations?
11 A No, not that I know of.
12 Q Just like a political party?
13 A Like a political party.
14 Q How many of these fronts were there?
15 A There were several of them. I really don't remember
16 the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary
17 Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one.
18 And there were some others.
19 Q The RDF?
20 A FRD.
21 Q I see.
22 A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the
23 Democratic Revolutionary Front.
24 Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?
25 A I would think not. I really don't know.

1 Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

2 A No. There was but there isn't any more. There

3 hasn't been one there for years.

4 Q When was it disbanded?

5 A I think the station was established around 1958

6 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it

7 went out of existence in 1958.

8 Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

9 A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

10 Q Do you know what function it was performing?

11 A (Nods in negative.)

12 Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked

13 in the Cuban community for the CIA?

14 A He worked with these fronts, too.

15 Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the

16 community?

17 A Intelligence functions. Well --

18 Q Was he collecting information?

19 A Sure. If he got information that he thought was

20 worthwhile he would pass it on.

21 Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three

22 or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

23 A Yes. He was a contract employee.

24 Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such

25 contract employees?

1 A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard,
2 or they were at that time. But here again, you always have
3 ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to
4 be surfaced.
5 Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in
6 the business of collecting intelligence information in the
7 Cuban communities in Miami.
8 A Right.
9 Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can
10 you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that
11 we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?
12 A No, not really. No.
13 Q I think you previously described them for me as the
14 eyes and ears into the Cuban community.
15 A Right.
16 Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami
17 which was their headquarters, did they not?
18 A Exactly.
19 Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to super-
20 vise that facility.
21 A Yes.
22 Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?
23 A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go
24 out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't
25 they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

mbh 5

1 Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

2 A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

3 Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept

4 for NSA?

5 A Yes. The only reason we use two different names

6 is that in each of these things in those days we had to have

7 a project which had to be renewed every year to get the

8 funding.

9 Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

10 A Synonymous.

11 Q -- are cryptonyms?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

14 A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt

15 somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a

16 crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened

17 at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

18 Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for

19 assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the

20 political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly

21 describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by

22 the Agency to the Secret Service?

23 A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted

24 name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted

25 traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

1 Beach where any convention activities were to take place,
2 employees of catering services, limosine service, employees
3 in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It
4 is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it.
5 Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.
6 Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested
7 all foreign nationals?
8 A All foreign nationals.
9 Q Was there any check made to determine whether
10 any of them were American citizens?
11 A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement
12 that they have identified these people by nationality before
13 we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time
14 they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens
15 which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could
16 not trace.
17 Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and
18 1972?
19 A That is right.
20 Q And where were these names traced?
21 A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The
22 Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check
23 here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had
24 more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.
25 Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

1 A Through Agency files.

2 Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI

3 on this as well?

4 A Oh, yes.

5 Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name

6 check --

7 A Right.

8 Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

9 A Yes.

10 Q -- to a candidate?

11 A Well, they were just trying to determine who might

12 be a security threat.

13 Q That is right. Potential threat.

14 A Yes.

15 Q For what political parties -- strike that.

16 In 1968 was this service provided for both political

17 conventions?

18 A Both political conventions.

19 Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

20 A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held

21 there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

22 Q These requests did come from the Secret Service

23 rather than --

24 A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director

25 of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

1 support.

2 Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to

3 that tracing activity?

4 A I have all the names that have been traced.

5 Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there

8 any reason those records have been maintained?

9 A Well, because we were told to maintain them when

10 the Watergate thing broke.

11 Q I see.

12 A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

13 Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various

14 places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban

15 groups?

16 A I was not aware of it until I was told of it.

17 I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on

18 the part of these people or whether they were instructed to

19 do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

20 Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets

21 were located?

22 A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another

23 place. I forget where it was.

24 Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these

25 persons were Cubans?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history
2 that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying
3 to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized
4 this,which I fully doubt.
5 Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?
6 A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony
7 Sforza.
8 Q Is he still alive?
9 A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know
10 whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the
11 AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with
12 Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.
13 Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.
14 What kind of an investigation have you conducted?
15 A I have talked to people, which is really all you
16 can do. There is no other way you can do it.
17 Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone,
18 authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify
19 any of the persons who participated in the picketing?
20 A No.
21 Q With what frequency did this activity occur?
22 A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.
23 Q This was in New York City?
24 A New York City and Miami.
25 Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

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1 the AMOTS engaged in?

2 A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

3 Q Any political activity.

4 Do you know of any other activities that they have

5 conducted within this country, they or any of their members

6 have conducted within this country that we have not already

7 discussed this afternoon?

8 A No.

9 Q Any political activities? Any operations?

10 A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain

11 select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban

12 defectors. In other words, live with them until they are

13 resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity

14 they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of any-

15 thing else.

16 Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have

17 been attribited to --

18 A I have heard of some allegations which have never

19 been proven.

20 Q What are the allegations?

21 A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances

22 and this type of thing.

23 Q Have those allegations been made with any fre-

24 quency?

25 A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

1 Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out
2 and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we
3 made file checks and this type of thing. One particular
4 activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller
5 Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of
6 context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise.
7 These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York
8 and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan
9 -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were
10 supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some
11 of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a
12 memory exercise.
13 Q With what frequency were those kinds of training
14 exercises conducted?
15 A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt
16 that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained
17 in trade craft.
18 Q And did their trade craft training include such
19 things as surveillance?
20 A Sure.
21 Q And break-ins?
22 A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I
23 said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinter-
24 preted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they
25 could have walked into your office, your outer office and

1 said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell
2 me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it?
3 This is just for observation.

4 Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have
5 been proven. Have any of them been proved to your
6 satisfaction?

7 A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

8 Q I take it you do not believe they took place other
9 than the training exercise?

10 A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

11 Q Do you know of any instances where members of that
12 group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry
13 in this country?

14 A No.

15 Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of
16 the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the
17 Miami Station within this country?

18 A Legality? No.

19 Q How about the propriety?

20 A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up.
21 No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or
22 the propriety of having the Station.

23 Q There have been some allegations in the press and
24 elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of
25 that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

bh 13

1 A No.

2 Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some

3 articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of

4 a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various

5 operations in this country.

6 A You mean this country?

7 Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some

8 other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge

9 of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type

10 of operation within this country?

11 A No.

12 Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided

13 any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

14 A No. Not to my knowledge.

15 Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

16 A No.

17 Q Establishment of businesses?

18 A No.

19 Q No?

20 A No.

21 Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed

22 the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups,

23 revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre,

24 Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported

25 by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

1 A Not to my knowledge.
2 Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached
3 to Mr. Colby?s statement?
4 A Yes.
5 Q Did you have some role in drafting that?
6 A You mean the Miami Station thing?
7 Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".
8 A Yes.
9 Q You wrote it?
10 A Yes.
11 Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references
12 to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are
13 there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?
14 A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you
15 want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize
16 the hell out of Juanita Castro.
17 Q Yes, I am familiar with that.
18 A You are familiar with all that and that is by the
19 board now, too.
20 Q She was doing --
21 A Propaganda.
22 Q -- propaganda broadcasts.
23 A Yes.
24 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of
25 intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

bh 15

1 area now by the Miami Station?

2 A There are no domestic activities at all in the

3 Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back

4 here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely

5 and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

6 Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon --

7 does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban

8 situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

9 A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have

10 a career agent who has been with us for a good many years

11 in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans

12 who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S.

13 who have relatives in Cuba.

14 Now, this is done principally with the idea of a

15 recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this

16 type of thing. He does contact these people all over the

17 United States. If we come across an individual that looks like

18 he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him,

19 we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we

20 find out where relatives and these types of people are, we

21 will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact

22 these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or what-

23 ever.

24 Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this

25 country, as access agents.

bh 16

1 A Right.

2 Q Just like foreign associates would do.

3 A Exactly.

4 Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who

5 are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the

6 Miami-Cuban community?

7 A No. None.

8 Q That entire apparatus has been --

9 A Has been dismantled.

10 Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the

11 Miami Station?

12 A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14,

13 as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal

14 year.

15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

18 BY MR. MANFREDI:

19 Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out

20 of Miami?

21 A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of

22 Headquarters.

23 Q And even from the Headquarters location there are

24 no paramilitary operations?

25 A No.

1 Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity
2 being conducted still?
3 A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility
4 that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated
5 by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated
6 now.
7 Q The Miami Station is under official cover.
8 A Yes.
9 Q And it has been decreased to how many people?
10 A Between 11 and 14.
11 Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with
12 respect to Cuba?
13 A Absolutely none.
14 Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to
15 other Latin American countries?
16 A To Caribbean countries.
17 Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are
18 other Agency stations in the Caribbean?
19 A Yes.
20 Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts.
21 If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome
22 to do so.
23 A No, I have nothing.
24 Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the
25 Commission for your cooperation.

SECRET

1 A Sure.

2 Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

3 A That is all right.

4 Q Thank you again.

5 (Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the

6 deposition was concluded.)

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